Why was the SBD such an effective aircraft?

[buffnut453]

I suspect that another part of the reason for the relatively little use of dive bombers in the ETO & Med vs PTO is that the people running the war in Europe and the Mediterranean were not particularly interested in dive bombing and the people running the air war were even less interested in it.

Of course, especially after the Italian surrender, there was far less marine traffic

Well, it rather depends if you're talking about the Allies or the Axis. Clearly, German leadership was obsessed with dive bombers, as evidenced by the faintly ridiculous requirement for the Ju88 to be capable of dive bombing.

The British levied the requirement that led to the Hawker Henley combined light bomber and dive bomber which first flew in 1937. However, interest in dive bombing was limited, a view that was reinforced by the tactical limitations of the Stuka that were thoroughly exposed in the Battle of Britain.

Bottom line is that, although there was much interest in dive bombers, the tactical environment in Europe from mid 1940 onwards was not suitable for dive bomber operations.

 

[GrauGeist]

The reason why the SBD and CVEs weren't as prevelant in the ETO/MTO as they were in the PTO also stems from numbers on hand.
By 7 December 1941, the USN only had one CVE: USS Long Island.
Mid-1942 saw several Bogue class CVEs become available and by 1943, the number of CVEs coming into service were in considerable numbers.
Following this timeline, aside from the priority of convoy protection, many critical battles in the MTO had passed.
Add to that, that the SBD (as mentioned above) was ill-suited for operations aboard the majority of CVEs because of space issues.
Additionally, by late 1942/early 1943, the TBF/TBM was proving to be effective as a bomber in it's own right, meaning that a CVE could take advantage of the TBF/TBM's ability to carry up to 2,000 of bombs or it's FFAR/HVAR for ASW or striking enemy positions while carrying more TBF/TBMs than it could the SBD.

 

[Schweik]

Well, it rather depends if you're talking about the Allies or the Axis. Clearly, German leadership was obsessed with dive bombers, as evidenced by the faintly ridiculous requirement for the Ju88 to be capable of dive bombing.

That may not have been a mistake. The Ju 88 could actually do 'partial' dive bombing, as at in a moderate dive angle, which seemed to enhance it's bombing accuracy particularly against ships. Ju 88 was a prominent ship-killer in the Med, limited mostly just by range. It's performance was such that Hurricanes did not seem to be able to intercept it and only Spits or P-40s ever shot them down (not sure of a Martlet or Wildcat could catch one or not) and it's accuracy was such that sinking ships were often left in the wake of their attacks.

The real example of what you are getting at is when the German authorities demanded that they make the He 177 into a dive bomber which seems to have really helped to mess up that particular aircraft development programme. But there was a reason they were so obsessed with dive bombers - they made a big difference.

The British levied the requirement that led to the Hawker Henley combined light bomber and dive bomber which first flew in 1937. However, interest in dive bombing was limited, a view that was reinforced by the tactical limitations of the Stuka that were thoroughly exposed in the Battle of Britain.

The Stuka didn't do so great in the BoB, (though better in the 'kanalkampf' I think) but that may have in part been how it was utilized - in large formations to attack Strategic targets, it proved vulnerable. This narrative about how the Stuka met it's match in the BoB however is often overplayed. People seem to forget that the Stuka was doing a great deal of damage in Russia and in North Africa. Lets remember that early German tanks were not like Tigers and Panthers. Though initially they were up against a lot of obsolete it, it wasn't long before their relatively short guns fairly thin armor meant they were only moderately superior to most of their opposition, largely due to less quantifiable qualities like gun / sight accuracy, leadership and training, and sometimes tank to tank, not at all. The Ju 87 was the key to armored breakthroughs in many battles in Russia in 1941-1943 and in many of Rommel's victories too, just like they had been in France in 1940. And they did not seem to suffer the kind of casualties over Libya or Egypt, or over the Volga as they did in the Battle of Britain.

I think the integrated British defense in the BoB also played a substantial role, but so did sending big fleets of Ju 87s and expecting them to fend off Hurricanes and Spitfires with their defensive guns.

In the Kanalkampf, per the wiki, the Germans lost 22 stukas but sunk 35 merchant ships and 4 destroyers which is a pretty good trade. That they also lost 100 "medium bombers" to me shows that the Ju 87, like the SBD, was actually pretty good at surviving under certain circumstances compared to other types

Bottom line is that, although there was much interest in dive bombers, the tactical environment in Europe from mid 1940 onwards was not suitable for dive bomber operations.

Well if you include Ukraine, Russia etc. as part of Europe, and Italy, that would seem to be incorrect. I would say the real dividing line was some time in late 1943 which is when the Germans started switching from Ju-87s to Fw 190 fighter-bombers.

I think the two real reasons the Allies didn't make more use of Dive Bombers is that they didn't manage to produce any good ones after the SBD. The SBD was good but, probably too slow for the MTO by some time in 1943 at the latest, mainly due to enemy AAA, and also to planes like the Fw 190.

The SB2C as we know came later than expected and with a lot of problems that took quite a while to sort out. If that had been a wild success earlier on (just as an airplane I mean) it probably would have seen much more use including in the Med. The A-36 / Allison Mustang dive bomber was actually pretty good - the high speed and special tactics they developed enabled it to survive the very dangerous environment of high value German targets and it was accurate. But they had some mysterious crashes and the bosses decided it didn't have the structural strength for the dive bombing job.

A host of other dive bomber designs basically failed or came too late to see action. The Albacore was an anachronism which wasn't really safe to use except in low-threat environments, the Skua was certainly obsolete for any but fringe areas by 1941. The Vengeance and the Vought Vindicator were disappointments...

... and the Douglas BTD Destroyer (which looks pretty damn good on paper) and Martin Mauler came too late to play any role.

 

[Schweik]

Just to be clear, I'm just theorizing there for the most part I'm not saying I know "for sure" anything about Allied dive bomber policy

 

[buffnut453]

The Stuka didn't do so great in the BoB, (though better in the 'kanalkampf' I think) but that may have in part been how it was utilized - in large formations to attack Strategic targets, it proved vulnerable. This narrative about how the Stuka met it's match in the BoB however is often overplayed. People seem to forget that the Stuka was doing a great deal of damage in Russia and in North Africa. Lets remember that early German tanks were not like Tigers and Panthers. Though initially they were up against a lot of obsolete it, it wasn't long before their relatively short guns fairly thin armor meant they were only moderately superior to most of their opposition, largely due to less quantifiable qualities like gun / sight accuracy, leadership and training, and sometimes tank to tank, not at all. The Ju 87 was the key to armored breakthroughs in many battles in Russia in 1941-1943 and in many of Rommel's victories too, just like they had been in France in 1940. And they did not seem to suffer the kind of casualties over Libya or Egypt, or over the Volga as they did in the Battle of Britain.

I think the integrated British defense in the BoB also played a substantial role, but so did sending big fleets of Ju 87s and expecting them to fend off Hurricanes and Spitfires with their defensive guns.

But that's exactly my point. In the European theatre, with highly-developed IADS, the dive bomber was nothing but a target. Yes, it could be used against shipping or in theatres like Africa which lacked IADS but--and it's a big BUT--the Allies were not going to throw dive bombers into the fray in Europe. That would simply be a waste of men and machines.

Well if you include Ukraine, Russia etc. as part of Europe, and Italy, that would seem to be incorrect. I would say the real dividing line was some time in late 1943 which is when the Germans started switching from Ju-87s to Fw 190 fighter-bombers.

I don't consider the Russian Front to be part of the European theatre. Ju-87s were not used operationally in IADS-capable environments after 1940, which about says it all for the utility of dive bombers in such tactical situations.

I think the two real reasons the Allies didn't make more use of Dive Bombers is that they didn't manage to produce any good ones after the SBD. The SBD was good but, probably too slow for the MTO by some time in 1943 at the latest, mainly due to enemy AAA, and also to planes like the Fw 190.

No. The Allies didn't make more use of dive bombers because the roles they fulfilled could be done as well or better by existing fighter aircraft, and in a much more survivable manner. The dive bomber had its heyday in the period 1939-1941. By 1942, they could only be used where there wasn't a significant air threat...and shortly after that, they started being replaced by fighters pretty much everywhere. The only reason any were retained was because local tactical conditions (eg in Burma) permitted their use but even then, they would eventually be replaced.

The concept of the dive bomber was valid early in WW2 but was obsolete by the middle of the war, except in low threat environments. That's why not a single dive bomber entered military service after 1945.

 

[Schweik]

Well that is one way of looking at it, here's another:

If by IADS you mean "Integrated Air Defense System" or something like that, then I would say this - I don't think there was ever a dive bomber which was going to be good at attacking a target defended by "IADS". These are the wrong kinds of targets and the wrong type of defense for a dive bomber to try to cope with.

The typical targets for a dive bomber (in my opinion) would be 1) on the sea or 2) on the battlefield. In neither case would you normally face a true "IADS" in the pre-digital era - on the open ocean there is a limited amount of air defense, and one which can be attrited by the bombers themselves. On the battlefield by definition as you approach the front lines the organized defenses break down, and this is where dive bombers proved to be most useful, again well into the mid-war, in fact I would say through the end of 1943 and into 1944.

(images from Wikipedia)

Of course gradually through the war both battlefield and naval defenses improved, which was generally matched by a corresponding increase in speed by the Tactical bombers, which increasingly were mostly fighter-bombers. There was a point beyond which the successful early and pre-war designs (basically SBD, D3A and Ju 87) could no longer keep up, and they never did come up with suitable replacements though several countries put a lot of money and effort into trying. Most of their efforts, as we just discussed, were "design fails" or else they came too late.

(image Wikipedia)

By the end of the war, all the propeller driven aircraft types were facing replacement, starting with the fighters, by jets. The basic nature of dive bombing - which required the aircraft to slow the dive (so as to keep below trans-sonic speed basically) with dive brakes, was a bad match for jets. Jets, especially early jets, didn't do so great at slower speeds so I don't think jets fit with the dive bomber design. I would say the same with torpedo bombers as well. But they did have the capacity to carry rockets which was the first post-war weapon type most favored for ground attack - along with napalm and for a brief era of madness, Tactical Nuclear Weapons.

Of course prop fighters were still being used for precision / long loiter CAS through the Vietnam era, but that is similar to the role played by biplanes and other specialized attack types in WW2.

Eventually by the 1960's we had a return to another technology pioneered during WW2, guided munitions, which is mostly what we use today when precision bombing is needed. No need for a dive bomber when you have a paveway or a maverick, or a hellfire...

 

[Shortround6]

It was, in large part, due to the large increase in organic AA (Integrated Air Defense System ???) during the war in some armies.

British expeditionary force in France in 1940 had four of these per battalion according to the "book".

Later in they put two Bren guns on each mount.
The next size up AA gun in the British Army at the time was the 3in 20cwt AA gun. 120 with the BEF in France but along with 48 of the 3.7in AA guns they had to cover 9-10 field divisions, the airfields, and the port facilities.

a somewhat updated relic of WW I

By some point in 1944 most British infantry divisions in France had 72 of the 40mm Bofors guns plus assorted 20mm guns and a varied assortment of the good old Bren guns on AA mountings. The 3.7in went with the Army but wasn't mobile enough to really keep up with the front line troops.

The Americans and Germans also had vast increases in Light AA guns during the war.
for the Americans the armoured divisions started with these in NA

A 37mm and two .50 cal

from wiki so take as you will.
"The M15 was first used during Operation Torch, the November 1942 Anglo-American invasion of North Africa. Tracer ammunition from the machine guns was used to bring the main gun onto the target when engaging enemy aircraft. T28E1 crews shot down more than a hundred aircraft during Operation Torch, the Battle of Kasserine Pass, and the Allied Invasion of Sicily, shooting down thirty-nine at Kasserine alone. ......During the Allied Invasion of Sicily, 78 T28E1s helped provide anti-aircraft fire for the invasion force. They were especially effective against low-flying aircraft, like Stuka dive bombers. T28E1s were used in Italy until the end of the war. "

The T28E1 was the early version without armor on the gun mount and with two water cooled .50s with the 37MM.

Wiki again "Each US Army armored division was allocated an anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) battalion of four companies, each equipped with eight M15 CGMCs and eight M45 Quadmount-equipped M16 MGMCs. At corps and army level, each AAA battalion was equipped with thirty-two of each vehicle. After first seeing action in the Allied invasion of Italy, the M15 and M15A1 served through the rest of the Italian Campaign, the Allied invasion of Normandy, Operation Dragoon in southern France, and throughout the fighting on the Western Front. "
Infantry divisions would be equipped with similar numbers of guns, many on trailers or trucks.


The French were knocked out early, the Italian industry could never keep up with demand, the Japanese likewise had poor designs, and nowhere near enough of what they did have. It took the Russians a while to get the numbers needed into the field.

Success or failure of one countries dive bombers/close support aircraft has to take into account the AA defences of their opponents and not just the opponents fighter assets.
AA guns have done their job if they cause the attacking aircraft to drop early and miss, drop wide or attack another target altogether.

 

[Schweik]

It was, in large part, due to the large increase in organic AA (Integrated Air Defense System ???) during the war in some armies.

Wiki again "Each US Army armored division was allocated an anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) battalion of four companies, each equipped with eight M15 CGMCs and eight M45 Quadmount-equipped M16 MGMCs.

Yes, this was basically the point I was making - which is why I posted that image of the M16 MGMC in the post you are replying to. The increasing proliferation of the multi-barrelled HMG and light cannon armed AAA did eventually start making the battlefield too hairy for the 1st generation of dive bombers, though I don't think the American kit was quite ubiquitous enough to make that much of a difference yet at Kasserine pass. It was only about 6 months after that that the Stuka was being phased out in favor of the Fw 190.

However that was still a pretty long run - 1936 - 1944 basically. For a 1st generation dive bomber with only incremental improvements (albeit quite a few of them).

The BEF in 1940 did not have enough truly dangerous mobile AAA to forestall the Stukas. Neither did the Desert Rats or the Russians until quite late.

 

[VBF-13]

Success or failure of one countries dive bombers/close support aircraft has to take into account the AA defences of their opponents and not just the opponents fighter assets.
AA guns have done their job if they cause the attacking aircraft to drop early and miss, drop wide or attack another target altogether.

But at sea the ships are firing at them too. What's the difference whether the fire is coming from the ground or the ships?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

But at sea the ships are firing at them too. What's the difference whether the fire is coming from the ground or the ships?

I think the context of that post was a discussion of why dive bombers in general and SBDs in particular were less prevalent in land warfare in Europe and Africa.

 

[buffnut453]

But at sea the ships are firing at them too. What's the difference whether the fire is coming from the ground or the ships?

Because, for the most part, the ship (ie target) is only shooting at the dive bomber during the attack phase. Unless you're conducting real tactical edge CAS, hitting land targets means traversing large areas of enemy territory that will also have localized defences, not to mention battling past defensive fighter CAPs.

That's a LOT more time where a dive bomber is exposed to attack while carrying a bomb. Hence my question earlier in the thread about how often the SBD had to fight through to a target.

 

[Schweik]

I would say it got more dangerous for all dive bombers and any kind of low-level attack planes in general as the war progressed, and speed therefore became more important. Both ships and armored columns got more effective AAA ordinance and delivery systems. Flak suppression was another option for maritime / naval strikes ala General Kennney in the South Pacific with the strafers and skip-bombers.

Also when I say "first generation dive bombers" I should stipulate I mean "first generation mass produced WW2 dive bombers". I know they had them before the war too.

 

[VBF-13]

Because, for the most part, the ship (ie target) is only shooting at the dive bomber during the attack phase. Unless you're conducting real tactical edge CAS, hitting land targets means traversing large areas of enemy territory that will also have localized defences, not to mention battling past defensive fighter CAPs.

That's a LOT more time where a dive bomber is exposed to attack while carrying a bomb. Hence my question earlier in the thread about how often the SBD had to fight through to a target.

But it's not only the target ship firing at them, as though to believe, it's only once a ship figures out it's the target, it starts firing. It's the whole fleet of ships throwing that flack into the skies. I wonder how the land dive bombers would have made out against that? I wonder if they'd even get anywhere near their targets for it. The SBDs got in there, from all accounts. A few didn't, but that wasn't for the ship-fire, it was for the fighter-harassment. And when the ones that got in, got in, unless their angles were impeded, they either hit their targets, or didn't miss by much when they did miss. There were other reasons they didn't see the action in Europe and Africa they did in the Pacific, I think. Still, by late 1944, CASU-24 was fleeting some of them in the Atlantic. For what reason, I don't know exactly.

 

[VBF-13]

And while we're at it, let's endeavor to keep our heads out of the sand. For combat purposes, the SBDs were one-purpose aircraft, dive bombing. That was it. There wasn't anything else. That's why the F6Fs and F4Us, VBF aircraft, were able, for the most part, to supplant them, again, in their combat roles...

 

[VBF-13]

Pretty little thing...

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Pretty little thing...

View attachment 542928

Beauty is as beauty does. The only person I've ever met who flew Helldivers in combat said it would bite you in the ass if you looked away for a second. He said on most missions there were more losses to accidents and mechanical failure than to enemy action. Said there was no such thing as a survivable landing accident on the carrier with them, and they ditched "like a crash-diving submarine".
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Schweik]

And while we're at it, let's endeavor to keep our heads out of the sand. For combat purposes, the SBDs were one-purpose aircraft, dive bombing. That was it. There wasn't anything else. That's why the F6Fs and F4Us, VBF aircraft, were able, for the most part, to supplant them, again, in their combat roles...

Actually it was dive bomber, scout, emergency fighter, and ASW. Used in all four roles historically, if you want to keep your head out of the sand.

 

[Schweik]

Beauty is as beauty does. The only person I've ever met who flew Helldivers in combat said it would bite you in the ass if you looked away for a second. He said most missions there were more losses to accidents and mechanical failure than to enemy action. Said there was no such thing as a survivable landing accident on the carrier with them, and they ditched "like a crash-diving submarine".
Cheers,
Wes

Yikes ... scary. Yeah there were some major design flaws with those things which, reminiscent of some comments Shortround6 made upthread, apparently came down to the size of the elevator on the carrier. The aircraft they designed was really too big for that elevator (and that itself was probably a mistake because bigger usually means slower). They tried to cram it all into that small square and had to shorten the airframe which was a source of a lot of the stability and handling problems. The rest was probably due to the engine. You can tell just looking at it, the backseater doesn't have enough room to train his guns... and his position takes a very awkward chunk out of the whole back fuselage which can't be good for aerodynamics. And the tail looks way oversized in a futile attempt to compensate. Giant tail fins are a sign of design trouble on an airplane IMO.

Almost a 50' wingspan seems a bit too much for a single-engined carrier aircraft to me. And while it was faster, the Helldiver really didn't offer much of an improvement over the much smaller and nicer flying SBD in terms of combat effectiveness. It had inferior range and a much higher accident rate, lower reliability / availability rate and I doubt any improvement in bombing accuracy. I think the thing was just too big from the get-go and it went downhill from there.

 

[Schweik]

It did have folding wings though. I think if they could have put maybe an R-2800 in the SBD and give it folding wings, they could have had a much better solution.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

But it's not only the target ship firing at them, as though to believe, it's only once a ship figures out it's the target, it starts firing. It's the whole fleet of ships throwing that flack into the skies.

Yes, but at their approach altitudes, dive bombers are looking at impressive looking, but not very effective flak, especially where the Japanese are concerned. Unless, of course, you're talking about radar guided 88s, which were a non-event in the PTO. IJN wasn't that sophisticated. It's only when they pick their targets and begin their dives that they get into the zone of truly accurate fire. And if they're crippled in the dive, they're likely to splash either on or right next to their target.
ETO, they're much more likely to encounter higher level accurate flak.
Cheers,
Wes