Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Mike Russo 27FG and John England P-51A (8 +2 P-51C) 311FGThe Allison P-51s weren't good for high altitude use, and (IMO sadly) there was only one Allison engine Mustang ace, and he flew the A-36 fighter/dive bomber variant interestingly. That said, the Mustang I and II was one of the few fighters equal to or superior to the Fw 190 at low/medium altitude until the Spitfire IX/VIII in 1942, and the RAF loved them for tactical fighter/recon roles. In fact, the RAF wanted more Allison P-51s for that role--but by then, production had switched to the Merlin models.
There was no "until" between the service of the Mustang I and the Spitfire Mk IX, they were introduced at almost exactly the same time and initially at very similar rates.The Allison P-51s weren't good for high altitude use, and (IMO sadly) there was only one Allison engine Mustang ace, and he flew the A-36 fighter/dive bomber variant interestingly. That said, the Mustang I and II was one of the few fighters equal to or superior to the Fw 190 at low/medium altitude until the Spitfire IX/VIII in 1942, and the RAF loved them for tactical fighter/recon roles. In fact, the RAF wanted more Allison P-51s for that role--but by then, production had switched to the Merlin models.
True, initially a couple of D-6 equipped with pylons to carry ferry tanks and fly to UK in summer 1943. That said, the wings were not stressed for the additional load save for medium G turns. The Burtonwood BAD1 set up shop to do depot level mod to pull wings, strengthen with doublers on spars, install plumbing and external pylons, to Republic specs, in very late 1943, but the production article -15 and -16 didn't arrive until late Feb 1944. The P-47D-25 didn't arrive until May 1944 w/370gal internal tankage but not operational at squadron level until mid June 1944.Republic equipped the P-47 for drop tanks, so they did their job. The aircraft manufacturer did NOT make or distribute drop tanks.
It was the USAAF that failed to provide P-47 squadrons with drop tanks - you'll have to look in their records for why.
The P-47C-2 & Subs were plumbed for C/L ferry tanks. The first missions using Ferry tanks were in latter days of Blitz Week in July 1943, using the 200gal 'tub' tank, which was not pressurized and would not feed from slaved vacuum pump above 18000 feet. Consequently it was only filled w/100 gal and extremely draggy. The reason 'why not' use them were a.) non sealed bomb carried into combat, b.) had the equivalent drag of 2x110 gal SS tanks delivered in September, 3,) were dangerous when ejected. LtC Cass Hough caused to be installed a wood 'horizontal fin' on the 200 gal tank to force it downward when ejected.The P-47 already had those fuel lines, if I recall.
I also recall that the US did not use drop tanks in Europe during the summer of 43. If the P-47 could use them, and it gave them the range needed for escort, why not use them?
You know, I've said this before, but if you're going to weigh in on a debate, I'd wish to God you'd elaborate more, these short, half-assed poorly researched responses you give simply won't do!The P-47C-2 & Subs were plumbed fo C/L ferry tanks. The first missions using Ferry tanks wre in latter days of Blitz Week in July 1943, using the 200gal 'tub' tank which was not pressurized and would not feed from slaved vacuum pump above 18000 feet. Consequently it was unly filled w/100 gal andextremely draggy. The reason 'why not' use them were a.) non sealed bomb carried into combat, b.) had the equivalent drag of 2x110 gal SS tanks delivered in September, 3,) were dangerous when ejected. LtC Cass Hough caused to be installed a wood 'horizontal fin' on the 200 gal tank to force it downward when ejected.
The straight line combat radius boost was about 75mi - the result = cross the German/Dutch border (barely) on a straiht line, but not out of France on a course to Schwenfurt.
So, yes the 8th AF did use the 200gal in July, the new 75 gal combat tank in August (still could not get out of France during Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission) and the 110 gal combat tank in September - Summer of 1943.
The PROBLEM for the P-47C and D through the P-47D-11 series was that the capability to hang fuel tanks on the wing was problemation for three reasons. 1.) The wing was not stressed to carry even 500 pounds under the wing, 2.) the wing did not have either a pylon or a fuel transfer system of plumbing to transfer fuel from external rack to engine, and 3.) while a 'doable' Depot Level Mod, it was far too labor and time intensive to remove the wings, remove the skin, install the plumbing, install the necessary doublers for the spars, re-skin the wing, install the pylons - IIRC only 50+ were so converted before the -15/-16 arrived in Feb/March 1944.
Exascerbating the PROBLEM (and Greg's lack of understanding) was that during escort the Penetration and Withdrawal Escort, the ony stright line cruise was to/from the R/V or Break Escort waypoint - from that point forward, the P-47C/D is burning fuel at optimal cruise - but not in a straight line as they were tethered to the B-17 formation straight line speed. They are going fast enough to go farther on a straight line, but slow marching while weaving and 'essing' to keep pace with the bombers.
Further, Greg failed to understand the difference between Ferry calculations and Combat Radius calculations - also tested by Wright Field to develop Operating Manual.
8th AF SOP included warm up and taxi time for approximately 50 ships including spares, take off at METO in pairs (usually), climb to 3000 feet - using internal fuel, switch to externals and begin the squadron assembly from elements to flights to squadron, repeat two times during orbit at Max Continuous Power, then climb to cruise altitude where power and RPM reduced to cruise settings (if on time to make R/V per schedule).
Extracted from various flight test data aswell as published Wright Field documents, the 'average' fuel consumption for the P-47 R-2800 at varius MP and RPM for each stage is APPROXIMATELY
With 75 gal C/L tank
113 gal for warm up, taxi, climb to altitude (no formation consumption), begin cruise
40 gal for reserve
90 gal for 20 min combat (15min MP, 5 min WEP)
305+75 gal at Engine Start =380gal
380-243=137gal available for straight line cruise BUT approx 25 gal (minimum) consumed during warm up, taxi, and takeoff to staging altitude to switch to external tank.
So optimally that P-47, independent of slowing down to effective 210mph TAS to escort bombers, at 85+ gph cruise consumption has 137/85 = 1.6 hours of total cruise time left to escort bombers and return home. The escort Effective airspeed is 210, the return after break escort and ejecting tank is closer to 300mph TAS.
The Bomb Division ops co-ordinates target info, take off times, R/V times and waypoint for escorts, etc
The mission planner (Div Ops) then has to adjust the straight line example above (which BTW is not a Precision calculation) for weather, winds aloft, the true linear distance of a course with course changes while escorting, the amount of time to takeoff and form up the group.
The Fighter Wing is performing the same calcs as it makes assignments for each group (Penetration, Withdawal, Sweep) to determine R/V and B/E waypoints -
The Fighter Gp Ops gets the Frag Order with target, R/V, B/E, Bomb Wing assignment, etc and baks out Start Engine times to accomdate estimates to get to R/V on time.
After all these deliberations, the Gp CO at briefing may caution the fighter pilots to intercept and return - do not chase, because of probable headwinds on course, or stretched escort time before B/E, or forecast weather and visibility expected upon return to base. etc, etc. All designed to ensure as much as possible fuel available for a safe return.
Summary - Greg was CORRECT, the P-47 COULD have gone to Schweinfurt BUT - everybody dies or is taken prisoner due to fuel starvation near the German/France border.
Thank you, that genuinely helps explain it. I imagine the tech needed for such escort range COULD have been made ready on the Jugs earlier if the USAAF were willing to find it, but that's a bit more what if than the original statement I made…The P-47C-2 & Subs were plumbed for C/L ferry tanks. The first missions using Ferry tanks were in latter days of Blitz Week in July 1943, using the 200gal 'tub' tank, which was not pressurized and would not feed from slaved vacuum pump above 18000 feet. Consequently it was only filled w/100 gal and extremely draggy. The reason 'why not' use them were a.) non sealed bomb carried into combat, b.) had the equivalent drag of 2x110 gal SS tanks delivered in September, 3,) were dangerous when ejected. LtC Cass Hough caused to be installed a wood 'horizontal fin' on the 200 gal tank to force it downward when ejected.
The straight line combat radius boost was about 75mi - the result = cross the German/Dutch border (barely) on a straight line, but not out of France on a course to Schwenfurt.
So, yes the 8th AF did use the 200gal in July, the new 75 gal combat tank in August (still could not get out of France during Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission) and the 110 gal combat tank in September - Summer of 1943.
The PROBLEM for the P-47C and D through the P-47D-11 series was that the capability to hang fuel tanks on the wing was problematic for three reasons. 1.) The wing was not stressed to carry even 500 pounds under the wing, 2.) the wing did not have either a pylon or a fuel transfer system of plumbing to transfer fuel from external rack to engine, and 3.) while a 'doable' Depot Level Mod, it was far too labor and time intensive to remove the wings, remove the skin, install the plumbing, install the necessary doublers for the spars, re-skin the wing, install the pylons - IIRC only 50+ were so converted before the -15/-16 arrived in Feb/March 1944.
Exascerbating the PROBLEM (and Greg's lack of understanding) was that during escort the Penetration and Withdrawal Escort, the ony stright line cruise was to/from the R/V or Break Escort waypoint - from that point forward, the P-47C/D is burning fuel at optimal cruise - but not in a straight line as they were tethered to the B-17 formation straight line speed. They are going fast enough to go farther on a straight line, but slow marching while weaving and 'essing' to keep pace with the bombers.
Further, Greg failed to understand the difference between Ferry calculations and Combat Radius calculations - also tested by Wright Field to develop Operating Manual.
8th AF SOP included warm up and taxi time for approximately 50 ships including spares, take off at METO in pairs (usually), climb to 3000 feet - using internal fuel, switch to externals and begin the squadron assembly from elements to flights to squadron, then repeat two times during orbit at Max Continuous Power, then climb to cruise altitude where power and RPM were reduced to cruise settings (if on time to make R/V per schedule).
Extracted from various flight test data aswell as published Wright Field documents, the 'average' fuel consumption for the P-47 R-2800 at varius MP and RPM for each stage is APPROXIMATELY
With 75 gal C/L tank
113 gal for warm up, taxi, climb to altitude (no formation consumption), begin cruise
40 gal for reserve
90 gal for 20 min combat (15min MP, 5 min WEP)
305+75 gal at Engine Start =380gal
380-243=137gal available for straight line cruise.
So optimally that P-47, independent of slowing down to effective 210mph TAS to escort bombers, at 85+ gph cruise consumption has 137/85 = 1.6 hours of total cruise time left to escort bombers and return home. The escort Effective airspeed is 210, the return after break escort and ejecting tank is closer to 300mph TAS.
The Bomb Division ops co-ordinates target info, take off times, R/V times and waypoint for escorts, etc via Frag Orders to Fighter Wings
The mission planner (Div Ops) then has to adjust the straight line example above (which BTW is not a Precision calculation) for weather, winds aloft, the true linear distance of a course with course changes while escorting, the amount of time to takeoff and form up the group.
The Fighter WingOps is performing the same calcs as it makes assignments for each group (Penetration, Withdawal, Sweep) to determine R/V and B/E waypoints -
The Fighter Gp Ops gets the Frag Order with target, R/V, B/E, Bomb Wing assignment, etc and baks out Start Engine times to accomdate estimates to get to R/V on time.
After all these deliberations, the Gp CO at briefing may caution the fighter pilots to intercept and return - do not chase, because of probable headwinds on course, or stretched escort time before B/E, or forecast weather and visibility expected upon return to base. etc, etc. All designed to ensure as much as possible fuel available for a safe return.
Summary - Greg was CORRECT, the P-47 COULD have gone to Schweinfurt BUT - everybody dies or is taken prisoner due to fuel starvation near the German/France border.
I don't believe the Davis wing was not robust in its resistance to flak, as much as its aerodynamic properties where extremely susceptible to disruption from said damage. Perhaps not much of a difference now that I think about it.
The February 1942 Fighter Conference, hosted by the CiC AAF deemed extending fighter ranges to be extremely important. The deveopment of 60, 75, 110 and 150gal combat tanks was assigned high priority to AAF-Materiel Command. The 60gal tank emerged first and applied to the P-39 and the P-40. The 75 gal and 110 gal combat tanks were next and produced in quantity by June 1943.Thank you, that genuinely helps explain it. I imagine the tech needed for such escort range COULD have been made ready on the Jugs earlier if the USAAF were willing to find it, but that's a bit more what if than the original statement I made…
1.) The wing was not stressed to carry even 500 pounds under the wing,
What doublers was installed for the spars (not local reinforcements) ?install the necessary doublers for the spars,
The use of uncalibrated BS meters can lead to embarrassing posts being made.What doublers was installed for the spars (not local reinforcements) ?
Sorry my bullshit meter just peaked.
Timppa - what do you think a 'doubler' is? The wing spars and stringers were not redesigned until the XP-47N when internal fuel was added to the wing.What doublers was installed for the spars (not local reinforcements) ?
Sorry my bullshit meter just peaked.
In my opinion it is a sad and sorry tale that cannot ever be fully explained. There is no real reason why the P-47 wasnt in service with increased internal fuel and working drop tanks C/L or wing mounted by mid 1943. That would not have allowed an escorted raid on Schweinfurt but would have allowed the USAAF to push the LW out of north Germany and the Ruhrgebiet long before "Big Week". The P-47 was designed as an interceptor, but when deployed to the UK, the UK didnt need interceptors. Before its arrival B-17 missions were escorted by Spitfires. The range of an early P-47 could just take it to the edge of Belgium and Netherlands escorting bombers, and this was known before they were ever sent. It is easy to blame the "Bomber Mafia" with some conspiracy theory, if a manufacturer drags their feet, the US didnt have the possibility that Stalin had of executing a few to concentrate minds. There are many examples on WW2 aviation history of manufacturers breaking their balls to win or keep a contract, sadly. Republic and the P-47 isnt one of them. The people who designed the P-47 had the design flair to make the only successful turbo S/E fighter but increasing its range and putting on wing tanks were problems beyond their capabilities, and the product of a malign group called the "Bomber Mafia"? It is just too silly to consider.The February 1942 Fighter Conference, hosted by the CiC AAF deemed extending fighter ranges to be extremely important. The deveopment of 60, 75, 110 and 150gal combat tanks was assigned high priority to AAF-Materiel Command. The 60gal tank emerged first and applied to the P-39 and the P-40. The 75 gal and 110 gal combat tanks were next and produced in quantity by June 1943.
Materiel Command under the leadership of Oliver Echols did not (IMO) apply their best and brightest resources to the project, or acquire the subcontractors as fast as could be managed as evidenced by Arnold's 'irritation' in May 1942 by the lack of progress and ordering regular status reports.
As to the technolgies of a self sealing tank combat tank? The combined aviation contractors (e.g. NAA and Curtiss and Bell) already had input and ideas from RAF with respect to removable self sealing fuel cells, and Firestone/Goodyear supplied the suitable bladders - but IIRC nobody had produced a self sealing external fuel tank, nor subjected them to destructive testing.
Another factor was simply that AAF wasn't specifying external racks and fuel cell pressurization as a requirement. Neither Lockheed, NAA or Republic were encouraged or funded to develop external racks for ferry tank attachments. NAA and Lockheed had the foresight to realize that long range ferry was a desirable feature and both had developed schemes to extend range well beyond production article internal fuel capability in 1941. Lockheed via pylon/fuel feed (unpressurized) and NAA via removing wing guns/ammo and replacing wit standard kit of 26gal auxillary fuel cell,leaving only the cowl guns in March 1941. Both delivered absent RFP. Crickets from Republic.
NAA installed a fuel pump, and plumbing to external pylon, for first flight of prototype A-36 in May 1942, approximately five months after Lockheed on the P-38E pylon kits of December 1941. Note that Republic didn't deliver a C/L rack on the P-47C-2 until nearly a year later, nor prototype pylon on D-6 (six total) until July 1943, nor production pylon/fuel feed on D-15/-16 until Jan/February 1944.
Note for the record that Republic apparently was uninterested in the CAS role in 1942/1943, never seeking a place at the table with the A-36, P-40 or P-39 - nor wing pylons, or C/L rack as late as December1942, when it was equipped to carry external ordnance. You can lay the absence of development to two factors - namely misunderstanding the magnitude of future escort requirements, and lacking the simple imagination regarding the effectiveness of a Fighter with triple the tactical footprint of a Spitfire or the equal of a P-38, yet also having capability to carry bombs in a tactical role. The lack of foresight also precluded the necesary strengthening of the wing to permit wing racks for either bombs or fuel tanks. Neither Lockheed or NAA misunderstood the value of Range.
Greg pontificated on the great bomber mafia conspiracy, but AAF believed in the P-47 and made every effort to prod Republic in February 1942 through June 1943 to get more internal fuel as well as external combat tank capability - to what end? They had the example of the A-36/P-51A and P-38 with external wing racks and fuel feed capability in mid 1942.
How was it AAF Leadership's fault? IMO, the 'great mistake' AAF/Eisenhower/Marshall made was to divert P-38 from the assigned escort role for 8th AF and send to Africa for Torch. IMO it would have been better to send the P-47 to MTO instead.
I was referring to Gregs history of the P-47 and his bomber maaaafia conspiracy theory.And all this is a false history?
Seversky was outed in April/May of 1939. In part because he sold 22 two seat P-35 type fighters to the Japanese in 1938 (?) and the USAAC wanted nothing to do with him.The P-47 Fuel tank troubles may have been fallout from the board ousting Seversky from his own company. As I recall, Seversky took a trip to Europe and while there, he was removed from the company. I read all of this long ago, so it should be available on the internet. The company was then run by people who wanted to make money from what Seversky had built. I don't remember if Kartvelli was still chief designer after the dust settled.
A - OK. No sweat. Actually, Iwas trying to get back on topic, but in a roundabout way.I was referring to Gregs history of the P-47 and his bomber maaaafia conspiracy theory.