Why American aces had lower scores than anybody else

[drgondog]

Hi
Leigh-Mallory was the Air Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) from 15th November, 1943 (previously he had commanded Fighter Command) not just 2 TAF. So he was a senior Allied commander with both British and US air organisations under his command and had a USAAF deputy commander.

Mike

Agreed - his 'deputy' was General Brereton CO of 9th AF and the battleground because Leigh-Mallory refused point-blank to release IX FC to support USSTAFE operations - and Spaatz's mandate to destroy the LW Pre-invasion, not 'over the invasion battlefield'.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

ETO combat sorties flown from Table 118; ETO total losses (heavy bombers, medium & light bombers, fighters) attributed enemy aircraft from Table 159; monthly sortie loss percentage calculated in Excel.

             Total  Losses
Month      Sorties  to E/A    Pct.
----------------------------------
Jan 1944    15,183    197    1.30%
Feb 1944    24,425    243    0.99%
Mar 1944    31,950    234    0.73%
Apr 1944    43,434    516    1.19%
May 1944    67,979    397    0.58%
Jun 1944    96,096    284    0.30%
Jul 1944    74,878    150    0.20%
Aug 1944    77,976    163    0.21%
Sep 1944    57,384    241    0.42%
Oct 1944    52,596    135    0.26%
Nov 1944    52,299    131    0.25%
Dec 1944    61,089    211    0.35%
Jan 1945    47,577    121    0.25%
Feb 1945    68,365     56    0.08%
Mar 1945   111,472    144    0.13%
Apr 1945    79,402    119    0.15%

There is a clear and unmistakable reduction in the percentage of sorties lost to German fighters.

The percentage reduction in losses is simply due to the vast increase in size of the 8th AF. If you look at the absolute values, you will see that the German fighters were actually shooting down more bombers in absolute terms up until D-day. The sudden drop in losses in June is not due to the sudden collapse of the Luftwaffe just in time for the invasion as is claimed by some but by the diversion of Luftwaffe fighter groups to the front line. The positive impact of invasion on AF casualties was admitted by none other than General Eaker in a White House meeting held on 18 June 1945 discussing the invasion of Japan.

"He stated that those who advocated the use against Japan of air power alone overlooked the very impressive fact that air casualties are always much heavier when air power faces the enemy alone and that these casualties never fail to drop as soon as the ground forces come in."

Unfortunately the link no longer works.

 

[JDCAVE]

The single digit salute comment was hyerbole. That said, Leigh-Mallory would not budge until ordered by Portal to stand down

Look to Carl A Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, To Command The Sky, Forged in Fire, to name a a few - IIRC Boylon's USAF Study 136 is also a good reference.

The underlying issue was the nomination of Leigh-Mallory to command the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, including 2TAF and Brereton's Ninth AF. Apparently he assumed two major concets as fact. 1.) That as AEF Air Force commander, he would have total control of ALL US/UK air assets (including Bomber Command and USSTAFE) to prepare for the invasion, and b.) that destruction of the LW could not be achieved before the Invasion.

I made the comment about the P-51B in my last book, because it formed the basis for the argument that Spaatz proposed as crucial to Pointblank. In fact Spaatz wanted to conrol of all US fighter assets in UK inluding the now arriving P-47D and P-38J Fighter Groups during the Strategic Bombing Campaign. The issue became a major issue in the burgoining organizational battles Eisenhower was confronted with as the newly appointed SHEAF.

Spaatz did Not have a problem answering to Tedder, but was adamant that he would ask to be replaced if ordered to stubborn 8th and 15th AF combat. operations to Leigh-Mallory. Everyone except Roosevelt were at one time or another brought in for this turf war.

I don't have access to any of those books, but to my understanding Leigh Mallory would have taken orders directly from Eisenhower, not Portal. You refer to your book, but I'm trying to understand what primary historical material such as memoranda and so forth are available. Those would go along way to supporting your points. Overall, and I hope you don't take this the wrong way, I'm concerned with unnecessary extemporization on this subject.

Jim

 

[drgondog]

I don't have access to any of those books, but to my understanding Leigh Mallory would have taken orders directly from Eisenhower, not Portal. You refer to your book, but I'm trying to understand what primary historical material such as memoranda and so forth are available. Those would go along way to supporting your points. Overall, and I hope you don't take this the wrong way, I'm concerned with unnecessary extemporization on this subject.

Jim

I'm not offended. Look to USAF Study 136 for a single focus of citations and actual documents reposing in USAF HRC and NARA.

 

[JDCAVE]

I'm not offended. Look to USAF Study 136 for a single focus of citations and actual documents reposing in USAF HRC and NARA.

Excellent! Thank you. I presume this coverers off all of the points you've made?

jim

 

[JDCAVE]

This is the only page in that document that relates to anything that Portal had to Mustangs, in that Arnold requested Portal to provide RAF Mustang fighter support for bombing missions. Portal's response was to suggest that the Americans should increase the nimber of bombers or accept a higher rate of loss. It does not specifically mention the RAF supporting these missions. I'm pretty certain that the number of RAF mustang squadrons was pretty low at that point (October 1943).

 

[MikeMeech]

This is the only page in that document that relates to anything that Portal had to Mustangs, in that Arnold requested Portal to provide RAF Mustang fighter support for bombing missions. Portal's response was to suggest that the Americans should increase the nimber of bombers or accept a higher rate of loss. It does not specifically mention the RAF supporting these missions. I'm pretty certain that the number of RAF mustang squadrons was pretty low at that point (October 1943).

View attachment 712797

Hi
The first Mustang III (P-51B & C) squadron for the RAF was No. 65 in service from December 1943, the second was No. 19 was in service from January 1944. They began operations in February 1944 escorting bomber formations. In October 1943 the RAF had no Mustang III squadrons available.

Mike

 

[drgondog]

Excellent! Thank you. I presume this coverers off all of the points you've made?

jim

If you are asking about the combined library I cited, I woud say that is a good assumption. That said, while all of those referenced books are well documented regarding sources and citations I don't recall finding a letter or smoking gun of exchange of high level memorandums of all the points discussed in Spaatz or Eaker or Eisenhower or Doolittle biographies. What you will find are 'quotes' of recollections, and well documented footnotes referencing context and others in discussions and meetings.

Boylon's Study 136 is available to download from USAFHRC. It is by far the best scholarship of the development and introduction of Long Range Escort and I sourced many of his citations at NARA and HRC - and referenced such often in my last book. That said, he did not devote much ink to the in-fighting which is well documented in the Spaatz Bio.

FWIIW of all the questions I addressed, the one question I never found an answer for is "Why Eaker, with the support of Lovett made a plea to Arnold in July 1943 for Mustangs - but inexplicably made no fight for them when the first groups were assigned to 9th AF." When Leigh-Mallory was tasked for Allied Expeditionary Air Force, which included Brereton's 9th AF, he assumed that a.) he would report to Eisenhower, and b.) he would assume control of Bomber Command and USSTAFE - which currently remained under Portal per Combined Bomber Command agreed structure out of Casablanca.

The reference you posted above was the agreement between Arnold and Portal to assign existing RAF Mustang III arriving between November and December 31, 1943 to USSTAFE control. This was as near as I can tell, the genesis between AEAF and USSTAFE flare up (L-M and Spaatz). Those ships went to BAD2 for installation of 85 gal fuel tanks. Later, Mustang III squadrons engaged in escort support of VIII BC,but those P-51s did not have 85 gal tank and had only effective combat radius of say, Schweinfurt. When applied they were used as long range penetration/withdrawal support.

Further, according to the sources cited in the books I pointed you to, he (L-M) and Brereton believed that air superiority could not be achieved before D-Day. According to Spaatz and Copp in Forged in Fire, L-M believed that under his leadership, when he had control of AAFEC that such dominance would be achieved 'over the invasion front' - which infuriated Spaatz and Arnold and George Marshall. Brereton was focused on training the 9th FC for the upcoming support obligations for Tactical Air and did not wish to relinquish the fighter assets tasked to IX FC (P-47D, P-38 and P-51B) to augment VIII FC for escort and engagement with the LW.

The reference you cited (Re; Portal/RAF Mustang discussion) was before settled 'business' between Eisenhower, Spaatz, Portal, L-M and Brereton that Eighth AF WOULD receive priority for P-38 and P-51 aircraft, and further that IX FC would be TDY to Spaatz/Doolittle for Pointblank.

Those discussions, arguments and agreements were exascerbated by Leigh-Mallory's refusal to accept relinquishing the notion that he would/should have control of Allied air assets prior to the invasion, in support of His planning prerogatives, and his on-going resistance to the concept of destroying the LW Before OVERLORD as Priority number 1.

I would point you to the Spaatz book as the very best I have seen regarding the organizational and objectives fights between AEAF, RAF Bomber Command USSTAFE and Combined Chiefs, as the best American view on the Portal, Arnold, Tedder, Leigh-Mallory and Spaatz issues. In addition to the timeline related discussions, there is a major section of Part IV, "Leigh-Mallory and the AEAF".

I might add that Leigh-Mallory did Not resist assigning all arriving P-51B to 8th AF per January 24, 1944 meetings between Spaatz, Brereton, Tedder, Conningham, Leigh-Malory, Doolittle and Kepner. That meeting resulted in a.) relinquishing new FG equipped with P-47s to 9th AF, b.) new FG equipped with P-51B to 8th AF, c.) swapping 358th FG (P-47) for 357th FG (P-51B), d.) planned movement of P-38s from 8th AF to 9th as P-51B/D transitions occurred.

 

[JDCAVE]

If you are asking about the combined library I cited….

Boylon's Study 136 is available to download from USAFHRC. It is by far the best scholarship of the development and introduction of Long Range Escort….

The reference you posted above was the agreement between Arnold and Portal to assign existing RAF Mustang III arriving between November and December 31, 1943 to USSTAFE control. This was as near as I can tell, the genesis between AEAF and USSTAFE flare up (L-M and Spaatz)…
.

The reference I posted above is from Study 136. It's not "searchable" until OCR'd. without the actual memos to which you refer, I'm not sure there was any agreement, per se, perhaps there was but I cannot discern that from what I have extracted above.

Where am I going with this? Because the RAF did not have the fighter resources in the first half of 1944, (as the USAAF had) to participate in the fight against the daylight Luftwaffe fighter. i had always assumed that these had gone to the USAAF.

jim

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Carl A Spaatz and the Air War in Europe https://media.defense.gov/2010/Oct/12/2001330126/-1/-1/0/AFD-101012-035.pdf

The effort the allied commanders had to distribute and Luftwaffe fighter strength. Imports from AIR 19/524, En route, Strength, Loss and total transferred from RAF Census AIR 20/1871. Loss and transfer are cumulative figures. End of month. Also 9th AF effort for month.

Mustang III

Imports

Imports

On Way

On Way

Strength

Strength

Loss

Loss

To USAAF

9th AF sorties

Tons on

Fighter

Month

UK

Med

UK

Med

UK

Med

UK

Med

Cumulative

Fighter

Bomber

Target

Kill claims

Sep-43​

3​

12​

Oct-43​

74​

75​

56​

1​

804​

427.05​

Nov-43​

90​

119​

115​

1​

1568​

1571.65​

Dec-43​

105​

130​

227​

1​

415​

2067​

1474.58​

9​

Jan-44​

53​

153​

158​

2​

36​

370​

1711​

1546.00​

42​

Feb-44​

46​

14​

112​

26​

201​

3​

35​

1966​

3881​

3368.90​

69.5​

Mar-44​

3​

11​

65​

56​

299​

14​

8​

35​

5080​

4067​

5219.08​

50​

Apr-44​

16​

54​

40​

76​

304​

14​

22​

35​

7914​

7346​

10213.18​

98​

May-44​

56​

14​

42​

70​

344​

23​

35​

2​

35​

21074​

11947​

17905.12​

85.5​

Jun-44​

51​

30​

4​

44​

404​

73​

82​

7​

37​

29990​

11687​

23059.02​

196.5​

Luftwaffe day fighters, date, single engine strength/serviceable, twin engine strength/serviceable
31-Dec-43 1561/1095, 290/199
10-Jan-44 1554/1043, 306/179
20-Jan-44 1545/1121, 299/186
31-Jan-44 1670/1008, 299/170
10-Feb-44 1763/1180, 310/196
20-Feb-44 1791/1216, 291/199
29-Feb-44 1747/1220, 247/158
10-Mar-44 1743/1141, 226/132
20-Mar-44 1704/1118, 233/145
31-Mar-44 1696/1188, 251/148
10-Apr-44 1801/1224, 288/157
20-Apr-44 1663/1163, 313/170
30-Apr-44 1648/1114, 321/153
10-May-44 1748/1250, 331/136
20-May-44 1749/1224, 320/155
31-May-44 1683/1111, 305/168
10-Jun-44 1483/1037, 309/158
20-Jun-44 1609/1067, 284/187
30-Jun-44 1523/895, 242/124

The 9th Air Force reports it flew 14,105 sorties as heavy bomber escort for the war. It flew 15,745 fighter sorties to end April 1944. 9th Air Force First missions, the 358th was a transfer from the 8th AF, it had arrived in England 20 October 1943, beginning operations 20 December. The first 4 B-26 groups were also transfers.

354 FG P-51 1-Dec-43, 358 FG P-47 3-Feb-44, 362 FG P-47 8-Feb-44, 365 FG P-47 22-Feb-44, 363 FG P-51 24-Feb-44, 366 FG P-47 14-Mar-44, 368 FG P-47 14-Mar-44, 405 FG P-47 11-Apr-44, 371 FG P-47 12-Apr-44, 48 FG P-47 20-Apr-44, 474 FG P-38 25-Apr-44, 50 FG P-47 1-May-44, 370 FG P-38 1-May-44, 404 FG P-47 1-May-44, 36 FG P-47 8-May-44, 373 FG P-47 8-May-44, 367 FG P-38 9-May-44, 406 FG P-47 9-May-44

322 BG B-26 16-Oct-43, 323 BG B-26 16-Oct-43, 386 BG B-26 16-Oct-43, 387 BG B-26 16-Oct-43, 391 BG B-26 15-Feb-44, 416 BG A-20 3-Mar-44, 344 BG B-26 6-Mar-44, 394 BG B-26 23-Mar-44, 409 BG A-20 13-Apr-44, 397 BG B-26 20-Apr-44, 410 BG A-20 1-May-44

Big Wing by Bill Newton Dunn is the biography of Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the author is a great nephew of Leigh-Mallory. As a specialist in Army Co-Operation (his unit did the first aircraft to tank communications in combat on 17 July 1918), I have little doubt he would have been given some bad treatment during the inter war period and now his time had come. It is also a reality Leigh-Mallory seems to have been more disliked than Montgomery. Leigh-Mallory would be the only significant outsider to the tried and generally well working ex Mediterranean command team headed by Eisenhower. In theory he was parallel to Montgomery while having Tedder as a superior, it meant Leigh-Mallory was easy to bypass.

On 27 March 1943 as commander of Fighter Command he began a tour of North Africa, in his 12 April report he stated. "All air forces must be centralised under one Commander in Chief. The headquarters of British and American staffs must be amalgamated." On 15 April came the proposal to form an Expeditionary Air Force HQ within Fighter Command. The Casablanca conference had approved the post of C-in-C Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) in principle, Leigh Mallory was formally nominated in July 1943, approved at the Quebec conference but not announced. In the end the Overlord command structure would end up with 1 army commander, 1 navy commander, 1 strategic air force commander and 1 tactical air force commander. The air force arrangement went against the concentration of force ideas, but then the army and navy only had the Normandy battle to deal with, nor did the navy commander control the Home Fleet, the air force had the Normandy battle and operations in western Europe, as the airmen had surplus firepower over what was required to support Overlord, plus commitments like the Crossbow anti V weapons raids. It also reinforced the air force ideas that operations well out of sight of the army were also supporting the army, it was not just aircraft over the battlefield. Yet no sane commander could plan Overlord assuming the Luftwaffe would lack the strength to intervene effectively, bombs on Germany's factories were hurting, a successful invasion of France was doom. Surely the Luftwaffe knew that?

October/November 1943 sees Leigh-Mallory in Washington starting to ask how the Pointblank directive is going to fit in or change to enable Overlord. General Marshall wants the air commander directly under the Overlord commander which fits awkwardly with the role of commander Fighter Command reporting to the British chiefs. Meeting with General Arnold who made a "welter of irrelevant statements most of which bore no relation to fact", Leigh-Mallory went about "correcting" them while agreeing there needed to be a mechanism to co-ordinate Mediterranean and Western Europe air operations.

The US Chiefs of Staff proposed the tactical and strategic air commanders idea on 4 November 1943, Leigh-Mallory objected noting Marshall wanted an air C-in-C controlling any part of the strategic air forces allocated to Overlord. The formal directive on 16 November gave Leigh-Mallory operational control of the tactical air forces, command of Fighter Command/ADGB had passed to Roderic Hill on 15 November but it was still subordinate to Leigh-Mallory, the 9th Air Force was subordinated on 15 December. In December 1943 Leigh-Mallory noted airfield attacks were not doing much to the Luftwaffe, best wait until making an intensive effort just before Overlord, meantime attack the enemy industry to force fights but remember Overlord is the operation, it must succeed even to the detriment of other operations.

In January 1944 the AEAF Bombing Committee is formed to work out the Overlord air plan. The Mediterranean Command Team generally arrive in Britain to take command of Overlord, first major task is to push for an increase of the initial invasion from 3 to 5 beaches. Target date for invasion is May 1944. We know it happened 5 weeks later, but think of the mindset of the commanders in late January having around 3 months to plan and carry out the necessary air operations, not over 4. On top of this Overlord was a moving target in the first half of 1944, both timing and size. COSSAC was a relatively junior planning staff unable to force the system to deliver the resources needed to deliver a successful invasion, instead it had to put together a plan using allocations it was given. Admiral Nimitz would alternate Halsey and Spruance making sure the next operation was planned by people carrying it out and having the authority to demand resources.

Also remember Anvil/Dragoon as (near) simultaneous landings in southern France. Rommel changing the German strategy from major counter attack to defend on the beaches. Add to the mix helpful suggestions like Churchill wanting to explore an invasion of the Bordeaux region as an alternative to Anvil. Marshall suggesting the airborne divisions be dropped near Paris. So how much of any COSSAC air plan made it to D-Day? How much did the believed attrition of Luftwaffe fighter pilot quality January to May 1944 affect the plan? In aircraft numbers the Jagdwaffe held up.

At Quebec in August 1943, Churchill suggested a 25% increase in the assault if possible and Marshall agreed, but in October when General Morgan went to the US to plead his case, he returned without success. On 23 October the US Joint Chiefs of Staff denied the request for more landing craft while on the 26th they approved a large increase in US landing craft production, but these would be too late for Overlord. The USN had already cancelled over 100 Destroyer Escorts on 15 September and more in October to make room for more LST.

Apart from the obvious need for sea and air superiority, lessons: Dieppe strong naval gunfire support was relearned and that amphibious assaults into urban areas is simply combining the two hardest ground operations, do not do it. Torch where the landings on the Atlantic coast lost some 25% of the landing craft. Sicily, where some of the invaders were met with heavy weapons in the form of armoured attacks, naval gunfire support was a good thing but best to ensure more army heavy weapons were ashore, equals more LSTs and LCTs. Also the US the standard amphibious supply technique was only geared to small forces on small landings. If an Army was coming ashore and they were going to move large distances it was imperative a proper Army logistics system was put in place. Salerno, beachhead roped off and for a time in peril of being destroyed. It could be argued it was held by the air and naval power but only freed by the threat from the arrival of ground troops from another landing, partly because there were no follow up troops, so how big should the first, second and third waves be? Tarawa, have fire support available as the troops touch down. Anzio another roped off beached. By February 1944 a report on the lessons learnt at Tarawa had made it to England.

In 1943 like USAAF the RAF planned to use P-51 in the tactical air force. As of end 1943 the idea was the heavy bombers would make their direct contribution for about 2 weeks before the invasion, that became 3 months. Meantime the quality and quantity of the day attacks was steadily increasing. A crucial point of the pre D-day training was joint exercises of troops and aircraft, it turned out there was a lot of on the job learning in June. More than the fighters Spaatz wanted light and medium bomber support, striking targets and at times to help heavy bomber raids, which delayed invasion support bombings. And of course no one knew how much effort was needed on the V weapons sites. It is clear the heavy bombers needed the fighter support, whether the light and medium bomber support was needed is much more uncertain, as is whether keeping the smaller bombers as purely invasion support would produce a better result. The command structure insisted Overlord was the major must succeed operation while the AEAF, the specific invasion support air power, was being told their priority was to be more indirect, via supporting the heavy bombers, remembering as of mid February D-Day was around 11 weeks away. While Spaatz made sure the 9th Air Force complied I do not know how much effect it had on 2nd TAF.

The Davis conclusion, "Spaatz was destroying airplanes, killing German pilots, and bombing factories while the tactical airmen wanted to conduct training exercises." is unfair, the shorter range allied airpower was doing plenty of combat, while dealing with new units that needed training (by themselves and with troops) before entering combat and the commanders would be in the firing line if the ground/air systems broke down in combat, or lots of friendly fire incidents, or worse contributed to the failure of the operation.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Part 2 due to 20,000 character limit.

20 December 1943 The first USAAF patrol ahead of the bomber force was done when the bombers turned up 30 minutes late, the 55th Fighter Group's P-38s decided to try the much discussed tactic. The USAAF bombers also dropped "window" for the first time.

7 January 1944 The USAAF started using phased escort tactics. That is the fighters flew direct and patrolled a specific section of the bomber route rather than a specific section of the bomber force.

10 January 1944, first draft of transport plan "Air Attacks on Rail and Road Communications" put before the Allied Expeditionary Air Force Bombing Committee, 186,000 short tons of bombs required, 151,300 from the heavy bombers (comparable to the entire 1943 heavy bomber tonnage). Strategic part of plan is to knock out the ability of the rail system to keep working, tactical to cut the links to Normandy. The evidence for the transport plan from operations in Italy is thin, France is bigger and require lots of diversions to disguise the invasion points. Plenty of reasons to be sceptical.

11 January 1944 The first officially sanctioned test of the "freelance" fighter escort tactic was done by the 56th Fighter Group.

13 January 1944, Harris letter essentially saying Bomber Command was not technically able to support the bombing plan.

22 January, 6th AEAF Bombing Committee meeting, the 2nd draft of plan sent to Eisenhower for approval, which was given. Anzio invasion, quickly becomes roped off and the beachhead under threat, like Salerno, until air and sea power help stabilise the situation. Making a case for the heavy bombers to be quickly available for invasion support. Also the need for general orders to cover the first few days of land operations to avoid troops reaching their objective then stopping while asking what next? Hence ambitious D-Day orders.

23 January target date for Overlord 1 May.

3 February 1944, 3rd Draft of Bombing Plan.

15 February Harris and Spaatz get a good look at the bombing plan and profoundly disagree. Portal comes down on the side of priority for the AEAF is heavy bomber support. Around mid February Anvil a 2 division assault.

20 February, Big Week begins.

25 February meeting, forty three pages of pro and con bombing plan documents presented.

29 February Churchill to Portal, no question of handing over all of Bomber, Coastal and Fighter to SHAEF but the forces must supply as best possible the resources required for the Overlord Air Plan.

By March the bombing plan was stalled awaiting Combined Chiefs of Staff sign off.

5 March 1944 Spaatz memo to Eisenhower about oil attacks.

6 March? The Eisenhower quote, total commitment of bombers or he would "simply have to go home". Seems to have been repeated a few times, maybe on 3, 11 and 22 March.

6/7 March first Bomber Command experimental raid, Trappes.

10 March Leigh-Mallory writes to Spaatz, Eisenhower agrees time for 9th AF to be directed towards Overlord. Target date for D-Day 31 May.

13 March Portal to Churchill, transport plan still has considerable controversy.

21 March Eisenhower recommends cancelling ANVIL as an attack timed to coincide with OVERLORD

25 March meeting, Transport plan adopted over oil plan

27 March British Combined Chiefs of Staff sign off the plan.

30 March, Nuremburg raid, along with the increasing amount of daylight makes it clear Bomber Command's ability to trike Germany is significantly limited.

April 1944 Churchill and the British War Cabinet raise objections based on probable civilian casualties, ultimately appealing to FDR. The USAAF thinks German fighter defences are weakening.

7 April Combined Chiefs "the USA Strategic Air Force and British Bomber Command will operate under the direction of the Supreme Commander".

14 April official start date SHAEF control of heavy bombers. Though Eisenhower notes operations have been under his general direction since the start of the month.

15 April Anvil cancelled as an attack timed to coincide with OVERLORD

27 April Churchill asks Eisenhower to remove targets, Eisenhower had already agreed targets with the highest risk of casualties were to be attacked as late as possible. He also issued his first directive to the heavy bomber forces. 8th Air Force first transport plan raid.

12 May first oil strikes.

End May 1944 SHAEF intelligence reported that the Germans still had three times the rail capacity needed for military traffic, four times the required number of cars, eight times the required locomotives, and ten times the required servicing facilities.

Overlord planning assumed a steady daily advance, when the allies fell well behind the plan it became a reason to assume Overlord was going the way of Anzio and Salerno, a roped off bridgehead unable to break out, time to remove Montgomery. Then came the pursuit and arrival at around the D+365 day line around D+90, with the railway desert now behind allied lines.

When considering the Luftwaffe fighter performance in message 326, consider the number of serviceable Luftwaffe single engined fighters, the following is the average of 3 dates per month from the quartermaster returns, Jan – 1057, Feb – 1205, Mar – 1149, Apr – 1167, May – 1195, Jun – 1000, Jul – 1045, Aug – 1088, Sep – 1430, Oct – 2108, Nov – 2383, Dec – 1945. In rough terms the available fighter force doubled, the number of US aircraft shot down by them more than halved between April and December. And yes fuel shortages played a part in the number of combats and even serviceable figures, easy to keep things working when usage declines.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

When considering the Luftwaffe fighter performance in message 326, consider the number of serviceable Luftwaffe single engined fighters, the following is the average of 3 dates per month from the quartermaster returns, Jan – 1057, Feb – 1205, Mar – 1149, Apr – 1167, May – 1195, Jun – 1000, Jul – 1045, Aug – 1088, Sep – 1430, Oct – 2108, Nov – 2383, Dec – 1945. In rough terms the available fighter force doubled, the number of US aircraft shot down by them more than halved between April and December. And yes fuel shortages played a part in the number of combats and even serviceable figures, easy to keep things working when usage declines.

After D-day the RAF became much more involved. For a total picture RAF losses need to be considered.