Which side would you fly for?.......

German replacement fighter pilots were basically in an accelerated training program from the beginnings of 1944.... By autumn, the average replacement pilot had about 150 hours, verses over 400 for the American jocks....

Thats not fair, even by todays standards, let alone back in 1944.... Crump and Dortenmann, as well as Weib knew this all to well and went to General of Fighters to complain about this, and in the end, were so disgusted with the training at Sagan that they were beside themselves...

Another thing that we seem to be getting away from, and Bill, u seem to be the most staunch on it, is the whole "The LW was NOT outnumbered"... If the LW put up 300 fighters and the 8th only put up 160 escorts, all these planes did not fly into the same area, nor did they stay in this huge formation of 300 planes to sweep in and destroy everything in sight....

There are many instances that Bill and Erich and myself, as well as others here, that know that many many times, individual Staffel were separated from the group and then bounced by an outnumbering forces of Mustangos... 30 vs 13 is called being outnumbered, and is usually followed by several black smoking holes in the German countryside....

Yea, it didnt happen all the time, but by the way things are starting to sound around here, it seems as though its being called a myth, and thats just not fu*kin right... It did happen, and most of us know it did, and it happened more than any of us will ever know...

There were many instances also where the LW outnumbered the Americans, and thats where the superior training came into play, as u are certainly aware of Bill.... During the mid point of 44, there was a good bit of fuel for the fighter units in combat, but the training facilities were constantly being rationed less and less fuel per pilot...

Point of the matter is this... Under-trained pilots with sometimes extremely poor leadership, as well as horrendous ground vectoring, lead to many situations where the 109s and 190s were severely outnumbered in a certain given area of airspace... There may have been less American escorts in Southern Germany or Northern France at that very moment, compared to what the LW had in the sky, but over the town of Heidelberg or Falaise in Normandy, a fighter sweep of 40 Mustangs bounces a wayward Staffel of 16 109s, and the rest as they say is history....

I had little chat with a LW experten last week and he stated " You'd come out the top of the clouds and there would be aircraft thousands of aircraft all trying to kill you most times we were outnumbered 10 -1 "

Dan - I am not disputing anything you say except I would pinpoint that the bulk of the eperienced pilots went down between Jan and May 1944... and that the replacement pilots with lower time were staring in that timeframe and accelerating in April because so many went down in the first four months of 44.

Nor am I disputing that the LW didn't always have local superiority during those four to five months because they didn't put them all up to blunt just one thrust.

But because so few fighter wings were spread so thin relative to the Target support for three bomb divisions it was very rare for more than one Fighter Group to be up against whatever concentration the LW threw at them in that region of sky. I hate to say this Dan, but do the math on what was available to cover 30-35 Bomb wings past Dummer Lake (~ 47 bingo time then) and then ask yourself "If more than one Group was in position to bounce a German force - how did they know "where and when" to be? and what were they uncovering to get another group in the fight.

As to Pbfoots recollection of a conversation "about thousands coming down at you" - with due respect to the LW pilot there weren't thousands or hundreds or 50's in the local area you were climbing in - not in Jan-May 1944.

Additionally that might have happened occasionally during bad weather when the LW didn't scramble in time (rare) to get an altitude advantage over the inbound bomber stream, but by and large and particularly in those first months when the Target escort was small (relatively speaking) to the available strike force the LW controllers and shadow ships were looking for the 'uncovered spot'

One Fighter group would ordinarily covering a space of 10-20 miles all by its lonesome. There were 15 Fighter Wings at peak to cover 45 bomber wings in 8th AF and it was much less coverage during the first four months of 1944.

So we can agree that we have a different perspective about the numbers of USAAF fighters available to take on the 450+ s/e fighters over German as well as the twins, and we can have a different perspective about the quality - but the German records show a lot of experienced pilots and squadrons being transferred from Russain front to Germany in late 1943 and I don't believe that bunch was heavily populated by the 150 hour replacement pilots.

If someone wishes to challenge my numbers, get different historical sources - for both the 8th AF TO&E for Mustang and Lightning Groups as well as the Luftflotte strengths?

Then tell me how the outnumbered few wings of those 51 and 38 groups were steered and directed to ambush, in 'great' numbers, the few german Fighters that contested the space while the rest of the available German force were unmolested?

On its best day in those four or five months the 8th AF would have 48 escorts over the target (of 5 or six different targets in different locations) for any given two or three bomb wings over 20 miles and most of the time the effectives were closer to 35.

If a REALLY big force with the huge numers attacked in one volume of space you might get a second wing engaging and this happened more frequently as the 8th transitioned to 51s and the 47s got the range to go to Berlin and back

Your point that 30 might bounce 13 is of course correct - and vice versa. But even if a group were at full strength it was rare that all three squadrons engaged - not if they were doing their job correctly.

The Good (responsible) ones tried to keep sections in place to cover the vacuum as they released one section after another to engage. If you saw a group that frequently engaged everybody you hadda ask 'what about covering the bombers'?? I have opinions about one or two that had that reputation but I don't comment on the specifics. For one thing I wasn't there.

But Dan - most of the people that comment on overwhelming numbers of fighters in the 8th AF in 1944 overlook the point that most of that Fighter force had to turn back near Bremen, Hannover, Frankfurt line while the 51s picked up the Penetration and Target Support from there all the way to Munich or Berlin or Posnan - or thereabouts.

The LW wasn't stupid - they withdrew much of their force (except JG2 and JG26) from France and the Lowlands and put JG1, 3, 5, 11, 27, 53, 54, 300, 301, 302 into Germany in the first months of 44... and those had Fw190s that could Fight - not the A8/R2 deathtraps de jour from July forward. Each one of the Jagds in January had 9+ staffeln with 10-12 effectives so each was the equivalent of perhaps two Mustang groups if the entire Jagd went maximum effort. Some of the above did not have a full compliment and some were split between Germany and other fronts (like JG5, JG53, JG54,JG301, JG302), etc

In addition the other side of the equation is that the long range escort focused first on the Zerstorer and NJG units with the firepower - that was another 374+ t/e ships available to attack those 31 bomb wings.. the math says the few long range fighter wings could be challenged at any point on the route by very large chunks of the available 374 t/e plus 479 s/e fighters.

The Germans couldn't concentrate 'em all but the fighters couldn't cover evrybody and had far fewer to respond to skill German controllers... who knew where they wanted to be and our guys had exactly one place where they were assigned to be.

The net is that I agree most of your points 100% - and leave room for common agreement on the rest.

I think as I look your post over again that our prime difference in point of view is the relative quality of the Luftwaffe Fighter arm in Luft3 and Luft Reich in January 1944. So I will repeat what I believe (about German relative strength) and what I know - 8th AF precise strength on January 1, 1944

I believe top to bottom that the Germans had far more experience and equivalent Fighter log time on 1 January than all of 8th FC and way more than the 354th and 357FG which were within two weeks and 6 weeks of being the first Mustang Target Support forces.. and that the 20th was in ops for 3 whole days,while the 55th had been flying for two whole months in their ratty engine blowing 38s.

Over the following four months till the end of April, 1944 the 4th/355th then the 352nd would join the Target escort force with buggy Mustangs and the 364th FG would come on ops in March. Then the 339th on 30 April, the 359th and 361st got their 51s in May, along with Robin Olds and 38s for the 479th.

January 1 ------> two P-38 groups operational
February 1------> " plus one 51 group
March 1---------> " plus 3 51 groups operational
April 1-----------> three P-38 groups plus four 51 groups operational
May 1-----------> three P-38 groups plus six 51 groups operational

....to escort 27 Bomb wings on January 1 and 31 Bomb wings deep into Germany on 1 May... three Long range fighter groups per Air Division, three Fighter groups to cover 10+ bomb wings of 40-45 bombers each stretched out for 30 miles over the target. That is May 1

On March 6 it was 5 fighter wings to cover 30 bomb wings to Berlin.. just less than two per 10 bomb wing column over 30+ miles

Tell me that this is an overwhelming force or had more than enough combat experience and log time to offset German forces but help me understand your point of view as to why I am wrong?


I won't goof around on this subject with people that I have already debated with - if my math and logic ain't right why embarass myself with the ones that have better facts than me?

Warm Regards,

Bill

Dan/Chris - another footnote to the discussions about air battles in the ETO. You may know more about this subject and just skip to the end

It occured to me that a lot of people on this forum think of the air battles over Germany as large formations of USAAF fighters picking on small formations of German fighters the same way every day.

The tactics and distributions of squadrons, flights and sections were very different depending on whether you were flying a Freelance Fighter Sweep or a Ramrod escorting bombers or were flying an Area Patrol down low under Beachy Head Control.

In the Sweep, the squadrons were untethered and more likely to fly a relatively compact formation strung out 600-1000+ yards. The formation would just as likely be line abreast in 'flight units' for each squadron and eschelon up and down to avoid m/a and collisions. Each squadron would be in trail with room between each. This formation is much better suited to every body having a chance to engage when a LW formation was spotted - and no requirement to leave anybody behind to escort bombers.

In the Ramrod, the three squadrons would be strung front to back and each squadron likesly to be broken up into sections of two flights each - essing one above the other to cover high and rear- above the bombers. Typically one squadron may be out in front and about 1-2 thousand feet above the lead box of bombers. There would usually be the high middle squadron somewhat higher, relatively, above the High Bomber squadrons ot give a little more buffer from high attacks and also have more energy to dive and help out the other two in a fight.. same sections, same 'essing' - then the other squadron would be in trail. Variation would be lead high, one aft qtr and side, both high on each side.

On the Area Partol - rare for the Group to be together - too many in close area, low to ground is trouble so squadrons would often be broken up with different assignements in different places. This would likely be more of a tactical spread with one set of eyes looking ahead and another high and behind. They would have an assigned target to bomb and strafe or were under Beachy Head or Type 16 Control

This scenario is where the LW scored biggest during Normandy campaign, catching our fighters from above and behind with minimum manuever room where the Fw190 and 109 could really perform against the 47 and 51. This is a scenario where the Allies (not just 8th FC) may get caught at a significant disadvantage numerically, altitude and performance wise.

The reason I bring this up is that during the Sweep - the 8th AF Group in this role is the most likely to a.) have a numerical advantage and b.) have an altitude advantage because they were c.) out in front where the LW would be logically trying to form up. This is where your 30-13 analogy really rings true!

During the Escort the usual mode was for LW staffeln to engage from higher altitudes. They would sent a couple of flights through and hope everybody would miss the 50 more 10,000 feet higher. The reaction would be to send a section to climb and engage the first batch if seen, or send a section after the divers or sit tight.

If the attackers found a weak spot and concentrated then usually only one squadron would be close enough to engage at same altitude before the attackers split S and waved 'bye' - so it was rare for more than parts of a squadron to engage at any one time - but over the course of 30-40 minutes there may be five or six smaller unit engagements in which flights and sections are engaged while another squadron may hear a lot but see notthing because of cloud cover, contrails in wrong place, etc

In these scenarios it was far more likely for the LW to have both a local numerical superiority and and altitude advantage, and if steered correctly a significant critical mass.

This is another topic I won't bore you with again but it is core to my other beliefs regarding the nature of the air war over daylight Germany Jan1 -May1, 1944.

Regards,

Bill

drgondog said:

Dan -

As to Pbfoots recollection of a conversation "about thousands coming down at you" - with due respect to the LW pilot there weren't thousands or hundreds or 50's in the local area you were climbing in - not in Jan-May 1944.

Regards,

Bill

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Don't **** me now .....it was an the mans impression and I believe he is somewhat of a better pilot then most

I am not denigrating his memory. I had the very same discussion with Rall, Krupinski and Galland, along with quite a few other American Aces back in 85(?) Fighter Aces Reunion at Champlin Museum.

I have studied this specific subject and analyzed till I was blue in the face by the time I asked this question. I asked a lot of questions of the fighter pilot community I grew up with and was comfortable with presnting the subject to Toliver first as he was close to Galland and I didn't want to offend anyone with the 'question'.

When pressed, to a man the three agreed the points I made about the relative weakness of Mustang units early to mid 1944.

I wish Toliver was alive as he was in that conversation and for that matter if anyone has a contact point with Rall, I could possibly steer him to remember this subject.

BTW - the real answer is not question of numerical superiority - it was that Goering basically ordered the LW to attack the bombers and ignore the fighters - which each of the three well knew was stupid and just cut well honed aggression out of a great fighter arm.

Pb - don't take my word or logic or data - just work it out yourself. Do the math on the numbers. Look at the long range mission, the assignments and the resources available to bomb beyond coverage of P-47s.

Paint a mental picture of 30 bomb wings/10 bomb wings per division - each Division heading to a different target region of Germany or all in one direction to same target but an hour long procession..

In the case of march 6, 1944, imagine a 100 mile line with each Bomb Group/wing occupying 2000+ feet wide and 3000 feet deep in a two+ mile long volume of rarified air and position each of the 3 Mustang Groups and two Lightning groups available on March 6, 1944 to cover 6 Wings each. So perhaps 48 fighters to see, react and meet the LW within a 15-20 mile block?

Optimal formation flying and control of space between each wing - no screw ups or lagging formations

Assume the Germans want to punish the bombers but not tangle with the fighters.

Assume the germans have close to 800 s/e and t/e fighters that they can distribute as they choose...but maybe only put up half theri force

Assume the 5 Fighter groups have no aborts and they put 48 fighters each into their assigned place.. so 240 versus 400.

Demonstrate to me (or ignore me and just please yourself) how the USAAF Fighter Groups achieves parity consistently, much less any numerical advantage?

I can illustrate as many times as you wish where smaller forces of fighters are attacking larger forces of German fighters in both Encounter Reports and mission histories. You will see same but opposite in LW reports.

Do the math and get your own conclusion - I'm comfortable with mine but I am equally comfortable that you believe what you believe about this subject based on multiple inputs.

Regards,

Bill

OK but what was the servicability rate of the various LW units remembering that many were double and triple tasked with both night and day duties American units were never shy of equipment and had spare aircraft ready in case one or several had snags also take into consideration the work with the 9th AF certainly the A20s 25s and 26s went out the same days as part of comprehensive strategy these were also escorted probably by the RAF/RCAF . How the fighters were vectored in by the GCI guys and how many was a guessing game how many LW aircraft actually saw the targets they were vectored in on . Meanwhile the 51's etc were in a concentrated area not attacking piecemeal

PB - the numbers I gave you are for the 1 May 1944 Order of Battle for the Luftflotte Reich - solely s/e and t/e fighters based in Germany - excluding JG2 and JG3. The 439 s/e (Me109s and Fw190s only) figure was the number in service - the 'auhtorized' count was much higer. The data can be found in Doctor Alfred Price's "The Luftwaffe Data book" published 1977. The data for Luftflotte 3 and Luftflotte Reich are found pg 92 -125.

Luft Reich was the force available to resist daylight and night attacks on Germany. Luft 3 was based in France and Netherlands and Belgium and available to attack RAF and USAAF inbound and outbound to Germany

In addition to the s/e fighters ZG 1, 26 and 76 had an additional 67 210 1nd 410s - way down from their Jan 1 levels. But these were all targeted to B-17s and B-24s penetrating Germany beyond the range p-47s. This number does not include the extra 300+ NJG units which did night and day defense - your 'double duty' fighters.

You closed with "Meanwhile the 51's etc were in a concentrated area not attacking piecemeal"

What did you mean by that?

There were three P-51 wings on March 6 and six Mustang wings at the end of May, 1944 covering 32 Bomb wings penetrating deep into Germany. Just how did they manage to be in a 'concentrated area' where they enjoyed numerical superiority.

No B-26s or A-20s or B-26s or B-25s or P-47s to dilute the Luftwaffe Reich's attention deep into Germany - only the 8th and occasionally the 12th and 15th down south where Luft2 and Lw Kdo Sud Ost were available to assist from the South.

So how did the three Mustang groups in march and six in May manage to 'concentrate themselves' to cover 100 miles of bomb wings? Pick your technique, and tell us how 8th AF directed Mustangs from one formation to another so they could concentrate.

Regards,

Bill

Bill

Sorry I have not spent years reading numbers but I have spent years reading and listening. Your theory is good if no other unit on the Allied side is flying I do believe the RAF, RAAf ,RNZAF,RCAF also flew on the same days as the USAAF they didn't stop flying in awe of the USAAF. Do you really think the LW dropped everything else on their plate just to attack the USAAF. Think about it coastal strikes ,day rangers ,gardening etc these "auxilliary units" also had a hand in diverting the LW.
on a quick search I found this

"The terrible pressure on the fighter force culminated in the five-month period between January and May of 1944. The Luftwaffe was already in serious trouble at the beginning of the year. On 31 December 1943 the Luftwaffe had 2395 single-engine pilots in combat squadrons deployed throughout Europe. Of these pilots only 1495 were fully operational (62 percent), 291 were partially combat-ready (12 percent), and 691 were not operationally ready under any circumstances (26 percent). This force lost no less than 2262 fighter pilots in the next five months—close to 100 percent of the number reporting for duty at the turn of the year.27 In a conference with Herman Göring in mid-May, General Adolf Galland admitted that Luftflotte Reich (responsible for air defense over northern Germany) had lost 38 percent of its fighter pilots in April, while Luftflotte 3 (responsible for air defense over France and southern Germany) had lost 24 percent of its fighter pilots.28

The laconic reports of II Gruppe/JG 53 indicate what happened to that unit in the months of May and August. In the former month the unit reported:

(A) Operations took place on thirteen days. Twenty-one scrambles, fifteen of which resulted in combats.

(B) Average aircraft strength thirty-four; average serviceability twenty.

(C) Fifty-three aircraft lost or damaged. Of these: (1) extent: thirty-four 100%, three over 60%, nine over 35%, seven under 35%, (2) reason: thirty-three through Allied action, four [through] technical faults, sixteen owing [to] servicing faults. . . ."

PB - I failed to make myself clear. Yes the RAF, RNZAF, RCAF, 8th AF P-47 groups, 9th AF P-47 groups ALL stopped flying east of Bremen and Frankfurt - simply because they don't make it back before running out of fuel.

What I gave you in the context of 2 Lightning and three Mustang groups is ALL there were to contest the Germans over Berlin, Munich, Brunswick, Ruhland, Leipzig, etc

Back to your figures for "38% Lost in Lufflotte Reich" ----> mostly due to the 8th AF bombers and those few mangy USAAF fighters that had the range to go deep (see above). Stick with Luftflotte Reich and stick to the maximum number of P-38 and P-51 Groups available between Jan 1 and May 1 1944.

That was the Daylight Battle for Air over Germany.

That was ALL the Allied fighters avialable to go to Berlin, Munich, Brunswick and beyond. Every single one was in those few groups. Not one RAF day fighter. Not one RNAF, RAAF, RCAF or 8th/9th AF P-47... just the 3 to six between 1/1 and 5/1/44. Period.

That is the point I am painfully, but not very clearly, trying to make.

Regards,

Bill

PS - EVERYBODY got a piece of Lflotte 3 because everybody could go to France, Belgium and Holland. RAF/9th/8th AF Fighter Groups.. but L3 was only about 1/5 size of LReich

drgondog said:

- but the German records show a lot of experienced pilots and squadrons being transferred from Russain front to Germany in late 1943 and I don't believe that bunch was heavily populated by the 150 hour replacement pilots.

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I agree with u in 1943, as well as the loss of many aces and experten

I would pinpoint that the bulk of the experienced pilots went down between Jan and May 1944... and that the replacement pilots with lower time were staring in that timeframe and accelerating in April because so many went down in the first four months of 44.

Click to expand...

most of the people that comment on overwhelming numbers of fighters in the 8th AF in 1944 overlook the point that most of that Fighter force had to turn back near Bremen, Hannover, Frankfurt line while the 51s picked up the Penetration and Target Support from there all the way to Munich or Berlin or Posnan - or thereabouts.

Click to expand...

Very true statement....

The LW wasn't stupid - they withdrew much of their force (except JG2 and JG26) from France and the Lowlands and put JG1, 3, 5, 11, 27, 53, 54, 300, 301, 302 into Germany in the first months of 44... and those had Fw190s that could Fight -

Click to expand...

One of the reasons was because they were decimated to the point of being inneffective.... One stafflen putting up 4 planes aint gonna work...

I think as I look your post over again that our prime difference in point of view is the relative quality of the Luftwaffe Fighter arm in Luft3 and Luft Reich in January 1944. So I will repeat what I believe (about German relative strength) and what I know -

Click to expand...

I would agree with u on the strength of the LW during January 44, as well as the number of experten and KC winners in the air...

Tell me that this is an overwhelming force or had more than enough combat experience and log time to offset German forces but help me understand your point of view as to why I am wrong?

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I dont think ur wrong at all... I was just pointing out some things that seemed to have gotten looked over.... I was also thinking more in terms of the latter part of 1944, not the beginnings... U made several valid points that are the same as my views...

As far as Im aware, not every bomber had a fighter covering him at all times... (that was a joke) The Mustangos couldnt be everywhere at one time, and usually, and I say usually loosely, the LW didnt attack a group of bombers with 40 190s in the stern attack...

Blah blah blah, we agree with each other more than we disagree so Im happy....

I won't goof around on this subject with people that I have already debated with - if my math and logic ain't right why embarass myself with the ones that have better facts than me?

Click to expand...

U have more facts than I do Bill, and ur opinion is more educated than mine... I cant say that about many here so.....

It occured to me that a lot of people on this forum think of the air battles over Germany as large formations of USAAF fighters picking on small formations of German fighters the same way every day.

Click to expand...

Not true at all....

Demonstrate to me (or ignore me and just please yourself) how the USAAF Fighter Groups achieves parity consistently, much less any numerical advantage?

Click to expand...

I cant do that from early to mid 44, but I can definatly say that certain LOCAL numerical superiority situations were sincerely favored to the Allies...

I can illustrate as many times as you wish where smaller forces of fighters are attacking larger forces of German fighters in both Encounter Reports and mission histories. You will see same but opposite in LW reports.

Click to expand...

And I can as well, as I too have read too many contact reports in my 41 years, and Im sure uve gone through more than myself... Ive had disussions with certain US pilots that said the same thing about attacking a larger sized LW force, and some that were bounced by a smaller force of 109s and got hammered...

War is hell aint it???

PBFOOT said:

I do believe the RAF, RAAf ,RNZAF,RCAF also flew on the same days as the USAAF they didn't stop flying in awe of the USAAF. Do you really think the LW dropped everything else on their plate just to attack the USAAF. Think about it coastal strikes ,day rangers ,gardening etc these "auxilliary units" also had a hand in diverting the LW.

Click to expand...

Gotta agree with u there pB... Very good point to bring up...

That is the point I am painfully, but not very clearly, trying to make.

Click to expand...

I got u Bill....

Dan/PB - this one is worth talking about just a little bit because of impressions that could inadvertantly be left behind?


Quote:
Originally Posted by PBFOOT
I do believe the RAF, RAAf ,RNZAF,RCAF also flew on the same days as the USAAF they didn't stop flying in awe of the USAAF. Do you really think the LW dropped everything else on their plate just to attack the USAAF. Think about it coastal strikes ,day rangers ,gardening etc these "auxilliary units" also had a hand in diverting the LW.

Dan - Gotta agree with u there pB... Very good point to bring up...

Although I touched on this in the previous thread - I want to be very clear on this part of the discussion I never intended to imply that the LW 'dropped' everything just to attack USAAF, nor did the R's (RAF, RNZAF, etc) stop flying, in 'awe of the USAAF'

Here is what was happening Jan-May 1944 for PB's benefit.

The entire fury of daytime ops from England for the R's were inflicted within escort range of Spit IX and XIV's, Mustang II's, Typhoons and Tempests for the B-25/A-20s', etc and other light and medium bombers. They were supporting both British AND American efforts all over France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark (a stretch)..

The 8th AF P-47 groups plus some 9th 47 groups were performing inbound and outbound escorts to both 8th BC and 9th AF Mediums to the limits of their range. That limit was roughly a radius curve through Bremen and south to Hannover. It covered the Ruhr and places like Munster, Frankfurt and Stuttgart (a stretch).

The 51's picked up Penetration, Target and Withdrawal Support for the Strategic Heavy Bomber deep raids to Leipzig, Brunswick, Ruhland, Augsburg, Kassel, Munich, Kiel, Hamburg, Merseburg, Misburg, Schweinfurt, Regensburg, etc, etc.

Neither the R's nor the 47s could go there. Mossies had other things to do.

But, effectively JG26 and JG2 in Lufflotte 3 had what was known as "a target rich environment' and could merrily choose to fight against overwhelming numbers of any nationality de jour that suited them... and they weren't near as constrained by 'Fatso' stupid directives to 'avoid the fighter escort' because they had no choice as many of their missions were trying to blunt fighter sweeps or simply trying to stay alive when 70% of the 8th AF Fighter Command plus most of the 9th and all of British TAC air was playing in their sandbox. They were all of Lufflotte 3 single engine fighters available. They occasionally pitched in on the 38s and 51s when they could ambush them going in to meet the bombers or coming home over their 'patch'

Occasionally JG11 and JG53 and and JG3 located more in Central zone could pitch in to help Luft 3, but mostly they waited for the 47's to turn back and then all the Luftflotte Reich had to deal with was 1000 B-17s and B-24s plus 100-250 (max 'effective') long range fighters from 354FG and 20th (P38) and 55th (P-38) from Jan11 forward, then 4th and 355th and 364th (P38) from 2/28-3/8 forward, the 352FG from ~4/10 forward to May1.

Last of the boring summaries -
On Jan1 approximately 96 P-38s would start engines and approximately 40 would actually make the target. This is ALL of the ALLIED fighters available to escort 8th BC past Dummer Lake on January 1, 1944.

On March 1, 144 P-51s could start engines, 96 P-38's would start engines - ~120 would make the target because of mechanical malfunctions in new airplanes..

On May1, 366 combined P-51s and P-38s would SE and more than 60% (~220) would reach the target.. (By August the P-51s reliability was up around 75% effective)

PB - No, the RAF didn't quit, nor did the 56th or 353rd or 78th or 356th (all P-47) quit - they (rest of 8th AF) just could not go to Central and Far Germany until mid to late May. On May 1, 1944 only half of 8th AF Fighter Command's ultimate build up could be available to escort 8th BC in the numbers I just described.

I apologise to you both for 'death by prose'

Regards,

Bill

Good post Bill...

axis,i'd love 2 fly a late italian plane like the Centauro or Sagittaro or other rare aircraft.
thats why im so happy about my il2 complete edition, i can fly fiat cr.42's, c,200,c.202 ,c.205 ,even a PZL.p11 or I.A.R.80/81 ,or the weirdo TB-3

I appreciate the jist of your point and I'm not arguing the fact of nominal support for the heavies all I am trying to say is I can't fathom the LW being any where as a effective a fighter force as it was in previous years lprior to 44 attrition of the experianced aircrew was extremely high and its really not a place to learn on the job . Its pretty hard to cram tactics gunnery formation flying and basic flight training into 150 hours starting off in a 100 hp Arados and moving up into the realm of 2000hp crotch rockets . Would you let some one with a 150 hrs fly your p51

slight comeback but this to add to Bills post. From late 1943 Heavy twin engine gruppen were brought back from the Ost front redeveloped tactics used and up-gunned the Bf 110G-2 with heavy cannon and additional Br 21cm rockets. In fact it was a July 1943 directive that I have a copy of that directed that all available S/E and twin E units were to take part in the defense of the Homeland, the utmost and most primary mission was to be "bring down US heavy bombers"

PB - in my humble opinion the deciding factor was Oct 43 through April 44 when the LW commanders were ordered to Ignore the Fighter Escort.

Americans are aggressive enough without being encouraged by perfectly good 109s and 190s as they split S and dove away. The 8th and 9th FC pilots got epxerience, made mistakes and survived to learn from them.

What the LW should have done in retrospect is specifically bounce every formation of P-47s and attempt to wipe them out early, each time taking a toll of experience. For sure they needed to meet them on the coast and try to force dropping of external fuel tanks early.

Having said that I think it would have only delayed the outcome as the 56th, 353rd and 4th and 78th were developing into very good organizations by that time and the key performance boosters in paddle blade props and longer range tanks were on the way.

These debates are good vehicles to test 'accepted tribal knowledge'

Regards,

Bill

seriously Bill in my estimation is that the LW should of inacted a furtherance of it's night time campaign in 1941 with Fernenachtjagd- long distnace night fighting. well during the day having all LW pilots trained in night and bad weather flying able to come over and strafe and bomb Allied airfields in England at un-Godly early morning hours instead of just waiting and listening to all the fighter/bomber engines engage, take off and get into formation and come over and paste Germany, etc........

as we have well noted the LW hierarchy including the FAT ONE made some huge blunders that cost Germany dearly

well there was that one part in Battle of Britain (the movie) where the German Squad leader asks for a squad of spitfires and po's the herman goering or whatever his name was guy...
I'd go with allies anyways.

Bird-Nerd said:

well there was that one part in Battle of Britain (the movie) where the German Squad leader asks for a squad of spitfires and po's the herman goering or whatever his name was guy...
I'd go with allies anyways.

Click to expand...

That "Squad Leader" was Adolph Galland.