Worst aircraft of WW2?

I agree that green pilots + inferior aircraft = disaster (VMF-221 was suffering, as were all Marine Aviation units, from the rapid expansion starting in late 1941, resulting in roughly 50% of VMF-221 pilots coming straight out of training) but there is another factor - tactical immaturity. By Midway, the USN was increasingly adopting 2-man formation elements combined with the Thach Weave as a means of countering the tactical advantages of the Zero. At Midway, VMF-221 was still using Division formation tactics in unwieldy 5 or 6 aircraft formations.

The quote from Lt White is frequently used - one senses his frustration at seeing his mates shot down around him. The after-action report from the unit stated that neither the F4F nor the F2A-3 had adequate performance compared to the Zero.

Finally, combat reports from 67 Sqn (the only surviving RAF Buffalo combat reports) observed that the Buffalo had a speed advantage over the IJAAF fighters encountered over Burma, including the Ki-43s. None of the reports give the impression that the 67 Sqn pilots, most of whom were also pretty green, although they did have time to get used to flying the Buffalo, felt they were outmatched by their adversaries.

KR,
Mark H (LKBS)

Elvis said:

I'm going to take some time and digest this a little more, but I'll leave you all with this.
...remember that all the accounts listed so far all deal with the worst version of the Buffalo that was ever produced, the "-3".
No one liked that plane, but originally (i.e., B-239), it was a good design.
...I really need to find that article I have on the Buff.


Shortround,

The gross weight figure I remember for the F2A-1 was around what you're quoting, but that's armed with 1-30 cal gun and 3-50 cal guns.
Your quote of one 30 and one 50 as armourment is news to me...HOWEVER, that is the armourment of the F3F.
I wonder if you haven't stumbled across a heretofore unknown typo.


Elvis

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It sure doesn't look like a typo in the weight charts.

Seeing as how the four weight charts for the 239 are labeled 2 gun fighter 110gal, bomber 110gal, 2 gun fighter 160gal, and 4 gun fighter 110gal.

rows in the chart are labeled "1 cal .50,1 cal.30" with weights of 108.7lb for the two gun versions and the row below saying "3 cal.50, 1cal .30 with a weight of 251.1 lbs in the 4 gun version.

further down after the row for basic weight are rows labeled "cal.50 ammo" and cal.30 ammo" with 39.0 lbs of ammo for the .30 in all versions and 59.8lbs of cal.50 ammo listed for the two gun versions and 179.4lbs listed for the 4 gun configuration.

On the opposite page are five weight charts for various configurations of the F2A-2 which are 2 gun fighter, 4 gun overl'd fighter, 2 gun bomber, 4 gun overl'd bomber and zero gun ferry. No references to cal 30 guns here but the 2 gun versions list 139lbs for guns with 277lbs being listed for the 4 gun versions. 150lbs of ammo for the 2 gun versions and 270lbs for the 4 gun configuration.

Below that are 5 weight charts for the F2A-3 all of which have 4 guns except the Zero gun ferry configuration.

There is a weight chart for the 239 which covers the weight of the wings, tail, fuselae, landing gear, engine section, engine and so on. 21 lines to come up with a empty weight of 3744.1lbs.

The tables for the various configurations start with that empty weight and add crew, armament (as described above) prov. for bombs, pyrotechnics, comm equipment, Navagation equip. and Misc. to come up with fixed useful load to which is added the useable oil, the ammo and internal fuel for the disposable load to come up with total useful load and gross weight. The other tables for loads are pretty much the same but the tables for the weights leading up to the empty weight are not quite as detailed.

Does this mean the authors couldn't have made a mistake? No, but it does kind of leave out a simple typo or misidentification of the aircraft.

Although not explicitly stated I believe these are factory weights/options and may not have been used in the feild.
Leave the wing guns behind so you can carry bombs and some extra gas by the book or take-off over loaded?
Even the later model Buffalos at just under 7000lbs had half the ground roll of a lightly loaded P-39

I am not sure why but the Buffalo just didn't seem to have much "growth" in it. From the XF2A-1 prototype to the F2A-3 it gained 280 pounds of airframe weight, 172 lbs of it in the wing. The power plant gained 547 pounds but less than half of that can be blamed on the new self sealing tanks. 77 pounds of that are for the new propeller alone. Fixed equipment went up by 210 lbs. Later aircarft also had a heavier radio set-up. And then there is the armament thing. 471lbs to go from the original one.50 and one .30 to four .50s and what was perhaps too much ammo.

Shortround6 said:

I am not sure why but the Buffalo just didn't seem to have much "growth" in it.

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1930s technology thrown into WW2. This was a bit of shortsightedness from the designer AND the US Navy as they are the one that dictated the design specification the Buffalo was developed to.

Don't forget that the spec the XF2A-1 was designed to meet didn't actually demand a monoplane solution. Grumman put forward an evolution of their biplane fighter series but the performance difference was so marked that the Navy pretty much had to go with the XF2A-1. Grumman went away, licked their wounds, donned thinking caps and came up with the XF4F, which ulitimately became the Wildcat. In truth, the Wildcat's performance didn't improve substantially throughout it's life but it was available in sufficient numbers and it came from the right manufacturer (Grumman = Navy fighters right through to the F-14).

In its time, the XF2A-1 was quite revolutionary but, by 1941, like so many inter-war fighter designs, it had been overtaken by events. I think it's a little unfair to criticize the design as short-sighted. In the 1930s, there was still a strong emphasis on bomber development and many still adhered to Douhet's philosophy on the inability of defences to overcome assaults from massed bomber formations. The vulnerabilities of the bomber (and it's failure to always get through) were only learned much later in WWII, and at much cost to British and US bomber crews, but the impacts of lackadaisical efforts in fighter development were felt much earlier. In this context, the British specification that led to the Hurricane and Spitfire was quite exceptional but both manufacturers had a heritage of developing high-performance aircraft which Brewster simply did not have - instead, they innovated with the design of the XF2A-1 which was thrown into combat in arguably the most disadvantageous situations possible (at least from the British and American perspectives).

buffnut453 said:

1. I agree that green pilots + inferior aircraft = disaster (VMF-221 was suffering, as were all Marine Aviation units, from the rapid expansion starting in late 1941, resulting in roughly 50% of VMF-221 pilots coming straight out of training) but there is another factor - tactical immaturity. By Midway, the USN was increasingly adopting 2-man formation elements combined with the Thach Weave as a means of countering the tactical advantages of the Zero. At Midway, VMF-221 was still using Division formation tactics in unwieldy 5 or 6 aircraft formations.

2. Finally, combat reports from 67 Sq...None of the reports give the impression that the 67 Sqn pilots, most of whom were also pretty green, although they did have time to get used to flying the Buffalo, felt they were outmatched by their adversaries.

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1. Inexperience of pilots is a partial reason, but the Marine units that did well with F4F's at Guadalcanal had similar make up. In only a few cases did any of their pilots have prior combat experience, and many were new pilots. One exception was Marion Carl later of Guadalcanal fame, who fought with VMF-221 at Midway, in an F4F. As mentioned, whether by coincidence or not, the comparative claims and losses show that the VMF-221 F4F's in that Midway combat probably achieved 2 Zeroes downed for 2 F4F's lost, pretty much in line with the F4F's general record against the Zero in 1942. USN units as well started the war with many high hour pilots, but rotated a lot of them back to training commands even before Coral Sea, ending up with a lot of relatively inexperienced pilots (relatively: green 1942 USN pilots had more hours than green pilots in most other WWII air arms).

The tactical point is at most partly correct. Thach used the 'Thach Weave' in his own division at Midway, that was the only use of that tactic in combat until VF-10 used it late in the Guadalcanal campaign. Thach through intermediaries had convinced the 'other Jimmy', Flatley (other highly respected leader/tactician among USN pilots) of the merit of the tactic by Flately led VF-10 (the first USN replacement squadron) into combat. But in general USN and USMC F4F units did not use the Thach Weave in combat in 1942, and the Marine units at Guadalcanal generally improvised and learned as they went along when it came to tactics.

2. But the fighter v fighter combat results show British and Dutch Buffalo's were outmatched, by Army Type 97's and Type 1's as well as Zeroes. As related above, taking all combats involving Buffalo's in the SEA campaigns of '41-42 for which both sides' losses are known, the outcomes were several: 1 in favor of the Japanese fighters for all three major Japanese types, and in almost every combat with few exceptions. Although as also noted it was about as true of Hurricane units, v Type 1's and Zeroes at least, and remained so for Hurricane v Type 1 in Burma through the end of *1943*. It was not true of the AVG v JAAF, either Type 97 or Type 1, the AVG bested both according to both side's loss records, but never met Zeroes. But USAAF P-40's (RAAF Kittyhawks too) and P-39's at least in the period with lots of combats through mid 1942 also suffered 1: several ratio in favor of Zeroes; although again those units did notably better in the fewer combats against Zeroes in New Guinea after the Guadalcanal campaign started.

The USN and USMC believed there was something about the F2A that made it worse than the F4F, and I don't see the clear evidence on which to reject that idea, though again it doesn't make the F2A worst of WWII. In actual combat results among Allied fighters in the Pacific that saw significant action in 1942, the F4F was the most successful, so worse than the F4F is not a reasonable proxy for worst.

Joe

tomo pauk said:

Since mr. White says that Zero as fast as P-51B/C/D, I'd say that his credibility is undermined a lot. No offense.

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I think we could take one bit of information from this quote...the A6M was faster then the F2A-3. Its possible that his estimate was based on a Zero that had his energy up (following a dive), OR maybe his estimate was Km/h, NOT mph...the A6M's top speed was near 450 km/h.

anyway...

Joe B. I can't disagree with your points. My previous post should have been caveated that I was working from memory (which is obviously failing!) because I'm working away from home without access to my library...and I'm rather sleep-deprived! However, did the USN fighters at Midway have much contact with Zeros? I know of 6 Zeros escorting the IJN bombers which sank Yorktown but how many other F4F-vs-Zero combats involving USN pilots were there during the Battle of Midway?

The kill-to-loss ratio of VMF-221's F4Fs is hardly statistically significant (which is, I know, a dreadful thing to say when discussing such life-and-death matters). The survival of a greater proportion of F4Fs could simply be the result of circumstance. For example, (and this is from memory) the F4Fs went into the fray sometime after the first 2 divisions, which were equipped with F2A-3s, had already attracted the attentions of the bulk of the escorting Zeros. I had the privilege of meeting Bill Brooks a number of years ago. He was one of the surviving F2A-3 pilots at Midway and later flew the F4F and, in his view, both aircraft had broadly similar performance against the Zero.

As for the British and Dutch combats, I don't think we can say with any certainty that the losses for both sides are fully known. I think the RAF and Dutch losses are well documented but the IJAAF losses are certainly less clear (at least from the information I've seen). I don't think we really know how many Type 97s were lost in operations over Malaya, nor do we have a clear view of 59th Sentai operations in that theatre (but I'd be delighted to be proved wrong). When I get home, I'll dig out a report I found in the UK National Archives written immediately after the war by 2 former IJAAF officers which outlined operations over Malaya and provided a (very vague) summary of losses in case it may bring useful information to bear on this subject.

Cheers,
Mark H

FLYBOYJ said:

1930s technology thrown into WW2. This was a bit of shortsightedness from the designer AND the US Navy as they are the one that dictated the design specification the Buffalo was developed to.

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Some planes seem to be able to stretch and grow, if not with ease , at least with dignity and usefulness while some of their contemporaries seem to hit a brick wall in development and go nowhere. I don't know if it is talent or hard work by the design team, luck, a larger budget, a better choice of engine or what.

First Spitfire flew over a year and half before the Buffalo. First 109 2 1/2 years before the Buffalo.
Things were changing fast and and maybe some designers just guessed better than others

And none of those types had to fit onto the elevator of an aircraft carrier or achieve low landing speeds required for carrier operations which, presumably, were key design criteria/constraints for the XF2A-1. Note that wing folding only came later in the Wildcat's development in an effort to fit more aircraft into the available space on a carrier.

buffnut453 said:

Don't forget that the spec the XF2A-1 was designed to meet didn't actually demand a monoplane solution. Grumman put forward an evolution of their biplane fighter series but the performance difference was so marked that the Navy pretty much had to go with the XF2A-1. Grumman went away, licked their wounds, donned thinking caps and came up with the XF4F, which ulitimately became the Wildcat. In truth, the Wildcat's performance didn't improve substantially throughout it's life but it was available in sufficient numbers and it came from the right manufacturer (Grumman = Navy fighters right through to the F-14).

In its time, the XF2A-1 was quite revolutionary but, by 1941, like so many inter-war fighter designs, it had been overtaken by events. I think it's a little unfair to criticize the design as short-sighted. In the 1930s, there was still a strong emphasis on bomber development and many still adhered to Douhet's philosophy on the inability of defences to overcome assaults from massed bomber formations. The vulnerabilities of the bomber (and it's failure to always get through) were only learned much later in WWII, and at much cost to British and US bomber crews, but the impacts of lackadaisical efforts in fighter development were felt much earlier. In this context, the British specification that led to the Hurricane and Spitfire was quite exceptional but both manufacturers had a heritage of developing high-performance aircraft which Brewster simply did not have - instead, they innovated with the design of the XF2A-1 which was thrown into combat in arguably the most disadvantageous situations possible (at least from the British and American perspectives).

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Mark, that is a great post and answers a lot of question which seem to be asked frequently.
Thank you for posting that.

To add to Mark's comments, it should also be realized that a lot of "combat experience" dated to WWI, the last major combat we'd been involved in.
To take that data, and add-in some more recent study, to come up with something like the B-239 is quite remarkable.
Remember, this is the FIRST monoplane fighter the USN received and only the third to enter US military service, period (the B-9 and P-26 pre-dating it).
This could explain the lack of "adaptability" of the Buffalo, as the engineers were most likely "pushing the envelope" when designing it.
It should also serve as a "gauge" to show just how fast technology was moving in the mid-late 30's, as something that was fairly advanced in 1937 was literally obsolete only 4 years later.




Elvis

buffnut453 said:

And none of those types had to fit onto the elevator of an aircraft carrier or achieve low landing speeds required for carrier operations which, presumably, were key design criteria/constraints for the XF2A-1. Note that wing folding only came later in the Wildcat's development in an effort to fit more aircraft into the available space on a carrier.

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The folding wing idea was the answer to how the Navy was able to fit an entire squardron into a vessel the size of a Cruiser, instead of a "proper" aircraft carrier.


Elvis

Elvis said:

Remember, this is the FIRST monoplane fighter the USN received and only the third to enter US military service, period (the B-9 and P-26 pre-dating it).

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I believe that while the first part of that statement is true the second part is far, far from being accurate.

PLEASE SEE:
P-30
P-35
P-36 (even the XP-37 flew before the Buffalo)
B-10/12
YB-17
B-18
A-17
A-18

Please note that these are all retactable landing gear aircraft which niether the B-9 or P-26 were. And please note that these are all aircraft that did enter production.
If you mistyped and ment the P-9 instead of the B-9 the list still does hold true and I would note that the P-9 was a one-off that used a braced high wing of fabric covered construction

Elvis said:

This could explain the lack of "adaptability" of the Buffalo, as the engineers were most likely "pushing the envelope" when designing it.
It should also serve as a "gauge" to show just how fast technology was moving in the mid-late 30's, as something that was fairly advanced in 1937 was literally obsolete only 4 years later.

Elvis

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There were plenty of other aircraft to keep the Buffalo company in being "advanced" in 1937 and obsolete 4 years later.

Can we all say "Fairey Battle"
And plenty more.

Part of the Buffalo's problem may have been the engine. While it did offer good power for weight it was a barn door of engine in size having 12% more frontal area than an R-2800 and actually being slightly larger than an R-3350. Clever cowl design can only get you so far. couple that with a gap in development at the critical time for the Buffalo. THe 1350hp version of the Cyclone that powered the FM-2 doesn't show up until the end of 1942 and doesn't enter service until the summer of 43.
I don't know how much an extra 150hp would have helped the Buffalo but but the Buffalo needed that power in late 1941.
The Buffalo's airframe wouldn't really take any other engine. The only other option, the P&W R-1830 was both longer and heavier. Both the F4F and P-36 which could take either engine were over 2 1/2 feet longer than the Buffalo.
By the time the fuselage is redesigned to take another engine and the wing structure is redesigned to eliminate the fuel tank problem, the landing gear is modified, and some other less than atractive minor problems are taken care of you are half way to designing a new airplane.

buffnut453 said:

And none of those types had to fit onto the elevator of an aircraft carrier or achieve low landing speeds required for carrier operations which, presumably, were key design criteria/constraints for the XF2A-1. Note that wing folding only came later in the Wildcat's development in an effort to fit more aircraft into the available space on a carrier.

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Please note that the Spitfire did operate off of carriers later and did so in rather heavier configuration than it's late 1930 version.
It did have weak landing gear( so did the Buffalo) would have taken up more space without the folding wing and had a much worse veiw for carrier landing but I don't believe the the landing speeds were actually that far apart.

Not every airplane was star. Not every aiplane had the capability of developing into a Star.

While the Buffalo does not deserve the reputation it has of being among the worst, no amount of rewriting history is going to put it among the best.

proton45 said:

I think we could take one bit of information from this quote...the A6M was faster then the F2A-3. Its possible that his estimate was based on a Zero that had his energy up (following a dive), OR maybe his estimate was Km/h, NOT mph...the A6M's top speed was near 450 km/h.

anyway...

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near 550 km/h was a best near or also 350 mp/h

Shortround6 said:

While the Buffalo does not deserve the reputation it has of being among the worst, no amount of rewriting history is going to put it among the best.

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Hi Shortround,

I entirely agree. I hope my posts haven't come across as rewriting history. I'm merely trying to present a balanced view that attempts to overcome hindsight and ill-informed received wisdom by thorough research and factual examples (despite some of my inaccurate comments made in the heat of the moment or when away from research resources). Mea culpa for the mistakes in previous (in fact any and all) postings!!! I would never count the Buffalo as one of the best aircraft but nor does it deserve the reputation it has acquired.

Per your earlier comments, both the Hurricane and the Spitfire did subsequently operate from carriers but they were only thrown into those roles when the inadequacies of the Sea Gladiator, Skua, Roc and Fulmar were fully revealed. Again, I applaud the foresightedness of the specification that led to the Hurri and Spit, and to the design teams who created such capable aircraft, particularly the Spit which, of the two, had unprecedented growth potential.

KR
Mark H

I don't believe you have come across that way.

I do enjoy finding out the actual facts of of an aircraft and it's use and I hope I can find a balance or reasons why the operational use of a plane may differ from it's "paper Spec's" or as someone reffered to it "what is in the brouchure" .

I thank you for your work in bringing the operational history of the Buffalo to our/my attention as the hard work and sacrifice of the pilots and ground crews sometimes is over shadowed by the combat results 'score card".

Any country that truely values it's soldiers (pilots and ground crew alike) should never be satsified with a plane that can just barely hold it's own or go one to one with the enemy. The country should be trying to provide it's pilots with a plane that can cause the most enemy losses while minimizing it's own losses. The Buffalo might never have been sent to Southeast Asia if the west had a better Idea of the Japanese aircraft's true ability. Or but a little more belief in the reports they did get

That the British, Australian and New Zealand units were able to do as well as they did is quite commendable. Bombings, withdrawals and such do tend to hamper proper maintaince (lack of spare parts).

JoeB said:

But the fighter v fighter combat results show British and Dutch Buffalo's were outmatched, by Army Type 97's and Type 1's as well as Zeroes.

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While it's true the Buffalo didn't do very well against the Japanese, I still think these results don't say much about the technical quality of the Buffalo as a fighter. They were too much in a dis-advantage for any fighter to do well. As I am more familiar with the ML-KNIL than the RAF, I will take this as an example:
1: Dutch pilots were very inexperienced. Many of them were fresh from training and had only a few hours on the Buffalo. Many had never fired at an aerial target. Remember many Japanese in this phase of the war were experienced and battle-hardened.
2. There was no early warning system. Therefore Buffalo's usually had an altitude dis-advantage which is a bad position for any fighter.

Doesn't matter if the Dutch would have had F4F's or even Spitfires. In any way they would have had a hard time. Same counts for the British I suppose.

Thanks for the generous words, Shortrounds. Be careful or you might get me started on my favourite hobby-horse - the Malayan Campaign and its origins (cue Monty Pythonesque shouts of "Run away! Run away!!"

Britain was desperately seeking to avoid confrontation with Japan during late 1941 and was doing everything possible to not provoke Tokyo in hopes that a Far East war could be forestalled. The Buffalo was almost certainly seen by London as a stop-gap measure until more/better fighters could be delivered to the Far East during 1942. Unfortunately for the Commonwealth fighter pilots this policy ran out of time on 8 Dec 41. The intelligence issues surrounding these events have still not been fully explored by historians.

I think I'll leave it there for now because (a) it's getting off-topic, and (b) I'd end up writing all night when I have work I need to complete.

KR
Mark

buffnut453 said:

I would never count the Buffalo as one of the best aircraft but nor does it deserve the reputation it has acquired.

KR
Mark H

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My thoughts, EXACTLY.
----------------------------------------------

Shortround,

My apologies for omitting the other aircraft you mentioned.
My memory is nothing, if not infalable.


Elvis

buffnut453 said:

1. However, did the USN fighters at Midway have much contact with Zeros? I know of 6 Zeros escorting the IJN bombers which sank Yorktown but how many other F4F-vs-Zero combats involving USN pilots were there during the Battle of Midway?

2. I had the privilege of meeting Bill Brooks a number of years ago. He was one of the surviving F2A-3 pilots at Midway and later flew the F4F and, in his view, both aircraft had broadly similar performance against the Zero.

3. As for the British and Dutch combats, I don't think we can say with any certainty that the losses for both sides are fully known. I think the RAF and Dutch losses are well documented but the IJAAF losses are certainly less clear (at least from the information I've seen).

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1. Lundstrom estimated, from comparing US and Japanese records, 11 Zeroes downed by USN F4F's at Midway v 4 (or 5?) F4F's downed by Zeroes IIRC. That's not a huge sample either, and considerably better than the the all-1942 average, but the point remains that the all-1942 average of Zero v F4F, which consisted of 100+ losses on each side, was pretty even (apparently a bit in the F4F's favor). Most of the kills and losses were by the USMC at Guadalcanal, but again the results didn't vary all that much comparing Navy results in the carrier battles with USMC (and USN) results defending Guadalcanal, which itself included a wider variety of tactical situations than is sometimes implied. There seemed to be a quite robust tendency of USN/USMC F4F v IJN Zero to come out about even, over time (some particular combats went strongly one way or another of course). I think this somewhat undercuts the idea that poorer results by most other Allied fighter units depended on a quirk in circumstances. I think the most reasonable simple conclusion is most other Allied fighter units just weren't as effective as IJN Zero units, but USN and USMC F4F units tended to be more their equal. And I believe there's considerable room to believe intangible factors about the F4F as practical combat plane had something to do with that, though the extent is not provable.

2. That wasn't the majority view, and again has few actual combat examples to demonstrate it.

3. My count leaves out combats where the source (Bloody Shambles, which basically uses Senshi Sosho as Japanese source) isn't clear on Japanese losses. It's combat by combat not counting losses of the Allies in combats where the source doesn't definitively state losses for the Japanese. So the only bias would come if Bloody Shambles/SS definitely states a Japanese loss in a particular combat but it's wrong. This is provably virtually never the case when it comes to the IJN, because the original 'tactical action records' of the IJN are now available on-line and the book is an accurate reflection of them to within a reasonable tolerance. And if we doubt what's in those handwritten records, that applies equally to the F4F's who basically only faced the JNAF in 1942, and where the source for saying 'they came out even' traces back to the same records as far as Zero losses. IOW if the Brit/CW or USAAF units really shot down a lot more Zeroes than IJN records say, then the F4F's probably did too, but I just don't think that's a plausible line of argument to begin with. Then by comparison, the kill ratio of both Buffalo and Hurricane v Army Type 1 fighters or Zeroes was about the same. This implies IMO that counting the combats in Bloody Shambles where a definitive result is given gives the approximately correct result for combats with the Army Type 1 as well as Zeroes. When it comes to the Type 97, the Buffalo did much worse than the Hurricane v Type 97 by the counting method, and also worse than Buffalo v Type 1 or Zero. So perhaps there's an anomaly there (or not, maybe it just did worse), but seems to me mainly a footnote, if the basic discussion is comparing ability to meet the Zero, for which Type 1 might be a limited proxy, but where Type 97 is pretty irrelevant.

Joe