Who Really Destroyed the Luftwaffe?

[riacrato]

Another thing that I think also helped, was the Germans fixation(?) with giant, sometimes useless machines! How many Ju 52 can they have done instead for the Me 321/323, those huge guns like Thor, Odin etc, made the He 177 into a proper 4 engined bomber from the beginning instead for that with two coupled engines etc., etc...

A Ju 52 cannot haul what a Me 321/Me 323 can. The Me 321 were specially designed for heavy cargo drops to be used alongside normal gliders. I don't think any other transport of the day could ship in a medium tank or a heavy AAA + halftrack. As such they did what they were intended to. In the course of the war they were probably used for duties were it may have been wiser to use Ju 52s, but that doesn't make them worthless imo. The huge guns like the Karl were specialized siege weapons and arguably did their job too, e.g. at Sevastopol. Neither of these were ever intended for the same purposes as normal transports or normal field cannons. In my opinion the negative effects these systems had on the German war economy is a bit hard to quantify and could very well be exaggregated.

The He 177 is a different story. It is too bad for the LW that they tried to make their coupled-engines thingy work instead of going the less stubborn but ultimately successful way the RAF went with the Manchester.

 

[Colin1]

A Ju 52 cannot haul what a Me 321/Me 323 can. The Me 321 were specially designed for heavy cargo drops to be used alongside normal gliders. I don't think any other transport of the day could ship in a medium tank or a heavy AAA + halftrack. As such they did what they were intended to. In the course of the war they were probably used for duties were it may have been wiser to use Ju 52s, but that doesn't make them worthless imo

The Me323
proved itself invaluable to the Germans, they pioneered the first steps of a key capability prized by first rate militaries today - airportability. Moving decisive platforms, even modest armour pieces, quickly to a situation where the enemy could not was a big step forward in flexibility and response.

They were also extremely difficult to shoot down, absorbing considerable levels of punishment - unless they were transporting fuel. The Germans however, learned the hard way that they simply couldn't operate (survive) without air superiority or at least a vigorous friendly presence in-theatre, any more than C-130s could today.

 

[tail end charlie]

Not only did the LW run out of fuel pilots and planes the whole of Germany ran out of fuel men and machines. As regards oil while raids on refineries and depots helped I would say over running the eastern oilfields did more. The LW was on the back foot after the BoB, not to say it didnt advance but it didnt advance at the pace of the collective opposition. The total number of 109s and 190s is impressive until compared to the total number of hurricanes spitfires kittyhawks hawks mustangs lightenings thunderbolts wildcats yaks and migs as well as a plethora of antiquated planes which were outclassed but still caused losses.

Once Germany didnt knock out Britain and then didnt knock out Russia it was just in increasingly rapid collapse. Who knocked out the Luftwaffe? The combined industrial production design effort and manpower of the allies.

 

[Erich]

geez................ this is a myth tail end.

the LW had plenty of craft and man power, the fuels were non-existant. this is easily seen in late 1945 and after war photos of which many books have been published showing the A/C sitting on the tarmacs and grass fields just waiting to be used or in this case to be plundered and bulldozed ans smashed into scrap.

I go by it again for the third time this thread it was a combined effort by BC and the US air arm to destroy the mechanics behind the LW secondly to pounce on the LW or more like as the US pilots hierarchy would have it, bring the LW on of course they already knew what they were up against with the very sensitive listening devices they had all through Germany. The coup de Grace was Bodenplatte and the real waste of life for the Tagdjagd, the LW General staff thinking up this one all should of been shot.

 

[tail end charlie]

When I saw: "Mustangs over Berlin ..... ". Not to misrepresent the importance of Mosquitos or Lancasters over Berlin, but Mustangs over Berlin symbolized the final tightening of the air superiority screws. And they were USAAF Mustangs.

MM

The quote is from Goering perhaps the most incompetent leader to serve any force throughout a war. If he had been really perceptive he would have said "when I was appointed as head of the Luftwaffe, the Luftwaffe quickly realised the game was up.

If the LW had been lead by military men of vision and expertise instead of party affiliations things probably would have been a lot more difficult, thankfully it wasnt.

 

[tail end charlie]

geez................ this is a myth tail end.

the LW had plenty of craft and man power, the fuels were non-existant. this is easily seen in late 1945 and after war photos of which many books have been published showing the A/C sitting on the tarmacs and grass fields just waiting to be used or in this case to be plundered and bulldozed ans smashed into scrap.

I go by it again for the third time this thread it was a combined effort by BC and the US air arm to destroy the mechanics behind the LW secondly to pounce on the LW or more like as the US pilots hierarchy would have it, bring the LW on of course they already knew what they were up against with the very sensitive listening devices they had all through Germany. The coup de Grace was Bodenplatte and the real waste of life for the Tagdjagd, the LW General staff thinking up this one all should of been shot.

Well accounts vary Erich. I have read that by 1944 the LW couldnt maintain seviceability because of transport the planes didnt have spares or ammunition or pilots or fuel or a combination of the whole lot. By the later stages of the war planes fighting the Russians in the east were also under attack by Mustangs from the west, it was a collapse.

I agree on the role of BC and US air arm but the role of the eastern front mediterranean africa and a whole lot more eventually bled the LW and the whole german regime to death IMO.

 

[Erich]

the machines were idle any LW pilot/crew during 1945 will tell you that they pulled their own hair out as they could do nothing with the limited fuels that were on hand. the LW night fighter force could not muster more than 3-4 aircraft instead of a full compliment of 15 night fighters of a staffel as the fuel was no more. not even the big cheese aces got up that much to defend German skies except they were about the only ones that did. the opinions do not vary the photos and first had accounts state this. Multiple moves during the spring of 45 for the jet and prop driven units broke up the complete cop-hesion of all the day time fighter forces due to the Allied bombings and the steam roller effect the Soviets had in eastern Germany except for Ost Preußia where the Soviets were bled terribly for every inch of ground taken

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... perhaps the most incompetent leader to serve any force throughout a war." I agree. But he was an interesting, conflicted, greedy, vain fellow who, nonetheless, knew good airplanes when he saw them.

I threw the quote into this discussion because the Mustang was a game-changer over Germany because of its great legs , and rugged construction.

The Soviet Airforce (IMHO ) was not a huge factor in the wearing out of the LW. Between Stalingrad and N. Africa they lost most of their heavy lift capacity. Air power was not - nor could have been (given the tank reserves the Soviets committed) - a deciding factor at Kursk. Now talking armour - yes - the Soviets tore the guts out of German armoured forces. But in the air there was no Kursk - at least not in the east. And Bodenplatt was a huge disaster - but with the failure in The Bulge, Bodenplatt really didn't matter much - except for the scarce pilots that 'command' threw away.

The back story is really fuel and pilots. Germany ran out of both before they exhausted production of 1st line aircraft.
And when you look at production numbers from 1943 going forward - the back story is (1) night fighters and (2) Jabo's.

Mustangs over Berlin, not Yaks or Sturmaviks .... .

MM

 

[Erich]

again Bull sh** you guys read too many mythical accounts about lack of pilots. young they were and not necessarily with more than 5 missions under their belt but there were plenty of them. the stupid and useless Sonderkommanado Elbe in april of 45 and Bienstock proves this, many youth pilots ready to give them selves up on the death throes of the Reich

the Soviets drew off the LW day units as I stated earlier back in January of 45 those that could of helped take on the US bombing campaign further had the eastern front escaped never had happened but now I am on a what-if. The Soviets helped out more than you guys know if the LW was still on an even par with the Ost front enemy

 

[tail end charlie]

again Bull sh** you guys read too many mythical accounts about lack of pilots. young they were and not necessarily with more than 5 missions under their belt but there were plenty of them. the stupid and useless Sonderkommanado Elbe in april of 45 and Bienstock proves this, many youth pilots ready to give them selves up on the death throes of the Reich

the Soviets drew off the LW day units as I stated earlier back in January of 45 those that could of helped take on the US bombing campaign further had the eastern front escaped never had happened but now I am on a what-if. The Soviets helped out more than you guys know if the LW was still on an even par with the Ost front enemy

I have also read about the use of the hitler youth whose youthful aggression would make up for lack of training, it generally meant you lose a plane and a pilot but some were trained to ram anyway so wernt expected to return. Apart from that you seem to be making the same point about soviet contribution being underestimated

 

[drgondog]

The quote is from Goering perhaps the most incompetent leader to serve any force throughout a war. If he had been really perceptive he would have said "when I was appointed as head of the Luftwaffe, the Luftwaffe quickly realised the game was up.

If the LW had been lead by military men of vision and expertise instead of party affiliations things probably would have been a lot more difficult, thankfully it wasnt.

TEC - you have some interesting notions about incompetence of LW versus an implied 'brilliance' of Allied leaders.

Simply, the LW was the finest air force in the world through perhaps 1942 and into 1943 with the RAF as a debatable contemporary. The US had talent, manufacturing, quantity and was building what would be the greatest AF in the world.

What the RAF could not do is defeat the Luftwaffe in the air. They brought the war to deep Germany but the strategic value was not sufficient to offset the bleeding they suffered while they helped the US get their feet under them.

What the Russians coould not do was a.) defeat the LW in the air and obtain complete air supririty, or b.) inflict damage to the German industrial base - so they did it the old fashion way and suffered 20,000,000 dead to gain inch by bloody inch on the ground.

What the US DID do is kill the LW over Germany, wrest complete control of the air all the way to Berlin, and pound Germany at will by D-Day. D-Day was a ho hum as far as any annoyance that the LW presented to assist the Wermacht in turning the Allies back. That was NOT the case in December 1943.

Winning the war a a joint effort by ALL the Allies at far greater expense in men and material to the Allies, but winning the battle of air superiority over Germany lay on the shoulders of the 8th AF as the 'dominant' cause - not the sole cause.

 

[drgondog]

I have also read about the use of the hitler youth whose youthful aggression would make up for lack of training, it generally meant you lose a plane and a pilot but some were trained to ram anyway so wernt expected to return. Apart from that you seem to be making the same point about soviet contribution being underestimated

TEC - I am curious regarding the depth of your knowledge and historical grasp... what would you consider your strong points regarding WWII history and what could you share with us regarding your literary research? Which books would you say are the foundation for your understanding of the evolution of airpower from say, 1934 to 1939 or 1939 to 1943 or 1944?

 

[tail end charlie]

TEC - you have some interesting notions about incompetence of LW versus an implied 'brilliance' of Allied leaders.

Simply, the LW was the finest air force in the world through perhaps 1942 and into 1943 with the RAF as a debatable contemporary. The US had talent, manufacturing, quantity and was building what would be the greatest AF in the world.

Georings only WWII achievement was an art collection that was the envy of the world.

The achievements of the LW were prodigeous but that was in spite of not because of Goering, at every step where he actually intervened he made a **** up mainly because he hadnt a clue and little interest in what was actually happening. The LW was beaten at the BoB despite many advantages especially in numbers and machines so how did it progress to be the best in the world 2 yrs later. Until the end of the war their bomber force hardly changed, their fighters benefitted from the 190

Goering as the head of the LW didnt use intelligence the intelligence just told him what he wanted to hear. He didnt develop radar any where near quickly enough even though germany had a head start.. As a political as well as military leader he didnt ensure new models were produced early enough and in sufficient quantity. When Adler tag was cancelled Germany as a whole should have ramped up production massively but this wasnt done until 1944 until it was too late.

Personally I think Hitler and Goering believed their own propaganda until it was obvious they were losing then they withdrew to their bunkers pretending it wasnt happening by 1945 Hitler was going gaga and Goering wasnt far behind. however since he was waging war with in effect 2 continents and several european countries I doubt that a tactical genius would have made a difference to the outcome.

 

[tail end charlie]

TEC - I am curious regarding the depth of your knowledge and historical grasp... what would you consider your strong points regarding WWII history and what could you share with us regarding your literary research? Which books would you say are the foundation for your understanding of the evolution of airpower from say, 1934 to 1939 or 1939 to 1943 or 1944?

Drgondog

it isnt the sort of research that comes up with a theory that BC and the US air force destroyed german aircraft manufacturing but that germany still had easily enough planes in 1945. Germany collapsed in 1945 that collapse started as soon as Barbarossa faltered.

Neither does it credit air raids for depriving germany of oil when the Soviets over ran the eastern oil fields or consider that the biggest threat facing germany in 1944/45 was from the air when the Soviet army had broken through german lines in the east. Everyones grasp of history is different.

As for development of air power, air power went hand in hand with aero engine development and the ability to mass produce as far as I can see. Most forces went down blind alleys as far as bombing is concerned based on interwar theories about the bomber always getting through and destruction of civilian moral.

 

[drgondog]

Back to the question I posed to you.. what is your body of carefully read sources which lead you to your conclusions?

 

[drgondog]

Drgondog

it isnt the sort of research that comes up with a theory that BC and the US air force destroyed german aircraft manufacturing but that germany still had easily enough planes in 1945. Germany collapsed in 1945 that collapse started as soon as Barbarossa faltered.

By that logic you could say that Germany's demise started when they declared war on the US on December 8, 1941.. In your opinion - which had the greater contribution to the defeat of Germany, and when do you put a stake on the 'failure of Barbarossa?

Neither does it credit air raids for depriving germany of oil when the Soviets over ran the eastern oil fields or consider that the biggest threat facing germany in 1944/45 was from the air when the Soviet army had broken through german lines in the east. Everyones grasp of history is different.

If you destroy a thing before its occupation by a ground force, does it diminish the Destruction (Ploesti)
As for development of air power, air power went hand in hand with aero engine development and the ability to mass produce as far as I can see. Most forces went down blind alleys as far as bombing is concerned based on interwar theories about the bomber always getting through and destruction of civilian moral.

How about AERODYNAMICS in which a fighter like the P-51 had only 2/3 of the flat plate drag of the Me 109? How about a design which (by accident of mating the right engine to the airframe) enabled a fighter over Berlin with the same or better performance of its prime antagonists (Fw 190 and Me 109)

How about presenting a dual threat (B-17 and B-24) capable of precision bombing on key strategic targets if one could only keep that threat from being eliminated by the LW? You think the ability of the USSR to mass produce at near the same rate as the US meant anything over Regensburg or Leipzg or Misburg or Merseburg or Brux or Posnan? I submit the answer is 'No'.

 

[Jabberwocky]

I think it can be fairly strongly argued that the USAAF did more to destroy the Luftwaffe as an effective fighting force than either the RAF or the VVS. I also believe that it was the sole force in the world at the time with the technical capabilities to project airpower in daylight at very long range.

However, it is the height of folly to argue that the USAAF should be given credit as the force that destroyed the Luftwaffe. Like the destruction of the German ground forces, it was a true collaborative effort.

The destruction of Germany's wartime airforce is vastly more complex than just he equation of aircraft destroyed in the daylight skies over France and Germany in late 1943 and early to mid-1944, when the USAAF did its most damage to the Luftwaffe.

Consider theses factors:

• The pilot and aircraft losses against the RAF and VVS that the Luftwaffe sustained prior to the large scale attacks by the USAAF.
• The pilot and aircraft losses that the Luftwaffe sustained fighting against the RAF and USAAF over North Africa, the Mediterranean and Italy.
• The Luftwaffe resources that were deployed to combat the RAF at night and the VVS on the Eastern Front.
• The loss in effectiveness the USAAF would suffer if it was also required to play a territory defence role and did not have the support of the RAF.

Operating from the UK and central Italy, the USAAF did something that no other airforce could do: operated long-range, escorted daylight bomber missions into Germany proper.

Did this decisively attrit the Luftwaffe? Yes, of course it did.
Would it have been possible without the contributions of the RAF and VVS? Impossible to say, but the result is much less clear cut, without the cumulative impact of all those other battles the Luftwaffe was also being forced to fight.

 

[HealzDevo]

As I understand Tail End Charlie it was the constant pressure of being bombarded and harrassed by the Allied Production Day after Day, as well as the lack of fuel that led to the Luftwaffe defeat. As I said in my post, the main front-line fighter in 1944-1945 was the Me-109 which though it had been improved in ways was still suffering from its age. The Spitfire however, in between Marks some of those Marks are actually more like Minor Variants in terms of design changes. The Me-109 was only being kept in production because the Germans had skill at producing it and could produce it in larger numbers than other fighters. In terms of numbers however, larger numbers of Allied Fighters were being turned out. With Oilfields destroyed or occuppied by the opposition and refinieries and chains of supply similarly dealt with, it was very hard to see the Germans being able to pull a victory out of the hat.

 

[Hop]

From A History of the VIII USAAF Fighter Command by Lt Col Waldo H Heinrichs, intelligence officer, 66th fighter wing. I believe it shows the position up to August 1944.

 

[bobbysocks]

are these stats from air to air combat or does it include reported ground kills as well? the deep penetrations into germany opened the underbelly of the LW. many aerodromes that were inaccessable before were straffed and a substancial number of ac were destroyed or damaged by long range fighter escorts. hitler/georing used this tatic at the beginning of the battle of britian reaching as far into britian as they could and inflicted heavy losses on the RAF. had they continued this and not switched to bombing london is a source of debate as to if the RAF could staved off the attack much longer. this was also the purpose and aim to bodenplatte...to catch allied ac with their pants down and planes on the ground, inflict crushing damage. now the shoe was on the other foot and due to this the LW had to resort to hiding airbases or otherwise trying to camouflaging them. see the map from capt. r. schimanski showing how they were doing it. this was from a mar 2, 45 bomber escort s.e. of magdeburg. the LW lost 24 planes 11 destroyed, 13 damaged on this airfield alone without bringing down one enemy ac. now you may think 24 planes a drop in the bucket in comparison but this was only from 1 FG on 1 day. i have not added up the figures but i believe the number of LW ac caught on the ground and destroyed or damaged would be considerable. because of this i am inclined to believe the claim of no fuel. if you could put an ac into the air when a known threat is close you would be foolish not to. at the very least to reposition them away potential danger. the issue wasnt if the LW had pilots but the quality of those pilots. i know, the same could have been said about the RAF in the BoB. one spitfire pilot interviewed said the training was cut from 4 weeks to 2 weeks then they were in the air in combat. I would venture to say though that the training of LW recruits was severly hampered by the lack of fuel. why would you waste a valuable fuel on training when that same fuel could be used to bring down a bomber.