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With that number of planes in reserve, what was the reserve pilot pool like? It seems that if you had more pilots, you could stand up more squadrons, and bring greater numbers to bear during battle.Even without combat you can loose quite a number of aircraft just on routine flying over the course of 6 months. Especially on less than ideal airfields.
British figured you needed about 100% replacements every 6 months just for normal flying, does not count combat.
This was one reason that they only equipped two squadrons with Whirlwinds despite making 114 (?) of them. The extras were place in store for issue when accidents or combat occurred.
Turns out the Whirlwinds lasted longer than expected
The 120 number for Spitfires in service in Sept of 1939 vs the 250 in service in April also has to be seen in that light. They made a lot more than 130 Spitfires in those 7 months.
But you have to figure in the operational losses (accidents) and trying to build up a reserve. You need a lot more aircraft in storage to keep double the number of squadrons active without a rapid depletion in numbers once heavy combat starts.
I don't know.With that number of planes in reserve, what was the reserve pilot pool like? It seems that if you had more pilots, you could stand up more squadrons, and bring greater numbers to bear during battle.
It just seems like that's a LOT of planes in reserve.
Cheers,
Biff
With that number of planes in reserve, what was the reserve pilot pool like? It seems that if you had more pilots, you could stand up more squadrons, and bring greater numbers to bear during battle.
It just seems like that's a LOT of planes in reserve.
Cheers,
Biff
Consolidated P-30? Cantilever ... everything, even featured the retractable U/C and, later, a turbocharger.If you want a fast monoplane you have to figure out how to rid of the struts and wires.
Everybody was evolving. The questions are how?
Maybe I am wrong but I really dislike the seaplane racer evolution theory. Yep they are monoplanes.
But they use thin airfoils and use Struts and wires to keep the wings from folding up.
They also are also not built to a big strength factor, most of those planes were only doing a bit over 2 Gs in a turn.
They also used the floats for fuel storage and cooling area.
They were very ingenious. They were lousy aircraft to base a fighter on.
A lot of the first generation monoplanes tried to keep the maneuverability of the biplanes.
Which was hard, The famous Hawker Fury had 252sq ft of wing and only weighed about 3600lbs.
The CR.32 had 238 sq ft and weighed (max) 4350lbs.
View attachment 699364
It was noted as being very strong and that was biplane advantage. For the upper wing to bend you had to bend the lower wing at the same time via the struts.
Wow! What the hell is that monstrosity! lolThis thing was like trying to bend a Warren truss bridge. (patented in 1846)
If you want a fast monoplane you have to figure out how to rid of the struts and wires.
View attachment 699365
There were later and more advanced biplanes - CR 42 comes to mind - but the biplane design inherently limited top speed, (and to some extent range as well) and we know that speed ended up being one of the most important factors for WW2 fighters. They may not have necessarily known that in 1936.203 sq ft, 4140lbs and using the same power engine, slower than the Italian Biplane. by around 10%.
View attachment 699362
295sqft , 4740lbs about 8mph faster (but at a higher altitude using a supercharged engine of 600hp) than the Italian fighter.
British didn't like it because the landing speed was too high
It took a while to sort out the airfoils and the structures that would allow for a monoplane without outside struts/bracing wires.
Please note the 109 didn't get rid of the tailplane struts until the "F" model.
View attachment 699366
I came across an Admiralty document from August 1939 which discussed the attrition reserves being sought by both the RAF and the RN.Not necessarily given the rather ghastly attrition rates at that time. From what I understand, during the Battle of France RAF lost about 270 bombers (mainly Fairey Battles but also a fair number of Blenheims and some others), and at least 250 fighters (mostly Hurricanes) in about 10 days.
I've seen other estimates or numbers on the losses but regardless, life span of a front line military aircraft at this time was not much..
This was covered in Bungays "Most Dangerous Enemy" which he described as creating a shortage of both men and machines. From memory the number of pilots per squadron was increased and the number of planes each squadron had was also increased but a squadron was still classed as 12 planes with pilots. Dowding was preparing for a war of attrition and his "system" of CAC relied on a squadron always being available sunrise to sunset every day. Twelve pilots with twelve planes would be lucky to survive the first morning at full strength without a reserve of planes, but you also need a reserve of pilots not only to replace any killed or injured but also to rotate and provide leave or cover for any sickness. As I remember it was around 18 pilots to a 12 man squadron. The situation was different with squadrons used as OTUs where pilots were supposed to train and then be introduced to the squadron proper in good time. This was where pilots with just a few hours (like 50) in proper fighters ended up in the battle itself.With that number of planes in reserve, what was the reserve pilot pool like? It seems that if you had more pilots, you could stand up more squadrons, and bring greater numbers to bear during battle.
It just seems like that's a LOT of planes in reserve.
Cheers,
Biff
When blitzkrieg started rolling in over airfields anything that wasnt airworthy refuelled and a pilot sat in it was lost along with all spares and ground crew.Not necessarily given the rather ghastly attrition rates at that time. From what I understand, during the Battle of France RAF lost about 270 bombers (mainly Fairey Battles but also a fair number of Blenheims and some others), and at least 250 fighters (mostly Hurricanes) in about 10 days.
I've seen other estimates or numbers on the losses but regardless, life span of a front line military aircraft at this time was not much..
Some of the repair centres had an airfield attached, pilots in the BoB were told to land there if they knew their plane was damaged or would be by a forced landing. Though the piece I read didnt say if the pilot picked up a replacement there or was transported back to his squadron to get one there.I don't know.
It seems like some of the pilots went through several planes is a short period of time (others passed on with the first crash/encounter with the enemy).
The British may have issued new planes while damaged planes (past a certain point) were returned to repair centers/depots for either repair or salvage.
This may have changed at different times or when overseas. Replacement planes harder to get? more effort spent on repairs at local level.
Yes they did it. Lockheed had done it much earlier with the Vega transport (except the landing gear part)Consolidated P-30? Cantilever ... everything, even featured the retractable U/C and, later, a turbocharger.
I love the planes from the 30's.Consolidated P-30? Cantilever ... everything, even featured the retractable U/C and, later, a turbocharger.
We are discussing plane numbers because Dowding and others referred to "Hurricanes" being deployed. In fact the numbers that mattered were Hurricane pilots, it was those that Dowding couldnt afford to lose. As per Tomo's post Hurricane and Spitfire production was an average of 100 per month in 1939, it rose through 1940 to a peak of around 500 per month of new aircraft in August 1940 with a similar number of damaged planes returned to service. As you say a lot of planes can be lost in normal operations, at the height of the battle, losses to all causes were almost incredible. Desite producing hundreds of new aircraft and repairing more the front line strength in numbers hardly increased at all and the actual strength in terms of experienced pilots went down. The situation was just the same on the other side of the channel, especially with bombers, Goerings bomber force went from the worlds most formidable to one with around 200 serviceable twin engined bombers with crews between the invasion of Norway and Sept 1940 in the BoB.Even without combat you can loose quite a number of aircraft just on routine flying over the course of 6 months. Especially on less than ideal airfields.
British figured you needed about 100% replacements every 6 months just for normal flying, does not count combat.
This was one reason that they only equipped two squadrons with Whirlwinds despite making 114 (?) of them. The extras were place in store for issue when accidents or combat occurred.
Turns out the Whirlwinds lasted longer than expected
The 120 number for Spitfires in service in Sept of 1939 vs the 250 in service in April also has to be seen in that light. They made a lot more than 130 Spitfires in those 7 months.
But you have to figure in the operational losses (accidents) and trying to build up a reserve. You need a lot more aircraft in storage to keep double the number of squadrons active without a rapid depletion in numbers once heavy combat starts.
Just trying to reconcile the numbers available with the numbers produced.We are discussing plane numbers because Dowding and others referred to "Hurricanes" being deployed. In fact the numbers that mattered were Hurricane pilots, it was those that Dowding couldnt afford to lose. As per Tomo's post Hurricane and Spitfire production was an average of 100 per month in 1939, it rose through 1940 to a peak of around 500 per month of new aircraft in August 1940 with a similar number of damaged planes returned to service. As you say a lot of planes can be lost in normal operations, at the height of the battle, losses to all causes were almost incredible. Desite producing hundreds of new aircraft and repairing more the front line strength in numbers hardly increased at all and the actual strength in terms of experienced pilots went down. The situation was just the same on the other side of the channel, especially with bombers, Goerings bomber force went from the worlds most formidable to one with around 200 serviceable twin engined bombers with crews between the invasion of Norway and Sept 1940 in the BoB.
I agree and despite being 100% correct on almost everything he made enemies of the clueless who remained clueless and forgot how really clueless they were.Just trying to reconcile the numbers available with the numbers produced.
Very little doubt that Dowding did the right thing.
The Dunning-Kreuger effect was alive and well in many military circles at the time!I agree and despite being 100% correct on almost everything he made enemies of the clueless who remained clueless and forgot how really clueless they were.