Why did the Spitfire fail over darwin?

[Razgriz1]

I've read a bit of 'Darwin Spitfires' & from what I can recall, it's because of inadequate training for the pilots (especially gunnery), poor tactics like use of the big wing, the vokes air filter etc...

Any more reasons why the Spitfire got massacred up north in Darwin?

 

[Peter Gunn]

Here's a primer from our forum:

Air combat over Darwin

Massacred? I'm not qualified to weigh in on that so I'll let our experts debate whether or not that was the case.

 

[stona]

The Spitfires were not massacred, what gives you that idea?

If we factor in all air combats over North West Australia, not just the attacks on escorted bomber formations, then 1 Fighter Wing wrote off 28 Japanese aircraft (15 bombers, 7 reconnaissance aircraft and 6 fighters) losing 28 Spitfires in the process. This 1:1 exchange ratio is typical of average squadrons during the first half of the war, similar to many fighter squadrons in the BoB, and much better than the Spitfire V squadrons based in England in 1941-42.

The Wing's loss rate of 11%-12% is almost identical to comparable USAAF units, the 49th FG suffered a loss rate of 11%. It was worse than the best USAAF units in theatre.

The reasons for the Wing's problems are many. Primarily a lack of training. In seven operations the Spitfire pilots made 126 gunnery passes but shot down just 14 bombers. Their gunnery was terrible, compounded by problems with the cannon jamming. The cannons typically jammed in the first two to three seconds of firing, leaving the Spitfires with just .303 machine guns when they finally closed the range. One of the few things Caldwell got right was a request for the Spitfires to be armed with .50 calibre Brownings, but this was quite impossible at the time.

There were also tactical deficiencies. Going after the bombers left the Spitfires vulnerable to a bounce, they did not have the luxury of other units as high cover as they might have had in Europe. This was compounded by poor training and the inability of the pilots to operate in pairs. The deficient 'look out' that resulted from this left them even more vulnerable than they needed to be.

As Anthony Cooper explains

"...the credit side of 1 Fighter Wing's tally sheet was thinned out by systematic gunnery problems, while the debit side was swollen by endemic procedural deficiencies."

1 Fighter Wing's performance was not brilliant, but it was no worse than that of most contemporaries in other theatres. It could have been better were it not for the issues sumarised above.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Any more reasons why the Spitfire got massacred up north in Darwin?

Massacred??

 

[rochie]

Any more reasons why the Spitfire got massacred up north in Darwin?

 

[parsifal]

the link provided has all that I would say on this issue. There is a lot to talk about, and people will believe what they want.

 

[RCAFson]

There was two major problems with the Spitfires at Darwin. The first was a defective CS prop ( two types were used on Spitfires and the other type used electric rather than hydraulic actuation and did not fail at high altitudes) unit that caused many prop failures and was probably the major cause of Spitfire losses. the 2nd major problem was 20mm cannon jams; this typically occurred asymmetrically and the unbalanced cannon recoil severely disturbed aiming accuracy.

Additional problems were Caldwell's use of "big wing" tactics and the initial failure to use drop tanks.

It should be noted that in the summer of 1943 the Allies had a distinct lack of combat ready high altitude fighters.

 

[Razgriz1]

The Spitfires were not massacred, what gives you that idea?

Probably because of the use of improper tactics & training by the guys over Darwin w/o knowing about the combat record of the MKV Spitfire in the other theaters. It might have something to do with my memory of some posts made by a guy in another thread on this forum.

I'd say the use of the big wing in Darwin made an impression in me

 

[stona]

The Spitfire squadrons were victims of the propaganda surrounding them. That Fighter Command would 'donate' three Spitfire squadrons to Australia was as much a symbolic as practical gesture.
Nos. 452 and 457 Squadrons were the only two Australian day fighter squadrons serving with Fighter Command, so their tickets were automatically stamped.
No. 54 Squadron was the unlucky 'British' squadron chosen to go too. No. 54 wasn't British at all, like typical squadrons it had a complement of foreigners and other Commonwealth pilots on its strength. They had to be posted out and replaced by British pilots before the squadron was sent to the antipodes.
Although No. 452 Squadron's ex-CO, Bob Bungey, flew in to commiserate with the pilots when he heard of their 'Ovidian exile', they were returning home. It was No. 54 Squadron that was going into exile!
All three squadrons were extremely average, not the crack units sometimes portrayed in the publicity surrounding the transfer down under.
For various reasons the leadership of the squadrons and Wing was substantially below par, and this had the most direct impact on the Wing's performance when it finally saw action. Say this in Australia and nobody will buy you a beer!

Cheers

Steve

 

[Koopernic]

It seems a rather a big case of the Australian squadrons massively over claiming. There is a certain psychology going on here.

 

[stona]

1 Fighter Wing claimed 70 aircraft when the actual number was 28. That's actually on the low side of over claiming. A ratio of 3:1 would be fairly typical for the average RAF fighter unit.
Cheers
Steve

 

[parsifal]

1 Fighter wing actually claimed 63 confirmed and 11 probables between 2 March and 6 July 1943. in exchange they lost 44 airframes, 17 to enemy action, the remainder to non-combat related caused. many others were damaged but repaired.

Allied losses include losses to all causes, whereas Japanese figures are combat losses only. We don't have accurate figures for total Japanese losses, even from Japanese sources, because many Japanese aircraft were staged to other commands and their fates not recorded (so anyone who say they 'know" the full extent of Japanese losses you should treat with a great deal of caution). However for the period up to the end of 1943, the japanese had lost 6500 a/c, of which 45% were lost to non-combat related causes. by extrapolation, one can expect the 28 combat losses suffered in combat to increase to about 41 a/c lost to all causes.

41 losses to 44 defenders lost isn't great but neither is it a defeat. Plus it needs to be remembered the wing did complete its mission whilst the IJN/IJA units engaged did not. The japanese continued to suffer heavy losses to shipping at the hands of the USAAC heavy bomber units at fenton and some supporting RAAF operations and ultimately completely abandoned their attacks on the northern Command. At the beginning of July the Japanese had had enough and withdrew, so it is obvious that they were suffering in the campaign. After the war, it is worth noting that the Japanese official history gave special praise to the efforts of the Churchill wing, something quite unusual.

I'm still trying to understand how what was essentiaslly a defensive holding action that completed its mission is a defeat?

.

 

[gumbyk]

The Spitfire squadrons were victims of the propaganda surrounding them. That Fighter Command would 'donate' three Spitfire squadrons to Australia was as much a symbolic as practical gesture.

As I understand it, it was done under duress from the Australian government. When Japan over-ran Singapore, the Australian government requested Britain's help with defence, which was rejected as High Command couldn't spare anyone.
It was only when the Australians threatened to withdraw all of their troops from Europe that suddenly these troops were made available.

Going from fighting one enemy, with one set of tactics to fighting another, with different tactics couldn't have helped with losses either.

 

[Stig1207]

.......

.

As your numbers differ from others in the linked thread in post #2 and in other posts in this thread, could you name your sources?

 

[parsifal]

My revised figures are based on a book by Anthony Cooper called "Darwin Spitfires - The real battle for Australia University of New South Wales Press . this is not the only source, but its the main one.

Previously I had been using mostly Parnells History of the RAAF. Its still a good reference, but getting old now.

 

[Stig1207]

http://www.darwinspitfires.com/

Your figures don't seem to agree with Coopers; neither appendix. 4 for claims nor appendix. 5 for losses?

 

[parsifal]

In the thread linked in Post 2 My total was 65, in this thread Ive claimed 63, that's not a lot of difference. Its been a while since I looked at Cooper so maybe I'm wrong.


Parnell claims 71 confirmed.


so what figure are you thinking is right?

 

[Peter Gunn]

*SNIP*


I'm still trying to understand how what was essentiaslly a defensive holding action that completed its mission is a defeat?

.

From my limited reading on the subject, I always thought the Spitfires and their pilots did a pretty competent job doing what they were asked to do. Namely, defend against IJN/IJA bombing raids. The Japanese quit, the Spitfires were still flying, they were there for a defensive action and could safely signal "Mission Complete". I'd call that a victory, (a fairly clear cut one, maybe not as stunning as a Midway style stomping but those are pretty rare anyway) others may have a differing opinion.

 

[Barrett]

Joe Foss went on R&R in Australia between Guadalcanal tours. He was hosted by Caldwell & Co. and got to fly a Spit. Joe told the story a couple of times: "I understand that a lot of you guys are aces. Well, congratulations. I know what you're thinking. If a stiff-necked American in an 8,000-lb airplane can beat the Zeros, you'll clean up in your 6,000-lb airplane. But I'm here to tell ya: if you dogfight with a Zero he'll eat your lunch." I did not pursue the matter w/Joe but only said that the Spits had problems until tactics were amended.

 

[stona]

"I understand that a lot of you guys are aces. Well, congratulations."

He understood wrong then.

No. 54 Squadron went to Australia with no aces and just three combat experienced pilots. Nearly half the pilots had no operational experience at all.

N0. 452 went to Australia with two experienced pilots, one of whom, Thorold-Smith was an ace. It was later joined by two Malta aces, Goldsmith and Bisley. Unfortunately Thorold-Smith was killed over Darwin on his second sortie against the Japanese.

No. 457 Squadron also went to Australia with no aces and only three pilots considered combat experienced. More than one third of pilots had no operational experience at all.

Three men would reach the five victories to qualify them for ace status in Australia, Foster, Gibbs and Caldwell.

A grand total of six out of all the men who served with the three squadrons, one of whom was lost before adding to his tally, is not 'a lot of you guys' !

It cannot be over emphasised just how average these squadrons were. They reflected the state of Fighter Command at this time very well, a lot of inexperienced pilots, a lot of rapidly promoted flight commanders and other leaders. It was not exactly an elite fighting force.

Cheers

Steve