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My understanding, and please correct me if I'm wrong, is that by June 1944 the Typhoon was being used almost exclusively as a bomber /or ground attack plane. This is why they didn't score many victories from that time onward. The Tempest was probably tangling with and maybe shooting down Me 262s and Fw 190D's and other exotic baddassery of the Luftwaffe, but I don't think the Typhoon was.
I also believe most of the Luftwaffe war effort by 1945, such as it was, was actually 1) on the Russian Front where they were facing La-7s, Yak-3s and Yak 9s, and 2) against the heavy bombers and their escorts at high altitude, which would by that time in daylight be P-51s for the most part, right?
I agree. It's not the most pertinent statistic I can think of but I don't think id say it's totally worthless. It does measure a certain amount of what they call in the investment world" ROI" ir " return on investment" for whetever the reasons it occurred. Some of those will most assuredly be inherent to the characteristics of the aircraft in question itself and many as you point out due to extraneous factors.There are way too many variables and unknowns in that statistic.
For example, how many of the aircraft produced actually went to combat squadrons, and how many of those squadrons actually did the role that the comparison is about (eg fighter, fighter-bomber, ground attack).
There are way too many variables and unknowns in that statistic.
For example, how many of the aircraft produced actually went to combat squadrons, and how many of those squadrons actually did the role that the comparison is about (eg fighter, fighter-bomber, ground attack).
The Luftwaffe did even better in the 1940 BoB when they claimed to have shot down over 2000 Spitfires, which meant those built in 1941.".....I also believe most of the Luftwaffe war effort by 1945, such as it was, was actually 1) on the Russian Front where they were facing La-7s, Yak-3s and Yak 9s, and 2) against the heavy bombers and their escorts at high altitude, which would by that time in daylight be P-51s for the most part, right? "…. And not a P-40F in sight! Not even the Soviets, who had long-since sent their P-40s to back-line units. The Typhoons were still finding the odd combat, despite concentrating on ground-attack. By the way, the USAAF over Germany claimed more German jet kills than were actually flown by all the Luftwaffe jet units on all fronts, but I suppose they were all old P-40F pilots, so that is understandable.
True, not going to argue that the Mustang wasn't a very good fighter. But that's the P-51, not the P-40.I agree, but IMHO, production to victories, does give a good idea of cost effectiveness, and you do need to run your war as cheaply as possible.
So with the Mustang, exactly how many never made it out of the States to operational squadrons? One figure I came across was 6000. This would put the USAAF Mustang on the pedestal as the most cost effective single seat fighter in WW2 as it means an average of one aerial victory for every Mustang that reached a front line squadron.
By the time the Spits arrived the chances of meeting the Japanese in air combat was slight, hence the drop in kills. The Spitfires were so under-utilised in the fighter role they were soon being used for ground-attack as well, something that angered experienced pilots like Clive Caldwell. In New Guinea, it was a similar fate for the P-39 compared to the P-38. The P-38 had the range to go looking for the elusive Japanese, whilst the P-39 did not. But when the Japanese showed up, the P-39 still managed to shoot them down. George Welch is credited with four kills over Pearl Harbor on December 7th 1941. He was flying P-39s with the 36th Fighter Squadron of the 8th FG in New Guinea and scored three kills, all in one day, the whole six months he was with them, simply due to the lack of opportunities for combat. As soon as he transferred to a P-38 unit he got more opportunities and racked up nine more kills in only three months. Like the P-39 units, the RAAF Spitfire units didn't have the range to go looking for the Japanese.In the Pacific the RAAF scored 125 victories with their 294 Kittyhawk I's, II's and III's. Once the Spitfire VIII takes over the fighter role and their P-40N's take on the fighter-bomber role, victories fall to just 24.
It would seem to me that claims to production or return on investment if you like would hold the same degree of validity whatever that may be whether it be used on the p51, the p40, or whatever. In other words, you can change the plane but the metric remains the same.True, not going to argue that the Mustang wasn't a very good fighter. But that's the P-51, not the P-40.
By the time the Spits arrived the chances of meeting the Japanese in air combat was slight, hence the drop in kills. The Spitfires were so under-utilised in the fighter role they were soon being used for ground-attack as well, something that angered experienced pilots like Clive Caldwell. In New Guinea, it was a similar fate for the P-39 compared to the P-38. The P-38 had the range to go looking for the elusive Japanese, whilst the P-39 did not. But when the Japanese showed up, the P-39 still managed to shoot them down. George Welch is credited with four kills over Pearl Harbor on December 7th 1941. He was flying P-39s with the 36th Fighter Squadron of the 8th FG in New Guinea and scored three kills, all in one day, the whole six months he was with them, simply due to the lack of opportunities for combat. As soon as he transferred to a P-38 unit he got more opportunities and racked up nine more kills in only three months. Like the P-39 units, the RAAF Spitfire units didn't have the range to go looking for the Japanese.
I agree. It's not the most pertinent statistic I can think of but I don't think id say it's totally worthless. It does measure a certain amount of what they call in the investment world" ROI" ir " return on investment" for whetever the reasons it occurred. Some of those will most assuredly be inherent to the characteristics of the aircraft in question itself and many as you point out due to extraneous factors.
However, like I said I was just trying to list every possible measure of success or lack thereof for the purposes of the discussion.
I agree, but IMHO, production to victories, does give a good idea of cost effectiveness, and you do need to run your war as cheaply as possible.
So with the Mustang, exactly how many never made it out of the States to operational squadrons? One figure I came across was 6000. This would put the USAAF Mustang on the pedestal as the most cost effective single seat fighter in WW2 as it means an average of one aerial victory for every Mustang that reached a front line squadron.
In the Pacific the RAAF scored 125 victories with their 294 Kittyhawk I's, II's and III's. Once the Spitfire VIII takes over the fighter role and their P-40N's take on the fighter-bomber role, victories fall to just 24.
If 3,000 fighters are made and only 200 are used in the fighter-only role, then the statistic is useless. Particularly if their use as fighters does not lead to much in the way of enemy contact.
It also does not value the role as a defensive aircraft, for example, which may involve a lot of sorties with no enemy contact. But still a valuable role.
Of course! They consented to fly a Curtiss product. Isn't that proof enough?unless there is reason to believe that p40 pilots were of inherently poorer judgement than pilots of other types.
After giving it some thought it seems that production to claims would have some validity as a statistic in one direction but not the other. That is seems there's no way a fighter aircraft gets to a high production to claims ratio without a good part of the reason being qualities inherent to the design itself( even with more oportunity you've still got tu shoot down the enemy) but a low ratio wouldn't nescesarily point to a defective design as there can be many mitigating factors as you pointed out.If 3,000 fighters are made and only 200 are used in the fighter-only role, then the statistic is useless. Particularly if their use as fighters does not lead to much in the way of enemy contact.
It also does not value the role as a defensive aircraft, for example, which may involve a lot of sorties with no enemy contact. But still a valuable role.
In which case the P-40 outshines the Typhoon in both initial cost and numbers produced to victory ratio.After giving it some thought it seems that production to claims would have some validity as a statistic in one direction but not the other. That is seems there's no way a fighter aircraft gets to a high production to claims ratio without a good part of the reason being qualities inherent to the design itself( even with more oportunity you've still got tu shoot down the enemy) but a low ratio wouldn't nescesarily point to a defective design as there can be many mitigating factors as you pointed out.
That said it is certainly a crude metric to be sure.
However, couple a high claims to production ratio and a kill/ loss ratio well into the positive and a low cost of production as we have here and it seems you've got a pretty successful aircraft from every angle for whatever the reasons.
What do think?
In which case the P-40 outshines the Typhoon in both initial cost
and numbers produced to victory ratio.
Apart from the fact you just claimed the USAAF P-40F units won the War by themselves, the Commonwealth P-40 aces are all very clear - to a man, they say the P-40 was the worst fighter they flew! Many of the Allied aces went on to fly Spitfires, Typhoons and Tempests over Germany, and not one of them said "Gee, I wish I was flying a P-40F now!" Billy Drake was clear in his disdain for the Kittyhawk, as was Clive Caldwell, Neville Duke, Bobby Gibbes, Eddie Edwards, just to name a few. Please find me even one P-40F jock that later switched to the P-47 or P-51 and regretted it.
In which case the P-40 outshines the Typhoon in both initial cost and numbers produced to victory ratio.