WHICH RIFLE?

[parsifal]

no, there were not. Having decided that the garand was the primary weapon of choice, with the springfield as an emergency fill in, the USGF was never going to approve the shipping out of formations with anything other than the standard issue. as far as training is concerned, I am less certain about that, but I have not seen formations training with large quantities of anything other than the springfield or the Garand.

The Marines are somewhat different and my knowledge of them is quite limited. did they not adopt a third rifle, the Johnson, at some point?

 

[Shortround6]

Ive no doubt that once the production wheels got greased, there was no stopping the juggernaut. however in the absence of any better data, we have this one off comment that Garand production in the critical year of 1941 was running at 4000 per month, or 3 divs per year. That had to be a huge bottleneck to the training regime in 1942 and 1943. given that the US was taking, on average, 18 months to train and ready its divisional sized formations, it was this massive bottleneck in 1941 that mattered, not the massive flood that followed in 1944. the 1944 production is basically meaningless to the army fielded for the war. And in 1941 the Garand was in short supply.

We seem to have discrepancy in figures, this website Scott A. Duff Publications and Historic Martial Arms: Who Made M1 Garands? How Many Were Made? When Were They Made?

says that Springfield Arsenal was making 100 per day in Jan of 1940 (but not working 7 days a week?) and by Jan of 1942 was making 1103 per day. It is quite possible that during 1941 (the early part) they were making 4000 per month but it seems that figure was not constant for the entire year?

It also seems Wiki was not accurate about the Winchester contribution (not a surprise) with Winchester getting a 500 rifle contract in April 1939 (first 100 shipped in Dec 1940) but Sept 1939 saw the first of many follow up contracts. Winchester building over 1/2 million total.

I am also puzzled by your statement about American artillery. In the North African campaign there were shortages but by the invasion of France most US divisions had 3 battalions of 105 howitzers with 12 guns per battalion and a single battalion of 155mm howitzers, also 12 guns, which may not compare well in number of tubes with a British division of up to 72 25pdrs but between the larger weight shells and the crappy british shells have low HE content things may even out somewhat.
I am not sure what "better" artillery should have been provided to individual divisions? More 155mm howitzers? a battery of 155mm guns? or a battery of 8in howitzers? These big guns need a lot of logistical support.
I don't believe the Germans had any more guns per division and by 1943 the Americans probably had more ammo per gun the majority of the time (local temporary shortages aside).

 

[Ivan1GFP]

no, there were not. Having decided that the garand was the primary weapon of choice, with the springfield as an emergency fill in, the USGF was never going to approve the shipping out of formations with anything other than the standard issue. as far as training is concerned, I am less certain about that, but I have not seen formations training with large quantities of anything other than the springfield or the Garand.

The Marines are somewhat different and my knowledge of them is quite limited. did they not adopt a third rifle, the Johnson, at some point?

To be honest, I have no idea whether the soldiers in the photograph were Army or Marines. I didn't think we were getting more specific than for each nation up to this point, but as usual the discussions tend to expand.
The photograph I saw was in a book but I don't know which book or even if it is one that I own or one from a library or even from a local library.
It is easy to find photographs of Garand, Springfield and to a lesser extent the Johnson rifle in the hands of troops. The M1917 will take more time.

- Ivan.

 

[parsifal]

Using two sources with respect to make observations about the US standard infantry divs and their artillery capabilities. the first is

David Myers, Unit Organisations WWII (TOEs) Z & M Publishing 1977.

Relevantly at page 51 it says

"this type of division performed well throughout the war when adequately led. Due to a chronic shortage of combat riflemen and the lack of shipping space, the US army insisted that it maintain its heavier artillery and supply echelons under the control of the higher corps and army level commands, often stripping out the heavier artillery allocations from the divisions. Consequently the US infantry was limited in firepower, unless adequately supplied and supported from higher up. This limited its ability to operate ubdependantly in most situations unless significant higher echelon s armoured artillery and logistic support was provided to the unit".

in theory, the divisional TOE called for 36 x 105mm, 12x155mm, 6 x 105 SP. it had 36 ATGs, admittedly by 1944 this was usually in the form of the M-10 TD. This however was an attached unit, not necessarily operating with the Div, the same with the nominal armoured battalion that was listed as attached.
By comparison the British infantry division was roughly twice the size of its US cousin. With its support echelons included, a British infantry division consisted of over 55000 personnel, to the US infantry divs 35000. British infantry divs of 1944 had 72 25 pdrs, 48 x 17 pdr (as part of the divisional slice, not a special attachment as was the case for the 1944 US type div), it was also supported by a full AA regt, including a large number of the hard hitting 3.7 inch guns. all part of the divisional firepower, in stark contrast to the US infantry which were supported by a single bn of AA, which was a bit more variable.

Second source is Shelby Stanton; Order of Battle US army WWII, Presidio Press 1984. Stanton gives an excellent overview of the flux and allocation of specific battalions to and from divisional organisations and it becomes immediately apparent that the lions share of heavier artillery formations were usually placed under the control of higher echelon commands. At page 9 of the book, he states that the divisions capabilities to operate as a fully independent formation were somewhat limited stating " it relied on higher echelon corps and army units ..." and "during the war the formation was reduced in power due to shipping considerations, in which the support echelons (including artillery) was concentrated at higher echelons". . In 1943 there was a 13% cut in personnel, a 23% cut in vehicles and vehicles themselves reduced in size . Artillery allocations were reduced by a whopping 25% . and nearly all of these reductions came out of the heavier calibres.

Stanton is very critical about the lack of numbers in divisions. with only 66 divs available for the ETO, he states " there is a serious question whether this provided enough divs in the light of the sustained and costly campaigns in northern Europe. This resulted in infrequent unit rotation which tended to chew up and exhaust veteran units. stateside divs and those in England were often stripped out for replacements and then shipped out with very poor preparation. ....battlefield opportunities were missed and long sections of front not secured sometimes in areas that proved critical (eg the Ardennes). The fact that successive soviet offensives negated the germans ability to really profit from these shortcomings does not erase the fact that resources were not properly distributed 9to the divisions).".

The US army achieved its mission and functioned well enough, but it did not function outstandingly and suffered from a lack of firepower at divisional level, at the frontline. It outperformed the german army finally in 1944, for a number of reasons, but would not have been able to defeat the germans except for the losses the heer was sustaining on the EF. by 1944, the heer had been bled white, with the ToE of its formations below authorised strengths.Costello estimates the combat strengths of formations on the EF was chronically about 40% and on the west front about 60% (units from the east were rotated to the west to be rebuilt). after the Ardennes these rough comparisons do not hold true. This is not just a criticsm of the US army, the british were even more ham fisted in dealing with the heer, but the US army did not derive any discernible benefits from its Garand equipped infantry that I can see. in the early days the introduction of the garand seems to have acted as part of the constraints that affected army sizes and capabilities later in the war. Even as late as 1944, the authorised ToE of Garands to the division was about 6000 Garands and 4000 carbines. a british Infantry div had about three times that number of enfield rifles, whilst the germans had about the same (though this varied a lot).

 

[The Basket]

Johnson rifle was never formally adopted by USA and it came far too late. The Garand was already chosen and the Johnson was at best a possibility if the Garand was a dog.
The barrel could be removed which gave it paradrop ability.
The Dutch ordered them and after the Dutch Asian possessions were overwhelmed they were stuck in warehouses where they were liberated.
If the Johnson appeared in the timeframe of the Garand then it may have won the order. Who knows.
The bayonet was a factor not only in the durability of the barrel but also in its balance. Sticking a big heavy bayonet on the end could have had issues with the short recoil action, making unable to recycle the bolt. The bayonet would be the spike variety
The lack of orders has given to the usual conspiracy theories online but the Johnson was a day late and a dollar short. And that's pretty much that. However the original Garand had a gas trap design which worked as well as gas traps work so Johnson is not without his logic.

 

[Shortround6]

As far as artillery goes, the " lions share of heavier artillery formations were usually placed under the control of higher echelon commands." in just about all armies. This may depend on what one calls heavy artillery. Most Armies using predominantly medium or field artillery in their infantry divisions. Again definitions differ but in 1939/40 there were very few armies using motor traction at even close to 100% and the old horse artillery definitions could pretty much apply. Field artillery being the heaviest guns/howitzers a team of horses could move at a walking pace with the gunners walking alongside.
Some armies motorised but few armies changed over the guns/howitzers to larger sizes very quickly. Although in some cases a battalion of heavy guns might replace one battalion of lighter guns or the heavy battalion was added.
Adding extra units for certain operations was often done and was an economy measure. While the infantry regiments took the most casualties, it makes sense to rotate the line infantry out for rest/refit (done much less often in WWII than WW I) while the supporting heavy artillery which had very few casualties could remain in place to support the new line infantry. Or Artillery concentrations could be formed to support planned assaults/offences.
I would note that the manpower figures given above are 2 to 3 times higher than the nominal manpower figures for either US or British divisions which do not include "support" units. Which makes one wonder what the author/s were including as "support".

I would also note that dragging in large AA guns to bolster artillery was pretty much a late war tactic. Or one of desperation. The 3.7in AA gun was an excellent weapon and did do good work in both the AA role and ground role. Late war the Allies suffered very little from German air attack and they could afford to use the AA guns (and AT guns) as general artillery. Both types having rather short barrel lives compared to normal field artillery. Worn barrels have both less velocity and less accuracy so wearing out your AA guns using them as ground artillery when you can expect a number of air attacks is not really smart use of assets. I will note that the 3.7 did have a reduced charge (about 37%) available for both training and for use in ground support firing, assuming that the reduced charge ammunition was available where the ground firing was going on. Ammunition was fixed and charges were not adjustable in the field.

Getting back to the Garand and it's effect or lack of effect on US mobilization.
One would have to show that the US could build a much larger number of bolt action rifles in the first few years leading up to the war (for the US 1939-40-41) and 1942 than they built Garands. As already noted, Remington got the tooling from one US arsenal out of the TWO that made Springfields in WW I. ANd that tooling was partially worn out. They also found that some of the jigs/fixtures wouldn't fit on the machines (lathes, milling machines, etc) that Remeinton had.
What condition the Springfield Arsenal tooling was in I have no idea. Please note that Smith Corona didn't start delivering 1903s until late 1942. Perhaps that could have been speeded up if there was no Garand.
AS far as the Garand giving the US troops a big advantage, perhaps it didn't or perhaps the Garand helped cover up the fact that the BAR wasn't really a very good light machine gun. When comparing US vs other armies you have to look at the weapons mix. How well would the US troops have done with 1903s and BARs? Not quite the same as Enfields and Brens or Mausers and MG 34/42s.

 

[The Basket]

For the infantry having a semi auto means getting them shots downrange so you can lead a target and get them follow up shots quick.
I still not sure when you say Johnson is inaccurate coz at close ranges I would take an inaccurate semi auto over a pin sharp bolt action any day of the week.
A banzai charge is not about minute of angles

 

[Ivan1GFP]

For the infantry having a semi auto means getting them shots downrange so you can lead a target and get them follow up shots quick.
I still not sure when you say Johnson is inaccurate coz at close ranges I would take an inaccurate semi auto over a pin sharp bolt action any day of the week.
A banzai charge is not about minute of angles

Each weapon has its own advantages and disadvantages.
At close range against a Banzai charge, MANY weapons would perform better than a Battle Rifle.
A Submachine Gun would be much more comforting.

I believe the purpose of a Battle Rifle is to have sufficient power AND long range accuracy in a portable package.
Are you stating that your preference is for semi auto rate of fire at the cost of long range accuracy?

We really should resurrect the "Design the perfect WW2 Battle Rifle" thread or create a new one because I believe that is where this discussion has been for quite some time.

- Ivan.

 

[Shortround6]

I would note that countries around the world are still trying to design the Perfect Battle Rifle.

 

[Ivan1GFP]

I would note that countries around the world are still trying to design the Perfect Battle Rifle.

Is anyone really still trying to design "Battle Rifles"?
My Wife and I stopped at a Gun Shop on the way back from dropping off my Daughter at school a few days ago and I had a pretty long (by her standards) discussion with one of the gentlemen running the store. All I can say is that I have NOT kept up with current events and new developments in firearms. Another conclusion from that discussion is that sometimes you DO NOT want to design what the Government is asking for because the work may not pay off and there may not be another market.

I figure we have a pretty good collection of expert armchair gun designers here, so who says we can't design the "perfect" battle rifle?
It isn't as if we actually had to build such a thing! There are endless supplies of Unobtanium we can use in our designs unlike in the real world.

I remember trying to do this kind of thing back when I was about 10 or 12 years old and it was fun back then.

- Ivan.

 

[The Basket]

the 30-06 v 45?
Always go big.
Perfect battle rifle is already here. AK of course. Perfection is a bang when you pull the trigger. And anything else is gravy.

 

[Shortround6]

Unless, of course, your enemy is on a ridge in arid country 7-800 meters away and armed with old bolt action full power rifle, in which case you might as well throw rocks as fire the AK.
Conversely if in close cover (jungle, heavy woods, town/city) the men with the old bolt actions will be at a considerable disadvantage.

And that is the problem with most "ideal" rifles. They are "ideal" right up until they are in a circumstance where they aren't.

An "ideal" rifle is actually a compromise which covers the greatest number of possible situations since it can't cover 100% of them.

Since some rifles were designed to be "cheap" which includes making them (or their ammunition) on legacy tooling they were less than ideal right out of the gate.

 

[Ivan1GFP]

the 30-06 v 45?
Always go big.
Perfect battle rifle is already here. AK of course. Perfection is a bang when you pull the trigger. And anything else is gravy.

Only problem is that the AK-47 doesn't fit into the category of "Battle Rifle" any more than it does the category of a pistol.

In the context of a design for WW2, the battle rifle made sense. These days I don't think anyone fields a battle rifle as standard anymore.
....Though as Shortround6 pointed out (paraphrasing a bit): The standard weapon is great up until it is not and then the old battle rifle again.

- Ivan.

 

[The Basket]

I find this all the time
A rifle has to be a compromise
So it's not the perfect rifle
It's the perfect compromise.
There once was a rifle with an inbuilt coffee grinder. The only problem is that I don't know if it should be judged against coffee grinders or other rifles.

 

[Ivan1GFP]

There once was a rifle with an inbuilt coffee grinder. The only problem is that I don't know if it should be judged against coffee grinders or other rifles.

My example of that rifle does not have a coffee grinder installed.
I would not use it much anyway; I don't drink much coffee.
(450 grain boolits at 1450 fps and 535 grain boolits at around 1400 fps.)

- Ivan.

 

[The Basket]

Let me tell ya.
Mock about coffee grinding but if you're out in the boondocks for extended periods all wet and cold then a warm cup of something is worth a million dollars. So the guy who put a coffee grinder in the stock knew his business. Army marches on its stomach.

 

[Ivan1GFP]

Let me tell ya.
Mock about coffee grinding but if you're out in the boondocks for extended periods all wet and cold then a warm cup of something is worth a million dollars. So the guy who put a coffee grinder in the stock knew his business. Army marches on its stomach.

Not mocking. Just stating the facts. I don't drink much coffee and my Sharps guns don't have a coffee grinder in their stocks.
I am sure there are better places to put a coffee grinder than in a rifle stock.

- Ivan.

 

[Shortround6]

Model of 1859.
By WW II rations were often somewhat better and Field kitchens were much more common than "camp followers" cooking for the troops on open fires,
Not saying it wasn't done but 80 years had seen some major changes in the day to day life of most armies.

 

[Ivan1GFP]

I suppose the real solution would have been to hire Chinese troops.
Chinese don't mind just drinking hot water with nothing else in it.
I understand Indians (not the North American natives) also have that habit.

- Ivan.

 

[The Basket]

Don't need coffee grinder due to instant coffee nowadays. Although I don't know the quality of coffee grinders in 1860s USA. Another thread perhaps. But if they installed it I would have to summarize that there was a need for it.
But my view is that if an enemy is shooting at you from extremely long range maybe mortars or heavy machine guns is the answer.