Why did the 56th FG stay with the P-47s? (1 Viewer)

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Complicated question, but I know that post-ww2, much of the production tooling for military engines and aircraft was government-owned. Indeed, much of the furniture when I worked at Lycoming and Sikorsky had US government property tags on it ;)

It is pretty much true that if the Contract is awarded to design, tool and produce a 'thing', that the tooling will be invoiced to, and paid by, the Government Contract Agency. One of the reasons is the Gov't reserves the right to re-locate the tooling when the contract is concluded, or breached, so as to reserve the right to have it built somewhere else. Different contracts occasionally treat IP differently, particularly if a product begins as a commercial, non-government, venture - or if the Contractor is far sighted enough to retain either exclusive rights (very rare) or joint ownership (more frequent but still rare)during contract negotiation.

Normally the Guvmint owns what they pay for, pay what they agree to pay for as overhead (depreciation, etc) for tools and other assets purchased by the contractor for other purposes than a specific contract procurement.

Joe, I am surprised that Lockheed owns the P-3 tooling and scratching my head wondering why Lockheed would have purchased such exclusive 'used for' type tooling on their own? Any background on that?

When I was at Bell the Model 206 Jet Ranger was designed before submitting later as OH-6, so they owned all the basic tooling and IP without question. I was later part of the design team which patented and developed the "Node A Magic" pylon to isolate rotor system oscillations from the airframe to lower vibration levels. I know Bell retained all rights to that.
 
I think that the January 1944 date is important. This was exactly the period at which the 8th Air Force fighters were beginning to operate more and more frequently at low level, separating from the bombers earlier and further inland. It also coincides with increasing losses to light flak which really started to climb in the early months of 1944. The men commanding the 56th FG would have been well aware of this and also the perceived vulnerability of the P-51 to light flak compared to the P-47. In November 1944 the 56th FG had 9 aircraft damaged by flak when attacking St Omer airfield, but they all managed to get home. This must have been a factor in their desire to stay with the P-47.
Cheers
Steve
 
Do you think it had something to do with their "mission"?

Do you think it had something to do with their "mission"?

The role and Prime Directive for the 56th FG was precisely the same as every other 8th AF fighter group. a.) Provide escort and b.) destroy the LW in the air and on the ground.

They were limited in the role compared to the Mustang because of range deficiencies, resulting in reduced leadership past Brunswick, Kassel, Stuttgart radius until mid summer 1944. But even the additional 60 gallons of fuselage fuel only extended them to the 'potential' of Berlin. By that time only the 56th, 78th, 353rd and 356th FGs still retained the P-47.
 
I think that the January 1944 date is important. This was exactly the period at which the 8th Air Force fighters were beginning to operate more and more frequently at low level, separating from the bombers earlier and further inland. It also coincides with increasing losses to light flak which really started to climb in the early months of 1944. The men commanding the 56th FG would have been well aware of this and also the perceived vulnerability of the P-51 to light flak compared to the P-47. In November 1944 the 56th FG had 9 aircraft damaged by flak when attacking St Omer airfield, but they all managed to get home. This must have been a factor in their desire to stay with the P-47.
Cheers
Steve

Not likely Steve. The first ground victory credits were awarded to 353rd on January 14 with no losses and next by 78th FG on February 6, both within the first four weeks after Doolittle issued his famous directive. To put a point on this, nobody in 8th (or 9th AF) really had a clue what LW airfield flak would produce as a danger to strafing attacks until March. The leading ace in the ETO, 353rd ace Walter Beckham, was flying a P-47 when shot down by airfield flak while strafing on February 23, 1944..

Additionally, with no losses in Mustangs while strafing until March 21 (4th FG lost five strafing), any fears regarding vulnerability (or relative advantages for air cooled engine over in-line) would have been idle speculation in January and February and probably even March, 1944.

Airfield strafing picked up in March with the 4th FG and the 355th FG flying Mustangs as the leaders.
 
Joe, I am surprised that Lockheed owns the P-3 tooling and scratching my head wondering why Lockheed would have purchased such exclusive 'used for' type tooling on their own? Any background on that?

When I was at Bell the Model 206 Jet Ranger was designed before submitting later as OH-6, so they owned all the basic tooling and IP without question. I was later part of the design team which patented and developed the "Node A Magic" pylon to isolate rotor system oscillations from the airframe to lower vibration levels. I know Bell retained all rights to that.

I am not sure how much of the tooling was carried over from the Lockheed 188 Electra airliner? An often forgotten aircraft.
 
Joe, I am surprised that Lockheed owns the P-3 tooling and scratching my head wondering why Lockheed would have purchased such exclusive 'used for' type tooling on their own? Any background on that?

Yup! Because it's the same tooling that built the Electra (L-188 ). The government never purchased or "force purchased" the tooling.

During the early 1980s then Secretary of the Navy John Lehman threatened to take the P-3 production contract away from Lockheed because of a payment and production cost dispute and have another contractor build P-3s. Lockheed then threatened to destroy all the tooling. It's obvious that a settlement was negotiated!
 
To put a point on this, nobody in 8th (or 9th AF) really had a clue what LW airfield flak would produce as a danger to strafing attacks until March. The leading ace in the ETO, 353rd ace Walter Beckham, was flying a P-47 when shot down by airfield flak while strafing on February 23, 1944.

The first loss to light flak was Lt. Col McCollum (353th) whilst dive bombing on 25th November 1943. I believe the 78th lost a P-47 strafing an airfield before the loss of Beckam but its splitting hairs. 2 of the 5 aircraft lost on 23rd February were to heavy flak, one was at 28,000ft when hit.

In February 1943 the 8th AF recorded 14 fighters of all types lost to flak of all types.

In March this rose to 32, including 4 P-47s and 10 P-51s whilst strafing airfields.

In April this rose to 43, including 2 P-38s, 14 P-47s and 17 P-51s whilst strafing air fields.

The figures are from the 8th AF's own statistics.

It is not unreasonable to suppose that the 56th saw as early as November '43 which way the wind was blowing and that low level air to ground operations were going to become more commonplace. I don't think anybody in the USAAF realised in January just how dangerous light flak was going to prove, but the writing was on the wall. Anyone who had talked to an RAF colleague may have been aware of the 'rules' already introduced the previous year in that service for both the avoidance of flak and specifically attacking heavily defended targets like airfields.

Cheers

Steve
 
Perhaps so but I would bet Republic had large purchase orders in hand before making such a massive investment in factory construction. Same applies to plants and plant expansions for P-47s R2800 engine. Plus the dozens of firms building sub components for P-47 program. You don't turn P-47 production off by flipping a switch. Nor do you double P-51 production by flipping another switch.
 
No you don't turn production on and off by flipping switches. Look at how long it took to turn of the P-40 Switch :)

On the other hand nobody says you have to use all three major types in every theater you are fighting in. And they didn't. One more P-51 Group in England may just mean one more P-47 group in the Med or in the CBI theater.
 
Perhaps so but I would bet Republic had large purchase orders in hand before making such a massive investment in factory construction.
I had relatives who worked there. The plant grew as the government awarded more and more contracts to Republic, bottom line, the government didn't own the factory.
Same applies to plants and plant expansions for P-47s R2800 engine. Plus the dozens of firms building sub components for P-47 program. You don't turn P-47 production off by flipping a switch. Nor do you double P-51 production by flipping another switch.
Having worked on aircraft production lines myself, I believe no one is disputing that.
 
Respectfully Steve - there was no history available to the 56th Group leaders to suggest that the P-47 offered better solution than the P-51B in January 1944. There were no operational statistics or data to compare operations profiles and losses other than the 354th FG. The new group, equipped with a new 'hot' fighter was going a lot farther into Germany and shooting down 52 German aircraft before the end of January, 1944.. a feat that required six months of combat operations by the 56th FG to achieve - and the 38.5 air victory credits by the 354th in January topped the 38 VC's by the 56th.

There was no rational reason for the 56th to choose to operate the P-47 over the P-51 simply because pilots and leaders were very much motivated by records and performance.

I don't know if Landry truly swayed Kepner, as Zemke states, but it could not have been based on perception that the P-47 was more survivable against either the LW or airfield strafing in January, 1944
 
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Fighter aircraft in those areas spent a lot of time at medium and low altitude. Not what P-47 was designed for.
 
Fighter aircraft in those areas spent a lot of time at medium and low altitude. Not what P-47 was designed for.


True but then we have the advantage of using the "retro-spectro-scope" to examine things with. The P-47 was ordered in Sept of 1940, while the BoB was in full swing. First flight was May 6th 1941, 7 months before Pearl Harbor.

Who, at the time, could guarantee that the Germans or Japanese would NOT develop high altitude fighters by 1943 or 1944?

If you wait for your enemy to deploy a new weapon or aircraft before starting work on your own you are usually too late.
 
Fighter aircraft in those areas spent a lot of time at medium and low altitude. Not what P-47 was designed for.

Lovely thing about the P-47 was that it's engine, when outfitted with water injection, was making 300-600 HP more than previously available 2000 HP. Combined with a better prop, the performance under 20000 ft improved considerably.
 
The P-47M was a limited production aircraft. It was produced to work the bugs out of the R-2800 engines with the "C" turbocharger. The task with the "M" was to match the new engine in the existing chassis of the P-47D. By the time the first "M" came off the assembly line, work on the "N" with its larger, wet, wing was pretty far along. The "N"s were Republic's answer to the long-range bomber escort problem. It just made sense to keep a P-47 unit in theater so they would be ready for the P-47N when it arrived.
 
The P-47M was a limited production aircraft. It was produced to work the bugs out of the R-2800 engines with the "C" turbocharger. The task with the "M" was to match the new engine in the existing chassis of the P-47D. By the time the first "M" came off the assembly line, work on the "N" with its larger, wet, wing was pretty far along. The "N"s were Republic's answer to the long-range bomber escort problem. It just made sense to keep a P-47 unit in theater so they would be ready for the P-47N when it arrived.

All P-47s had C-series superchargers.
 

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