Why airplanes were designed the way they were. (3 Viewers)

[Shortround6]

Thanks to the information provided by MikeMeech in Hard runways in WWII

It appears that in/by 1938 the RAF was specifying new fighter airfields with 800yd runways. Distance to 50ft not given and by 1939 they wanted 1000yd runways. They were also specifying at least two pitch props on fighters and heading for constant speed props which helped take-off and climb out. But they were stuck with the Hurricane and Spitfire which had been designed for the old airfields.
Also helps explain the Hawker Typhoon only needing a wing 7% larger than the Hurricane. You can blast the plane off the runway using the power of the Sabre engine but you still have to land the beast. Even with fat tires

 

[Holtzauge]

And here we get to the heart of the matter.
Hawker and Supermarine both failed to meet the specification. Hawker by a little and Supermarine by a lot. There is also a difference between prototypes and service models.

Hurricane prototype at 5672lbs needed 265 yd take off run and 430 yds to clear the 50ft barrier. corrected for zero wind. Not bad but the problem was landing. It needed 475 yds from 50ft. with brakes and with a 5mph wind. Everybody who thinks they should have cut 30-60 sq feet of wing area please raise your hands
Problem really hits home when the weight for a service Hurricane I with wooden two blade prop hit 6040lbs and the take off run went to 370yds and distance to 50 ft went to 580yds.
Now lets add another 50 gallons of fuel had see how much runway we need
Things got better with the 2 pitch propeller but that was around 3 years after the Hurricane prototype flew.

Take-off figures for the Spitfire prototype are not listed on WWII Aircraft Performance but Aug through Dec 1938 K.9787 gave the following results.
K.9787 was almost 500lbs heavier than the prototype.

420yd take off run with 720 yds to 50 ft. and landing run was 380 yds with brakes. This was corrected to no wind and standard atmosphere. With an 8mph head wind and at 20 degrees F (?) the take off run was 367yds and it took until 640yds to clear the 50ft distance. Landing ground run was 315yds.

So which brave (but suicidal) pilots want to strap a 50-60 gal tank to the plane and take off from a standard RAF fighter field on a hot summer zero wind day so they can escort any sort of bomber across the channel? Things got better with two pitch prop with the take-off run shortened to 320yds and distance to 50 ft down to 490yds.

109 with Jumo engine was designed to carry two machine guns and only 270 (?) liters of fuel and had better flaps (not saying much), You can use a much smaller wing when the plane only weighs around 4400lbs.

As I recall it, there was also an "alightening speed" requirement of 60 mph not to be exceeded which the Spitfire did not live up to. And as far as I know there were voices raised in the British procurement organization that it and the Westland entry should both be struck off the list for failing this requirement, which as I understand it was put there because it was not felt that higher speeds were consistent with safe night operations at the time. However, when the Spitfire's superb speed performance (compared to the other entries) became apparent, it was allowed to stay in the competition. Then about the Bf 109: As I recall it the Germans instead had a wing loading requirement which Willy Messerschmitt choose to ignore because he knew that high wing loading is the easiest and safest path to high speed performance. It is said that Milch (who did not like Messerschmitt), still allowed the Bf 109 to compete with the others like Heinkel, not as a serious contender, but more as a "pike in the carp pool" to make the (in Milch's view) more serious contenders walk the extra mile. However, as we all know, this plan backfired on Milch and the rest is history.......

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

As of June 1934 the Hurricane prototype normal loaded weight was expected to be 4,600 pounds, by December 4,800 pounds, as of August 1935 5,200 pounds, as weighed in October 5,416 pounds with Watts two-bladed, fixed pitch (wood) airscrew fitted. As of March 1938 first production Hurricane L1547 Normal Loaded Weight was 6,017 pounds.

Gauntlet F7/30 at best (no prototype as such, K4081 FF Dec-34), Gladiator F7/30 & F14/35 (FF Sep-34), Hurricane F5/34 & F10/35 (FF Nov-35), Spitfire F10/35 (FF Mar-36), Defiant F9/35 (Aug-37), Whirlwind F37/35 (Oct-38) Blenheim night fighter decided on in mid 1938, first examples around in December.

From 1935 on the expected size of a fighter airfield was rapidly changing, at least some would need to be light bomber size. Even a 2 man crew single engine fighter was going to need more room than a single seater.

First Hurricane column DH, second column Rotol propeller and yes the report actually says adding weight to the Whirlwind reduces take off run.

Aircraft

Defiant I

Beaufighter I

Blenheim IVF

Tomahawk

Havoc I

Havoc II

Gauntlet

Gladiator

Hurricane I

Hurricane I

Spitfire I

Whirlwind

Wing Sq ft

250​

503​

469​

236​

465​

465​

315​

323​

258​

258​

242​

250​

Tare (pounds)

5938​

13,918​

9,236​

5,615​

11,800​

13,073​

2,933​

3,695​

5,210​

5,085​

4,795​

8,040​

Weight (pounds)

7710​

19,816​

12,660​

7,224​

15,400​

16,700​

4,028​

4,757​

6,629​

6,532​

6,255​

9,980​

Take Off (Over 50 ft) (Yards)

500​

790​

550​

570​

600​

420​

320​

370​

520​

430​

400​

630​

Landing (Over 50 ft) (Yards)

770​

940​

730​

630​

560​

551​

n/a

475​

610​

600​

590​

750​

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Weight (pounds)

n/a

21,120​

14,100​

7,602​

n/a

n/a

n/a

4,912​

6,758​

6,661​

n/a

10,115​

Take Off (Over 50 ft) (Yards)

n/a

940​

720​

620​

n/a

n/a

n/a

420​

540​

445​

n/a

580​

The RAF 15 minute allowance for the Spitfire I used 19.5 gallons, leaving 64.5 gallons available for cruise at 15,000 feet. At 304 mph that gave a range of 415 miles, at 180-190 mph 575 miles, simply adding the extra 12 gallons of forward fuselage fuel the mark VII and VIII carried extends those ranges to 490 and 680 miles, give the mark I the full 124 mark VII and VIII internal fuel capacity and the ranges are 670 and 930 miles. Quite adequate if based in France (though Nancy to Berlin is about 415 miles versus 580 from London) but the RAF at best was doing the occasional light/medium bomber escort training, the heavies, like Wellingtons, were on their own.

Agreed a neutral Holland/Belgium/Denmark makes air attacks to/from Britain/Germany long range affairs, going over the North Sea runs into two RAF declared impossibilities, long range fighter and single seat fighter pilot having long range navigation skills. Belgium in the war as per WWI largely removes the range problem, more so as the RAF over rated the importance of the Ruhr.

I thought the multi thousand RAF heavy bomber ideas were post June 1940, not pre war.

 

[Shortround6]

Then about the Bf 109: As I recall it the Germans instead had a wing loading requirement which Willy Messerschmitt choose to ignore because he knew that high wing loading is the easiest and safest path to high speed performance. It is said that Milch (who did not like Messerschmitt), still allowed the Bf 109 to compete with the others like Heinkel, not as a serious contender, but more as a "pike in the carp pool" to make the (in Milch's view) more serious contenders walk the extra mile. However, as we all know, this plan backfired on Milch and the rest is history.......

Well, there was quite a bit of evolution with the 109.
Willy and the boys did use a smaller wing but compared to the British fighters the 109V1 with the Kestrel engine and no guns was about 1800kg. A service 109B was about 2000kg and a 109E about 2600kg depending on guns. 109E empty weight was just over the loaded weight of the 109V1. The extra power of the DB601 certainly helped the speed and climb. Increasing the wing loading by almost 30% didn't help either maneuver or landing qualities. Adding another 20% to go from the 109E to the 109G-6 (57% more than the 109B) certainly didn't help. But that is as evolved vs as designed. The 109 was not designed to fight/fly/land at a wing loading in the high 30lb/sq/ft range.
Other planes were and they had different landing gear (and longer runways) and different flaps, etc to try to deal with it.

 

[Shortround6]

I thought the multi thousand RAF heavy bomber ideas were post June 1940, not pre war.

I am reading few books that are rather critical of the RAF in the late 30s and early 40s and there may be some bias going in the books. There may a difference in the ideas/plans/dreams of some RAF officers and what was ordered and when. Telling the treasury/parliament you want 2000lb heavy bombers in 1936/37 may get you early retirement as you are obviously barking mad
Easing them into it by ordering lots of smaller bombers (Blenheim's and larger) and creating the squadrons and then reequipping the squadrons with newer/larger aircraft may have been a long term plan. The RAF was to win the future war by itself, no need for the army or even the navy.
Some of these bomber officers may have even begrudged getting Hurricanes and Spitfires as that cut into bomber production and only bombers could win wars, fighters could not.
Over looked was that fighters might keep you from loosing the war in meantime.

Author may have his own agenda but the infighting at the Air ministry/war department may have come close to rivaling the Japanese army and Navy.

 

[Holtzauge]

Well, there was quite a bit of evolution with the 109.
Willy and the boys did use a smaller wing but compared to the British fighters the 109V1 with the Kestrel engine and no guns was about 1800kg. A service 109B was about 2000kg and a 109E about 2600kg depending on guns. 109E empty weight was just over the loaded weight of the 109V1. The extra power of the DB601 certainly helped the speed and climb. Increasing the wing loading by almost 30% didn't help either maneuver or landing qualities. Adding another 20% to go from the 109E to the 109G-6 (57% more than the 109B) certainly didn't help. But that is as evolved vs as designed. The 109 was not designed to fight/fly/land at a wing loading in the high 30lb/sq/ft range.
Other planes were and they had different landing gear (and longer runways) and different flaps, etc to try to deal with it.

"The 109 was not designed to fight/fly/land at a wing loading in the high 30lb/sq/ft range." Well neither was the Spitfire: There was not only an evolution in terms of wing loading for the Bf 109: This was also the case for the Spitfire which actually ended up with a higher wing loading in the Spitfire Mk 14 than the Bf 109E4 had in 1939. The weight creep lead to both designs having wing loadings at the end of the war that would have seemed outlandish in the late 1930's. My point was that Messerschmitt in the initial design work was allowed to go to a 25% higher wing loading (125 kg/sqrm) than the other competing German designs from Heinkel and Arado which at a time were limited to 100 kg/sqrm (or 20.5 lb/sqft). In addition, all things are relative and "Adding another 20% to go from the 109E to the 109G-6 (57% more than the 109B) certainly didn't help." and "Increasing the wing loading by almost 30% didn't help either maneuver or landing qualities." Well, both the P-47C and P-51D had higher wing loadings that the Bf 109G6, so I would not be too worried about the Bf 109 G6 having a particularly high wing loading.

 

[Art Medcalf]

Most aircraft are designed for a purpose or multiple purposes. The designer has a pantry of ingredients to mix in order to come up with a recipe that works for the intended purpose. In the rapidly changing first half of the 20th century, the availability of materials, engines, engineering knowledge (ie., structural and aerodynamic design techniques), and infrastructure (airfields, fuels, manufacturing capabilities). to name a few. Availability of money and manpower are always considerations. We have now reached a plateau where a transport aircraft today may not look dramatically different from one designed 50 years ago. Try saying that in 1950! However, technology is a many splintered thing and the devil is often in the details. Thus an aircraft that does not appear much different from another may, based upon the parameters each is judged by (first cost, operating cost, payload, infrastructure requirements (for example, runway length), be much better or worse. The operative words for any designer are tradeoffs and iteration.

W.A.Medcalf PEME (aviation nut 1937 to 2024)

 

[Holtzauge]

Most aircraft are designed for a purpose or multiple purposes. The designer has a pantry of ingredients to mix in order to come up with a recipe that works for the intended purpose. In the rapidly changing first half of the 20th century, the availability of materials, engines, engineering knowledge (ie., structural and aerodynamic design techniques), and infrastructure (airfields, fuels, manufacturing capabilities). to name a few. Availability of money and manpower are always considerations. We have now reached a plateau where a transport aircraft today may not look dramatically different from one designed 50 years ago. Try saying that in 1950! However, technology is a many splintered thing and the devil is often in the details. Thus an aircraft that does not appear much different from another may, based upon the parameters each is judged by (first cost, operating cost, payload, infrastructure requirements (for example, runway length), be much better or worse. The operative words for any designer are tradeoffs and iteration.

W.A.Medcalf PEME (aviation nut 1937 to 2024)

Absolutely: I believe the phenomena is called the technology S-curve. And commercial aviation is now on the upper, mature part of the S-curve asymptotically approaching the optimal. As a boy, I flew in the brand new Boeing 747 "Jumbojet" from London to Johannesburg in 1970 IIRC, but AFAIK the 747 was retired just a few years ago. Granted, the engines on the late versions were quite different and more fuel efficient than back then but the airframe? Basically the same. Just like sharks really: not much to improve on!

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

I am reading few books that are rather critical of the RAF in the late 30s and early 40s

What are their titles?

When trying to predict the future there are always those who argue with absolute certainty based on absolute ignorance of what is to come while afterwards there are the writers looking back wanting to show how obviously incompetent the ancestors were. Those Romans had basic steam engines as toys, good control of landscape, straight Roman roads, a wide trade economy, advanced engineering with all those aqueducts, metal working, surely it was the dire impacts steam power would have on a slave based economy that stopped the rail revolution of the 1st century BCE or earlier. Ask yourself what did the Romans ever do for you?

The USN war plan against Japan ended in a negotiated peace, since the planners knew the US could never produce enough stuff to mount an invasion of a Japanese main island. The 1920's USAAF discussions at Maxwell about the future had things like 100 division armies in the field, but debated about fights and squadrons as that was all they actually had, not the groups and wings a 100 division army would need.

In peace time the Defence Department tends to defend the department, while going to war amongst itself. Strategic Bombing and its counterpoint Strategic Defence were close to "pure" air only operations, anything "tactical" and the issue of who was finally in command came into play. World War I had seen little air/ground or air/naval operations and in any case for most of the war the army and navy had their own air power. The pre 1918 fighting had shown the benefits of reconnaissance and air spotting. The 1918 offensives had shown the costs and benefits of airpower combat intervention on the front line. In the 1930's it was understood air power could intervene much further away with more effect, on land it could actually hurt the rail system and so isolate the battlefield. The idea of joint plans under a supreme commander was a utopian theory and to be fair, required real experience about what worked. Also of course the big driver of WWII combined operations was large scale amphibious attacks, not required for a repeat WWI. Probably somewhere in the background some people were pointing out France could choose to stay neutral and the British were not going to be able to create an army as big as Germany's so go air force.

In the 1920's the RN was almost back to the 2 power standard, if France, Italy and Germany declared war all at the same time the RN had a nice measure of superiority. France and Germany could not come by sea and Germany had to go through France by land, that left air power.

Pre WWI the British air force effectively did not exist, then the ramp up during WWI was very end weighted, 60 odd squadrons passed in 1917, peaking at 204 in November 1918, back to 29 in 1920, or about 1915 levels, rising to 65 in early 1935, up to 158 in September 1939, peaking at over 500 squadrons in WWII, back to 150 in the late 1940's.

On 1 January 1935 the RAF had 14 fighter squadrons in Britain, the Auxiliary Air Force Squadrons were light bomber and army co-operation units, 14 reserve squadrons were formed or redesignated fighter between March 1935 and August 1939, another 11 regular squadrons formed, giving 39 fighter squadrons nominally available in September 1939, another 18 squadrons formed in October 1939.

In 1935 there was the heavy weight Heyford at 9,200 pounds, with what we consider the simple trainer Anson arriving at 5,375 pounds, and on the horizon what we consider the light weight Battle at 6,647 pounds and Blenheim at 8,100 pounds. The Whitley at 15,475 pounds and Wellington 18,000 pounds, these were the RAF heavy bombers of the mid 1930's. Then came the 4 engine types.

Whatever individual officers wanted the actual schemes approved were A in July 1934 for completion in March 1939 for 127.5 squadrons (16.5 FAA) including 13 reserve squadrons there were 28 fighter and 8 heavy bomber based in Britain. Scheme C in May 1935 upped that to 166.5 including 13 reserve and FAA, with 35 fighter and 20 Heavy Bomber based in Britain by March 1937, both A and C had 5 Army Co-operation squadrons, C increased some squadron strengths. Scheme F was November 1935 for completion March 1939, had 187 squadrons including 20 reserve, again upped some squadron strengths, light bomber units abolished, 30 fighter, 20 heavy bomber and 11 Army Co-Operation in Britain.

Scheme H was withdrawn, Scheme J (38 fighter 64 heavy bomber) was cut down to become K in January 1938, completion in March 1941, 38 fighter, 58 heavy bomber, 11 army co-operation in Britain, but it was overtaken by events. J for the first time added Japan as an issue. Scheme L in April 1938 for completion in March 1940 had 38 fighter, 47 heavy bomber and 11 army co-operation in Britain, all up 180 squadrons without the FAA.

Finally came scheme M in October 1938 for completion in March 1942, 50 fighter, 85 heavy bomber, 9 army co-operation squadrons in Britain, 212 squadrons all up, no more medium bomber squadrons. Apart from the RAF desire for bombing the distances from Britain to Germany mandated heavy bombers to obtain the necessary range and bomb loads. Scheme A had based in Britain a 500 aircraft striking force, 336 fighters, 64 coastal and 60 army co-operation, scheme M had 1,360 striking force, 800 fighters, 281 coastal, 108 army co-operation.

Scheme M fighters were Typhoon, Tornado and Whirlwind, bombers Halifax, Manchester and Stirling.

The British tend to dislike large armies and the trauma of WWI intensified that, meaning in early 1938 the army was not thinking in terms of sending any force onto the continent, later they upgraded the expeditionary force to 2 divisions. In mid 1939 came the idea of sending an army sized unit, but the British Army preparedness then went backwards as conscription was introduced.

The next problem is the definition of army support, for the army it included them having control of a large bombing force that hit the front line positions. The RAF at the time thought reconnaissance and some strategic interdiction, key rail centres at key times sort of thing, with any reconnaissance aircraft carrying a few bombs for targets of opportunity. Neither side of the debate was understanding the other, neither had the right doctrine. The RAF certainly was not interested in the tactical support of armies as defined in 1944, but neither was the army, and given the army was not talking about expeditionary forces until near the start of WWII the RAF actually had quite a sizeable Army Co-operation Command.

In September 1939 the command came to 13 squadrons, Bomber Command had 39 squadrons, Fighter Command 36 squadrons and Coastal Command 19 squadrons. The 13 Army Co-Operation squadrons were, 1, 73, 85, 87 Hurricane, 2, 4, 13, 16, 26, 614, Lysander, 613 Hind/Hector, 53, 59 Blenheim. Obviously 613 squadron was not front line. The Blenheims were meant as longer range reconnaissance. 2 squadron received Lysanders in July 1938, 4 squadron went to Lysanders in December 1938, 13 squadron received Lysanders in January 1939, 16 squadron received Lysanders in May 1938, 26 squadron, Lysanders in February 1939, and 614 squadron Lysanders in July 1939. So essentially the RAF was actually ahead of the army in providing basic reconnaissance airpower, but well behind in terms of firepower.

Number 1 group Bomber Command had 10 Fairey Battle squadrons, they went to France in September 1939, to either bring them within range of Germany (strategic) or to support the army (tactical) depending on how you read the relevant documents. By May 1940 it was understood the Battles would do tactical bombing. A new number 1 group was being formed in Bomber Command on the assumption the Battle squadrons would not be returning. The then current thinking was the majority of the Blenheim bomber squadrons, number 2 group, would move to France in the foreseeable future and the Battle squadrons would convert to more modern aircraft. Things like the airfield construction program had been delayed by the bad weather. In the period September 1939 to April 1940 very little effective work was done on figuring out how to combine air and ground forces.

When the fighting started in May 1940 the RAF had in France, under the Air Component, so meant to directly support the army, 4 fighter, 5 short range reconnaissance (Lysander), 2 long range bomber reconnaissance and another 2 bomber squadrons with Blenheims. The striking force had 2 fighter, 1 strategic reconnaissance and 10 bomber squadrons (8 Battle and 2 Blenheim). The 6 fighter squadrons were reinforced by another 4 once the Germans attacked. The ground force they were supporting had 10 front line divisions plus another 3 in training, and plans were to expand to something like 15 or more divisions when you add the armour and Canadians.

In June 1944, with a much better doctrine 2nd TAF had 12 bomber squadrons (6 Mosquito fighter bomber, 2 Boston, 4 Mitchell), as well as 8 tactical reconnaissance squadrons (Spitfires, Mustangs) and 9 Auster squadrons. The latter effectively army units. The big difference of course is fighter squadrons, there were something like 66 fighter squadrons in 2nd TAF in June 1944, including 6 night fighter. This to support the 1944 army of around 17 divisions, so a larger size to that in May 1940. Of course there were other air assets available in both 1940 and 1944 with lots more in 1944, but the above is essentially the airpower which was supposed to give priority to army support.

So in 1940 there were 7 reconnaissance squadrons, in 1944 there were 8, with another 9 very short range reconnaissance squadrons who have a main purpose of artillery fire control, but clearly are useful observers. In 1940 and 1944 there were 12 bomber squadrons. Of course the role of front line support had been moved from bomber to fighter aircraft so there really should be more bomber squadrons in 1940 to match the 1944 force mix.

The support assets were there in 1940 and in remarkably accurate numbers relative to the army they were supporting given the lack of experience and planning. In the end the lack of fighters in 1940 meant the support aircraft were not going to be very effective even if they had good doctrine. And the doctrine required all parties to work together, something that really took until Montgomery took control of 8th Army.

Essentially the RAF actually provided a reasonable army support force in 1940 but made a big contribution to ensuring it would be ineffective thanks to poor doctrine. The RAF did not provide a reasonable defence force. The army also hurt development of doctrine. The Lysander was a more survivable aircraft than the Auster. In 1940 lots of Lysanders did not survive, in 1944 lots of Austers did. The miscellaneous types require air superiority to function well with minimal losses.

 

[Shortround6]

What are their titles?

Author is Greg Baughen. There are 4-5 books (?)

He does use a fair amount of hindsight.

However other authors have pointed out that some of the British (and French) officers did tend to cherry pick the experiences of the 1st WW to suit their own view points during the 20s and 30s and discount experiences that were contrary.

And what some officers wanted vs what they could actually get approved/authorized may not be the same thing.

The Lysander was a more survivable aircraft than the Auster.

The British were far from the only air force to go down the path that lead to the Lysander. The French went even further down that path but with the fast fall of France for a number of reasons the French Air force failings tend to get over looked.

They had ordered almost 1400 of these with 730 delivered and while these were an improvement on this

60 built with the observer in the gondola instead of in the nose. Faster than a Lysander but without fighter escort they were equally doomed/ineffective. I won't go over other nations except to point out the German Hs 126, which was replaced by the Storch.

The problem here was that the Auster is more survivable than it is give credit for for several reasons. Any recon plane short of a single seat fighter (very high speed bomber?) needs escorts or air supremacy to survive. You can limit losses by picking the mission/s. Hedge hop, don't fly more than a few miles into enemy territory and get out quick, don't try to play light bomber and so on. And Austers are a lot cheaper than Lysanders. Pilots aren't but stupid tactics/missions are going to lose Lysanders, Potez 63.11, Hs 126s etc in large numbers.

EVERYBODY fell into the strategic bomber trap and the idea that a few hundred bombers could destroy a single city and cause rioting in the streets and the forced surrender of the central government. So bombers were seen as cheap alternatives to land armies, Navies, and tactical aircraft. The more bombers you had the faster you could force the enemy to surrender.

British and French had done some good things with tactical air in 1918. Problem was that was costly. But not as costly as losing the battle as a whole. And this is where the lessons taken go in different directions. Air force/s say " we cannot afford such losses long term" and they are right. But the losses should not be long term, only at peak times and/or emergency to archive or stop a breakthrough. And the losses to the army of failing to stop a breakthrough (or failing to achieve one if blocked part way through) are going to be very high for the countries involved. Air forces are supposed to part of the country, not fighting their own war.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

However other authors have pointed out that some of the British (and French) officers did tend to cherry pick the experiences of the 1st WW to suit their own view points during the 20s and 30s and discount experiences that were contrary.

Ignoring the dates, just change "some of..." to all humans.

And what some officers wanted vs what they could actually get approved/authorized may not be the same thing.

again change some officers to all humans, a characteristic that obviously appears around the age of 1 or 2

But the losses should not be long term, only at peak times and/or emergency to archive or stop a breakthrough. And the losses to the army of failing to stop a breakthrough (or failing to achieve one if blocked part way through) are going to be very high for the countries involved. Air forces are supposed to part of the country, not fighting their own war.

Which is no doubt why the Luftwaffe should have stripped the eastern etc. fronts of all aircraft, to support the Mortain counter attack and take Avranches in August 1944, or at least destroyed the single bridge third army was using, leaving the now isolated Americans vulnerable to heavy defeat. Bradley noted the ground attack taking place further would likely have done much better.

Meantime based on the results of the Pre Cobra bombings on Panzer Lehr and those that supported Operation Goodwood, one Bomber Command and one 8th Air Force strike by day just behind the front line from D-Day onwards, reducing a couple of German divisions to largely unable to resist status, ground forces then follow up, steady advance across France surely? While I do not believe the claim "The average cost per ton of bombs dropped was £2,911.00" for Bomber Command at say £1,000 times 2,000 tons gives £2,000,000 pounds per strike times 50 strikes times 2 air forces, would save a lot of allied lives if it worked.

Greg Baughen. Looking at the blurb for the battle of France/Britain book. It talks about the wrong type of fighter force, that would be Defiants by day and the lack night fighters, as the majority of damage to Britain was done in the night raids, of course such a force requires development of electronics, better ground control etc. as well as the aircraft themselves but there were plenty of Blenheims around, say 2 Group converted to night fighter units pre war?

"Only a fortuitous sequence of events enabled Fighter Command to prevail", if there was no skill component, that is good decisions, the bad decisions really do not count as well, just ride your luck and your choice of random number generator. Hopefully the language is blurb hype

"between the RAF and the Luftwaffe and the equally bitter struggle between the Air Ministry and the War Office" as an author I would be raising red flag on the language, bringing to mind British Army artillery shoots on RAF airfields, RAF bomb raids on army barracks.

The flag for me that says do not bother with the book is "Why were hundreds of American combat planes and experienced Polish and Czech pilots left on the sidelines?" The pilots were certainly not on the side lines, the general conclusion is they were ready before the RAF was willing to commit them.

As for hundreds of American Combat planes, the numbers are 1,069 arrivals from the US March to December 1940, including 652 fighters. Of course the ones that arrived by end September 1940 were orders for others who tended to use other languages and measuring systems, plus there would be a spare parts issues and training times before talking about combat worthiness features like self sealing fuel tanks. The Havoc I figures are estimates, the Brewster are the Belgian order,

Type	Brewster	Havoc I	Havoc II	Mohawk I	Tomahawk	Martlet	Total Imports	UK
Jun-40​	0​	8​	0​	0​	0​	0​	8​	446​
Jul-40​	21​	0​	0​	32​	0​	0​	53​	496​
Aug-40​	11​	14​	0​	37​	1​	6​	69​	476​
Sep-40​	1​	34​	0​	117​	0​	38​	190​	468​
Oct-40​	0​	4​	0​	18​	69​	6​	97​	469​
Nov-40​	0​	0​	0​	0​	50​	15​	65​	459​
Dec-40​	0​	0​	3​	0​	161​	6​	170​	413​
Total	33​	60​	3​	204​	281​	71​	652​	3,227​

In addition 53 Hurricane I airframes arrived from Canada. RAF Fighter production January to May 1940 was 157, 149, 177, 256 and 325. To show the gap between import and service, deliveries to the RAF in 1940 were 31 Buffalo, 184 Mohawk and 70 Tomahawk.

The RAF in the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain

From the website Overview In May 1940, the German Army and the Allied forces they faced were fairly evenly matched. Two months later Britain was on her own, hopelessly outnumbered and facing imminent defeat. Should the RAF have done more to support the Allied armies in France? Could the RAF have...

reviews.ipmsusa.org

One claim is the British failed to provide air support to the Dutch, I wonder how such support would work. In 1940 the Luftwaffe could concentrate its fighter force in western Germany where they could be available for attack and defence, the RAF had to guard the front plus the air routes across the North Sea.

The book on the French Air Force in 1940 "defeat was not inevitable. If better use had been made of the planes that were available, the result might have been different." From what I know a major revamp of the Army High Command was required first, starting with more and faster communications and training to make decisions faster. Air Forces and Armies can help each other but not substitute for each other except in the very short term.

The RAF's Road to D-Day "He explains how army air support went backwards after the successes of the Desert Air Force, and how this led to a failure to support the troops landing on the D-Day beaches in Normandy." I assume the major known factor of inexperienced units in the air and on the ground, plus the arrival times of the 9th Air Force and its commitments to heavy bomber escort are discussed.

"questions whether Eisenhower, Montgomery or Tedder ever fully understood how to make best use of the massive aerial forces available to them" Did anyone then or anyone now have that knowledge? Presumably also the armour, artillery and airlift etc. as well, the blurbs are really off putting.

Rise of the Bomber "reassess British air policy in the inter-war years. Gone is the image of a Royal Air Force starved of funds and struggling for survival against a bullying Army and Navy. Instead, Baughen describes how the Air Force set out to replace both the Army and Navy. It blocked the development of a modern air/tank strategy" "The Air Staff had misled the government, deceived itself and left the country defenseless. Yet, all was not lost. Unintentionally, the Air Ministry had been creating the aircraft that might still save the country" Nice to know is was mostly accidental and the fighters around in 1938 were useless, plus the radar stations etc.

RAF At the cross roads, "Britain had never had the resources to build a large army as well as a strategic bomber fleet; it had always had to make a choice." As a first approximation large army is manpower heavy, equipment light, heavy bombers the other way around.

The Fairey Battle book sounds interesting but again the blurb indicates hind sight in use. Also "argues that with a few basic modifications it could have been almost as successful as the Il-2 Sturmovik"

RAF on the offensive book, View of Greg Baughen, RAF on the Offensive: The Rebirth of Tactical Air Power 1940-1941

On another note, if you can access JSTOR https://www.jstor.org/stable/40107938?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

 

[Art Medcalf]

This one seems to have gotten way off the subject, perhaps a new thread is needed.

 

[Juha3]

Author is Greg Baughen. There are 4-5 books (?)

He does use a fair amount of hindsight.

However other authors have pointed out that some of the British (and French) officers did tend to cherry pick the experiences of the 1st WW to suit their own view points during the 20s and 30s and discount experiences that were contrary.

And what some officers wanted vs what they could actually get approved/authorized may not be the same thing.


The British were far from the only air force to go down the path that lead to the Lysander. The French went even further down that path but with the fast fall of France for a number of reasons the French Air force failings tend to get over looked.
View attachment 790602
They had ordered almost 1400 of these with 730 delivered and while these were an improvement on this
View attachment 790603
60 built with the observer in the gondola instead of in the nose. Faster than a Lysander but without fighter escort they were equally doomed/ineffective. I won't go over other nations except to point out the German Hs 126, which was replaced by the Storch.

The problem here was that the Auster is more survivable than it is give credit for for several reasons. Any recon plane short of a single seat fighter (very high speed bomber?) needs escorts or air supremacy to survive. You can limit losses by picking the mission/s. Hedge hop, don't fly more than a few miles into enemy territory and get out quick, don't try to play light bomber and so on. And Austers are a lot cheaper than Lysanders. Pilots aren't but stupid tactics/missions are going to lose Lysanders, Potez 63.11, Hs 126s etc in large numbers.

EVERYBODY fell into the strategic bomber trap and the idea that a few hundred bombers could destroy a single city and cause rioting in the streets and the forced surrender of the central government. So bombers were seen as cheap alternatives to land armies, Navies, and tactical aircraft. The more bombers you had the faster you could force the enemy to surrender.

British and French had done some good things with tactical air in 1918. Problem was that was costly. But not as costly as losing the battle as a whole. And this is where the lessons taken go in different directions. Air force/s say " we cannot afford such losses long term" and they are right. But the losses should not be long term, only at peak times and/or emergency to archive or stop a breakthrough. And the losses to the army of failing to stop a breakthrough (or failing to achieve one if blocked part way through) are going to be very high for the countries involved. Air forces are supposed to part of the country, not fighting their own war.

Fi 156 did not replace Hs 126, its replacement was Fw 189. The main function of 156 was liaison.

Baughen is overcritical towards the RAF even if there are several examples the RAF being too protective of its independence and forgot, at times, that the purpose was to win the war together with the navy and the army.

 

[Shortround6]

As of June 1934 the Hurricane prototype normal loaded weight was expected to be 4,600 pounds, by December 4,800 pounds, as of August 1935 5,200 pounds, as weighed in October 5,416 pounds with Watts two-bladed, fixed pitch (wood) airscrew fitted. As of March 1938 first production Hurricane L1547 Normal Loaded Weight was 6,017 pounds.

Gauntlet F7/30 at best (no prototype as such, K4081 FF Dec-34), Gladiator F7/30 & F14/35 (FF Sep-34), Hurricane F5/34 & F10/35 (FF Nov-35), Spitfire F10/35 (FF Mar-36), Defiant F9/35 (Aug-37), Whirlwind F37/35 (Oct-38) Blenheim night fighter decided on in mid 1938, first examples around in December.

From 1935 on the expected size of a fighter airfield was rapidly changing, at least some would need to be light bomber size. Even a 2 man crew single engine fighter was going to need more room than a single seater.

First Hurricane column DH, second column Rotol propeller and yes the report actually says adding weight to the Whirlwind reduces take off run.

Aircraft

Defiant I

Beaufighter I

Blenheim IVF

Tomahawk

Havoc I

Havoc II

Gauntlet

Gladiator

Hurricane I

Hurricane I

Spitfire I

Whirlwind

Wing Sq ft

250​

503​

469​

236​

465​

465​

315​

323​

258​

258​

242​

250​

Tare (pounds)

5938​

13,918​

9,236​

5,615​

11,800​

13,073​

2,933​

3,695​

5,210​

5,085​

4,795​

8,040​

Weight (pounds)

7710​

19,816​

12,660​

7,224​

15,400​

16,700​

4,028​

4,757​

6,629​

6,532​

6,255​

9,980​

Take Off (Over 50 ft) (Yards)

500​

790​

550​

570​

600​

420​

320​

370​

520​

430​

400​

630​

Landing (Over 50 ft) (Yards)

770​

940​

730​

630​

560​

551​

n/a

475​

610​

600​

590​

750​

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Weight (pounds)

n/a

21,120​

14,100​

7,602​

n/a

n/a

n/a

4,912​

6,758​

6,661​

n/a

10,115​

Take Off (Over 50 ft) (Yards)

n/a

940​

720​

620​

n/a

n/a

n/a

420​

540​

445​

n/a

580​

The RAF 15 minute allowance for the Spitfire I used 19.5 gallons, leaving 64.5 gallons available for cruise at 15,000 feet. At 304 mph that gave a range of 415 miles, at 180-190 mph 575 miles, simply adding the extra 12 gallons of forward fuselage fuel the mark VII and VIII carried extends those ranges to 490 and 680 miles, give the mark I the full 124 mark VII and VIII internal fuel capacity and the ranges are 670 and 930 miles. Quite adequate if based in France (though Nancy to Berlin is about 415 miles versus 580 from London) but the RAF at best was doing the occasional light/medium bomber escort training, the heavies, like Wellingtons, were on their own.

Agreed a neutral Holland/Belgium/Denmark makes air attacks to/from Britain/Germany long range affairs, going over the North Sea runs into two RAF declared impossibilities, long range fighter and single seat fighter pilot having long range navigation skills. Belgium in the war as per WWI largely removes the range problem, more so as the RAF over rated the importance of the Ruhr.

I thought the multi thousand RAF heavy bomber ideas were post June 1940, not pre war.

Thank you for the chart. I think it shows rather well that the British designers of mid 30s were trying to get planes to operate from small airfields and that eve just a couple of years can make a difference as to what is acceptable and what is not. I will note that the Gladiator was first British fighter to use flaps, this was to meet the landing speed requirement for night operations. Night fighter had a rather different meaning in 1934.
Defiant first flight was Aug 1937 and Whirlwind first flight was Oct 1938 so even in 1936-37 the landscape (expected airfield size) was changing.
I will also note that for the Tomahawk, at the weight given, probably only has 120US gallons (100Imp gal) in the tank/s and any range comparisons with the Spitfire should take that into account.

 

[GregP]

Actually while he had experience with planes in Nautical conditions from a corrosion/weather standpoint, He didn't have much experience designing planes for carrier operations. Aside from using the Seagull/Walrus family from carriers.

Mitchell was skilled and could see outside the box. He could not perform magic and he could not see into the future or perform Jedi mind tricks to get the Air Ministry to go along with his ideas. Just a year and especially 2 years could make large changes in what engines were favored by the Air Ministry, and what power could be expected from the engines as they changed from 87 octane to 100 octane let alone the change in 1940-41 to 100/130 fuel. "the late 1930s" covers large changes in engines, armament and lift devices in just a few years.

In early 1937 the designer has a choice of .303 machine guns or.................................303 machine guns. Doesn't matter what the aircraft designer thinks aircraft armament should be. Air Ministry may have expressed a desire for 20mm guns but they have not adopted one. In 1938 they have adopted the Hispano gun, bought the license and are building the factory. At this point the Hispano is drum feed only.
The Sabre and Vulture and Griffon engines (the later coming late) were attempts to get high power with 87 octane fuel. So what engine is Mitchell going to design his late 30s fighter around?
Mitchell would also have been working in a vacuum. In the late 30s he would have no knowledge of the A6M or the Ki-43 or the Fw 190. He would have known about the Reggiane 2000 indirectly as the Seversky P-35 and kin. The Reggiane 2000 first flew in May 1939 which is rather late to try to "reply" to. The 109 didn't fly with the DB601 engine until 1938.
View attachment 777842
This is the XF4F-2 in 1938. Wings with rounded tips and 2 ft shorter on each side (4ft total), round Vertical fin and rudder, round horizontal stabilizer mounted on the fuselage and not on the fin and only two guns, in the cowl. Things changed a lot in 1939. Of interest is the landing gear. Wildcats had just about 1 ft of vertical travel. 2in was used up just sitting on the ground/deck. A lot of land planes had 6-7in of travel. the long travel landing gear gave a lot cushion on arrested landings.

Mitchell had the Spitfire well in hand, but robust construction for carrier use (arrested landings) means more weight. Longer endurance means more weight. Increased ammo capacity means more weight. Landing characteristics are a fine line, you need good control and low speed but not "floaty". Spitfire had a lot of room for improvement to the flap system as the Spitfire flaps were about as simple as they came. But complicated flaps are heavier and more costly to construct. Everything, repeat, Everything is a compromise.

Now a super-duper Supermarine carrier fighter that first flies in 1939 (very late 1930s) could show large advances over a number of other aircraft. Trouble is that it won't enter squadron service until 1941 if you are lucky. The Fulmar was ordered in mid 1938 off the drawing board and entered service in 1940 and it had the advantage of using the P.4/34 bomber as a flying Prototype. The P.4/34 had flown in Jan 1937 so the ordering off the drawing board was rather low risk. I know it is not want is wanted but it speaks to timing.

Now think about what the Navy and/or Air Ministry wanted at the time (late 30s), assuming that they would accept the idea of a single seat fighter. It is not the speed/climb that really matters. It is the desired endurance (fuel load) and armament weight (guns plus ammo) that help govern the wing loading/landing speed. And some of that goes back to operational requirements. Endurance of 2 hours or 3 or 4 hours? firing time of 15 seconds or 23 seconds or 30 seconds. How often will the fighters have to land to refuel/reload?
With time you will get better engines and perhaps better guns (what is known in 1938?) but you will be stuck with the airframe except for minor changes (cutting or adding to the wing a little bit).

Going back to why planes were designed they way they were. F4F-3 wildcat was designed to carry about 37% more fuel than a Hurricane and about 12% more guns (4 .50s) and over double the amount of ammo (even at just 300rpg). This is before armor and SS tanks show up.

Lets also remember that early A6Ms only held 60 rounds per 20mm and were landing during the Battle of Midway for more ammo. Doesn't matter if you have super range/endurance if you only have 7 seconds of firing time for the big guns.

Maybe 11 inches of vertical travel?