The applecores got waxed by the French
Why was the SBD such an effective aircraft?
- Thread starter fliger747
- Start date
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The applecores got waxed by the French
Conslaw
Senior Airman
While it's true US escort carriers didn't usually carry SBDs. Torch was an exception. Santee also had SBDs. Check out this US Navy photo of SBDs and F4Fs on the Santee.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Keep in mind that the USS Santee (and four others) weren't Long Island or Bogue class CVEs, but were converted tankers and freighters, so they had a different layout to each ship and were a bit larger (up to 30+ aircraft, if memory serves right)
Conslaw
Senior Airman
This class of aircraft carriers is very interesting. The Sangamon-Class carriers, including the named ship, the Santee, the Suwannee, and the Chenango, were built on the hulls of fleet oilers. They were rushed to conversion, barely being complete at the time they had to sale for Operation Torch. Displacing over 11,000 tons, they were as heavy as the Independence-class light carriers, and had a more-capacious hanger-deck. (On a ferry mission in 1944, the USS Santee carried 66 F4U Corsairs and 15 F6F Hellcats.) They even retained a lot of their fleet-oiler fuel capacity and could refuel their escorts.
The conversion of the four fleet oilers to carriers was a two-edged sword for the US Navy. The ability to have these carriers in the Atlantic for Operation Torch allowed the Navy to concentrate all of its fleet carriers except for the Ranger in the Pacific. On the other hand, the Navy in the Pacific suffered throughout the Guadalcanal campaign due to lack of fleet oilers.
After Torch, three of the Sangamon-class carriers made their way into the Pacific after the major naval battles of Guadalcanal had concluded and provided some level of backup for the USS Enterprise (which was the only fleet carrier in the South Pacific from the time of the Battle of Santa Cruz, where the Hornet was sunk and the Enterprise significantly damaged in November 1942). Saratoga arrived roughly the same time.
- Thread starter
- #386
Yes, the CVE's of the Sangamon Class were quite prized, a couple of knots faster than the others, larger and especially still having oiler capability. I would expect them to still be Combustable, Vulnerable, but not particularly expendable. The deck crews were pretty good so I imagine they were able to strike the SBD's below just fine. Perhaps after some practice.
Shortround6
Major General
Picture of a model.
The SBD had just inches to spare on the elevators.
Actual dimensions of elevators and SBD are in previous posts, picture of model just gives perspective.
The SBD had just inches to spare on the elevators.
Actual dimensions of elevators and SBD are in previous posts, picture of model just gives perspective.
- Thread starter
- #388
Beautiful model! I would guess the dimensions were desired to fit the plane. I don't know the dimensions of various AAC aircraft, but the escort carriers were occasionally used to ferry fighters which the AAC pilots flew OFF the ships.
Easy enough for the practiced deck crews to pivot the plane a bit.
Easy enough for the practiced deck crews to pivot the plane a bit.
pinehilljoe
Staff Sergeant
- 753
- May 1, 2016
ADM JJ Clark was the commissioning CO of Suwannee. In his autobio he has a description of the Class'es origin as a Tanker. The book is a good read for anyone interested in Carrier Aviation in the Pacific.
Attachments
Conslaw
Senior Airman
Pinehilljoe, this looks like a good book, but it it is out of print and no kindle version (sad face). There are a few used copies available, so I might pick it up. Have you ever read On the Warpath in the Pacific: Admiral Jocko Clark and the Fast Carriers, by Clar Reynolds? That one is available on Kindle.
Conslaw
Senior Airman
This is an incredible model. It really shows how important adding folding wings was for the F4F-4 Wildcat.
Shortround6
Major General
And the TBF.
pinehilljoe
Staff Sergeant
- 753
- May 1, 2016
Yes I have both, On the Warpath is basically the same book re-edited. IMHO Carrier Admiral reads better, its worth ordering a used copy or check your library.
This is another good book from Clark Reynolds: Amazon product ASIN 1591147220
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Does anyone know why the SBD wasn't more widely used in the Med, or why more generally the US carriers like the Ranger and the various CVE's weren't used more for example for convoy escort? Seems like they could have helped in some key moments for example at Malta or during the Sicily and Salerno landings. Seems lke most of the CVE's were sent back to the Pacific after Torch.
I suspect it was felt that SBDs might be less survivable against the LW and RA than they were against the IJN, and, let's face it, the ground pounder military weren't much into dive bombing, for reasons given upthread, and jeep carriers were of limited utility for a stiff wing dive bomber, as well as for delivering significant numbers of land based aircraft. CVEs did get some usage for Uboat killer groups and convoy escort (my uncle flew off one), but the use of long range patrol bombers for convoy coverage turned out to be a cheaper approach, and the crying need for flightdecks was in the PTO.
Cheers,
Wes
Kevin J
Banned
Wasp helped out a couple of times ferrying fighters to Malta. Ranger was used off both Norway and Morocco. The Bogue class escort carriers escorted convoys thru the Azores to Europe and the Med. The Sangamon class converted oilers in the invasion of French NW Africa, operation Torch. Also a couple of Casablanca class escort carriers in Operation Dragoon, the invasion of Southern France.
Regarding the utility of Dive bombing, the Germans were still getting a lot of mileage from their Ju 87s and to a lesser extent (as in not quite true dive bombing) their Ju 88s in 1942 and most of 1943. The Allies shifted over more quickly to Fighter Bombers, with some specialist ground attack planes, but they were clearly tempted by the clear advantages of dive bombers. The Allison P-51 / A-36 dive bombers in particular tends to be almost unknown in the historical shorthand but it did play a pretty important role as the closest the Allies ever got to the significant use of the elusive fast dive bombers. Due to the aileron issues (I gather) it was not really considered effective as a fighter, but it was considered one of their best tactical bombing assets. For the Germans the Stuka was still to a large extent linked to breakthroughs in their offensive operations.
The big issue was target accuracy. Early level bombers were considered pretty much useless. Later level bombers had their specific uses, for example attacking airbases which they seem to have been quite good at, but weren't very good at bombing tanks, artillery and infantry. Fighter bombers had much better accuracy, but still, limited. We saw an example of an analysis comparing SBD's and F4U, with a few percentage points difference in scoring hits and a notable contrast in CEP size. This translates to more tanks and AT guns etc. being knocked out per sortie. The difference seems small but when you are talking about 20 sorties at a time 3 times a day, day after day, the difference ads up. This is also even more true when attacking shipping which as we know was still important in the Med in 1942 and into 43.
Later the addition of rockets to the fighter bombers seems to have tipped the balance later back toward the fighter bomber for the Allies, but for a while they were I think very interested in dive bombers.
That said, you may be right that SBD's were considered too vulnerable, though they did see some use in Free French hands (they had about 50 A-24B's in North Africa in 1943) and from what I gather did pretty well until 1944 when they lost a lot of them to AAA. That may have been the main difference between Pacific and Med, German flak seems to have been much more intense and formidable and speed did make a difference in surviving it.
The big issue was target accuracy. Early level bombers were considered pretty much useless. Later level bombers had their specific uses, for example attacking airbases which they seem to have been quite good at, but weren't very good at bombing tanks, artillery and infantry. Fighter bombers had much better accuracy, but still, limited. We saw an example of an analysis comparing SBD's and F4U, with a few percentage points difference in scoring hits and a notable contrast in CEP size. This translates to more tanks and AT guns etc. being knocked out per sortie. The difference seems small but when you are talking about 20 sorties at a time 3 times a day, day after day, the difference ads up. This is also even more true when attacking shipping which as we know was still important in the Med in 1942 and into 43.
Later the addition of rockets to the fighter bombers seems to have tipped the balance later back toward the fighter bomber for the Allies, but for a while they were I think very interested in dive bombers.
That said, you may be right that SBD's were considered too vulnerable, though they did see some use in Free French hands (they had about 50 A-24B's in North Africa in 1943) and from what I gather did pretty well until 1944 when they lost a lot of them to AAA. That may have been the main difference between Pacific and Med, German flak seems to have been much more intense and formidable and speed did make a difference in surviving it.
For a while there, the limited number of US PTO carriers were being sunk at an ominous rate, so that's where the need was in US eyes. Each incremental flightdeck could make a greater difference there than in the ETO/MTO/NA war.
Cheers,
Wes
This was the original post by Barret here
SBD CEP: 175 feet Hits on 50-ft radius circle: 5.4%
F4U CEP: 195 feet Hits on 50-ft radius circle: 4.5%
So this seems like a marginal difference, 20' of CEP and 0.9% difference on hits in a 50' radius.
I'm not that good at statistics, but how much difference does that mean if you are talking about say a fighter / bomber group sized unit, 36 aircraft, 3 missions per day (108 sorties per day), over say, 90 days? 9720 sorties, per the above hit rates for 50' (a reasonable distance to do damage with say, 2 x or 3 x 500 lb bombs) means 524 hits vs 437. That means a difference of almost 90 tanks or AT guns or artillery pieces. It probably matters more as the number of planes scales up but I think that could already be significant. The Germans had quite a few Ju 87s in the Med though I don't have the precise numbers handy, I could go look them up.
Of course you have to factor the hit rate against the loss rate, and the SBD may be more vulnerable than fighters, but keep in mind we are talking about Hurricanes or Kittyhawks as the alternatives mainly, which are not as lethal in air to air as an F4U
SBD CEP: 175 feet Hits on 50-ft radius circle: 5.4%
F4U CEP: 195 feet Hits on 50-ft radius circle: 4.5%
So this seems like a marginal difference, 20' of CEP and 0.9% difference on hits in a 50' radius.
I'm not that good at statistics, but how much difference does that mean if you are talking about say a fighter / bomber group sized unit, 36 aircraft, 3 missions per day (108 sorties per day), over say, 90 days? 9720 sorties, per the above hit rates for 50' (a reasonable distance to do damage with say, 2 x or 3 x 500 lb bombs) means 524 hits vs 437. That means a difference of almost 90 tanks or AT guns or artillery pieces. It probably matters more as the number of planes scales up but I think that could already be significant. The Germans had quite a few Ju 87s in the Med though I don't have the precise numbers handy, I could go look them up.
Of course you have to factor the hit rate against the loss rate, and the SBD may be more vulnerable than fighters, but keep in mind we are talking about Hurricanes or Kittyhawks as the alternatives mainly, which are not as lethal in air to air as an F4U
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,031
- Jun 25, 2013
I suspect that another part of the reason for the relatively little use of dive bombers in the ETO & Med vs PTO is that the people running the war in Europe and the Mediterranean were not particularly interested in dive bombing and the people running the air war were even less interested in it.
Of course, especially after the Italian surrender, there was far less marine traffic
Of course, especially after the Italian surrender, there was far less marine traffic
