Which was more valuable: mass production of the Jumo 213 in 1942 or Jumo 222 in 1943?

[wiking85]

Assuming one of the following options were available, which would have been better for the LW assuming they worked: mass production of a 1750hp Jumo 213 in mid/late 1942 or waiting for a 2000hp Jumo 222 in early/mid1943? The 213 would probably be upgraded to 2000hp status in production in 1944, while the 222 would reach 2500hp in production in 1944.
As far as physical characteristics, the 222 is about 130kg heavier, 130mm longer, and IIRC about 400mm wider. The 222 is more complex, but more fuel efficient due to its smaller cylinders, which allow for greater fuel efficiency; unlike the Napier Sabre, the layout of the 222 doesn't make it nearly as complex to service, but it does have to be removed from its mounting to be properly looked after.

I'm inclined to see the 222 as worth waiting for, as at best the 213 will be cleared for mass production 12 months early, if even that, and will take a while to phase in, while not offering that much of a boost over existing engines given that it would require major retooling. Waiting an extra 12 months for the Jumo 222 (if not altered in power output it should be entering limited production in late 1942 and full production in early 1943). In all assuming the best case scenario for both engines the 213 would get into production perhaps 6 months earlier than the 222, while not needing as much retooling/retraining to produce, but still causing significant disruptions to existing engine production. The 222 on the other hand, with it working it wouldn't cause much disruption due to Ostmark being able to start on schedule with Jumo 222 production, rather than needing to be modified to produce a different engine, be it the 213 or DB603. Plus future power output of the 222 is superior to the 213; by 1943 Jumo engineers had a 2500hp version working without changing the bore and stoke of the 222:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Jumo_222

Junkers still did not give up. Using the original 46.4 litre displacement A/B design, they added a new two-stage supercharger including a trio of aftercoolers, one per pair of neighboring cylinder banks for high-altitude use, producing the 222E and F-series. Although sea-level performance was unchanged, the engine was able to produce 1,439 kW (1,930 hp) at 9,000 m (29,530 ft). By this point it appeared that the problems were finally being worked out, but bombing of the Junkers Motorenwerke's headquarters factories in Dessau made production almost impossible.

The difference is that with Ostmark in production of the 222 in 1943 the 2500hp version could be phased in even with Dessau being bombed, rather than the historical version of waiting to boost power before putting in production and then having production plans wrecked by administrative fiat bombing of the sole production facility set up for it at Dessau.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Jumo_213#Specifications_.28Jumo_213E.29

General characteristics
Type: 12-cylinder supercharged liquid-cooled inverted Vee piston aircraft engine
Bore: 150 mm (5.906 in)
Stroke: 165 mm (6.496 in)
Displacement: 35 L (2,135.2 in³)
Length: 2,266 mm (89.2 in)
Dry weight: 940 kg (2,072 lb)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Jumo_222#Specifications_.28Jumo_222A.29

General characteristics
Type: 6-bank, 24-cylinder supercharged liquid-cooled in-line aircraft engine
Bore: 135 mm (5.3 in)
Stroke: 135 mm (5.3 in)
Displacement: 46.5 L (2,830 in³)
Length: 2,400 mm (94.5 in)
Diameter: 1,160 mm (45.7 in)
Dry weight: 1,088 kg (2,399 lb)

 

[Denniss]

By mid/late 42 you could have a Jumo 211 with ~1500/1550 PS (211 F/J with more rpm) but not a 213 with 1750 PS. Both of these options were rarely seen even in 1943.

 

[davebender]

Original 2,000hp version of Jumo 222 would have entered mass production during spring of 1942. What's wrong with that option?

 

[wiking85]

Original 2,000hp version of Jumo 222 would have entered mass production during spring of 1942. What's wrong with that option?

Where? It might have been cleared for mass production in mid-1942, but Ostmark wasn't supposed to be making major delivers until 1943 and only Dessau would have been putting any out in 1942 unless they phased it in in Stettin (which phased out production in 1942) or somewhere else, which would take a minimum of 6 months to get into production, which puts us back to late 1942 at the earliest for initial low output mass production.

Jumo production figures in 1942 on:
Junkers Engines - Jumo 213

 

[davebender]

Ostmark production start will not be delayed as long as Germany sticks to the original plan.

Jumo 222 tooling was ordered during fall of 1941. Ostmark factory construction completed during March 1942. That was the original plan and it works for me.

 

[Shortround6]

Aside from nobody knows if the if the Jumo 222 actually worked?

Don't bother to trot out when it passed a type test, instead figure out how many planes actually flew with Jumo 222s in 1942. Or look at planes that flew with other engines after the first 2-3 planes with Jumo 222s flewbecause there weren't enough flight cleared Jumo 222s.

Mass production of the Jumo 222 in 1942 might have been one of greatest favors the allies could have received.

 

[DonL]

To answer the question, clearly the Jumo 213 and also the DB 603.

The Bomber B and the Jumo 222 and DB 604X has shown clearly one of the weakest points of the RLM and LW. Not be able to concentrate or to built a focal point, but to fritter, because there was nobody with a leading character, technical understanding and a clear concept after the death of Wever.

All the right developments were existing, engines and a/c's before and at the beginning of the war, but the RLM was not able to use them and concentrate them.
The RLM shows the classical exampel, how you can fritter despite a very good base.

The clear opposite shows the RAF, which concentrate it's base in the right directions

If we are lookong at the engine base DB 601 DB 603, Jumo 211 and BMW 801 and also the Jumo 213 was on the horizon at 1940, nothing more were needed except the development of the jet engines.

Also at the a/c's all was there!

Me 109, Ju 88, Do 17/215, Do 217, He 177, FW 190 and Me 110 or to my opinion more the FW 187. The only development that was in need was the Ju 252 to replace the Ju 52 and the development of Jets.

We had tons of threads how you can make the Me 109 better, to my understanding there was a lot of potential, but no Messerschmitt was busy with the Me 210, 209, 309, Me 264 and all other crap instead to concentrate only on the Me 109 and Me 262.

I can write to every company, engine and a/c novels, how they all fritter instead of concentrate on the important points.

Imagine no Ju 288, FW 191, Me 210, 209, 309, 264 and all other nameless crap projects.

FW works only on the FW 190 and alternative FW 187 and do development and research to the next generation a/c's, which are jets.
Messerschmitt works only on the Me 109, Me 110 and Me 262
Heinkel works only the He 177 and do development and reasearch on jets and jet engines
Junkers works only on the Ju 88, Ju 252 and the Ju 87
Dornier works only on the Do 17/215 and Do 217.

BMW only works on the 801 and 003
Daimler only worls on the DB 601/605 and DB 603
Junkers only works on the Jumo 211/213 and 004

This would be concentration and to my opinion with a lot better results!

 

[tomo pauk]

A somewhat related news, re. Junkers engines: the book "Junkers Flugtriebwerke" will likely to go into the print again (link) by June 2014. The listed price is just under 40€; today people are asking almost 10 times as much for second hand examples, printed in 2005.

 

[davebender]

There's more then one possible solution for building an effective Luftwaffe. Most important thing is to create a master plan early on and stick with it.

If Luftwaffe wants an air cooled radial engine larger then BMW132 then development should begin during 1935. If Luftwaffe wants more powerful V12 engine then development of DB603 and/or Jumo213 engines should begin as soon as DB601 and Jumo211 engines enter production. If Luftwaffe wants V24 engine those programs would begin about 1936 ILO DB603 and Jumo 213 engines. If Luftwaffe wants coupled DB606 engine they must spend money to perfect power egg mounting starting NLT 1938. Any of these programs can succeed if begun early on, given adequate development funding and if RLM doesn't keep changing the specifications.

In addition you've got to calculate how much aviation gasoline will be required and build enough hydrogenation plants. Otherwise your high tech engines and airframes will never achieve their full potential.

 

[wiking85]

This would be concentration and to my opinion with a lot better results!

You make a good point; the US military report on German research establishments produced in 1947 noted that although Germany had some of the very best research facilities and personnel in the world, they very badly managed them; they dispersed effort and did not direct research enough causing them to only yield what the US thought was between 1/2 or 1/10 of what they could have under better management. They especially note the excellent facilities for engine development and both the US and British were astonished how many projects the Germans had and how if they had focused on 1/2 as many or less they could have actually produced far more powerful and workable engines than they historically managed to achieve.

My impression is that the Udet era really screwed the Luftwaffe and they never recovered from it. Of course there was a serious lack of investment in aviation engine production relative to the airframe industry, which Milch deserves some blame for and IIRC he acknowledged later.

 

[davebender]

Udet era gave Luftwaffe the Me-109 and Ju-88. Together these programs amounted to over half the Luftwaffe aircraft production effort. Nothing much to criticize with those programs. Mass production at it's finest.

Problem child concerns follow-on engine development and the remaining airframe programs. Aircraft such as He-219, Fw-189, Hs.126, Ju-87, Ju-290, Fw-200, Do-217 and Hs.129 were procured in quantities too small for efficient mass production.

 

[rinkol]

One of the things that strikes me was the indecision with which engine and airframe development was managed in Germany. Several examples:

1. The Jumo 222 went through several iterations during which cylinder dimensions were changed (a rather fundamental change in any aircraft engine). This reflected changing requirements for the JU 288 program, which itself went through major changes.
2. Junkers carried out development of a large number of diesel aircraft engines Jumo 205, 206, 207, 208 and 223, of which only the Jumo 205 and 207 reached service.
3. Daimler-Benz carried out development of a large number of variations on the DB 601, 605 and 603. Although many of these mainly involved different supercharger arrangements, it is curious that hardly any DB engines ever reached service with two stage superchargers.
4. BMW devoted significant resources to the development of the BMW 803. It is difficult to believe that there was ever any serious expectation that this engine would reach service in time to contribute to the war. For bombers, a simpler and more reliable solution was surely to use multiple BMW 801s. Furthermore, as this engine would have had little commonality with the BMW 801, work carried out on its development would have had limited applicability to the BMW 801/802.

It does seem that many of these programs could have been better focused. Aside from this, engine development seems to have slowed in the 1939-1940 time frame. There is a gap of several years between the availability of the the DB601A and Jumo 211A/B and their follow on developments (DB601E/F and Jumo 211F/J) . I can only speculate on the factors; perhaps both diversions of resources to other projects and thorny technical problems were factors.

 

[wiking85]

Udet era gave Luftwaffe the Me-109 and Ju-88. Together these programs amounted to over half the Luftwaffe aircraft production effort. Nothing much to criticize with those programs. Mass production at it's finest.

Both of those projects originated under Walter Wever, Wilhelm Wimmer, and Erhard Milch's tenure pre-Udet. All Udet contributed was the dive bombing requirement for the Ju88 and the vast over emphasis on it in production that horribly unbalanced the LW and left them with a compromised design that couldn't even be used for what it was good at (fast bombing, heavy fighter, night fighter/intruder, recon) because it had to be Germany's medium bomber; the lesson of it and the modern F-35 project is that trying to have one aircraft do everything is not a good idea; some specialization is necessary.

Problem child concerns follow-on engine development and the remaining airframe programs. Aircraft such as He-219, Fw-189, Hs.126, Ju-87, Ju-290, Fw-200, Do-217 and Hs.129 were procured in quantities too small for efficient mass production.

The He-219 was an unnecessary duplication of effort. The Fw-189 was limited due to having a limited recon role; it was just fine as it was. The Ju87 (over 5000 were produced), Fw200, Ju290 were all of limited utility and the latter two were only the result of the early war and the failure of the He177 project; they were stop gaps that were needed with the war on. The Do-217 was a replacement for the He111, but war circumstances prevented it from being widely available, also poor planning was the problem there mainly stemming from the vast over reliance on the Ju88. The He-129 was again a specialized aircraft, but a poor design, so it need not have been mass produced and frankly shouldn't have been once the Ju87G and FW190F and G were in production. It was more a case of throw everything we've got into the ring and hope it works.

 

[wiking85]

One of the things that strikes me was the indecision with which engine and airframe development was managed in Germany. Several examples:

1. The Jumo 222 went through several iterations during which cylinder dimensions were changed (a rather fundamental change in any aircraft engine). This reflected changing requirements for the JU 288 program, which itself went through major changes.

Administrative sabotage of the Bomber B program due to a political war in the RLM when Milch took back over in December 1941.

2. Junkers carried out development of a large number of diesel aircraft engines Jumo 205, 206, 207, 208 and 223, of which only the Jumo 205 and 207 reached service.

Yeah, the RLM, specifically Udet allowed anything to go and Jumo was just trying to get as many contracts as possible to suck up as much money as possible.

3. Daimler-Benz carried out development of a large number of variations on the DB 601, 605 and 603. Although many of these mainly involved different supercharger arrangements, it is curious that hardly any DB engines ever reached service with two stage superchargers.

Same deal, DB was proposing anything to get lots of development money and hoping it would pay off in major some major production contract; that's why its important to have a competent technical department that can prioritize and say no; once Udet was in there he didn't stop saying yes because he was afraid to say no.

4. BMW devoted significant resources to the development of the BMW 803. It is difficult to believe that there was ever any serious expectation that this engine would reach service in time to contribute to the war. For bombers, a simpler and more reliable solution was surely to use multiple BMW 801s. Furthermore, as this engine would have had little commonality with the BMW 801, work carried out on its development would have had limited applicability to the BMW 801/802.

Same as above.

It does seem that many of these programs could have been better focused. Aside from this, engine development seems to have slowed in the 1939-1940 time frame. There is a gap of several years between the availability of the the DB601A and Jumo 211A/B and their follow on developments (DB601E/F and Jumo 211F/J) . I can only speculate on the factors; perhaps both diversions of resources to other projects and thorny technical problems were factors.

There was the development of the DB601N in 1939-40 and it saw service then too. The Jumo 211F/J were projects started in 1938 to test out pressurized cooling systems, which Jumo had no experience with, so it took time to get ready; it was ready in mid-1940, but it took time to phase into production due to again not having experience with producing a cooling system like that, so they had to research production technologies first. It was available by January 1941, so technically it was a 1940 development. There wasn't a slow down per se, rather production technology development lag for Jumo, while DB did have a new engine ready in 1940, but it wasn't a major upgrade like the E/F series; still the E was available in early 1941 IIRC though it was ready sooner, it just took time to phase in due to the pressurized cooling system that DB was new to like Jumo.

 

[DonL]

Both of those projects originated under Walter Wever, Wilhelm Wimmer, and Erhard Milch's tenure pre-Udet. All Udet contributed was the dive bombing requirement for the Ju88 and the vast over emphasis on it in production that horribly unbalanced the LW and left them with a compromised design that couldn't even be used for what it was good at (fast bombing, heavy fighter, night fighter/intruder, recon) because it had to be Germany's medium bomber; the less of its and the modern F-35 project is that trying to have one aircraft do everything is not a good idea; some specialization is necessary.



The He-219 was an unnecessary duplication of effort. The Fw-189 was limited due to having a limited recon role; it was just fine as it was. The Ju87 (over 5000 were produced), Fw200, Ju290 were all of limited utility and the latter two were only the result of the early war and the failure of the He177 project; they were stop gaps that were needed with the war on. The Do-217 was a replacement for the He111, but war circumstances prevented it from being widely available, also poor planning was the problem there mainly stemming from the vast over reliance on the Ju88. The He-129 was again a specialized aircraft, but a poor design, so it need not have been mass produced and frankly shouldn't have been once the Ju87G and FW190F and G were in production. It was more a case of throw everything we've got into the ring and hope it works.

Good summary wiking85 and right to the point.



The Do 217 suffered the most, that no proper engine was available.

 

[wiking85]

Good summary wiking85 and right to the point.



The Do 217 suffered the most, that no proper engine was available.

Thanks. Agree about the Do-217; Koppenburg, head of the Ju88 project, bragged about killing the Do-217 project by denying it manpower and production resources due to hoarding it all for the Ju88 program. Udet again let his subordinates run wild and amass empires in the chaos of his reign; when Milch reasserted control, he needed to break his rival and the Jumo 222 and Ju288 died as a result to Germany's detriment.

 

[Shortround6]

........ the Jumo 222 and Ju288 died as a result to Germany's detriment.

The Jumo 222 and Ju 288 should have died while still on the drawing board. One KG if actual metal committed to either program was one KG too much. The Jumo 222 was going to take to long to straighten out even without the changes in cylinder size and the entire bomber B program was too ambitious. The Germans may very well have needed a newer/better bomber airframe than the He 111, JU-88 and even the Do-217 but the Ju 288 ( or FW 191) was not it.

 

[DonL]

The Jumo 222 and Ju 288 should have died while still on the drawing board. One KG if actual metal committed to either program was one KG too much. The Jumo 222 was going to take to long to straighten out even without the changes in cylinder size and the entire bomber B program was too ambitious. The Germans may very well have needed a newer/better bomber airframe than the He 111, JU-88 and even the Do-217 but the Ju 288 ( or FW 191) was not it.

I agree with the FW 191, Ju 288 and Jumo 222 analyse.

But I can't see what is wrong on the combination of the Ju 88, Do 217 (with earlier developed DB 603 from the original timeline) and a four gondula He 177.
Why should the LW needed an other Bomber?

After an introduction of a Do 217 and He 177 you only need a small part of the Ju 88 production as a real bomber, mainly for sea attack, close support and fast intruder, the main production could be nightfighter and heavy destroyer.

To my opinion the Do 217 with a developed DB 603 at 1942 would be on of the best medium bomber of the war and a four gondula He 177 which functioned too. Where is the need for a new bomber design?

Which other medium bomber of the war, except the A-26 Invader had the performance (bombload, range and speed) of the Do 217 M (DB 603)?

 

[wiking85]

I agree with the FW 191, Ju 288 and Jumo 222 analyse.

But I can't see what is wrong on the combination of the Ju 88, Do 217 (with earlier developed DB 603 from the original timeline) and a four gondula He 177.
Why should the LW needed an other Bomber?

After an introduction of a Do 217 and He 177 you only need a small part of the Ju 88 production as a real bomber, mainly for sea attack, close support and fast intruder, the main production could be nightfighter and heavy destroyer.

To my opinion the Do 217 with a developed DB 603 at 1942 would be on of the best medium bomber of the war and a four gondula He 177 which functioned too. Where is the need for a new bomber design?

Which other medium bomber of the war, except the A-26 Invader had the performance (bombload, range and speed) of the Do 217 M (DB 603)?

What's wrong with the Jumo 222 if its sticks to its original spec? Or the Do317? The DB603 was an inferior engine compared to the developed Jumo engines, but I see your point about it being an early high powered engine that would be a stopgap.

 

[DonL]

I don't think the LW was in any need of the Jumo 222.

It never realy functioned properly and it cost a lot of important alloy's. Also the maintenance could be very complicated, we have seen the desaster of the DB 606 and DB 610.

I wouldn't say the DB 603 is inferior to the Jumo 213, both engines had other philosophy's.
The DB 603 was much lighter compare to the Jumo 213 if we look at the diffferent engine displacement and operated with lower RPM.
Was the DB 601/605 through it's lighter design and earlier (timeline) higher RPM, a better fighter engine compare to the Jumo 211, with the DB 603 and Jumo 213 characteristics this changed to the opposite. The Jumo 213 was more agile with higher RPM and the DB 603 took it's power from his cubic inch and not from RPM.
To my opinion a from 1938 developed DB 603 would be a very good powerplant for Bomber, here Do 217 and He 177.

Also if we look the production capacities and facilities of Germany, you are in need to develop both engines from 1938, DB 603 and Jumo 213.
To my opinion nobody would be in need of a Jumo 222 engine.
Looking at a LW 1942/43

FW 190 D - Jumo 213 later Ta 152 - Jumo 213
FW 190 G - BMW 801
Me 109 - DB 601/605
Me 110/Fw 187 - DB 601/605
Ju 88 - Jumo 213
Ju 87 - Jumo 211/213
Do 217 - DB 603
He 177 - DB 603
Ju 252 - Jumo 211

In such a scenario you also you have the BMW 801 powerplant as a reserve of a Bomber powerplant.

If tomp pauk would initiate a thread built and plan your LW from 1936, this would be my result at 1943 and I also think it would be possible in reality, without all the fritter of dive bombing and the Bomber B project.

From the technical aspect such a LW would be much more dangerous then the original, but without fuel, more pilots and proper pilot training it would be also without any impact.

It only shows the real potency of the german aero industry.