WHICH RIFLE?

parsifal said:

We trained using the Lee Enfield in the 70s and were expected, as recruits, to deliver accurate aimed fire within a 9x9 target over 250 yds at a minimum of 15 rounds per minute. we also used the cousin of the garand, the M1 carbine in similar exercises. The Lee Enfield was ideal to the purpose of training a man to shoot accurately and watch his ammunition expenditure, the M1 was not. The old SMLE NEVER failed us. it was reliable, accurate, effortless and for the average grunts like us. By comparison the M1 was a mule, with constant stoppages, vastly less accuracy but most important of all this desire to make up for those weaknesses by firing off rounds as fast as was possible. the result, by calculation, the firepower generated by a squad of enfield armed men was vastly more effective because of accuracy and dependability over the M1. I have only fired the Garand occasionally, and I would concede that its greater weight and length might make it a better proposition, but im not convinced.

some time further up the food chain, i trained using the SLR and the M-16. The M-16 had a full auto function, the SLRs (that we used) were only semi auto. The m-16 as a meaningful weapon of war was in my opinion a total waste of time. Sure, you could go nuts and spray bullets in every direction as your fear prescribed, but your ability to deliver accurate, measured fire designed to keep a target's head down whilst your mates enveloped and then repositioned themselves was inconsequential and totally ineffective when compared to the SLR. this is not just my bias talking. the RAR, considered to be far more effective in battles in Vietnam than any comparable US outfit except the very top elite forces refused to use the m-16 as a rule for those reasons and time and again proved the point that the measured, deliberate aimed fire of the SLR was far superior .

Semi auto superiority is a theoretical advantage, but in the real world is a total crock

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Seems like you are talking out both sides of your mouth here.
"...........this is not just my bias talking. the RAR, considered to be far more effective in battles in Vietnam than any comparable US outfit except the very top elite forces refused to use the m-16 as a rule for those reasons and time and again proved the point that the measured, deliberate aimed fire of the SLR was far superior."

Now I believe that the SLR was a gas operated semi-auto rifle as you have stated. it had a 20 round magazine. and yet somehow it was so much better at at "measured, deliberate aimed fire" than the gas operated semi-auto M-1 Garand with it's 8 round magazine. Both rifles were about the same length (within a few inches) the same weight (1/2 to 1 pound) fired a cartridge of about the same power and used similar sights. The SLR may well have been more reliable in adverse conditions than the Garand. It should be, it was designed a number of years later. However an panicked, undisciplined soldier could probably fire more rounds in given period of time from the SLR than from the Garand due to it's large magazine and easier reload.

The US standard of marksmanship during the Vietnam war started at mediocre at best and often descended to abysmal. This had much more to do with training and doctrine that the actual rifles/weapons used. The M16 could be used for measured, deliberate aimed fire out to 400-500 meters. However it required that the troops be taught that method and trained in that method and that was something the US army was not doing at the time.
I knew some members of a national guard rifle team that switched from M-14s to the M-16 and after a short learning curve they were doing about as well with the M-16 in competitive matches. It wasn't as good at long range (this is back in the light bullet days) but at 200yds standing slowfire and the 200 and 300 yd rapid fire stages there wasn't much difference in scores.
However this was rather an elite unit. Not only did they routinely clobber all the other national guard teams they often beat regular army teams. They had several national record holders (in other disciplines) on the team and several of their members were on the "All Guard team" which was the national team as opposed to state teams.

The M-1 Carbine was pretty much a piece of rubbish as a "battle" rifle but then it's original intention was to replace the .45 automatic pistol. One old team mate of mine once described not being able to keep all his shots on a 4ft by 5ft target at 200yds with one. How old it was and in what condition I don't know. He had set an NCAA record in his collage years and was a member of the Army MTU in the 1960s for several years so his personal ability wasn't the problem.

Separating training and doctrine from the capabilities of the rifles in question isn't always easy. but blaming the rifle for lapses in training and doctrine doesn't answer the question.

The training and doctrine that you are talking about produced two things in the US army....the inventory of weapons like the M-16, and an inability of most soldiers in the US army to not be able to hit anything smaller than the side of the barn door. Reason, they relied far too much on massed fire effects, with virtually no adequate training in aimed fire exercises. Result was that whilst rates of fire were higher, rates of effective fire were abysmal.

This all stems from faulty doctrine that extends back at least to the 1930s, and is further traceable to the introduction of the garand. with its higher rates of fire compared to standard bolt action weapons, the US command has for a long time believed it unnecessary for their grunts to be able to actually hit anything. that's in stark contrast to the way we trained, or indeed the way the british army has trained since the introduction of the self loading rifle. Our equipment reflects that fundamental difference in ideology.

parsifal said:

This all stems from faulty doctrine that extends back at least to the 1930s, and is further traceable to the introduction of the garand. with its higher rates of fire compared to standard bolt action weapons, the US command has for a long time believed it unnecessary for their grunts to be able to actually hit anything. that's in stark contrast to the way we trained, or indeed the way the british army has trained since the introduction of the self loading rifle. Our equipment reflects that fundamental difference in ideology.

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Which is it?

The first issue of production M-1s (the gas trap model) wasn't until Sept 1937 and Springfield arsenal was making 10 rifles per day. It took two years to get to 100 rifles per day. The Arsenal reached 600 rifles per day in 1941 and the existing army was only fulled equipped ( although there were exceptions) at the end of 1941.
According to you the army developed it's mass firepower/low accuracy faulty doctrine using 5 shot bolt action Springfields?

The M-1 was supposed to allow for a higher rate of aimed fire per soldier/per unit of time in pre-war writings. What the Army may have done with it during the war may be different. But blaming the rifle for poor training and doctrine isn't fair.

You haven't answered why the M-1 is so bad and yet the SLR is so good as a combat rifle when both semi-automatic rifles are so similar in actual rates of fire and accuracy?
I will grant the SLR is more reliable and better able to function in bad environments but what is the huge difference in rapid aimed fire between the two? The SLR holds more rounds and needs fewer magazine changes?

All you have to do is hold and fire an M-1. I have owned an Enfield Mk III, and I have a Garand. The quality of the Garand receiver is amazing. M-1 hands down.

I would pick a Springfield after the M-1

Shortround6 said:

Which is it?

The first issue of production M-1s (the gas trap model) wasn't until Sept 1937 and Springfield arsenal was making 10 rifles per day. It took two years to get to 100 rifles per day. The Arsenal reached 600 rifles per day in 1941 and the existing army was only fulled equipped ( although there were exceptions) at the end of 1941.
According to you the army developed it's mass firepower/low accuracy faulty doctrine using 5 shot bolt action Springfields?

The M-1 was supposed to allow for a higher rate of aimed fire per soldier/per unit of time in pre-war writings. What the Army may have done with it during the war may be different. But blaming the rifle for poor training and doctrine isn't fair.

You haven't answered why the M-1 is so bad and yet the SLR is so good as a combat rifle when both semi-automatic rifles are so similar in actual rates of fire and accuracy?
I will grant the SLR is more reliable and better able to function in bad environments but what is the huge difference in rapid aimed fire between the two? The SLR holds more rounds and needs fewer magazine changes?

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I don't pretend to know why the M1 was worse than the SLR, but your points re reliability and all round functioning in hostile environments are not to be sniffed at in a combat rifle. I just look at the history. Post WW2 the M1 was already starting to be modified and fairly quickly was replaced by the M14 for presumably a number of good reasons.
The FN FAL rifle of which the SLR is basically a copy is closer to the M14 in that it was developed in light of experience in WW2.
What is interesting is how many countries went to the expense of buying the FN or building it under licence rather than buy the much cheaper M1 or M14. Governments don't tend to spend extra money without good reasons.

No weapon is reliable 100% just varying degrees of acceptable.
The M1 and M14 don't do well in extreme tests.

Shortround6 said:

Which is it?

The first issue of production M-1s (the gas trap model) wasn't until Sept 1937 and Springfield arsenal was making 10 rifles per day. It took two years to get to 100 rifles per day. The Arsenal reached 600 rifles per day in 1941 and the existing army was only fulled equipped ( although there were exceptions) at the end of 1941.
According to you the army developed it's mass firepower/low accuracy faulty doctrine using 5 shot bolt action Springfields?

The M-1 was supposed to allow for a higher rate of aimed fire per soldier/per unit of time in pre-war writings. What the Army may have done with it during the war may be different. But blaming the rifle for poor training and doctrine isn't fair.

You haven't answered why the M-1 is so bad and yet the SLR is so good as a combat rifle when both semi-automatic rifles are so similar in actual rates of fire and accuracy?
I will grant the SLR is more reliable and better able to function in bad environments but what is the huge difference in rapid aimed fire between the two? The SLR holds more rounds and needs fewer magazine changes?

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I thought it might be helpful to post some of the academic material emanating from the US military academia on their theories of warfare, and how firepower holds sway in preference to accuracy. training in the US military to this day emphasises getting more lead across to the enemy with less regard to where it lands and more regard on how much of it is being sent.

As a start I would recommend you look at the following:

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a233505.pdf

This might work in the age of ball and musket, but in the age where firepower is measured in the hundreds of rounds per minute and where logistics is almost always an issue, such as in new guinea or the jungles of SE asia, it almost always makes your standard American military unit more of a liability than they need be.

you are looking at the individual weapon and saying "whats wrong with it?" not much really, though I think it is generally conceded that the M1 and Garand were not as reliable as either the lee enfield or the successor the SLR (as we refer to the FAL). wars are not won on the basis of an individual rifle, but they are won by the mass effect of the doctrine to which they apply. The rifles selected by the US military are a reflection of the doctrine that they work towards, and the US military doctrine has not been particularly successful since the civil war. It works (just) mostly because of the massive material superiority that could be brought to bear in the battles it fought. In NW Europe, 1944-5, superiorities of about 8-10:1 were needed for success at the point of impact. similar advantage in number and firepower were needed to ensure success. this is far from a ringing endorsement of any aspect of the US military, including the military kit it saw fit to haul into action. On saipan, the Marines were initially confronted with odds of 20;1 in their favour at the beach heads (despite the massive levels of fire support afforded to them), they still struggled initially against an enemy clearly inferior to them in terms of firepower.

The US objective was to use firepower to save lives, but there is strong evidence to suggest their unwillingness to close to contact and deal with the enemy accurately and effectively instead of spraying bullets in every direction except the right one cost them unnecessarily. it still does. in comparison to the germans, the Us was profligate with their personnels lives, not because they meant to, but because their doctrine was faulty 9and hence their equipment also0, and failed to deal with the enemy effectively. this is a criticism of US military performance that comes up more or less routinely in the performance assessments made of your military by allies like us

parsifal said:

you are looking at the individual weapon and saying "whats wrong with it?" not much really, though I think it is generally conceded that the M1 and Garand were not as reliable as either the lee enfield or the successor the SLR (as we refer to the FAL).

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I think this is where some of the confusion is coming from.

M 1 Garand


M1 Carbine

Not to scale.
Ammo

30-06 on left, 30 cal carbine in the middle and .45ACP on right.

The Carbine weighs about 5 to 5 1/2 lbs. It's proclaimed mission was to replace the pistol for troops like drivers, artillery men, signalers and other assorted support personnel that were NOT front line infantry.
The carbine is a slug squirter. It was made in nearly obscene numbers and became a front line weapon sort of by osmosis.
But it was NOT the shoulder arm the US Army (or Marines) developed their doctrine/tactics around either per war or for most of the war.
The M2 version (full auto) didn't show up in the hands of troops until 1945 so this had little effect on tactics or doctrine.

The M 1 rifle (Garand) was the replacement for the 1903 Springfield.

I an still puzzled how and 8 shot semi automatic rifle is a bad weapon because it encourages wasteful shooting or spraying an area hoping for a hit and yet the SLR with it's 20 round magazine (firing a cartridge of almost equal power/ballistics) is an example or a firearm that encourages restrained economical use of ammunition?

Thanks for the link, I am working my way though it but so far I fail to see the relevance. Yes the US Army as whole emphasized firepower but I am not at all sure how having a good artillery branch with good communications is evidence of encouraging wasteful barrages of rifle fire?
I would note that the M1 Rifle had the best (most adjustable and easiest to use) rear sight of any common WW II rifle which suggests a standard of expected accuracy in excess of any other nation. How well that standard was maintained (it needed good training) with the massive expansion of the WW II Army is another story. But is hardly the fault of the rifle.

I will fully agree that post WW II the US Army did some incredibly stupid things and by the time of Vietnam the Army doctrine/training as far as accurate rifle work went was well and truly in the crapper.

But this thread is "best standard issue rifle" and is in the WW II section not the post war or modern section.

IMHO, the only fault of the M-1 is that you cant top off magazine. The whole clip needs to be inserted. When I've fired in CMP matches, i load one round and fire the one round.

I didn't think you could either but there is at least one video out there showing how to do it. I am sure that with practice it could be done but I don't think it was taught and sticking fingers/thumbs into an open M1 Breech may not be the best thing to do when hurried or distracted.

Rear sight of M1 Garand

Right knob controls elevation and has a travel of 72 clicks, is click is 1 minute of angle or about 1 in per hundred yards (at 500 yards each click is 5 in). left knob provides for 16 clicks each way from center.
One could well criticize the sight for being overly complicated, both to manufacture and to use (over 90% of the troops will not be able to make full use of it in combat, well over 90%) but such a sight is hardly compatible with a philosophy or doctrine of indiscriminate rapid fire in the general direction of the enemy.
Such a sight would resemble this

or this

Read the 300 page doctrine piece I posted, a piece put together within the confines of the US military doctrinalists, and it is immediately apparent that your assertion that the US trains for accuracy and not volume is exposed as the fallacy that it is.

The US army throughout modern history has never been known to favour target accuracy. it has always favoured a policy of volume of fire. this is as true about its procurement policy, its small arms training and both its large and small formation tactics.

You can insert individual rounds in the Garand but it's not easy.
The Enfield 1917 should have been standard issue after ww1 not the 1903 but hey ho.
The Carcano was clip fed with varying degrees of difficulty so would be interesting to note if the Garand had similar issues with reliability and how well it fed from its clip.

parsifal said:

Read the 300 page doctrine piece I posted, a piece put together within the confines of the US military doctrinalists, and it is immediately apparent that your assertion that the US trains for accuracy and not volume is exposed as the fallacy that it is.

The US army throughout modern history has never been known to favour target accuracy. it has always favoured a policy of volume of fire. this is as true about its procurement policy, its small arms training and both its large and small formation tactics.

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Please define "modern history".
1890s on
1917 on
1935 on
1949 on
Pick a year

You made the statement implying that the US adopted the "volume" over accuracy doctrine in the 1930s in regards to small arms So far I have seen nothing to support that.

Post war I would not disagree with you. I don't know when but the Army sure didn't speed a lot of time on precision shooting in the late 50s, 60s or 70s. a few days a year at the range isn't enough whatever the "doctrine" may have been.

The whole idea of the Garand (and the Johnson and other competitors) was to combine both accuracy and volume of fire.
AN accurate rifle with good sights that can be fired with with less disturbance (no letting go with one had to manipulate the bolt) giving more time to aim each shot while keeping up a good rate of fire.

I agree that even a k98k is obsolete next to any semi or full auto rifle.
Although the change from 1km to 300 metres is important when it comes to doctrine.
The SMLE still had volley sights in ww1 so getting rid of volley sights and extreme range accuracy was as important as technology

Read the article. You are seeing nothing because you are not looking. If you read the article, and many others like it, it will become immediately apparent to you that US military thinking and doctrine stemming from that has favoured, and trained for (and pursued equipment policies towards), volume of fire over accuracy. This has been the case since the great battles of the ACW. There are exceptions, I'm am not trying to talk absolutes, but the general training, doctrine, equipment and logistics has always been in the direction of volume over effect. Its not been a perticualalry successful trend, and its chief aim of saving lives in favour of using lead, has not been very successful.

This is not my theory, and frankly ive given you all the necessary supporting material that you need. posting photos of a peep sight is a poor level of evidence in comparison to a 300 page military treatise by a serving US Army officer.

read the article.

Fellas, before everyone gets finished hating on the M1, please bother to read "Hatcher's Book of the Garand", written by Julian Hatcher, an Ordnance General during the War, and later a higher-up in the National Rifle Association. It's enlightening, and the Garand was tested have to death during the period between the Wars, besting many of the bolt-action rifles available at that time. It's a love-fest of the M1, for sure, but Hatcher was pretty objective when comparing various rifles.

Are we talking gas trap Garand or .276?

There is nothing inherently wrong with the Garand, or M1 (ie the carbine, which is always referred to as the M1 in Oz). I have no doubt that Americans would have no difficulty entering into a fit of self adulation about it, but as an outsider who knows veterans who had no special attachment to it, and were unfortunate enough to work with people that used it, it has quite serious problems .


Its problems are less technological as operational. You take a garand pull the trigger, chances are it will fire, and fire well, unless it has run out of ammunition. And therein lies its chief problem. If you are on patrol in the jungle, or surrounded in north western Europe, or cut off in the desert, or stuck in the snow, or the mountains of Algeria (ie nearly every situation your average American GI is likely to fight, in) you are going to be limited in your ammunition supply. In the jungle you would often be restricted to just 3-5 reloads for your personal weapon. The average squaddie would carry about 50% of the ammunition he carried as ammunition for the heavy weapons in the squad. On contact, squad MG goes to ground, and the first thing everyone does is throw or pass their ammo pouches for the squad MG to that gun position. If the squad is supported by a mortar, everyone will also be carrying mortar rounds for that weapon as well. First job for the grunts on point is locate the enemy position causing the problem. No-one would be firing at this stage, except if you are a trigger happy American with a Garand. Chances are you have been taught to go to ground and start firing like an idiot. The weapon you are equipped with is perfect for that way of thinking, so off you go expending ammunition and giving away your position like you have nothing to worry about.


Logistics for the front line is always a problem, and a force that is equipped to just blaze away the minute contact is made, and is equipped with a weapon made for that purpose, and trained to react in that way, will run out of ammo fast, and will take casualties that they needn't.. Instead of using your grunts as you should….to be targets basically (but hard targets because your enemy isn't sure where you are) and out there to protect the main squad assets as quietly and efficiently as you can, they are all out there trying ti win the fight on their own resources. This is about the worst way to manage your small unit tactics. And the garand is built for that purpose.


Americans are taught to get as many rounds out as quickly as they can, trying to win the battle single handedly. After all, they are equipped with the most up to date side arm, fully semi automatic and well able to empty the magazine in seconds. Result of this John Wayne attitude is a squad that is loud, inaccurate and a logistic liability. The Garand and M1 are built for that purpose, and from an operational point of view should not be viewed as optimal weaponary especially in the WWII era when re-supply was even more difficult than it is now. Only by the use of overwhelming numbers were the American forces able to keep their loss rates to low levels. That is not a mark of success. It is the mark of desperation.

In 1946 in the aftermath of the WWII experiences of the US armed forces, there was a meeting of US infantry specialists that was to have long reaching effects that affected US small unit thinking to this day in one form or another. The meeting was held at fort benning ans was wide ranging, looking at tactics, doctrine, weapons leadership, kit organisation and training.


The following is a link to a paper that deals with this meeting and subsequent methgods and TOEs adopted by the US army.


http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a225438.pdf


Generally the conference attendees at that meeting felt that WWII combat had proven the basic soundness of US tactical doctrine and organisation, but there were some significant misgivings. Basically four recommendations arose from that conference; the difficulties of squad command and control exacerbated by the US squads belief that the main firepower arose from their Infantry, not the support weapons, the lingering effects of attrition, the urgent need for a proper squad level LMG, and as a result of all these factors, the limits on squad tactics.


The third critical factor concerning the infantry squad was firepower. Because of the limits placed on the squad arising from the limits on the BAR, the conference members felt that too much emphasis had been placed on the reliance of the firepower generated from the rifles within the squad. They felt the garand had been poorly used as a result, downplaying its ability to deliver fire accurately in favour of delivering mass firepower. As a firepower oriented weapon the garand was too lacking in firepower to be effective (i think the committee members were thinking about the limited magazine capacity here), but as a semi automatic with the ability to put out a lot of rounds in a short space of time it promoted the temptation to go nuts in a firefight and use the limited supply of ammo quickly.


All of the committee members had been impressed with the german methods and equipment, which centred heavily on the primacy of the support gun. Perhaps unfairly, the committee compared the weight unloaded of the MG42 at 24 lbs with good quick change capability to the US LMG M1919A6 at 33 lbs, with no quick change capability for the barrel. The bolt action 98K with only 5 rounds capacity was a disadvantage, but less so when compared to the British 10 round capacity of their lee enfields