brickhistory
Airman 1st Class
- 104
- Jan 13, 2007
Like the SAW BNs, the FCS personnel often fought under fire. In July 1942, the 8th was still based at Milne Bay, New Guinea. In August, Japanese troops landed from barges only six miles from the headquarters. The squadron endured mortar and artillery fire for several days. Due to a shortage of combat troops, the men of the 8th Fighter Control Squadron were pressed into service as infantry, bolstering an Australian infantry brigade. Several tense days in fighting positions ensued but the Japanese threat was eliminated before the airman ***-infantry had to be used.42
In a more serious example, a Sgt Brown, 8th FCS radio operator, was awarded the Bronze Star for Valor for combat action during the invasion of Biak. Coming ashore on D-Day, Sgt Brown killed several Japanese soldiers during an enemy infantry charge against the U.S forces. Sgt Brown later crawled out under intense enemy fire to rescue a wounded U.S. soldier. 43
The airmen of the 8th faced more than ground threats. A combat report dated March 4, 1944 from the commanding officer of the 8th FCS to the commanding general, Fifth Air Force, described a Japanese bombing attack on Gusap, New Guinea and results:
1. Weather: 4/10s cloud cover, vis 8 miles, cloud base 3,000
2. First radar contact: 1230L, last contact 1340L
3. 16 a/c scrambled, 42 a/c returning from mission
4. 4 'Tonys' sighted, 3 destroyed, 0 friendly aircraft missing *
5. Several H/E bombs dropped; 2 A-20s damaged, 3 A-20s slightly damaged
No warnings given – enemy a/c came in low and timing of returning mission covered plot board with tracks.44
* 'Tony' was the Allied code name for the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force's Ki-63single engine fighter/bomber
Finally, the 8th's combat reports also include a Bronze Star citation for a Capt Lloyd Brooks who served as a ground control intercept officer aboard a US Navy destroyer supporting the December, 1944 invasion of Ormoc bay, the Phillipines. Capt Brooks was directing a flight of fighters to intercept a group of enemy tracks. Despite the picture-perfect intercept, one of the attackers broke through and performed a kamikaze attack on the destroyer. Capt Brooks continued controlling until the ship lost power and eventually sank.45
These examples are but dramatic interludes in the work-a-day business of providing early warning and ground controlled intercept of enemy aircraft. The 8th FCS, and later squadrons like the 1st, 35th, 49th and 56th, working with the Signal Aircraft Warning battalions expanded the roles that radar could play. By war's end, GCI had expanded to include both the SAW BNs and the FCS to become Fifth Air Force's primary means of command and control (C2) for tactical operations. Indeed, V Fighter Command had been designated primary agency for all matters concerning air warning and defense. As such, V Fighter was the sole source for using SAW BNs and FCS.46
The Allied advance into the Philippines was perhaps the culmination of the progress made in combining the SAW BNs and the FCS into a smoothly running air warning and effective air defense machine. Many radar sites spread throughout the islands as the campaign progressed covered virtually every square mile of territory. Radar supplies and replacements shipped from Signal Corps depots from the ZI (Zone of the Interior) arrived into Air Force supply dumps and were distributed as Air Force assets. The signalmen of the SAW BNs drew rations and pay from the Air Force. BN commanding officers took orders directly from V Fighter Command that in turn relied on the Signal Corps officers to lend advice on how best to place and use the equipment. Ground controllers and signalmen worked side by side in operations tents and at radar scopes, directing Allied aircraft in a myriad of missions.47
This unity was a far cry from the early divided concept between the Signal Corps and the Army Air Forces. As a fitting finale, in June 1945, the Signal Aircraft Warning Battalions officially transferred from the Signal Corps to the Army Air Force. 48
In a more serious example, a Sgt Brown, 8th FCS radio operator, was awarded the Bronze Star for Valor for combat action during the invasion of Biak. Coming ashore on D-Day, Sgt Brown killed several Japanese soldiers during an enemy infantry charge against the U.S forces. Sgt Brown later crawled out under intense enemy fire to rescue a wounded U.S. soldier. 43
The airmen of the 8th faced more than ground threats. A combat report dated March 4, 1944 from the commanding officer of the 8th FCS to the commanding general, Fifth Air Force, described a Japanese bombing attack on Gusap, New Guinea and results:
1. Weather: 4/10s cloud cover, vis 8 miles, cloud base 3,000
2. First radar contact: 1230L, last contact 1340L
3. 16 a/c scrambled, 42 a/c returning from mission
4. 4 'Tonys' sighted, 3 destroyed, 0 friendly aircraft missing *
5. Several H/E bombs dropped; 2 A-20s damaged, 3 A-20s slightly damaged
No warnings given – enemy a/c came in low and timing of returning mission covered plot board with tracks.44
* 'Tony' was the Allied code name for the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force's Ki-63single engine fighter/bomber
Finally, the 8th's combat reports also include a Bronze Star citation for a Capt Lloyd Brooks who served as a ground control intercept officer aboard a US Navy destroyer supporting the December, 1944 invasion of Ormoc bay, the Phillipines. Capt Brooks was directing a flight of fighters to intercept a group of enemy tracks. Despite the picture-perfect intercept, one of the attackers broke through and performed a kamikaze attack on the destroyer. Capt Brooks continued controlling until the ship lost power and eventually sank.45
These examples are but dramatic interludes in the work-a-day business of providing early warning and ground controlled intercept of enemy aircraft. The 8th FCS, and later squadrons like the 1st, 35th, 49th and 56th, working with the Signal Aircraft Warning battalions expanded the roles that radar could play. By war's end, GCI had expanded to include both the SAW BNs and the FCS to become Fifth Air Force's primary means of command and control (C2) for tactical operations. Indeed, V Fighter Command had been designated primary agency for all matters concerning air warning and defense. As such, V Fighter was the sole source for using SAW BNs and FCS.46
The Allied advance into the Philippines was perhaps the culmination of the progress made in combining the SAW BNs and the FCS into a smoothly running air warning and effective air defense machine. Many radar sites spread throughout the islands as the campaign progressed covered virtually every square mile of territory. Radar supplies and replacements shipped from Signal Corps depots from the ZI (Zone of the Interior) arrived into Air Force supply dumps and were distributed as Air Force assets. The signalmen of the SAW BNs drew rations and pay from the Air Force. BN commanding officers took orders directly from V Fighter Command that in turn relied on the Signal Corps officers to lend advice on how best to place and use the equipment. Ground controllers and signalmen worked side by side in operations tents and at radar scopes, directing Allied aircraft in a myriad of missions.47
This unity was a far cry from the early divided concept between the Signal Corps and the Army Air Forces. As a fitting finale, in June 1945, the Signal Aircraft Warning Battalions officially transferred from the Signal Corps to the Army Air Force. 48