Why did the Brits persist with the Seafire until the end of WWII and beyond?

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Bf 109 T they would have been landing on a faster carrier with a longer deck and with better forward visibility than their British counterparts in their Seafires.
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Me-109T1 would not have been used operationally. There weren't enough (60 built) for the air wings of KM Graf Zeppelin and KM Peter Strasser in addition to naval pilot training. If German CVs had been pushed to completion they would operate the Me-155 which had wide track landing gear.
 

They simply would have produced more 109Ts if the carrier(s) had been completed. 109s were the planned equipoment of the GZ. Me 155s would have been lucky to have made the war, let alone even be built. The specification for this new type was May 1942, which makes it a contemporary of the Sea Fury, the A7M Sam, the F8 Bearcat and the Seafire XV,. Against contemporary opposition, it is not so impressive.

When the GZ was revived in early 1942, there was considerable debate about possible replacement a/c. Aiming for a mid 1943 completion of the Carrier, the KM settled on the successor to the Emils. They settleed on the Me 109f along with a wing folding version of the Ju87G. AFAIK protoypes of both a/c were never built. But the important thing is that the KM knew that the Me 155 was of no use in the context of the current conflict. It would not have been ready until 1944-5 at the earliest.
 
The Joint Fighter Conference rated the seafire 6th on there rating of best fighter above 25k, well below the F4U and F6F. Oddly, it was not rated at all below 25k. The performance stats from internet sites indicate the Seafire II and III were relatively slow. Maybe the boost was low.
 

They would have been.
When Hitler ordered in August 1941 that the Graf Spee be completed by October 1942 the Bf 109 T-2s started to be converted back to T-1 configuration. From December 1941 at least 48 were converted to the carrier standard. Why on earth would this have been done if there was no intention to use them on the carrier?
The type was a victim of the shambolic on/off German carrier program but it was the only game in town.
Cheers
Steve
 
I believe Renrich in post39 has the main reason - the terms of the lend lease meant that at the end of hostilities a lot of American fighter were dumped at sea.
This meant that whatever fighters were available were kept in use as long as possible - until the arrival of more modern and specifically designed types such as the Sea Fury, and then the jets.
 
I am pretty sick of it. Tired of saying something about it, and it doing no good. I have thought about leaving, but then I have decided against it. Why should they ruin it for me, and others. We will just have to start removing the problems.
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IMO this is the best English language military history forum on the web. You and the other moderators must be doing something right, even if accidentally.
 


The Seafire II/III were low altitude rated fighters with single stage, single speed SCs with 16-18lb boost at low altitude. The LIIC and LFIII had the Merlin 32/55m respectively so they had spectacular initial climb rates and good speed at low altitudes. IIRC, the plan when intercepting FW190s was to climb rapidly then attempt an intercept using speed accumulated in the dive. The Seafire XV/XVII had single stage, two speed griffons, with much better high altitude performance and the Seafire 47 two stage, two speed griffons with excellent high altitude performance and a service ceiling of about 40,000 ft.
 
The only version of that account I've seen simply states the FAA claims from FAA POV, 7 Japanese a/c downed, then states that [Nakamura] testified to have seen Hockley alive and turned him over to others, not that Nakamura, as an air warden on the ground, somehow knew the exact loss causes of other Japanese a/c. How would he know that better than the fighter units themselves? There's no question several Japanese fighters were lost, but lots of overlapping USN claims, and the sources I cited only mention one Seafire loss and one pilot WIA as due to Seafires.

But please provide a real source citation backing up your characterization of Nakamura's testimony.

You've accused me of 'pedalling half baked sources' but for example in the last post you said: "i rely on rod kirkby's and Gerry Murphy's research as a more balanced and accurate account." then
"There were no hellcats or Corsairs in the air on that day. It was a British controlled sector...any US forces that stumbled into the operational area risked being shot at"

The latter statement is clearly wrong, in direct contradiction to both USN and JNAF accounts, and no actual FAA source has been given even claiming it. But it's not clear from your post if that's something you say Kirkby*and Murphy said, or just something you concluded. I won't attack your motives the way you have mine (agenda, half baked pedalling) but I will say that's sloppy sourcing of info. Someone reading your post cannot tell who is really making that obviously wrong statment.

Likewise I find your Nakamura citation pretty wishy washy, why not just say which book it came from?

*for others reading this debate, Rod Kirkby is an aviation artist; Gerry Murphy was one of the FAA pilots involved in the August 15 1945 combat.

Joe
 
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Seafires were considered the best fleet defence fighter by the FAA in their inventory after the war. By 1945 their safety and accident rates were much improved, and their low altitude performance gave them preference as the dedicated fleet defence fighterr until 1949. This was not a matter of penny pinching, or "making do", it was a matter of preference. Seafires from 1945 were not considered any less durable than their US counterparts, and further were as long leged as their USN counterparts (operational range) .

Britain did not use US equipment on its carriers until the 1960s. Australia didnt either. British equipment was also used by the Dutch and Canadian Navies in the post war period. There were reasons for that, the fittings the hangar clearances, and for aircraft operating off smaller carriers, the British a/c I should also add that in the 1960s the cost of American a/c per unit were generally 1.5 to two times the cost of RN equipment. This was not an issue for the cash soaked USN of the 1950s-60s, but for smaller mere mortal navies it was a big issue. For Australia, in 1967, when the Venoms and Gannets were being replaqced, a decision was very nearly made to convert the carrier to a rotary wing carrier, because of the astronomical cost of USN equipment, and the cost of converting the Melbourne to operate the A4s and Trackers. The Canadians and Dutch scrapped their carriers at about that time for precisely the reason of upgrade costs.

Unfortunately operating off smaller slower carriers was not suited to the Seafire deck handling characterisitcs, and by 1950, the British were paying off (some were being extensively rebuilt, but were out of commission in that 1945-50 time period) nearly all their bigger carriers. The RN, and most other navies using British carriers universally preferred British equipment over US equpiment on their British carriers until the advent of the jet age. Seafires were selected as the fleet defence fighter for the bigger carriers, Furies were designated as Fighter Bombers, and Fireflies were given the roles of night fighter, strike aircraft and ASW.

But in the world of the RN without big carriers, the RN was forced back into a similar situation they had found themselves in 1936-43....not enough carrier deck space to afford the luxury of a specialised single purpose aircraft. The Seafire was just such a beast. It could only do one thing really well, and that was defend the skies over the fleet (and in this role it was very successful in 1945). Later marks had the range, but no mark really was ever a great bomb truck. And what really damned it was it unsuitability for operation from smaller carriers. Mercifully, by 1951 Jets were entering service in the RN that could replace the Seafire and the Furies doing both jobs in a single aircraft.

Much is made of the relatively high attrition rate compared to USN equipment, and in particular the alleged poor showing of the Seafire. Both claims are spurious in my observation. Sea Furies were embarked on the Sydney September to January 1951-2 spending from memory 37 days on station. In that period they lost 11 Furies out of 22 embarked, with just 2 confirmed as falling to enemy fire. One of the 11 simply failed to return, entering a cloud and not coming out. That is no worse than the Seafire operational loss rates, and Sydney had the reputation of being a safe and efficient CAG (according to the USN who were there operating next to her).

Our next main fighter was the Sea Venom. It never operated in wartime conditions....39 were acquired (by the RAN), and in a 12 year operational period, 11 were lost. Then we purchased 22 A4 Skyhawaks. In a 13 year operational period, 12 of those 22 were lost over the side or in other accidents. Just to keep this in perspective, USN carrier trained pilots, were forbidden by their own service from operating from our carrier. And we had a truckload of exchange aircrew that flew with us. They just knew their aircraft and training standards were not up to the task of flying off or on to the Melbourne....

The idea that at any time USN equipment was safer or more rugged or better at fleet defence than the Seafire in the post 1945 environment, is a toatal crock, in the context of the operating requirements of RN (and allied) carriers after 1945.
 
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1. No you've omitted to read my entire post before responding to it, since it clearly mentioned the name of the ship, Triumph, and anyway I view it as a matter of common knowledge that all FAA/RAN ops in Korea were from Colossus class ships.

2. First I'm not at all sure that's true, but moroever the post I responded to gave a general wikipedia statement about fuselage wrinkling of Seafires in Korea, and I simply added historical details of the actual operations the a/c was asked to perform from the ship actually available from which to perform them, and troubles resulted. That's a historical fact, unless you have a contrary source. If so please provide it.

Joe
 
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To get the full testimony, and trial transcript, you will need to apply to the University of Hong Kong and seek special permission for the transcript. The case number is WO235/2031. You will, as i have, be required to agree to a confidentiality agreement that prevents you from posting this stuff allover the internet.

Her is a link that may help you on your path to enlightenement...good luck it might do your otherwise impressive research credential some good to do some ground truthing rather than accept the credentials of questionable unit records as gospel all the time.

Hong Kong's War Crimes Trials Collection

Kiyozo does inlcude that in his testimony incidentally, and given the fight was occuring over Tokyo Bay in full view of his OP I have no difficulty in accepting his testimony. Neither do i have any problem with accepting that the Japanese records kept by the Japanese fliers on that day are wrong or incomplete. The battle took place at seven in the morning, by noon that day, Japan had surrendered. In every sense this battle was a symbolic gesture by the IJN, a last hurrah, to save nothing else other than their shattered pride. The battle in fact had many witnesses, including those of Hockleys executioners. Though I cannot prove it, I am certain they killed him because they were P*ssed off at watching the best they could put into the air being shot out of the sky by the British.

Moreover, Nakamuras was no mere civilian, he was a trained air raid warden, and from his testimony observed the battle. I assume he was manning an OP which apparently overlooked the place of battle. He would have been trained in A/C recognition as well as anybody, and in fact was better placed to observe the battlke than the participants themselves. Thisd was common to many ARPs.


Kiyozos account clearly states the allied aircraft involved in this scrap were Seafires, not Hellcats, or Corsairs


*for others reading this debate, Rod Kirkby is an aviation artist; Gerry Murphy was one of the FAA pilots involved in the August 15 1945 combat.
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Who happens to quote and rely on Commander Ormsby's account, the chief prosecutor at Wo235/1021, and someone they have met and talked to personally. These men are well placed to know the truth of what happened
 
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To get the full testimony, and trial transcript, you will need to apply to the University of Hong Kong and seek special permission for the transcript. The case number is WO235/1021. You will, as i have, be required to agree to a confidentiality agreement that prevents you from posting this stuff allover the internet.

Here is a link that may help you on your path to enlightenement...good luck it might do your otherwise impressive research credential some good to do some ground truthing rather than accept the credentials of questionable unit records as gospel all the time.

Hong Kong's War Crimes Trials Collection

Kiyozo does inlcude that in his testimony incidentally, and given the fight was occuring over Tokyo Bay in full view of his OP I have no difficulty in accepting his testimony. Neither do i have any problem with accepting that the Japanese records kept by the Japanese fliers on that day are wrong or incomplete. The battle took place at seven in the morning, by noon that day, Japan had surrendered. In every sense this battle was a symbolic gesture by the IJN, a last hurrah, to save nothing else other than their shattered pride. The battle in fact had many witnesses, including those of Hockleys executioners. Though I cannot prove it, I am certain they killed him because they were P*ssed off at watching the best they could put into the air being shot out of the sky by the British.

Moreover, Nakamuras was no mere civilian, he was a trained air raid warden, and from his testimony observed the battle. I assume he was manning an OP which apparently overlooked the place of battle. He would have been trained in A/C recognition as well as anybody, and in fact was better placed to observe the battlke than the participants themselves. Thisd was common to many ARPs.


Kiyozos account clearly states the allied aircraft involved in this scrap were Seafires, not Hellcats, or Corsairs


*for others reading this debate, Rod Kirkby is an aviation artist; Gerry Murphy was one of the FAA pilots involved in the August 15 1945 combat.
Click to expand...


Who happens to quote and rely on Commander Ormsby's account, the chief prosecutor at Wo235/1021, and someone they have met and talked to personally. These men are well placed to know the truth of what happened
 
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1. I can easily accept that particular sources don't allow full reproduction, but with all frankness have more trouble accepting that you couldn't 'fair use' quote the relevant passages. I'll leave it at that for now as far as that one piece of evidence; without really knowing it it's impossible to opine whether it should overturn the other pieces of evidence, though again it seems quite remarkable for a single ground observer to tally the exact number and cause of losses down to the enemy plane type, better than the air units involved knew...

2. In case of 202nd AG ops over Darwin we're reading directly from combat reports and you've never presented any credible argument why we should assume any other aircraft/pilots were lost than given in those reports. The wrecks of any others were never found. Nobody has found the names of any other pilots killed or unaccounted for in the period. By claiming more Zeroes were really lost, or there's any real likelihood of such, you've always just diminished your own crediblity as a objective observer IMHO, rather than showing that I gullibly (or dishonestly) take 'questionable sources' at face value.

But again this case August 15 '45 has a bit more wiggle room, as I said each time I initially presented it in a thread. It's accounts from three different books two with overlapping but highly respect Japanese authors. To review once again, "Sky of August 15" gives a detailed account by a 252nd (not 302nd, only unit mentioned by your 'more trusted' researchers) pilot who says he was downed by Seafires, "Maru Special Series" gives a chronology, times, pilots etc. for the two units as from records, but it's not itself a primary source, and gives the same 252nd loss and leader of 302nd flight wounded by Seafire but doesn't otherwise mention Seafires and does mention F6F opponents for both; and Hata/Izawa "JNAF Aces" just say 302nd's 4 losses Aug 15 were to F6F's. But I don't have the actual combat reports of the units in the August 15 '45 case and never said so for this particular case.

And, much as you've criticized those (8/15/45) sources, or me for citing them, you didn't provide any direct contradiction to anything in them, just added the air warden thing, but we're at a dead end for now in further analyzing that it would seem.

3. Yes, a time directly coinciding with F6F combats recorded in USN records and the Japanese accounts I cited of combats with F6F's. So unless both the 252nd and 302nd AG pilots imagined (or cooked up for some reason? I can't see what it would be) engaging USN a/c more or less simultaneously with Seafires, and more than one USN snd also coincidentally imagined engaging Japanese fighters at the same time and place, then we must reject the idea that no F6F's were around.

Joe
 
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The reason I question reecords from either axis partner has to do with the regimes themselves. Trying to judge their objectivity by our standards is flawed. Most of the time records are going to be accurate, but it is my opinion that these regimes were so morally bankrupt that wholesale falsification of records is not beyond the realm of possibility (in fact for the Germans I can confirm that it did happen...often). Its not beyond the realms of possibility for the allies either, but more possible with regimes like tha Nazis or the japanese, and especially true as their regimes came crashing down around their ears.

I have interviewwed several German soldiers from the eastern Front over the years, including my own father. On the eastern front, faslification of records was more or less routine. My father laughed one day when i produced a unit diary entry citing a certain number of casualties and effectives for a particular battle. he just laughed and said the records could not be relied on for historical accuracy. Depending on the wishes of the higher commands, effective strengths, losses and kills could be routinley altered to suit the wishes of the higher command. The true losses were usually communicated informally. Sometimess effectives (both equipment and personnel) were kept "on strength" simply to draw additional supply for these ghost assets. Sometimes it was for a higher purpose. Sometimes the units themselves, as things became more and more chaotioc did not know what happened to personnel or materiel. In the case of Germans units would, at the end of the war, routinely (more or less) press gang convalescents, furlough men, tanks in workshops and the like to form "new" units to meet Hitlers insatiable desire to have "divisions" on the map. Same approaches were applied to air units. The extent of utter confusion, and downright lying that went on on the Axis side ought not be discounted, and I have raised this with you on many occasions, which you steadfastly refuse to accept. The piece de resistance on this issue, has to be your unshakeable belief that the Nanking incident either never happened, or has been grossly overblown. i will never foreget that conversation. At the time we discussed that, even when presented with very strong proof that it did happen, and in numbers substantially greater than you were prepared to admit, you were stubborn in your belief and support of the contemporary Japanese account. If ever i needed proof that I was dealing with a biased analyst, that was it. As a consequence i question every pro-japanese account that you give, simply because it has a demonstrated lack of criticality of the records being relied on. I admit that such cross referencing is often impassible, but in this case it is. Still, you cling to the japanese side of the story almost to the exclusion of all other sources.

As for

And, much as you've criticized those (8/15/45) sources, or me for citing them, you didn't provide any direct contradiction to anything in them, just added the air warden thing, but we're at a dead end for now in further analyzing that it would seem
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its not a dead end, and you can obtain the records for yourself, as i have. I have given you the account as read, and it contradicts the partisan accounts and official histories of the units concerned that you are relying and accepting uncritically. Kiyozo is about as independant and impartial as could be asked for....it would be nice to have a Kiyozo for the battles over Darwin Burma and other places where you have plied your trade, but unformatunately there arent
 

Your post did not state that Triumph was a rather slow CVL, and is written so that it is not clear that Triumph was operating the Seafires in question rather than acting as a ferry to bring the surviving aircraft from Korea.

The fact is that all WW2 CV capable aircraft are more prone to landing damage if the CV or apparent wind is too slow, since it causes much greater strain on the aircraft hooks and LG.
 
Joe, I will have a closer look at your sources and try and see the issue from your pov. I note that one source you seem to rely very heavily on is

Hata I Yasuho, - Japanese Naval Aces and fighter Units of WWII

I notice from Amazone there are the a number of reviews, including a "Joe Brennan" from NJ, which may well be yourself. This man is glowing in his prais of the book, stating "This book is written strictly from the Japanese perspective. But unfortunately, after so many years, a lot of the Pacific Air War is still only understood in the West via books written strictly, or pretty much, from the Western perspective. There are now a number of notable exceptions to that statement, books written in English using sources from both sides. However for various episodes involving Japanese Navy fighters, it's still either this translation or nothing, as far as English language books giving the Japanese side. It's an indispensable resource, a must have, for anyone at all seriously interested in the Pacific Air War. I think the low rated reviews completely miss the point of why one would buy this book".

Nobody agrees with this review according to Amazon

The majority of reviews of this book are far less charitable

These are other reviews given at Amazon

Flawed, (By ANA-607 (NY)) - Useful for details of personnel and units, but marred by fantastical inaccuracies in accounting of claims and losses.
(4 of 10 people found the following review helpful)

1.0 out of 5 stars Reads like a patsy high school year book, (By Yau "Ming" (Melbourne)) A lot of sappy coverage on the pilots... reads like a high school yearbook written by a drunk cheerleader. A lot of motherhood statements and glorified rubbish about the Imperial Japanese Navy. Interesting that the writer claims that the IJN only had a few of its planes shot down during the Mariannas Turkey Shoot. If I were you, I'd just borrow it from the library, worth a laugh.
(5 of 17 people found the following review helpful)

1.0 out of 5 stars Hata is careless with sources and commits sloppy analysis, Hata writes a great book apart from the fact that the sources chosen are overly biased and Hata does not acknowledge this. Also the fact that Hata goes into this foray with a direct intention to discredit Iris Chang with her claims in the Rape of Nanking is damaging to what is otherwise a plausible extrapulation of a complex issue.

So, on the assumption that you have relied upon Hata (which you say you do) it is becoming clear that you are in fact relying on extremely dodgy source material, in the eyes of the majority. I am not putting too much credibility on that , but its an indication that something is very wrong here. i will reserve my own judgement until i get a copy and look at it for myself

I also need to have a look at Japanese Naval Air Force Fighter Units and Their Aces, 1932-1945 , Ikuhiko Hata Yasuho Izawa , Christopher Shores, which I know you also like. Ive heard better things about that source at least.
 
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