Why American aces had lower scores than anybody else (1 Viewer)

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

An interesting discussion. Summary notes.

The best prediction of the future is usually the predictions will be wrong. In the first half of 1944 the plans for Overlord underwent major revisions, from 3 to 5 beaches, from using what landing craft were allocated to demanding landing craft to match requirements. The air plan probably underwent more changes and took longer to finalise as experience came in from operations over Italy and France. No one had tried to stop a rail system as big as the French one, there was a lot of learning to do.

A big issue was taking enough room to deploy the available troops backed by a working supply line, beaches and preferably ports not under artillery fire for a start. Every analysis came to a similar conclusion, the Germans could more easily move more troops to Normandy than the allies. That Hitler kept believing the deception plan obscures this. Look at how quickly the beach head was contained even with all that allied airpower interdicting movement, say 6 infantry divisions from 15th Army arriving in June enabling the Panzer divisions to pull out of the front line, no grand counter attack to the beaches possible but a lot more power to counter allied attacks, the forces would move from reserve. End July the US army had 18 divisions in France, after the airborne divisions had returned to Britain, the British had 13, plus the Canadian and Poles etc. US army divisions in Britain would go up to 6 in October and others sent to southern France due to the difficulties in landing them along with enough supplies for the troops already in northern France. To ship units from the US required working ports and lots of unpacking time, or else as was done, to Britain, unpack, then ferry across channel.

Supply was another issue, during the planning one supply officer wrote a parody called "Operation Overboard" with "The general principle is that the number of divisions required to capture the ports required to maintain those divisions is always greater than the number of divisions those ports can maintain." Cherbourg was mainly a passenger port, it was number 22 on the ranking of French Ports, cargo capacity at 900 tons per day pre war. While the Mulberry idea had advantages it had a built in disadvantage, inland transport links, the British Mulberry had poor roads to the beach and the railhead was 12 miles away, limiting its discharge ability, after all before the port arrived it was just another beach. Bad weather could stop almost all supply flow and storms could last for days.

As it turned out despite the US Mulberry being wrecked in the storm the Gooseberry block ships and the post D-Day decision to allow LST's and the like to dry out, ground themselves as the tide went out then unload, were far more effective than planned.

Strikes on rail marshalling yards turned out to be the least cost effective way to shut down the German army supply system through France, as it made the trains up in Germany for a round trip, the flip side was such strikes were very effective in stopping an economy. The heavy bombers could generally only do marshalling yard strikes and their effect on the fighting in France was mostly the damage to the usually co-located maintenance and repair facilities. Attacks on bridges etc. the lines themselves and the trains were best left to other bomber types. When it came to knocking out airfields the opposite was true, the heavies could drop far more bombs.

As usual all sorts of trade offs, nothing could be exactly right. The casualty rates in Normandy were higher than those in WWI.

Luftwaffe day fighter pilot losses. As Williamson Murray says pilots I am assuming that means they exclude other crew members in multi seat fighters and I am assuming it includes wounded, but so far no proof, it may be deaths, it may be all crew members, it must be all causes, all fronts. Galland was working from memory before we have someone changing aircrew casualties to pilots killed. Don Caldwell usually gives personnel casualties but that requires tabulating numbers from around 150 pages. Caldwell has entries for days when the 8th attacked non German targets, 5th, 14th, 21st January, 5th, 6th, 8th, 11th, 13th February for example, it is not just raids on Germany.

I understand the German definitions of losses on operations not due to enemy action and losses not on operations are similar to allied ones, but that comes from English translations, it would be good to check, they were high thanks to reducing training standards and so killed a lot of pilots.

The basic idea Leigh-Mallory followed was usually bomb Germany when there was no suitable target in France, it was not a ban on raids on Germany and open to the idea if the Luftwaffe was sitting out the raids on France see if the same applies over Germany, allied air operations in support of Overlord were a work in progress right through probably the first 8 or 9 months of the year. While the allies needed to attrition the Luftwaffe so the Luftwaffe need to inflict losses on the allies. We do not know what the Luftwaffe reaction would have been to no raids at all on Germany, it would at least try for interceptions in eastern France. No one on the allied side said they were going to ignore the Luftwaffe but they had to assume the Luftwaffe would ignore them to preserve strength for the big day if required. It helped the Luftwaffe split the fighter force so some carried bombs despite their lack of training, that upped losses, instead of doing pure fighter operations.

Agreed JG2 and JG26 did a lot of interceptions of raids to German targets as well as defence of France and I suspect there are probably a few examples of Luftflotte Reich fighters intercepting raids on France. The point I should have made clearer was losses were not just when Germany was attacked, not trying to create a separate category.

General Spaatz was offering the reality the Luftwaffe day fighter force was willing to fight hard over Germany and the theory the bomb damage there could seriously impact overall German fighting power, but would do little otherwise to support Overlord. The army was offering the proven reality the ultimate form of air superiority is your tank on their runway, economic superiority your soldiers in their factories.

Spaatz was taking more casualties by fighting over Germany. Taking 1 September 1944 as the day the continental airfields became available for emergency landings. In the period to 31 August 1944 some 2.7% of B-17s listed as lost to fighters made it back to allied territory, versus 6.4% of those listed as lost to flak. For the period 1 September 1944 to the end of the war the figures become 5.8% and 16.6%. Clearly then there would also be B-17s that would have been lost without friendly continental airfields, but landed and were ultimately repaired.

The mission of 8th AF was diluted by the Transportation Plan and several missions attacking French airfields. V-1 sites and marshaling yards but the core mission every month was strategic. 2TAC/9th AF focused on the France/Netherlands infrastructure.

To me that is the equivalent of the army stating its mission was diluted by the need to provide AA guns, it is an air force problem to stop raids. There is also a twist in that the most effective strikes on the German economy were transport ones, ignore the factories, stop the movement between them.

The primary mission of the 8th and all other air forces was to be part of a combined plan that maximised the effectiveness of allied military operations. The more effective Overlord the quicker Germany is defeated and the quicker things like invasion shipping can be moved to other theatres, starting with the landings in Southern France onto the defeat of Japan, but also intermediate objectives like regaining the natural rubber output of South East Asia given the US investment in synthetic rubber was comparable to the Manhattan Project, one of the few important war resources the allies lacked and had to pay a premium for. Putting the Burma back to being a major rice exporter in a food scarce world.

As of early 1944 in the ETO, the rules became the less impact on helping Overlord the lower the priority, Spaatz (and Harris at least), were trying to minimise the impact of these on their forces but using a theoretical view of a better tomorrow would come as a result.

8th AF January to May 1944, Richard Davis figures, 112,003.1 tons of bombs, 71,149.3 tons on Germany, 35,074.7 tons on France
Airfields 22,361.5 tons, 7,361.7 on Germany
Aircraft industry 19,113 tons, 17,432.6 on Germany including 5,732.5 tons on Bf110 plants.
Industrial Area (usually means radar bombing) 10,840.7 tons, 10,505.2 tons on Germany
Marshalling Yards (usually means radar bombing in Germany) 16,971.1 tons, 10,095.1 on Germany
Government areas (Berlin) 8,683.2 tons
V weapons 16,110.3 tons
Oil 4,222 tons, 3,911.5 on Germany
Ports in Germany 2,170.6 tons
Target of opportunity 4,455.4 tons, 4,096.4 on Germany
U-boat yards in Germany 2,859.3
Bearing plants in Germany 2,223 tons

The 8th was pursuing a main air force aim, defeating the enemy air force, dropping 1 in 8 of its bombs on Germany on the administrative areas of Berlin shows that, so does about 10% of the bombs dropped on airfields there, while individual targets could be heavily damaged the effort was too diffuse to cause lasting damage to the economy, the output of around 36 million workers. The bombs had near zero effect in making Overlord less risky and German fighter production went up as more effort was put in.

The main 8th AF targets in France were V weapons at 16,110.3 tons, Airfields 13,257.8 tons, Marshalling Yards 4,427.6 tons, the first two fairly evenly spread January to May, Marshalling yards were 554.3 tons in April and 3,693.3 tons in May.

Agreed to a point. Spaatz was focused on LW, POL and critical industrial choke points (A/C engines, airframe rebuild, ball bearings), prioritizing diminishing LW ability to effectively oppose Allied forces during Overlord. His perspective was that while Allies sure to have overwhelming numerical superiority over the battlefield, ignoring LW strength build up was a dumb idea. It would not take a large % of an attacking force to wreak havoc on transport during the opening critical days of the invasion.

Luftwaffe ability to interfere required three things, trained units, operational airfields within range and supplies. Bombing France removed 2 of the 3 factors, the third was tied to the losses the air units took. By 1944 everyone knew you had to keep hitting a target, as they were rarely destroyed and usually repaired, efforts had to start well before the invasion and continued. If you like the damaged train could not be moved until the track was repaired and the bridge made safe and then ended up where the repair facilities were themselves damaged, make sure there are multiple problems. The stakes for Overlord were too high, it was a case of prove the damage had happened in France before doing something else.

Units like JG 300/301 constituted as s/e night fighter units were re-deployed in defense of the Reich as well as several NJG units in east and south Germany performing double duty until losses to 8th/15th AF made them stop in order to conserve crews vs RAF.

JG300 were cat's eye fighters, meant to intercept over the target, a viable enough idea in summer but lots of non combat losses in winter, being instrument trained they could share the bad weather interception duties with some night fighters, the latter being noted in 1943 as not usually worth it thanks to their extra weight and lack of formation training, the twin engine day fighter units and JG300 series units took over.

The regular night fighter units known claims by day, mostly B-17 or B-24, January 1943 to May 1944, 1, 5, 4, 3, 1, 2, 2, 16, 2, 36, 6, 4, 56, 32, 9, 8, 0. Peaks in August and October 1943 as expected, then in the winter. NJG1 claimed 31, NJG2 11, NJG3 58, NJG4 7, NJG5 33, NJG6 28, NJG101 17, NJG102 3 and NAG13 1. According to the Luftwaffe quartermaster Luftflotte Mitte/Reich night fighter losses in air combat were, June 1943 to May 1944, 9, 10 (+1 MIA), 26+4, 20+1, 26+4, 6, 18+4, 55+6, 19+3, 30+3, 25, 24+1, day and night, which comes to 268 in air combat, 27 MIA, another 88 were destroyed on the ground by enemy action, 6 by other causes, 323 lost on operations not due to enemy action and 209 lost not on operations. Wartime night flying was hazardous. All up 929 losses, under a third by the enemy in the air. The deployment of night fighters to France followed the night bombers, that is March/April 1944

In all the above examples, a vastly inferior (numerically) LW was able to badly harass harbor logistics. Not so, Normandy. Despite the airpower dominance, however, there were no 'break-outs' at Normandy until Patton was allowed to participate once again.

Salerno and Anzio main defect was the size of the landing force relative to the number of defenders. Cobra launched on 25 July, VIIth corps commander Lawton Collins (who had fought on Guadalcanal and so quickly adapted to Bocage fighting) committed the armour on 26 July and confirmed the break out, on 28 July orders became to drive beyond Avranches (reached on 30 July) and Mortain, Patton entered the scene on 28 July as an "advisor" and began turning the break out into a devastating pursuit, on 1st August 3rd Army became operational.

I might point out that nearly every German land force was significantly dependent on horse drawn logistics - which points to industrial chokepoints of ball bearings, POL due to the strategic efforts of RAF, 8th and 15th AF.

Everyone's land logistics were tied to the rail system, tactical supply and movement was more horse drawn, the Germans built the army structure their economy could support, weapons and fuel. Whatever the choke points would be the air forces had to mid 1944 not done anything like the damage required to cause choking and Overlord could not wait. The 8th Air Force mid way point for bombs on Germany was mid November 1944, Bomber Command end September 1944, along with friendly airspace to the German border, allowing the arrival of fighter, light and medium bombers, that made a big difference to what the bombers could do and what the Germans could repair in the time.

In early 1944 Spaatz was advocating theoretical longer term benefits while the number of targets in France mandated the heavy bombers take part, the experience of actual bomb damage done meant plenty of follow up raids were required, 2nd TAF and 9th AF were the force primarily tasked with army support, Overlord needed a lot more.

 

[drgondog]

An interesting discussion. Summary notes.

The best prediction of the future is usually the predictions will be wrong. In the first half of 1944 the plans for Overlord underwent major revisions, from 3 to 5 beaches, from using what landing craft were allocated to demanding landing craft to match requirements. The air plan probably underwent more changes and took longer to finalise as experience came in from operations over Italy and France. No one had tried to stop a rail system as big as the French one, there was a lot of learning to do.

A big issue was taking enough room to deploy the available troops backed by a working supply line, beaches and preferably ports not under artillery fire for a start. Every analysis came to a similar conclusion, the Germans could more easily move more troops to Normandy than the allies. That Hitler kept believing the deception plan obscures this. Look at how quickly the beach head was contained even with all that allied airpower interdicting movement, say 6 infantry divisions from 15th Army arriving in June enabling the Panzer divisions to pull out of the front line, no grand counter attack to the beaches possible but a lot more power to counter allied attacks, the forces would move from reserve. End July the US army had 18 divisions in France, after the airborne divisions had returned to Britain, the British had 13, plus the Canadian and Poles etc. US army divisions in Britain would go up to 6 in October and others sent to southern France due to the difficulties in landing them along with enough supplies for the troops already in northern France. To ship units from the US required working ports and lots of unpacking time, or else as was done, to Britain, unpack, then ferry across channel.

Supply was another issue, during the planning one supply officer wrote a parody called "Operation Overboard" with "The general principle is that the number of divisions required to capture the ports required to maintain those divisions is always greater than the number of divisions those ports can maintain." Cherbourg was mainly a passenger port, it was number 22 on the ranking of French Ports, cargo capacity at 900 tons per day pre war. While the Mulberry idea had advantages it had a built in disadvantage, inland transport links, the British Mulberry had poor roads to the beach and the railhead was 12 miles away, limiting its discharge ability, after all before the port arrived it was just another beach. Bad weather could stop almost all supply flow and storms could last for days.

As it turned out despite the US Mulberry being wrecked in the storm the Gooseberry block ships and the post D-Day decision to allow LST's and the like to dry out, ground themselves as the tide went out then unload, were far more effective than planned.

Strikes on rail marshalling yards turned out to be the least cost effective way to shut down the German army supply system through France, as it made the trains up in Germany for a round trip, the flip side was such strikes were very effective in stopping an economy. The heavy bombers could generally only do marshalling yard strikes and their effect on the fighting in France was mostly the damage to the usually co-located maintenance and repair facilities. Attacks on bridges etc. the lines themselves and the trains were best left to other bomber types. When it came to knocking out airfields the opposite was true, the heavies could drop far more bombs.

As usual all sorts of trade offs, nothing could be exactly right. The casualty rates in Normandy were higher than those in WWI.

Luftwaffe day fighter pilot losses. As Williamson Murray says pilots I am assuming that means they exclude other crew members in multi seat fighters and I am assuming it includes wounded, but so far no proof, it may be deaths, it may be all crew members, it must be all causes, all fronts. Galland was working from memory before we have someone changing aircrew casualties to pilots killed. Don Caldwell usually gives personnel casualties but that requires tabulating numbers from around 150 pages. Caldwell has entries for days when the 8th attacked non German targets, 5th, 14th, 21st January, 5th, 6th, 8th, 11th, 13th February for example, it is not just raids on Germany.

I understand the German definitions of losses on operations not due to enemy action and losses not on operations are similar to allied ones, but that comes from English translations, it would be good to check, they were high thanks to reducing training standards and so killed a lot of pilots.

The basic idea Leigh-Mallory followed was usually bomb Germany when there was no suitable target in France, it was not a ban on raids on Germany and open to the idea if the Luftwaffe was sitting out the raids on France see if the same applies over Germany, allied air operations in support of Overlord were a work in progress right through probably the first 8 or 9 months of the year. While the allies needed to attrition the Luftwaffe so the Luftwaffe need to inflict losses on the allies. We do not know what the Luftwaffe reaction would have been to no raids at all on Germany, it would at least try for interceptions in eastern France. No one on the allied side said they were going to ignore the Luftwaffe but they had to assume the Luftwaffe would ignore them to preserve strength for the big day if required. It helped the Luftwaffe split the fighter force so some carried bombs despite their lack of training, that upped losses, instead of doing pure fighter operations.

Agreed JG2 and JG26 did a lot of interceptions of raids to German targets as well as defence of France and I suspect there are probably a few examples of Luftflotte Reich fighters intercepting raids on France. The point I should have made clearer was losses were not just when Germany was attacked, not trying to create a separate category.

General Spaatz was offering the reality the Luftwaffe day fighter force was willing to fight hard over Germany and the theory the bomb damage there could seriously impact overall German fighting power, but would do little otherwise to support Overlord. The army was offering the proven reality the ultimate form of air superiority is your tank on their runway, economic superiority your soldiers in their factories.

Spaatz was taking more casualties by fighting over Germany. Taking 1 September 1944 as the day the continental airfields became available for emergency landings. In the period to 31 August 1944 some 2.7% of B-17s listed as lost to fighters made it back to allied territory, versus 6.4% of those listed as lost to flak. For the period 1 September 1944 to the end of the war the figures become 5.8% and 16.6%. Clearly then there would also be B-17s that would have been lost without friendly continental airfields, but landed and were ultimately repaired.


To me that is the equivalent of the army stating its mission was diluted by the need to provide AA guns, it is an air force problem to stop raids. There is also a twist in that the most effective strikes on the German economy were transport ones, ignore the factories, stop the movement between them.

The primary mission of the 8th and all other air forces was to be part of a combined plan that maximised the effectiveness of allied military operations. The more effective Overlord the quicker Germany is defeated and the quicker things like invasion shipping can be moved to other theatres, starting with the landings in Southern France onto the defeat of Japan, but also intermediate objectives like regaining the natural rubber output of South East Asia given the US investment in synthetic rubber was comparable to the Manhattan Project, one of the few important war resources the allies lacked and had to pay a premium for. Putting the Burma back to being a major rice exporter in a food scarce world.

As of early 1944 in the ETO, the rules became the less impact on helping Overlord the lower the priority, Spaatz (and Harris at least), were trying to minimise the impact of these on their forces but using a theoretical view of a better tomorrow would come as a result.

8th AF January to May 1944, Richard Davis figures, 112,003.1 tons of bombs, 71,149.3 tons on Germany, 35,074.7 tons on France
Airfields 22,361.5 tons, 7,361.7 on Germany
Aircraft industry 19,113 tons, 17,432.6 on Germany including 5,732.5 tons on Bf110 plants.
Industrial Area (usually means radar bombing) 10,840.7 tons, 10,505.2 tons on Germany
Marshalling Yards (usually means radar bombing in Germany) 16,971.1 tons, 10,095.1 on Germany
Government areas (Berlin) 8,683.2 tons
V weapons 16,110.3 tons
Oil 4,222 tons, 3,911.5 on Germany
Ports in Germany 2,170.6 tons
Target of opportunity 4,455.4 tons, 4,096.4 on Germany
U-boat yards in Germany 2,859.3
Bearing plants in Germany 2,223 tons

The 8th was pursuing a main air force aim, defeating the enemy air force, dropping 1 in 8 of its bombs on Germany on the administrative areas of Berlin shows that, so does about 10% of the bombs dropped on airfields there, while individual targets could be heavily damaged the effort was too diffuse to cause lasting damage to the economy, the output of around 36 million workers. The bombs had near zero effect in making Overlord less risky and German fighter production went up as more effort was put in.

The main 8th AF targets in France were V weapons at 16,110.3 tons, Airfields 13,257.8 tons, Marshalling Yards 4,427.6 tons, the first two fairly evenly spread January to May, Marshalling yards were 554.3 tons in April and 3,693.3 tons in May.


Luftwaffe ability to interfere required three things, trained units, operational airfields within range and supplies. Bombing France removed 2 of the 3 factors, the third was tied to the losses the air units took. By 1944 everyone knew you had to keep hitting a target, as they were rarely destroyed and usually repaired, efforts had to start well before the invasion and continued. If you like the damaged train could not be moved until the track was repaired and the bridge made safe and then ended up where the repair facilities were themselves damaged, make sure there are multiple problems. The stakes for Overlord were too high, it was a case of prove the damage had happened in France before doing something else.


JG300 were cat's eye fighters, meant to intercept over the target, a viable enough idea in summer but lots of non combat losses in winter, being instrument trained they could share the bad weather interception duties with some night fighters, the latter being noted in 1943 as not usually worth it thanks to their extra weight and lack of formation training, the twin engine day fighter units and JG300 series units took over.

The regular night fighter units known claims by day, mostly B-17 or B-24, January 1943 to May 1944, 1, 5, 4, 3, 1, 2, 2, 16, 2, 36, 6, 4, 56, 32, 9, 8, 0. Peaks in August and October 1943 as expected, then in the winter. NJG1 claimed 31, NJG2 11, NJG3 58, NJG4 7, NJG5 33, NJG6 28, NJG101 17, NJG102 3 and NAG13 1. According to the Luftwaffe quartermaster Luftflotte Mitte/Reich night fighter losses in air combat were, June 1943 to May 1944, 9, 10 (+1 MIA), 26+4, 20+1, 26+4, 6, 18+4, 55+6, 19+3, 30+3, 25, 24+1, day and night, which comes to 268 in air combat, 27 MIA, another 88 were destroyed on the ground by enemy action, 6 by other causes, 323 lost on operations not due to enemy action and 209 lost not on operations. Wartime night flying was hazardous. All up 929 losses, under a third by the enemy in the air. The deployment of night fighters to France followed the night bombers, that is March/April 1944


Salerno and Anzio main defect was the size of the landing force relative to the number of defenders. Cobra launched on 25 July, VIIth corps commander Lawton Collins (who had fought on Guadalcanal and so quickly adapted to Bocage fighting) committed the armour on 26 July and confirmed the break out, on 28 July orders became to drive beyond Avranches (reached on 30 July) and Mortain, Patton entered the scene on 28 July as an "advisor" and began turning the break out into a devastating pursuit, on 1st August 3rd Army became operational.


Everyone's land logistics were tied to the rail system, tactical supply and movement was more horse drawn, the Germans built the army structure their economy could support, weapons and fuel. Whatever the choke points would be the air forces had to mid 1944 not done anything like the damage required to cause choking and Overlord could not wait. The 8th Air Force mid way point for bombs on Germany was mid November 1944, Bomber Command end September 1944, along with friendly airspace to the German border, allowing the arrival of fighter, light and medium bombers, that made a big difference to what the bombers could do and what the Germans could repair in the time.

In early 1944 Spaatz was advocating theoretical longer term benefits while the number of targets in France mandated the heavy bombers take part, the experience of actual bomb damage done meant plenty of follow up raids were required, 2nd TAF and 9th AF were the force primarily tasked with army support, Overlord needed a lot more.

Geoffrey - Very interesting discussion (at least for me).

In a roundabout fashion, I believe you have captured much of the point/counterpoint discussions surrounding both Overlord planning deliberations and the possible 'what if', had hindsight of post war deliberations been made earlier in 1944.

At the end of the day, I remain convinced that Spaatz/Kuter/Fairchild were correct that the approach taken by USSAFE to goad and kill LW day fighter/fighter bomber threat to Overlord was the correct one. I also agree your point that USSAFE strategy to attack key industries were long term with no other major impact to Wehrmacht response to Overlord.

Further I would give the edge to 2TAC/9th AF interdiction near MLR in harassing troop movement and attrition to logistics in general.

The question neither of us have the answer to is how effective/disruptive the LW could have been in defense of both the beach head assaults and Allied logistics, had they been unmolested by USSAFE strikes to German industry.

If Hitler had released 9th and 10th Panzer immediately, would those assets have been enough to contain or even defeat the invasion?

FWIIW I don't have an appreciation for either Montgomery or Bradley as the 'right leaders' for the Invasion ground leadership, nor do I look to Eisenhower contributions other than superb politically astute manager of risk. That said, I don't have a Montgomery replacement choice in mind.

Good to chat. You have a lot to offer by consolidating your research into subjects suitable for commercial distribution.

 

[MIflyer]

Well, I think that US pilots had to provide a higher level of proof than some others.

I read of a Marine F4F pilot at the "Canal" who saw Zeros attacking a PBY that they had "borrowed" from a visiting Admiral to drop a torpedo at some IJN ships. He dove down, spraying rounds at the Zekes, trying them get them to break off and not shoot down the PBY. All three Zekes broke off. It was not until well after the war that he found out he had shot down al three of them. One round had nicked an oil line and the engine quit on the way back to Lae. One round had hit a fuel tank and the Zeke rna out of gas on the way back to Lae. The third Zeke had suffered engine damage that led it to fail before it got home. I don't even think he had even claimed them as damaged.

In contrast the famed Hans Joaquim Marseilles at least once claimed something like 17 kills on one day in N Africa, and the RAF only suffered something like 12 losses that day in the entire theater and no Hurricanes, while Marseilles claimed six of them.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

At the end of the day, I remain convinced that Spaatz/Kuter/Fairchild were correct that the approach taken by USSAFE to goad and kill LW day fighter/fighter bomber threat to Overlord was the correct one. I also agree your point that USSAFE strategy to attack key industries were long term with no other major impact to Wehrmacht response to Overlord.

The USAAF attacking Germany through the 1943/44 winter was an important foundation for the 1944 fighting. As noted my main objection is the Davis quote, not USAAF operations, so I largely agree, the other point I stick on is ideas the heavy bombers could continue treating Overlord as second priority. Almost everyone agreed writing down the Luftwaffe was desirable, Eisenhower in on record as supporting Point Blank, but Overlord first if a decision has to be made. The question being whether that could be done with a mix of operations more towards France and whether those raids would have helped the allied armies in Normandy. After that comes being ready if the Luftwaffe adopted a conservation of force approach, the counter being make sure there are few forward airfields available, let them support Normandy by flying from Germany and see how that worked.

As far as I can tell in terms of air combat January to May 1944 defending the Reich the Luftwaffe won or broke even in terms of number of aircraft shot down, easily won in terms of material losses and very easily won in terms of aircrew losses, then add the allied losses to flak. Germany was the best place to make a stand but the Luftwaffe lost as they could not maintain operational aircrew capability even as the nominal fighter strength grew.

The transport plan was far from set in stone, had many changes and even more attempts to change it. First draft considered on 10 January, on 22 January came the 6th meeting of the AEAF Bombing Committee, 3 February 3rd draft circulated, 15 February meeting on it produced strong reactions from Spaatz and Harris, 5 March Spaatz oil plan, 6/7 March Bomber Command hit Trappes later Le mans and Amiens as experimental raids, all successfully. Portal called a meeting held on 25 March, which went transport plan, 27 March British hand "direction" of Bomber Command to SHAEF, late April Churchill asks for limits on attacks to reduce French casualties and sends a message to Roosevelt on 7 May who replies it is up to SHAEF to make the judgements. That ended the discussions about the plan as a whole.

Scepticism and changes continued, a week before D Day the SHAEF G-2 reported that the whole rail bombing operation had accomplished nothing of importance. Meantime the Todt organisation was querying whether it was worth repairing rail damage. Some of the allied sceptics went for the plan of bridge destruction, which was thought to be too hard by many, and found the bridges could be destroyed economically. Late May 1944 French rail traffic was down to 55% of January (not sure if winter meant fewer trains or more as the darkness helped prevent air attack), in almost the last week of the month the allied fighter bombers had damaged 500 locomotives and the marshalling yards. Destroying the Seine bridges dropped traffic to 30% of January by D-Day, continued pressure dropped traffic to 10% of January in July and in the area around Normandy effectively closed the rail links.

On 30th August a working rail line from Normandy reaches Paris meaning the allies have crossed the railway desert the allied air forces are largely responsible for. The supply people write memos about was all that destruction really necessary?

There was no breakout and pursuit envisaged in the Overlord plans, rather a reasonably steady advance of so many miles per day, arriving on the German border in May or June 1945 at its longest projections. Caen was supposed to be taken on day 1, Vire and Granville on day 17, Avranches a day or so later, that is around 25 June. The D+25 line says the US have St Malo and Rennes, with the border with second army being at Alencon, with the line then running slightly beyond Argentan to Lisieux to the channel. At the date Cobra started the plans had the allied armies near Brest, their southern flank on the Loire river, closing in on Tours and on the coast over half way to Le Havre. Avranches finally fell on 30 July. By D+90, when the allies were supposed to have made it to the Seine and Paris they were at the D+365 line, the German border. An impossibility according to the supply plans.

If Hitler had released 9th and 10th Panzer immediately, would those assets have been enough to contain or even defeat the invasion?

9th and 10th no, they were Western Theatre forces "on loan" to the east, releasing the Panzer divisions in France earlier would help, the 15th Army infantry divisions as well. Sicily, Salerno and Anzio showed destroying a beach head was very hard as long as the warships could stay and enemy air power was active, roping off the beach head was a definite possibility

The book Brute Force by Ellis gives some of the times it took for key German formations to make the battlefield. The nearby divisions (12th SS, Lehr) found that they could have elements make the battlefield on 7 June but at a cost of disorganisation and lost vehicles. Second Panzer division was 160 miles from Normandy, started out on 8th June and on 13th June the advanced infantry elements began to arrive, the tanks started arriving on 18th June, and apparently the march had cost, in destroyed and broken down tanks, around 40 out of 120 tanks. Second SS was 450 miles away, started moving on the 8th and arrived between the 15th and 30th and as a result was thrown into battle piecemeal, not assembled as a division until around the 10th of July.

First SS Panzer was also activated on 8th June but was held up by the threat of landings in Calais, so it did not move until the 15th, the 400 mile trip took the fastest units 10 days, even by 30 June it had not assembled all its tanks in the battle area. Ninth and tenth SS Panzer were entrained in Poland on 12 June, at the French border on 16 June and found they had to quit their trains, they began arriving on the 25th of June. Infantry divisions report similar problems. The worst experience seems to be the infantry division that took 9 days by rail to make what should have been a 120 km (75 mile) march. In June 1941 some German Infantry divisions had taken about 2-3 days to cover this distance. Up to 400 mile road marches for tracked vehicles would have hurt the strength before any losses to air power.

FWIIW I don't have an appreciation for either Montgomery or Bradley as the 'right leaders' for the Invasion ground leadership, nor do I look to Eisenhower contributions other than superb politically astute manager of risk. That said, I don't have a Montgomery replacement choice in mind.

The way I look at it is there are a number of successful WWII commanders I would not want to be around, but there are also a number of them who would not want me around. After years of war senior commanders are at least competent. The Mediterranean command team was tried, tested and worked well.

In defence of Montgomery and Bradley in Normandy, they, their command teams and troops were largely inexperienced in what they were doing. Rundstedt had been commanding Army Groups since 1939, Montgomery was doing it for the first time, Dempsey and Bradley an army for the first time, Rommel had commanded an army since say 1941, the British brought four divisions from the Middle East, otherwise their divisions had either not fought or had not fought since 1940, the US army was even less experienced and had to remove a number of officers whose peace time promise did not translate to effective combat command. The time it took to land new units limited their ability to do things. The storm of 19-22 June put the British army at least three divisions behind schedule. It also forced Bradley to choose between driving on Cherbourg or St Lo. The requirement for infrastructure repair and maintenance left little US engineer strength to help the infantry in the Bocage. The Overlord plans had concentrated on the landings, it was assumed the allies would advance beyond the Bocage country in a few days, so it would not be a factor.

3rd Army did not keep track of its supply status until the crisis hit and then discovered what had been going on, its units were more likely to shoot up rail engines and rolling stock, divert supply shipments meant for others and drain fuel from supply trucks leaving them stranded instead of heading back to Normandy to reload. For the "they stole our supplies" people, as part of the breakout several British truck companies were assigned to help the US army for a time.

Good to chat. You have a lot to offer by consolidating your research into subjects suitable for commercial distribution.

Thanks, but my writing style is poor and WWII is passing from interest like WWI largely has and the publishing industry is already in enough trouble.

 

[Barrett]

Late to this party, which features numerous standouts among the "guests."
Bill is always a must-pump.

Anyway:

The thread's original list accords huge latitude to the Japanese (who typically over claimed by orders of magnitude) and omits others including Commonwealth members Canada, Australia, and N Zealand.

The Axis lineup might include Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, and particularly Romania. (Cantacuzino remains a fascinating study.)
France and Italy had aces on both sides.

I'll just say that in my 15 years or so as secretary of the American Fighter Aces Assn, I came to realize that EVERYBODY over claimed most of the time. The Japanese, as noted, were Exhibit A while the Italians and RAF frequently bumped up the numbers. It's particularly remarkable that the RAF over claimed so much during the BoB when presumably the locals could count wrecks. Nobody I know buys the notion that half the Luftwaffe losses went down in the Channel...

BUT

As Dowding properly noted: The Score mattered far less than who controlled Kentish airspace.

 

[Frog]

...., the British brought four divisions from the Middle East, ...

And they discovered that in the Normandy landscape their desert war experience was of little value, notably for the 7th Armoured Division.

 

[JDCAVE]

An addendum to the above, the Canadians were tasked with "clearing" the Scheldt estuary, i.e, the approaches to Antwerpt, the harbour with by far the largest capacity for the allied cause. Montgomery's Market Garden sucked up all of the resources and the Canadian 4th armoured division was provided insufficient ammunition for the task. I talked to a gunner with my Uncle's 23rd Field Regiment, Self-Propelled, and he said their guns were rationed to 4 rounds per day. Shocking.

Battle of the Scheldt - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

From the above "Back at SHAEF headquarters, Ramsay, who was more concerned about the problems facing the Canadians than their own generals, complained to Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower that the Canadians were having to ration ammunition as Montgomery made holding the Arnhem salient his main priority.[24]​ After Ramsay raised the issue with Eisenhower, the latter informed Montgomery on or about 9 October "the supreme importance of Antwerp. It is reported to me this morning by the Navy that the Canadian Army will not repeat not be able to attack until 1 November unless immediately supplied with ammunition.""

Jim

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

In September 1944 the usual suspects (Patton, Bradley, Montgomery and Eisenhower) greatly overestimated the possibilities before them. While Antwerp was in Montgomery's area neither Bradley nor Patton seem to have made the point that it would be best to prioritise opening the port over their attacks, nor did Montgomery propose Antwerp over Market-Garden. The commanders of the Allied Airborne army acted as a solution in search of a problem, with Generals Arnold and Marshall taking an interest, transport aircraft kept withdrawing from airlift to ready for an operation, several of which had been already cancelled as the area was captured first, the impression being this would be their last chance before the end of the war. A military so devoted to supplies first battle second would go battle first supplies second. When a supply system shatters it takes a while to fix it.

During the pursuit after Normandy the British discover many of their trucks have defective engines, as do thousands of replacement engines.

During August 1944 the British VIII corps of 2 divisions and independent brigades will be grounded so their transport can be used for the pursuit. Since many bridges are captured intact it is also possible for 21st Army to use bridge companies as well as anti aircraft and tank transporter units for supplies. The UK 59th division is also left behind as it is being disbanded. VIII corps will be back in the line for Arnhem. A British analysis of tank losses indicates that on average it takes 1.63 hits to knock out a Sherman, 2.55 to knock out a Panther and 4.2 hits to knock out a Tiger. Commonwealth imports to France are halved to free transport, this means only half the daily consumption is being landed. 21st Army group loans 300 to 360 3, 6 and 10 ton trucks (6 or 7 above average capacity truck companies) to 12th Army Group, mainly used for 3rd Army supply. This loan is trucks as well as 3 to 4 UK truck companies.

On 22nd August, The exploitation plan becomes 21st Army group plus 1st Allied Airborne Army to go North of the Ardennes, 12th Army Group to go South.

On 28th August First Allied Airborne army appeal succeeds and its transport aircraft are withdrawn from airlift operations, so the lift went down to various auxiliary air units.

During the pursuit 21st Army Group's initial plan was for 7 supply routes. The roads in the area had been under maintained since 1940 but it was considered enough were first class. Instead it was soon discovered many of the roads were too narrow or too fragile to stand the traffic, "with the result that numerous bypasses, lateral routes and roundabouts had to be constructed. The scope of this task was increased significantly due to the effects of allied bombing which had caused whole villages to become obstacles, thus necessitating routes being cut through or around them." It was also found units did not have the best equipment or training for road repair and maintenance. For the entire campaign "In all more than 50% of the total engineer effort at divisional level and above in 21st Army Group was directed to route maintenance."

On 3rd September Brussels is liberated. Admiral Ramsay signals 21st Army Group and SHAEF pointing out the need to clear the approaches to Antwerp and Rotterdam as well as capture the ports, that both ports are highly vulnerable to mining and blocking, and if the Germans were successful in doing so no estimate of the time to open the ports could be given.

On 4th (D+90) September first train beyond Paris. Allied armies are on the D+330 lines. In the US case this means supporting 33% more divisions than the plans expected to cross the Seine on D+120 in an area not expected to be captured until May 1945, over 450 mile supply lines using motor transport, when the amount of such transport was predicted to be inadequate for the original plan. The mood of optimism is reinforced by the realisation the allied armies are closer to Germany than they were on 11th November 1918 and that Germany's eastern allies are deserting it, just like Austria Hungary in 1918. There are 40,000 German PoWs being used as labourers. Antwerp is captured, the port has berths for 242 ships, not all will be brought back into service by the allies. The front line halts in what are effectively the northern suburbs of Antwerp, capturing the port itself was not necessarily enough, electricity and other such basics were usually needed as well, for example Antwerp had 270 electric and 320 hydraulic cranes. Hence a need for coal for power stations as well as trains. Then add having enough tugs and barges. UK XXX corps commander considers he has enough fuel to make the Rhine.

On 5th September half the 1st Allied Airborne Army transport aircraft are put back on the airlift. With 7,000 tons of supplies per day for the ground troops of 12th Army group the agreed split is 50/50 between 1st and 3rd armies, this is to enable the drive to the Rhine. Boulogne is captured. Allied troops arrive at Calais.

On 6th September Around this date a 7th Army ordnance unit, lacking food, sends two trucks loaded with souvenirs 160 miles across the gap between the 7th and 3rd Army, to intercept the Red Ball Express, returning with two truckloads of food.

On 9th September Eisenhower notifies the Combined Chiefs of Staff he has authorised 12th Army Group's advance to the Rhine.

On 10th September the Red Ball route is effectively doubled from St Lo to Soissons for the 1st Army and Sommesous for the 3rd Army. The southern route round trip is now 590 miles, the northern route even longer. The rail line behind 21st Army group has reached the Seine. Montgomery meets Eisenhower expanding operation Comet into Market-Garden. General Browning is briefed and makes his "a bridge too far" comment.

On 12th September (D+98) allied armies are on the D+350 line but the advance has largely stopped in the North. As a further problem as the allies move further away from the coast they capture regions of increasing food shortages, Belgium in particular, plus Northern France, complicating the supply situation, since it means troops cannot easily find food locally instead they have to start devoting supply tonnage to civil relief. Le Havre is captured, it has 4 tanker berths. At the start of the Octagon conference the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree with General Eisenhower's intention to continue to strike towards Germany as a higher priority than opening the ports. The CCS do note the ports will be needed before bad weather sets in. Both 1st and 3rd Armies report they have the fuel and ammunition needed to advance to the Rhine.

On 13th September Eisenhower adds clearing the approaches to Antwerp to 21st Army Group tasks.

On 14th September the 1st Allied Airborne Army transports are withdrawn from airlift. During September around half the airlifted supplies are from dumps in Normandy. The airlift had been continually hampered by lack of reception capacity at the newly captured airfields and a lack of transport in England. With the prospect of more supplies 12th Army group allocates the next 1,500 tons over 7,000 tons to 1st army. Montgomery allocates clearance of the approaches to Antwerp to 1st Canadian Army, after it has taken Calais and Boulogne. In effect a psuedo "siege train" will move along the coast, clearing the ports in order. It will be hampered by a lack of Commonwealth artillery ammunition on the continent. In mid/late 1944 expenditure of 25 pounder ammunition will be 1,500,000 rounds/month higher than production, the Italian theatre experiences more of the shortage but 21st Army Group also has to watch consumption.

Mid September, pipeline fuel to Chartres, 3rd army down to 0.59 days of food (Patton's, my men can eat their belts line seems appropriate here). First army was down to 0.43 days of food and used captured rations, 75,000 on the 11th and 52,000 on the 12th. By this stage 1st Army is 400,000 men, 3rd is 265,000. There was also no clothing, 3rd Army 80% of issue before mid September was renovated salvage.

Mid September 1st Canadian Army ground an infantry division to use its transport, also during September a corps will be grounded for about 7 days for the same reason.

On 16th September start of Red Lion run, 8 US truck companies (6 with 2.5 ton trucks, 2 with 10 ton semi trailers) to ship around 650 tons/day for a total of 18,000 tons for Market Garden, half these supplies are for the 82nd and 101st. The companies are withdrawn from the Red Ball Express and are replaced there by provisional companies using the men and trucks from the 26th, 95th and 104th divisions. The route is very efficient thanks to denser cargo and the fact all cargo comes from the one dump near Caen to a single dump near Brussels a distance of 300 miles. Each truck carries an average load of 5.9 tons.

On 17th September Brest is captured, not worth repairing, the army using around 22,500 tons of ammunition in the siege and capture. Operation Market Garden is launched

On 22nd September Devers announces he can support an extra 3 divisions, and is promptly given XV corps for 7th Army (2nd French Armoured and the US 79th Infantry divisions), 6th Army Group tries to demand the corps come with ammunition but is rebuffed. Some of the merchant ships waiting off northern France are sent to Marseilles. The British agree to share more of Le Havre, Boulogne is captured (Winnie and Pooh firing in support from Dover). Absolute priority will be given to clearing the Scheldt estuary to open Antwerp.

On 24th September Start of a 2 day meeting between COMZ and 21st Army Group to decide how to share port capacity at Antwerp.

On 26th September the survivors of the British 1st Airborne division are pulled back across the Rhine. Despite the failure of the attack German reaction to the corridor is so strong Montgomery requests and is allowed to retain the 2 US airborne divisions in the area. They do not leave for 7 weeks (82nd) and 9 weeks (101st). The Arnhem operation has cost the allied air forces 153 transports and 656 men, plus another 1,242 transports damaged.

On 30th September Calais is captured. Dieppe is handling 3,000 tons a day of cargo. There is a rail link from Normandy to Brussels.

On 1st October the Canadians begin operations to clear the Scheldt estuary. The front line near Antwerp is at Merxem, effectively a northern suburb of Antwerp. SHAEF approves strikes on the Walcheren dykes.

On 2nd October Le Havre opens as a US port, it needs DUKWs to help unload ships, in the first 3 months of 1945 35.2% of cargo handled will be unloaded via DUKWs. First army attacks the Siegfried line.

On 4th October Field Marshall Brooke notes that Montgomery should have gone for Antwerp first And that Eisenhower took full responsibility for the decision to try Market-Garden first.

On 9th October the first ship docks at Le Havre. Eisenhower declares Antwerp to be of supreme importance. In his memoirs Montgomery claims this is when SHAEF made Antwerp a priority, which is not strictly correct, Eisenhower had issued directives pointing out the importance of Antwerp previously, but not as supreme importance. Montgomery does admit he made a mistake in assuming 1st Canadian army had the strength to make the necessary attacks.

In the period 11th October to 7th November 3rd Army will use 76,325 artillery rounds, equivalent to one days expenditure at the height of the Ardennes offensive.

On 13th October the first liberty ships are ordered to Le Havre

In the period 15th to 21st October 3rd Army 105mm ammunition expenditure is 1.1 rounds/gun/day in action, compared with the desired rate of 60, and in the time period a total of 3,401 rounds were fired. First Army was better off, expending 309,469 rounds at 30 rounds/gun/day. The 155mm howitzer ammunition expenditure was similar, 3rd 553 rounds at 0.4 rounds/gun/day versus 1st Army 24,341 rounds at 15 rounds/gun/day. First Army was using most of this ammunition against Aachen, 3rd Army called of the Metz attack due to a lack of ammunition.

On 16th October after two weeks of fighting the Canadians have almost succeeded in isolating South Beveland

On 18th October The Memorandum of Agreement on how to share Antwerp is signed, 22,500 tons/day to the US 17,500 to the Commonwealth, these tonnages exclusive of POL. The Commonwealth would control the railways running north and northeast, the US would control the lines running south and southeast.

On 24th October the assault on South Beveland begins.

On 27th October a German counter attack on the UK VIII corps, which includes the US 7th Armoured division, forces the allies back several miles.

In the last week in October 80% of all the ammunition fired by XX corps in 3rd army consisted of captured ammunition.

At the end of October 21st Army group advanced depot has 19,000 tons of general supplies, 23,000 tons of POL and 4,000 tons of ammunition. The requirement for a major advance is of 20,000 tons of supplies, 40,000 tons of POL and 40,000 tons of ammunition. "The problem of dealing with refugees, evacuation of displaced persons and accommodation was becoming serious, particularly in Second Army Area." There was no coal for civil heating. The allies needed to import a ton of pit props for every 40 tons of coal mined on the continent, pit props were proving to be the limiting factor along with manpower.

On 2nd November the Breskens pocket collapses, freeing the south bank of the Scheldt.

On 4th November the first allied minesweeper makes it to Antwerp.

On 8th November Walcheren island is captured, freeing the north bank of the Scheldt

On 26th November Antwerp is opened when 3 coasters arrive. Some 219 out of 242 berths have been completely cleared, all 600 cranes are working and all necessary bridges repaired. There is an acute shortage of storage space at or near the port, although there is fuel storage for 120 million gallons.

On 28th November Antwerp is opened for US cargo as the first liberty ship arrives, but while the port can discharge 80 to 100,000 tons/day the land links can initially only clear 10 to 20,000 tons/day. All up a convoy of 19 liberty ships arrive. The AA defences of Antwerp and the Scheldt estuary total 216 3.7 inch and 486 40 mm guns, plus another 120 3.7 inch, 192 90mm and around 150 40mm guns for anti V1 duties. There were also searchlight batteries, smoke companies, a balloon barrage over the estuary, mine watching service and a dummy port site. Antwerp actually makes the rail congestion problem worse since it shortens travel time, leaving the depots that much less time to unload trains.

At the end of November 21st Army group advanced depot has 15,000 tons of general supplies, 79,000 tons of POL and 32,000 tons of ammunition with still 11,000 tons of general supplies, 26,000 tons of POL and 25,000 tons of ammunition in Normandy despite some 60,000 tons of cargo being shifted north during November.

Around late November the US replacement system separates the new replacements from the US from the men returning to their units, the "old hands" had been too good in telling horror stories to the new men.

 

[JDCAVE]

Thanks Geoffrey. Thorough as always. As mentioned, I was at a reunion of the 23rd field regiment in 2007 when I met up with Mike "Spike" Maskel. He said more than a few salty words about Montgomery, who he accused of starving the Canadians of artillery rounds for their 25 pounder guns on their Sexton Self Propelled vehicles. He said 4 rounds per day, which is consistent with what you have determined to be true. The Canadians were not particularly fond of Montgomery.