The definition I gave is textbook stuff. In the context of a strategic bombing campaign, where the locations of troop concentrations is secondary to the location of the strikes formations, the troop concentration concept should be substituted with bomber formations.
Now, I say that air parity had been reached, tending toward air superiority, because by 1942, the LW was no longer in a position to mount massed raids over enemy controlled territory, whereas the allies were able to mount substantial attacks over german controlled territory with tolerable losses. Abeit at night for the deep penetration stuff, but even this capability had been denied (substantially) to the germans over allied controlled territory.
This part of the equation only amounts to air parity, since in 1942, as you rightly point out, the germans still controlled large portions of their air spaces (to the point of excercising air supremacy over those portions of their airspace), at least during the daylight hours. However, the fact that they had withdrawn, (and this was forced on them, by mounting losses in their battles over france principally) from defending parts of their territory, in particular, over NW France, by 1942, suggests that this air parity was tending toward Allied superiority. all the allies needed from that point was to develop the fighter aircraft with the legs to reach into the traditional areas of german controlled airspace, to complete the dominance over the LW....enter the mustang.
This is consistent with what actually happened. The Germans did not wake up one morning in early 1944 and suddenly find they had lost control of the skies over their own country. It was a process years in the making, with contributory effect found all the way back to 1940, and beyond. Actions by the RAF and the VVS in 1942, affected in a direct and tangible way, outcomes observed in 1944. Without those actions , the outcome in 1944 would have been completely different