Using two sources with respect to make observations about the US standard infantry divs and their artillery capabilities. the first is
David Myers, Unit Organisations WWII (TOEs) Z & M Publishing 1977.
Relevantly at page 51 it says
"this type of division performed well throughout the war when adequately led. Due to a chronic shortage of combat riflemen and the lack of shipping space, the US army insisted that it maintain its heavier artillery and supply echelons under the control of the higher corps and army level commands, often stripping out the heavier artillery allocations from the divisions. Consequently the US infantry was limited in firepower, unless adequately supplied and supported from higher up. This limited its ability to operate ubdependantly in most situations unless significant higher echelon s armoured artillery and logistic support was provided to the unit".
in theory, the divisional TOE called for 36 x 105mm, 12x155mm, 6 x 105 SP. it had 36 ATGs, admittedly by 1944 this was usually in the form of the M-10 TD. This however was an attached unit, not necessarily operating with the Div, the same with the nominal armoured battalion that was listed as attached.
By comparison the British infantry division was roughly twice the size of its US cousin. With its support echelons included, a British infantry division consisted of over 55000 personnel, to the US infantry divs 35000. British infantry divs of 1944 had 72 25 pdrs, 48 x 17 pdr (as part of the divisional slice, not a special attachment as was the case for the 1944 US type div), it was also supported by a full AA regt, including a large number of the hard hitting 3.7 inch guns. all part of the divisional firepower, in stark contrast to the US infantry which were supported by a single bn of AA, which was a bit more variable.
Second source is Shelby Stanton; Order of Battle US army WWII, Presidio Press 1984. Stanton gives an excellent overview of the flux and allocation of specific battalions to and from divisional organisations and it becomes immediately apparent that the lions share of heavier artillery formations were usually placed under the control of higher echelon commands. At page 9 of the book, he states that the divisions capabilities to operate as a fully independent formation were somewhat limited stating " it relied on higher echelon corps and army units ..." and "during the war the formation was reduced in power due to shipping considerations, in which the support echelons (including artillery) was concentrated at higher echelons". . In 1943 there was a 13% cut in personnel, a 23% cut in vehicles and vehicles themselves reduced in size . Artillery allocations were reduced by a whopping 25% . and nearly all of these reductions came out of the heavier calibres.
Stanton is very critical about the lack of numbers in divisions. with only 66 divs available for the ETO, he states " there is a serious question whether this provided enough divs in the light of the sustained and costly campaigns in northern Europe. This resulted in infrequent unit rotation which tended to chew up and exhaust veteran units. stateside divs and those in England were often stripped out for replacements and then shipped out with very poor preparation. ....battlefield opportunities were missed and long sections of front not secured sometimes in areas that proved critical (eg the Ardennes). The fact that successive soviet offensives negated the germans ability to really profit from these shortcomings does not erase the fact that resources were not properly distributed 9to the divisions).".
The US army achieved its mission and functioned well enough, but it did not function outstandingly and suffered from a lack of firepower at divisional level, at the frontline. It outperformed the german army finally in 1944, for a number of reasons, but would not have been able to defeat the germans except for the losses the heer was sustaining on the EF. by 1944, the heer had been bled white, with the ToE of its formations below authorised strengths.Costello estimates the combat strengths of formations on the EF was chronically about 40% and on the west front about 60% (units from the east were rotated to the west to be rebuilt). after the Ardennes these rough comparisons do not hold true. This is not just a criticsm of the US army, the british were even more ham fisted in dealing with the heer, but the US army did not derive any discernible benefits from its Garand equipped infantry that I can see. in the early days the introduction of the garand seems to have acted as part of the constraints that affected army sizes and capabilities later in the war. Even as late as 1944, the authorised ToE of Garands to the division was about 6000 Garands and 4000 carbines. a british Infantry div had about three times that number of enfield rifles, whilst the germans had about the same (though this varied a lot).
