Can you elaborate on that. I have always thought, that the success of of the P-51 was mainly because of its greater range, giving more shooting and strafing opportunities, especially when Germans were perhaps not expecting fight so far east.
Why did the 56th FG stay with the P-47s?
Can you elaborate on that. I have always thought, that the success of of the P-51 was mainly because of its greater range, giving more shooting and strafing opportunities, especially when Germans were perhaps not expecting fight so far east.
Mike Williams
Senior Airman
- 572
- Oct 19, 2006
Tomo, check Power in Level Flight P-47D 42-26167 for power of a P-47D equipped with a R-2800-63 operating at 70" Hg using 100/150 grade fuel with water injection.
drgondog
Major
Timppa - here is the 8th AF summary roll up of all the individual Fighter by Fighter, Group by Group including Scout Forces from beginning of operations in 1942 to VE Day for the 8th AF. These data are extracted from USAF Study 85 for air victory credits, 8th AF Victory Credits Board - June 1945 and Missing Aircrew Reports and Accident Reports for 8th AF FC.
It represents approximately 30 years of research and published along with other tables in my recently published book "Our Might Always - History of the 355th FG in WWII" from Schiffer
Thanks, Mike
Topping 2800 HP at lower altitudes, ie. 2840 HP at ~10000 ft.
Mike, would you be so kind to check out the power of the engine from the P-47M/N, ie. the 'C' series R-2800 at 72 in (150 grade + WI)?
drgondog
Major
Timppa - I posted the wrong table. Here is what I wanted to post - which is the aircraft type summary for 8th AF.
This is a summary rollup of 8th AF only for the 4 types of aircraft. The loss data was extracted from Macr's. Where aircraft were lost strafing, whether hitting a tree or colliding with an aircraft on the ground or another a/c in the air or lost coolant after strafing, etc - or "unknown cause' following strafing - I assigned the loss to "Strafing'.
For losses during an air to air, or 'unknown' in which enemy air activity was encountered, or lost coolant or had mechanical failure after a fight, I assigned the loss to "Enemy Air". Also included are mid air collisions between US and German fighter, mid air collisions between US fighters breaking to engage, and several that were simply unknown but Macrs stated a found wreckage at a time and place that coincided with a LW victory credit on Tony Wood List.
I do Not claim perfection in the numerical results of my assignments with actual causes for all circumstances but I did the best I could to err on the higher side of the loss due to enemy action for each of the losses that had either a Macr or an Accident Report. These totals do Not include aircraft lost crash landing or on take offs around the respective bases nor does it include aircraft salvaged for any reason that made emergency landings at bases like Manston as those records are practically silent regarding cause (air battle or flak or fuel or mechanical of any type)
You said:
"victory credits using the same formula and evaluation techniques was 50% higher"
I said :
"success of of the P-51 was mainly because of its greater range"
Your tables don't give any evidence one way or the other. i understand that taking account of the range (of the credits) is very difficult, if not impossible.
"victory credits using the same formula and evaluation techniques was 50% higher"
I said :
"success of of the P-51 was mainly because of its greater range"
Your tables don't give any evidence one way or the other. i understand that taking account of the range (of the credits) is very difficult, if not impossible.
drgondog
Major
There is an additional factor working Against the Mustang, which is range related - namely internal fuel remaining when drop tanks are punched to engage. The internal fuel for the P-47D, prior to June 1944 were all 305 gallons whereas the Mustang was 269 gallons.
The Mustang burned perhaps 5 gallons for warm up and take off from the left main, then switched to burn 0-25 gallons from the fuselage tank depending on the range. The P-47 would burn 50% more for same warm up/take off before switching to Drop tanks so best case for maximum internal fuel in ~ 295 gallons and the Mustang for best case maximum internal fuel is not to burn any fuselage tank fuel and have 264 (269 less 5 gallons) gallons.
The fuel remaining after dropping tanks is
P-51 - 264x6#/gal = 1584 pounds. The Gross weight less external tanks then is about 9260 pounds for P-51B will full ammo and 264 gallons of fuel. The Fuel wt. to mission wt. = 1584/9260 = 17%
P-47D - 295x6# = 1770. The Gross weight less external tanks then is about 13340 pounds for full ammo and 295 gallons of fuel. The Fuel wt to Mission wt. = 1770/13340 = 13%
Under the assumptions that engagement begins before all external fuel has been consumed and nearly full internal fuel remains for both ships, the P-51B is paying a heavier price relative to proportionate maneuverability based on fuel remaining.
Back to the question - Does range potential help or hinder the Mustang more than the P-47 in air to air combat during Penetration to the target where most air to air combat occurred? I would say yes and that the explanation for the higher air to air ratio's to losses for the Mustang is due to inherent greater maneuverability - not range.
Clearly my example is Not a proof.
drgondog
Major
FYI - while overall air to air ratio for collectively All Mustang groups was 10.3:1 and the collective ratio for All P-47 groups was 7.3:1 the 56th FG individual ratio was 11.1:1. It also accounted for 42% of all 8th AF P-47 air victory credits - so they had the effect of Raising the overall P-47 performance.
A better illustration of the Mustang as a 'difference maker' is the 355th FG which had a 3.5:1 P-47 ratio and a 10.3:1 P-51 ratio.
Another item to contemplate regarding the swing of air victory credits. Post January 1, 1945 the air battles and victory credits plummeted as the LW moved east to defend against the Russians. Prior to that period there were many combats in range of P-47s, although not as much as with P-51s.
A better illustration of the Mustang as a 'difference maker' is the 355th FG which had a 3.5:1 P-47 ratio and a 10.3:1 P-51 ratio.
Another item to contemplate regarding the swing of air victory credits. Post January 1, 1945 the air battles and victory credits plummeted as the LW moved east to defend against the Russians. Prior to that period there were many combats in range of P-47s, although not as much as with P-51s.
This is where I disagree. 4 points to consider:
1. The quality of German pilots plummeted at the same time when all of the 8AF FG's (save one) were being equipped with the P-51.
2. At the same time the numerical superiority of the Allied AF's increased from manageable to impossible.
3. It is said that most of the pilots did not see the attacker who shot them down. So the performance difference obviously does not matter in these cases.
4. Relating the above, the P-51 pilots had more opportunities to such attacks (due to that very range), when German pilots were taking off, climbing, landing, not expecting to be attacked.
Sidenote:
You have a habit to put your answers inside other peoples posts. This makes direct quoting impossible. Just FYI.
Last edited:
The most salient point.
The Luftwaffe the allies were fighting in 1944/45 was not that the RAF had taken on in 1940/41. It annoys me when people make Spitfire/P-51 comparisons ignoring the quality of the most critical component of any air force, its pilots
Cheers
Steve
drgondog
Major
1. Between Dec 1, 1943 and May 30. 1944 the quality of the German forces in LuftFlotte Reich was as high as it ever would be with the great influx of experienced pilots and leaders from both Ost and Sud fronts as entire squadrons were transferred for the Defense of the Reich. Units such as III./JG 54, II. and III./JG 27, all of JG 3, all of JG 11, JG 1, II and III./JG 53, JG 300, JG 301, I.and II./JG 5, II./JG 51 (IIRC) - plus the ZG 26 and ZG 76 plus NJG 2, 5, 7 and I. &II./NZG 101, I. II./NJG 102. This doesn't include the formidable JG 2 and JG 26 units.
The point may be that the LW relatively speaking was less experienced on the average compared to 1942 but it was equally experienced to the 8th AF average pilots - most of which had not seen combat until the ETO while the LW units flowing into LF Reich were all experienced for some time fighting in Russia and against the Brits and US in the MTO. Replacements were less skilled on the average but not the pilots within the transferring squadrons.
2. The force structure and sorties flown by Mustang units was a small percentage of escort Groups in the 9th and 8th AF. During Big Week February 20, 1944 there were two operational FG's - the 354 (1/43) and 357 (2/43). By the end of the first week of March there were five (4th, 355th, 363rd) plus three P-38 FG's (55th, 20th, 3634th) compared to (56, 78, 352, 353, 356, 358, 359, 361, 362, 363, 365, 366, 368). At May 1, eight more P-47 groups were operational plus two more P-38 groups plus 339 and 352nd FG Mustang groups were operational...by May 1, the 36, 50, 371, 404, 405, 406 P-47 groups were added and the 352nd converted to Mustangs.
Only the P-51B was in the ETO, only seven Mustang and five P-38 Groups were operational - but seventeen P-47 groups were operational - so the forces of the two combined US Air Forces (8th and 9th) were 29. Interesting but a.) Half had no more than two months of combat experience, only 12 could go near Berlin, only five could go to Poland and Czechoslovakia or far southeast Germany.
Of that group of seven Mustang groups, only two P-51 Groups could be allocated for target support of up to seven boxes of 50 bombers each over a trail of 30+ miles. Yes good planning and Control by the ground controllers could and did put enormous relative strength at the point of attack where only one, perhaps two Mustang groups, could engage the LW attackers.
3. "Some Say" that a lot of lousy shooting was involved by both sides, creating an opportunity to evade given skill and performance advantage of some form... meaning that maneuverability was still important for survival when placed in a dangerous situation - bot sides are replete with reports of 'escape'
4. True - which made the Mustang the most critical fighter in the battle for daylight supremacy in preparation for the Required air superiority over the beaches during the critical landing and consolidation phase, June 6 -June 20
Your point 1 is simply not true. Throughout 1942 Luftwaffe training programmes were curtailed, redesigned and cut back or in some cases completely suspended. They never recovered to anything like the programmes they had previously been. I covered this with relevant data, particularly about fuel shortages in the training programme and lack of instructors elsewhere. I have data about the drastically shortened courses somewhere. It was not possible to turn out pilots of the quality of those trained in the pre war and first two years of the war in such circumstances.
Of course there were some experienced and formidable pilots still present, there were still a few left at the end of the war, but the overall quality of the Luftwaffe's pilots had declined sharply.
It is interesting that by 1944 both British and US combat reports start to mention Luftwaffe pilots bailing out as soon as they were shot at, or even before combat was joined. That didn't happen earlier. It was by no means common place, but it is a clear reflection of the low morale and lack of fighting ability of some young pilots. I for one will not judge them for that, some of them could barely fly the aircraft they were supposed to fight.
Between September and December 1943 the Luftwaffe lost 2,967 fighter pilots, 141% of its average strength of 2105 for that year. Between January and May 1944 the Luftwaffe lost 2,262 fighter pilots. That's 99% of its average strength of 2,283. Such figures would be inconceivable to the RAF or USAAF. Is it any surprise that Luftwaffe morale was fragile?
By 1944 the average Luftwaffe fighter pilot had a total of about 120 hours flying hours, 20 on front line types if he was lucky. His US counterpart had nearly 400 hours total, about 150 on front line types. That is no contest.
Cheers
Steve
Of course there were some experienced and formidable pilots still present, there were still a few left at the end of the war, but the overall quality of the Luftwaffe's pilots had declined sharply.
It is interesting that by 1944 both British and US combat reports start to mention Luftwaffe pilots bailing out as soon as they were shot at, or even before combat was joined. That didn't happen earlier. It was by no means common place, but it is a clear reflection of the low morale and lack of fighting ability of some young pilots. I for one will not judge them for that, some of them could barely fly the aircraft they were supposed to fight.
Between September and December 1943 the Luftwaffe lost 2,967 fighter pilots, 141% of its average strength of 2105 for that year. Between January and May 1944 the Luftwaffe lost 2,262 fighter pilots. That's 99% of its average strength of 2,283. Such figures would be inconceivable to the RAF or USAAF. Is it any surprise that Luftwaffe morale was fragile?
By 1944 the average Luftwaffe fighter pilot had a total of about 120 hours flying hours, 20 on front line types if he was lucky. His US counterpart had nearly 400 hours total, about 150 on front line types. That is no contest.
Cheers
Steve
Last edited:
drgondog
Major
Steve - I have no argument regarding the quality of the REPLACEMENT pilots. What I detailed in length was the mass migration of skilled and experienced units whose replacements were bloodied in the East and South - in contrast to the REPLACEMENT pilots that came from the flying schools in January and February and March to fill in the attrition.
Somehow you seem to take an implied position that all those units somehow transformed their TO&E with all new rookies as they moved to LuftFlotte Reich.
Second point - the US pilots that came into the ETO, beginning with 56th and 78th FG were combat rookies - only the 4th FG was populated by combat veterans that transferred from Eagle Squadron. They immediately came into combat with experienced vets of the LuftFlotte 3 JG 26 and JG 2. While they whittled them down somewhat both of those organizations managed to absorb new rookies fairly well.
You might also recall that we were sending back experienced pilots after first tour to go home and train so there was always an influx of raw flight school grads from the states that frequently got killed or captured before 10 missions.
Quoting statistics of the replacements of the January through May timeframe is interesting but not as interesting as the experience and the skill injected into LuftFlotte Reich from the other fronts to confront the rookies coming into 8th and 9th AF ETO combat teams.
When you have sustained losses like those of the Luftwaffe in late 1943 and 1944 then your units will have a preponderance of inexperienced or replacement pilots. Because statistically the more experienced pilots had a better chance of survival they will be likely to survive longer, but they were not immune to this appalling attrition. Look at any list of Luftwaffe aces to see how many were killed between 1943 and 1945.
Whilst it is true replacement US and British pilots were arriving at their units with 300-400 hours flying time and 100-150 hours on operational types this bares no comparison with the numbers for Luftwaffe replacements. Allied pilots had more hours on operational types than their Luftwaffe counterparts had in total. Allied air forces also provided 'on the job' training to their replacement pilots. In the RAF these were usually in the form of the so called 'sector training flights' carried out at the operational squadron. The Luftwaffe simply lacked the means to do anything like this.
The Luftwaffe in defence of the Reich, unlike the RAF during the BoB, did not have the luxury of creating different classes of squadrons and putting those non-operational ones out of harm's way. The quality of all their units was degraded.
It is interesting to note that both US and British combat reports sometimes make a specific comment that a Luftwaffe pilot must have been experienced due to the way he fought his aeroplane. Such comments are few and far between.
Cheers
Steve
Whilst it is true replacement US and British pilots were arriving at their units with 300-400 hours flying time and 100-150 hours on operational types this bares no comparison with the numbers for Luftwaffe replacements. Allied pilots had more hours on operational types than their Luftwaffe counterparts had in total. Allied air forces also provided 'on the job' training to their replacement pilots. In the RAF these were usually in the form of the so called 'sector training flights' carried out at the operational squadron. The Luftwaffe simply lacked the means to do anything like this.
The Luftwaffe in defence of the Reich, unlike the RAF during the BoB, did not have the luxury of creating different classes of squadrons and putting those non-operational ones out of harm's way. The quality of all their units was degraded.
It is interesting to note that both US and British combat reports sometimes make a specific comment that a Luftwaffe pilot must have been experienced due to the way he fought his aeroplane. Such comments are few and far between.
Cheers
Steve
Drgndog,
I agree with your numbers based on the assumption that both the Mustang and the Thunderbolt fly the same distance prior to engaging enemy aircraft (EA). However, I think there is another way to interpret your fuel numbers. Based on the assumptions that the Mustang is flying the deepest/furthest portion of the bomber escort missions, carries more fuel weight and gets better fuel mileage than other US products. I "think" it would stand to reason that not only would it get more time aloft (or in the more heavily defended areas and thus more trigger time), but would get the more "high risk of Luftwaffe showing up" missions. FYI this is just a hypothesis.
On another vein of the same front (why some aircraft had more kills than others) I think ease of flying should get at least a cursory nod. The Lightning introduces complexity in the form of 2 of everything (several years older cockpit layout), slow roll rate as compared to it's adversaries, dreaded compressibility at a lower mach, and some MX issues. The Thunderbolt has size against it as far as long range tally ho's go, less maneuverability as compared to it's adversaries at the altitudes most likely to encounter EA, and shorter range (less play time in target area). Both of these aircraft required a definite game plan for handling a smaller, more maneuverable aircraft (Fw-190 / Me-109). The Mustang had the legs, maneuverability (as long as fuel was properly managed), and fuel mileage to give it staying power in the target area at normal combat altitudes.
Layered on top of the last point is all the discussion regards the state of the Luftwaffe pilots fuel and the timing around and amount of Mustangs showing up. I can also honestly say a guy will be more confident and aggressive if he believes in his mount and understands how to fight with it. I put forward that the Mustang, with how they taught tactics and flew combat, was probably easier to use in the ETO than the other US products. Once again this is all hypothesis and open for spear chucking.
Cheers,
Biff
Last edited:
drgondog
Major
BiffF15 to Drgndog,
I agree with your numbers based on the assumption that both the Mustang and the Thunderbolt fly the same distance prior to engaging enemy aircraft (EA).
My illustration wasn't quite clear, Biff. The point is that external tanks were critical to get both the P-51 and P-47 to the route point for which the combat radius assumptions are relevant and drive the differences in range depending on the internal fuel remaining after 20 minutes of MP and 5 WEP which has to be enough to get back with 30 minutes reserve for bad weather. In fact none of the P-47D models had enough internal fuel to match the P-51 as the fuel flow was about 3.3:2 meaning the P-47 didn't have the ability to get closer than 100 mi Radius versus the max 51 combat Radius.
Net - the Jug pilot was flying four hours at about the same cruise speed while the 51 was flying seven
However, I think there is another way to interpret your fuel numbers. Based on the assumptions that the Mustang is flying the deepest/furthest portion of the bomber escort missions, carries more fuel weight and gets better fuel mileage than other US products. I "think" it would stand to reason that not only would it get more time aloft (or in the more heavily defended areas and thus more trigger time), but would get the more "high risk of Luftwaffe showing up" missions. FYI this is just a hypothesis.
I think it is the correct hypothesis but maybe for a different reason - the LW kept pulling assets farther away from England so that the shorter range (P-47) would not be able to 'pile on', leaving the defense of the 8th and 15th AF entirely to the more limited combat strength of the P-51 and P-38
On another vein of the same front (why some aircraft had more kills than others) I think ease of flying should get at least a cursory nod. The Lightning introduces complexity in the form of 2 of everything (several years older cockpit layout), slow roll rate as compared to it's adversaries, dreaded compressibility at a lower mach, and some MX issues. The Thunderbolt has size against it as far as long range tally ho's go, less maneuverability as compared to it's adversaries at the altitudes most likely to encounter EA, and shorter range (less play time in target area). Both of these aircraft required a definite game plan for handling a smaller, more maneuverable aircraft (Fw-190 / Me-109). The Mustang had the legs, maneuverability (as long as fuel was properly managed), and fuel mileage to give it staying power in the target area at normal combat altitudes.
I agree all this but would add the greater speed advantage of the Mustang for the altitude envelopes of 29,000 to SL.
Layered on top of the last point is all the discussion regards the state of the Luftwaffe pilots fuel and the timing around and amount of Mustangs showing up. I can also honestly say a guy will be more confident and aggressive if he believes in his mount and understands how to fight with it. I put forward that the Mustang, with how they taught tactics and flew combat, was probably easier to use in the ETO than the other US products. Once again this is all hypothesis and open for spear chucking.
Cheers,
Biff
Biff - I would agree everything except 'taught combat tactics' in ETO/PTO/MTO. IF we taught any air to air it was solely at the individual (and informal) "clobber Colleges" set up at the Group/Wing level for say, 8th FC. What our flight schools taught was familiarity with the Type in Fighter School after Advanced, in which gunnery both at towed flags and ground were taught. My father came to ETO out of AAF Fighter Training in a P-40K and had 1.5 hours at Goxhill familiarizing himself in the P-51B and had six combat hours before shooting his first a/c down.
While I agree with Steve, above, the US and Commonwealth FLIGHT training was superior to LW in mid 1943 forward, there was really no combat training except rat races on an individual basis. NOTHING remotely looking like Top Gun or Red Flag. Having said that, not having to 'think out a maneuver' which can only come from experience (and talent)is critical to air to air combat. So, our replacements were better prepared than theirs.
What I took issue with in debates that I frequently have with folks that think or assume that all the good LW pilots were killed before the Mustang arrived, is that so many LW combat units were transferred intact - that had Not been in combat with P-47s, including a lot of BoB "pro's", that were the core of LuftFlotte Reich in January 1944 through May, 1944 in prep for D-Day.
I agree with your numbers based on the assumption that both the Mustang and the Thunderbolt fly the same distance prior to engaging enemy aircraft (EA).
My illustration wasn't quite clear, Biff. The point is that external tanks were critical to get both the P-51 and P-47 to the route point for which the combat radius assumptions are relevant and drive the differences in range depending on the internal fuel remaining after 20 minutes of MP and 5 WEP which has to be enough to get back with 30 minutes reserve for bad weather. In fact none of the P-47D models had enough internal fuel to match the P-51 as the fuel flow was about 3.3:2 meaning the P-47 didn't have the ability to get closer than 100 mi Radius versus the max 51 combat Radius.
Net - the Jug pilot was flying four hours at about the same cruise speed while the 51 was flying seven
However, I think there is another way to interpret your fuel numbers. Based on the assumptions that the Mustang is flying the deepest/furthest portion of the bomber escort missions, carries more fuel weight and gets better fuel mileage than other US products. I "think" it would stand to reason that not only would it get more time aloft (or in the more heavily defended areas and thus more trigger time), but would get the more "high risk of Luftwaffe showing up" missions. FYI this is just a hypothesis.
I think it is the correct hypothesis but maybe for a different reason - the LW kept pulling assets farther away from England so that the shorter range (P-47) would not be able to 'pile on', leaving the defense of the 8th and 15th AF entirely to the more limited combat strength of the P-51 and P-38
On another vein of the same front (why some aircraft had more kills than others) I think ease of flying should get at least a cursory nod. The Lightning introduces complexity in the form of 2 of everything (several years older cockpit layout), slow roll rate as compared to it's adversaries, dreaded compressibility at a lower mach, and some MX issues. The Thunderbolt has size against it as far as long range tally ho's go, less maneuverability as compared to it's adversaries at the altitudes most likely to encounter EA, and shorter range (less play time in target area). Both of these aircraft required a definite game plan for handling a smaller, more maneuverable aircraft (Fw-190 / Me-109). The Mustang had the legs, maneuverability (as long as fuel was properly managed), and fuel mileage to give it staying power in the target area at normal combat altitudes.
I agree all this but would add the greater speed advantage of the Mustang for the altitude envelopes of 29,000 to SL.
Layered on top of the last point is all the discussion regards the state of the Luftwaffe pilots fuel and the timing around and amount of Mustangs showing up. I can also honestly say a guy will be more confident and aggressive if he believes in his mount and understands how to fight with it. I put forward that the Mustang, with how they taught tactics and flew combat, was probably easier to use in the ETO than the other US products. Once again this is all hypothesis and open for spear chucking.
Cheers,
Biff
Biff - I would agree everything except 'taught combat tactics' in ETO/PTO/MTO. IF we taught any air to air it was solely at the individual (and informal) "clobber Colleges" set up at the Group/Wing level for say, 8th FC. What our flight schools taught was familiarity with the Type in Fighter School after Advanced, in which gunnery both at towed flags and ground were taught. My father came to ETO out of AAF Fighter Training in a P-40K and had 1.5 hours at Goxhill familiarizing himself in the P-51B and had six combat hours before shooting his first a/c down.
While I agree with Steve, above, the US and Commonwealth FLIGHT training was superior to LW in mid 1943 forward, there was really no combat training except rat races on an individual basis. NOTHING remotely looking like Top Gun or Red Flag. Having said that, not having to 'think out a maneuver' which can only come from experience (and talent)is critical to air to air combat. So, our replacements were better prepared than theirs.
What I took issue with in debates that I frequently have with folks that think or assume that all the good LW pilots were killed before the Mustang arrived, is that so many LW combat units were transferred intact - that had Not been in combat with P-47s, including a lot of BoB "pro's", that were the core of LuftFlotte Reich in January 1944 through May, 1944 in prep for D-Day.
drgondog
Major
BiffF15 to Drgndog,
I agree with your numbers based on the assumption that both the Mustang and the Thunderbolt fly the same distance prior to engaging enemy aircraft (EA).
My illustration wasn't quite clear, Biff. The point is that external tanks were critical to get both the P-51 and P-47 to the route point for which the combat radius assumptions are relevant and drive the differences in range depending on the internal fuel remaining after 20 minutes of MP and 5 WEP which has to be enough to get back with 30 minutes reserve for bad weather. In fact none of the P-47D models had enough internal fuel to match the P-51 as the fuel flow was about 3.3:2 meaning the P-47 didn't have the ability to get closer than 100 mi Radius versus the max 51 combat Radius.
Net - the Jug pilot was flying four hours at about the same cruise speed while the 51 was flying seven
However, I think there is another way to interpret your fuel numbers. Based on the assumptions that the Mustang is flying the deepest/furthest portion of the bomber escort missions, carries more fuel weight and gets better fuel mileage than other US products. I "think" it would stand to reason that not only would it get more time aloft (or in the more heavily defended areas and thus more trigger time), but would get the more "high risk of Luftwaffe showing up" missions. FYI this is just a hypothesis.
I think it is the correct hypothesis but maybe for a different reason - the LW kept pulling assets farther away from England so that the shorter range (P-47) would not be able to 'pile on', leaving the defense of the 8th and 15th AF entirely to the more limited combat strength of the P-51 and P-38
On another vein of the same front (why some aircraft had more kills than others) I think ease of flying should get at least a cursory nod. The Lightning introduces complexity in the form of 2 of everything (several years older cockpit layout), slow roll rate as compared to it's adversaries, dreaded compressibility at a lower mach, and some MX issues. The Thunderbolt has size against it as far as long range tally ho's go, less maneuverability as compared to it's adversaries at the altitudes most likely to encounter EA, and shorter range (less play time in target area). Both of these aircraft required a definite game plan for handling a smaller, more maneuverable aircraft (Fw-190 / Me-109). The Mustang had the legs, maneuverability (as long as fuel was properly managed), and fuel mileage to give it staying power in the target area at normal combat altitudes.
I agree all this but would add the greater speed advantage of the Mustang for the altitude envelopes of 29,000 to SL.
Layered on top of the last point is all the discussion regards the state of the Luftwaffe pilots fuel and the timing around and amount of Mustangs showing up. I can also honestly say a guy will be more confident and aggressive if he believes in his mount and understands how to fight with it. I put forward that the Mustang, with how they taught tactics and flew combat, was probably easier to use in the ETO than the other US products. Once again this is all hypothesis and open for spear chucking.
Cheers,
Biff
Biff - I would agree everything except 'taught combat tactics' in ETO/PTO/MTO. IF we taught any air to air it was solely at the individual (and informal) "clobber Colleges" set up at the Group/Wing level for say, 8th FC. What our flight schools taught was familiarity with the Type in Fighter School after Advanced, in which gunnery both at towed flags and ground were taught. My father came to ETO out of AAF Fighter Training in a P-40K and had 1.5 hours at Goxhill familiarizing himself in the P-51B and had six combat hours before shooting his first a/c down.
While I agree with Steve, above, the US and Commonwealth FLIGHT training was superior to LW in mid 1943 forward, there was really no combat training except rat races on an individual basis. NOTHING remotely looking like Top Gun or Red Flag. Having said that, not having to 'think out a maneuver' which can only come from experience (and talent)is critical to air to air combat. So, our replacements were better prepared than theirs.
What I took issue with in debates that I frequently have with folks that think or assume that all the good LW pilots were killed before the Mustang arrived, is that so many LW combat units were transferred intact - that had Not been in combat with P-47s, including a lot of BoB "pro's", that were the core of LuftFlotte Reich in January 1944 through May, 1944 in prep for D-Day.
I agree with your numbers based on the assumption that both the Mustang and the Thunderbolt fly the same distance prior to engaging enemy aircraft (EA).
My illustration wasn't quite clear, Biff. The point is that external tanks were critical to get both the P-51 and P-47 to the route point for which the combat radius assumptions are relevant and drive the differences in range depending on the internal fuel remaining after 20 minutes of MP and 5 WEP which has to be enough to get back with 30 minutes reserve for bad weather. In fact none of the P-47D models had enough internal fuel to match the P-51 as the fuel flow was about 3.3:2 meaning the P-47 didn't have the ability to get closer than 100 mi Radius versus the max 51 combat Radius.
Net - the Jug pilot was flying four hours at about the same cruise speed while the 51 was flying seven
However, I think there is another way to interpret your fuel numbers. Based on the assumptions that the Mustang is flying the deepest/furthest portion of the bomber escort missions, carries more fuel weight and gets better fuel mileage than other US products. I "think" it would stand to reason that not only would it get more time aloft (or in the more heavily defended areas and thus more trigger time), but would get the more "high risk of Luftwaffe showing up" missions. FYI this is just a hypothesis.
I think it is the correct hypothesis but maybe for a different reason - the LW kept pulling assets farther away from England so that the shorter range (P-47) would not be able to 'pile on', leaving the defense of the 8th and 15th AF entirely to the more limited combat strength of the P-51 and P-38
On another vein of the same front (why some aircraft had more kills than others) I think ease of flying should get at least a cursory nod. The Lightning introduces complexity in the form of 2 of everything (several years older cockpit layout), slow roll rate as compared to it's adversaries, dreaded compressibility at a lower mach, and some MX issues. The Thunderbolt has size against it as far as long range tally ho's go, less maneuverability as compared to it's adversaries at the altitudes most likely to encounter EA, and shorter range (less play time in target area). Both of these aircraft required a definite game plan for handling a smaller, more maneuverable aircraft (Fw-190 / Me-109). The Mustang had the legs, maneuverability (as long as fuel was properly managed), and fuel mileage to give it staying power in the target area at normal combat altitudes.
I agree all this but would add the greater speed advantage of the Mustang for the altitude envelopes of 29,000 to SL.
Layered on top of the last point is all the discussion regards the state of the Luftwaffe pilots fuel and the timing around and amount of Mustangs showing up. I can also honestly say a guy will be more confident and aggressive if he believes in his mount and understands how to fight with it. I put forward that the Mustang, with how they taught tactics and flew combat, was probably easier to use in the ETO than the other US products. Once again this is all hypothesis and open for spear chucking.
Cheers,
Biff
Biff - I would agree everything except 'taught combat tactics' in ETO/PTO/MTO. IF we taught any air to air it was solely at the individual (and informal) "clobber Colleges" set up at the Group/Wing level for say, 8th FC. What our flight schools taught was familiarity with the Type in Fighter School after Advanced, in which gunnery both at towed flags and ground were taught. My father came to ETO out of AAF Fighter Training in a P-40K and had 1.5 hours at Goxhill familiarizing himself in the P-51B and had six combat hours before shooting his first a/c down.
While I agree with Steve, above, the US and Commonwealth FLIGHT training was superior to LW in mid 1943 forward, there was really no combat training except rat races on an individual basis. NOTHING remotely looking like Top Gun or Red Flag. Having said that, not having to 'think out a maneuver' which can only come from experience (and talent)is critical to air to air combat. So, our replacements were better prepared than theirs.
What I took issue with in debates that I frequently have with folks that think or assume that all the good LW pilots were killed before the Mustang arrived, is that so many LW combat units were transferred intact - that had Not been in combat with P-47s, including a lot of BoB "pro's", that were the core of LuftFlotte Reich in January 1944 through May, 1944 in prep for D-Day.
drgondog
Major
I just did a sample research set on many of the 355FG air to air aces. Two very high first pilot hours - both IP before escaping Training command - Bert Marshall and Gordon Graham with 1845 and 2478 hours respectively 1st pilot time. Two others with service in AAF from before WWII Kinnard (1350 hrs and Stewart 1170 hrs including 280 in PTO.
Every other pilot was pretty much the same with ~ 200 hours student, but ranged from 108 hours (Priest), most others in the 200-230 hours 1st Pilot and Fred Havilland at 617 hrs.
Basically, five of the 21 aces had more than six hundred first pilot time before coming to the 355th, and 15 had more than 175 and less than 250 hours, and one had 108hrs of 1st pilot time.
Everett Stewart as a PTO vet flew P-40 for 280 hours before transitioning and flying P-47s. Clay Kinnard was an IP in which most of his 1st pilot time was in BT-13s, AT-6, ditto Graham and Haviland. Marshall ditto as an IP but he also had 250 hours as 1st pilot in B-26B. All had 50-100 hours Advanced Fighter school in P-40K's.
Virtually all other aces had 50 hours of their total 1st pilot time in P-40s in Advanced Fighter School in States plus 10 hours in Mustang (or P-47 before March 1944) at 496FTG before assignment to 355th FG.
So take what you want - the key metric is that ALL had student time of 200-230 hours before 1st pilot time, which is one primary difference between US and LW in 1944, but few had significant time in the fighter they would take to war in 1944.
Every other pilot was pretty much the same with ~ 200 hours student, but ranged from 108 hours (Priest), most others in the 200-230 hours 1st Pilot and Fred Havilland at 617 hrs.
Basically, five of the 21 aces had more than six hundred first pilot time before coming to the 355th, and 15 had more than 175 and less than 250 hours, and one had 108hrs of 1st pilot time.
Everett Stewart as a PTO vet flew P-40 for 280 hours before transitioning and flying P-47s. Clay Kinnard was an IP in which most of his 1st pilot time was in BT-13s, AT-6, ditto Graham and Haviland. Marshall ditto as an IP but he also had 250 hours as 1st pilot in B-26B. All had 50-100 hours Advanced Fighter school in P-40K's.
Virtually all other aces had 50 hours of their total 1st pilot time in P-40s in Advanced Fighter School in States plus 10 hours in Mustang (or P-47 before March 1944) at 496FTG before assignment to 355th FG.
So take what you want - the key metric is that ALL had student time of 200-230 hours before 1st pilot time, which is one primary difference between US and LW in 1944, but few had significant time in the fighter they would take to war in 1944.
Which is my point. The USAAF pilots had hundreds of student flying hours including 50-100 hours at an Advanced Fighter School on the P-40.
The fact that they had limited hours on the P-51 is not the point. A Luftwaffe pilot finishing training might have 20 hours on an 'operational type' at a 'C school' if he was lucky, but this would not be what he would fly at his unit. He would have flown an older or obsolete dash number, or even sub-type, of the Bf 109 or Fw 190 at the training unit. Since the Luftwaffe only really operated these two single engine fighters this was inevitable.
Cheers
Steve
The fact that they had limited hours on the P-51 is not the point. A Luftwaffe pilot finishing training might have 20 hours on an 'operational type' at a 'C school' if he was lucky, but this would not be what he would fly at his unit. He would have flown an older or obsolete dash number, or even sub-type, of the Bf 109 or Fw 190 at the training unit. Since the Luftwaffe only really operated these two single engine fighters this was inevitable.
Cheers
Steve
drgondog
Major
You said "By 1944 the average Luftwaffe fighter pilot had a total of about 120 hours flying hours, 20 on front line types if he was lucky. His US counterpart had nearly 400 hours total, about 150 on front line types. That is no contest.
The 150 hours in 'front line' types is grossly exaggerated, For example through November 1944 there were not enough Mustangs to give advanced students any time in a P-51. All advanced fighter training was done in a P-40 and rarely were more than 40-50 hours accumulated before rotation to ETO/MTO/PTO and CBI. Only ETO had "clobber Colleges or the FTG in place for transition training.
Additionally - the total time averaged 200 Student time with instructor, and 100-250 hours of combined Advanced (AT-6) plus Fighter Training (P-40)
The Student time advantage of the US counterpart was an advantage but those were not nearly the same as flying without an instructor which is the 200+ plus first pilot time for all the flight school replacements from 1943 into 1945.
As I reflect on my own experiences as a student pilot to a rating, familiarity with processes and protocols took more time than familiarity with flying. Formation flying, weather and flying wing would be the next step in the growth process. US students in WWII stateside training got some formation/wing training in Advanced - before Fighter Training school. At most of the 8th AF Operational Fighter Groups, nobody was assumed to be competent in any of those skills and set up individual programs in the Clobber Colleges.
My father presided over the Instrument re-training as well as check rides for all new pilots at the 355th.
Operationally the 8th AF air to air losses were similar to the LW, namely most such losses occurred in the population of 10 or fewer combat missions.
The 150 hours in 'front line' types is grossly exaggerated, For example through November 1944 there were not enough Mustangs to give advanced students any time in a P-51. All advanced fighter training was done in a P-40 and rarely were more than 40-50 hours accumulated before rotation to ETO/MTO/PTO and CBI. Only ETO had "clobber Colleges or the FTG in place for transition training.
Additionally - the total time averaged 200 Student time with instructor, and 100-250 hours of combined Advanced (AT-6) plus Fighter Training (P-40)
The Student time advantage of the US counterpart was an advantage but those were not nearly the same as flying without an instructor which is the 200+ plus first pilot time for all the flight school replacements from 1943 into 1945.
As I reflect on my own experiences as a student pilot to a rating, familiarity with processes and protocols took more time than familiarity with flying. Formation flying, weather and flying wing would be the next step in the growth process. US students in WWII stateside training got some formation/wing training in Advanced - before Fighter Training school. At most of the 8th AF Operational Fighter Groups, nobody was assumed to be competent in any of those skills and set up individual programs in the Clobber Colleges.
My father presided over the Instrument re-training as well as check rides for all new pilots at the 355th.
Operationally the 8th AF air to air losses were similar to the LW, namely most such losses occurred in the population of 10 or fewer combat missions.
Last edited:
