Worst aircraft of WW2?

[proton45]

Hi Buffnut

I don't think you can safely assume anything, because your assumptions and quotes appear to heavily rely on discredited information, which I pointed out to you previously, but which you are preferring to adhere to at this point

Are you saying that my information is discredited? The numbers I quoted are from a reputable book...one of the authors (Christopher Shores) is even cited in an article you linked. http://www.warbirdforum.com/jaaf.htm The only thing Buffnut comes even close to "assuming" is the aerocraft numbers I quoted...

 

[JoeB]

Are you saying that my information is discredited? The numbers I quoted are from a reputable book...one of the authors (Christopher Shores) is even cited in an article you linked. The only thing Buffnut comes even close to "assuming" is the aerocraft numbers I quoted...

I agree the ORBAT info is pretty clear in for example Bloody Shambles, and most of the JAAF info in that book is straight out of Vol 34 of Senshi Sosho, the Japanese official history volume covering JAAF ops in that theater and period (likewise relevant volume for JNAF info). So I agree with your and Buffnut's side of the argument there.

However, comparison of Japanese and Allied info as in BS vol I. gives the outcomes of combats case by case; I don't see a reason to generalize based on total losses, or even to generalize based on total order of battle strengths. Overall numbers of course tend to affect the final outcome, one side may run out of planes, the other may have plenty left: no more air fighting! . But ORBAT numbers don't necessarily affect the numerical odds in particular combats or the average combat. One side with 100 planes other with 50 does not mean one side outnumbered the other 2:1 in the typical combat, that's a lot more complicated function of how each side organized itself, what missions it was trying to perform, etc.

So, looking at invidual combat as reported in BS Vol 1., Parsifal is actually at least partly right. The first combat which saw Buffalo's meet Type 1's was Dec 21 1941, according to that book, even though the 59th and 64th Sentai's were operational in the theater before that. And I've given before the results I counted up from that book for Buffalo's, including all the early campaigns for RAF not just Malaya, and including KNIL. I counted 44 Buffalo's downed by Japanese fighters, 12.5 by Zeroes (indeed later in the campaign), 16 by Type 1's, 15.5 by Type 97's, 2 (Dutch) by Type 0 Observation Seaplanes acting as fighters. In return the book gives 4 Zeroes, 4.5 Type 1's, 1.8 Type 97's and no Type 0 Obs downed by Buffaloes in those same battles. The fractions are prorating by me where more than one type was present on each side; I ignore combats where Shores et al don't report results from each side (but that's only a few combats). But let's be clear, this is info from Shores et al. that anyone can go check, not some proprietary info of mine.

I know from reading parts of SS Vol 34 that the JAAF accounts are sometimes vague (in contrast the original JNAF records are on the web now, there's no doubt about the completeness of those). But look at the context: by same source and counting method the Hurricane did no better than the Buffalo in the same period v Zero or Type 1; it did do better v the Type 97 but still less than a 1:1 kill ratio. And I recently counted up Hurricane v Type 1 results for late 1942 (when air combat involving Hurricanes resumed)-end of 1943 in "Air War for Burma" by the same authors the same way, and was surprised to find that even in that later period the Hurricane's kill ratio v the Type 1 hardly improved from the early 1942 campaign, about 1:4.5 in the later period v 1:5 in the earlier period. Those JAAF units were simply more effective (and various new Allied units always faced the same more and more experienced 64th Sentai, the most dangerous unit). That's the only reasonable conclusion IMO. Neither the Buffalo as an airplance nor the special handicaps in early war for the RAF/CW units seems to have been the dominant factor in *fighter-fighter kill ratio* problem of the RAF in the Far East through 1943 (which of course also included Spitfire units in Australia v Zeroes in 1943). Again, the overall outcome of air campaigns was surely affected by numbers, overrunning of enemy a/f's etc. The RAF could continue for months on end at short end of a kill ratio v Type 1's in Burma late 1942- end of '43, with plenty of replacement a/c, bases secure, and losses of pilots considerably less than those of a/c. But kill ratio is still a useful measure of a fighter unit's effectiveness, IMO. Overall numerical superiority or your own ground forces seizing enemy airfields are always good things, but it's always better if you're also more effective in air combat as measured by kill ratio.

To review my position on this particular thread, the Buffalo was quite unsuccessful against Japanese fighters, that's no myth. But, since many other Allied types also were in 1942, and some were even in 1943, I don't think the Buffalo can be singled out.

Joe

 

[buffnut453]

Joe,

Thank you for a balanced contribution to the discussion. I entirely agree that total numbers available cannot be equated to the numbers of combatants meeting in specific combats but that, too, raises issues. Such a tactical level of examination elevates other factors, aside from mere aircraft performance, to importance in the discussion - weather, relative positions of the opposing units, unit leadership and coherence. For example, it is possible for a formation of relatively few aircraft to defeat a larger formation if the conditions are right (attacking from up-sun or from a blind spot). In such discussions, aircraft performance is but one parameter within a complex range of variables that often cannot be measured empirically, hence the complexity of examining fighter engagement. For example, in the case of the 22 Dec engagement over Kuala Lumpur, the only massed engagement between Buffalos and Ki-43s during the entire campaign, the Buffalos were climbing up into the fight while the Ki-43s had the height advantage.

There is also a tendency to confuse the counting method (ie interchanging total ORBAT count with aircraft that are operationally available for use). For example, several sources declare that 21 Sqn had only 4 Buffalos remaining after the initial IJAAF onslaught on 8 Dec 41 and yet it seems clear that this was probably the number of aircraft operationally available from a total of 8-11 airframes (depending on the date). This brings in the additional factor of availability, maintainability into the equation and the logistics train to support the front-line squadrons.

As for the first Ki-43/Buffalo engagements taking place on 21 Dec, I read some of the early 21 Sqn engagements on 8/9 Dec as involving Ki-43s which would place the first combat between the types much earlier in the campaign. Your info on which aircraft claimed Buffalo kills is also quite illuminating, although it would be interesting to examine a smaller subset of the campaign, for example Dec 41, since the genesis of this discussion was the question of which aircraft gained air superiority over Malaya.

Despite the above, I fully concur with your closing remarks. Why does the Buffalo get such a slating when no other Allied aircraft types did any better against the Japanese air arms? The Buffalo performed poorly against superior opposition (IJAAF and IJNAF) and so is castigated as "the world's worst aircraft" yet when it performed well in the hands of the Finns it is still criticized because it was flying against weak opposition. Why are these criteria applied to other aircraft - the Zero performed well against inferior opposition but didn't do so well against Hellcats and Corsairs so does that make the Zero a bad aircraft? The main problem seems to be the "accepted wisdom" that the Buffalo was hopeless and so the myth perpetuates, even to the extent where people make things up (eg earlier in this thread there's a comment about the Buffalo not being able to sustain combat damage - tell that to Harry Griffiths of 453 Sqn whose Buffalo sustained more than 70 hits but still brought him home).

Kind regards,
Mark H

 

[proton45]

Good information...8)

 

[Shortround6]

The Buffalo may have been unfairly criticized for it's combat performance but the Facts may be that no one saw it capable of doing any better.
The wing structure, while inovative in some ways, was less than ideal for a combat plane.

The wing was one piece (no left anf right) with the landing gear in it so the only way to repace the wing was to hoist the fuselage into the air with a crane. (OK. Lots of jacks and cribbing?)

The fuel tanks being intergral with the wing spars was certainly inovative but ment that they were almost impossiable to install selfsealing materials inside of and very difficult to repair without replacing the wing. see problem above.

The U.S. Navy's "solution" of adding extra protected fuel tanks to the Buffalo and then not filling one of the existing ones to get the same capacity sure points to something.

The Buffalo's small wing, for an American fighter, means there is only so much weight that can be added before the wing loading gets out of hand. Handling was already being criticized on the later models. While a more powerfull engine might have helped straight line speed and climb but unless it wasn't much heavier than the existing engine there were going to be problems.

Existing landing gear was already a problem.

Armament may have been borderline. While more might not be necessary, four .50s were about as light as the Americans were willing to go.

While it did do better in combat than popular legend it just didn't offer much in the way of improvement down the road.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The wing was one piece (no left anf right) with the landing gear in it so the only way to repace the wing was to hoist the fuselage into the air with a crane. (OK. Lots of jacks and cribbing?)

The zero wing was built in the same manner.

 

[Shortround6]

True but the Buffalo being a midwing aircraft didn't make the job any easier. Lower fuselage was built in with the wing so you did need more ground clearance before the wing could be slid out.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

True but the Buffalo being a midwing aircraft didn't make the job any easier. Lower fuselage was built in with the wing so you did need more ground clearance before the wing could be slid out.

Having removed a few wings in this manner I don't think it would make that much of a difference, the determining factor would be how accessible the attach points would be on both aircraft and what type of support equipment is available to facilitate removal.

 

[Shortround6]

You certainly have more experience than I do but considering that most U.S. fighters din't have this repair problem why stick with one that did considering it (the Buffalo) offered no real advantages to compensate?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

You certainly have more experience than I do but considering that most U.S. fighters din't have this repair problem why stick with one that did considering it (the Buffalo) offered no real advantages to compensate?

And there you have a point - a matter of maintainability.

But some aircraft that offered a "single piece" wing did have some advantages with regards to strength and repairs, but again if the rest of the aircraft is substandard, the point is mute.

In the end, with all the evidence shown here, its clear that the Buffalo doesn't deserve to to be labeled as "the worse" aircraft of WW2. IMO it shouldn't even be on the top 5.

 

[vikingBerserker]

I've wondered if the prime cause of the "worst fighter" label had more to due with the Navy's/Other's opinion of the Brewster Co itself then the plane.

 

[buffnut453]

That's a very valid point. Brewster had no real reputation as an aircraft manufacturer of note, despite some innovative designs. However, it's also worth remembering that the Buffalo dated back to 1936 when Grumman was still up-engining biplanes. For its time, it was quite advanced, particularly for a naval aircraft-- retractable undercarriage, enclosed cockpit, single-seat, 4x50cal MGs (most naval fighters of the time had, at most, 2 small-calibre MGs), and flaps--but the company's lack of experience was witnessed by the landing gear problems associated with heavy deck landings and the design's general lack of growth potential. By the time it entered combat with the US and Brit militaries, its performance had been surpassed and aircraft manufacturers were building aircraft based on a couple of years of combat experience. Even the Zero resulted from IJNAF combat experience in China with the A5M.

The points about the single-piece wing are valid, more so because the lack of any wing folding mechanism limited the potential wing area of the design. One much-publicised commentary by Sqn Ldr Churchill of 71 Sqn RAF famously claimed that a single bullet hole in the wing fuel tanks would necessitate replacing the entire wing, although operational maintenance procedures were put in place (at least by the RAF) to repair battle damage to the wing tanks. I also believe the RAF aircraft had a form of self-sealing based on, if memory serves, a horsehair liner. That said. replacing a wing was a major activity involving numerous bolts that had to be undone and then re-fastened although RAF Stations in the Far East appear to have been equipped with the necessary equipment to do the job (and is wing replacement really an activity that maintenance crews would do quickly...all things are relative, I suppose).

 

[Elvis]

buffnut,

You wrote: "...However, it's also worth remembering that the Buffalo dated back to 1936...it was quite advanced...retractable undercarriage, enclosed cockpit, single-seat, 4x50cal MGs..."
I read that as you quoting the original design, so it would then be 3-50's and 1-30....and why one 30? What's the point? I never got that about the later pre-war fighters.

You also wrote: "...Brewster had no real reputation as an aircraft manufacturer of note..."
Its my understanding that Brewster was actually a fairly new company at the time they vied for the Naval Fighter contract.
I seem to recall an inception date for the company being 1930, possibly 1932?
In fact, that appears to have been a glaring problem with them, during the stormy relationship they had with the US Government - They were so new, they hadn't had time to "develop" the production facilities needed to successfully satisfy the Naval order in a timely fashion.
Is that how you understand the story, as well?

As for wing replacement, I have some video on a P-40 being restored and they showed the crew putting the wing on that plane.
Appeared to have taken 10 guys and a LOT of time to get the wing on.
Lots of , "a smidge this way" and "I see a hole!". A bunch of rollin head bars seemed to help, as well.
Once squared up and a few bolts started, the procedure seemed to have gone fairly quickly....so it seems a majority of the time was spent just fiting the wing to the plane and lining up all those bolt holes.
Of course, "apples-2-oranges", it could've been a completely different procedure in the Buffalo.


Elvis

 

[Shortround6]

I think that Navy, while not real pleased with Brewster's Performance while building Buffaloes didn't really get P.O.d until later with the lack of progress on both the Bermuda and the Corsair.

See:Brewster Aeronautical Corporation - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Navy may have been willing to cut them some slack in 1939-40 because they finished a $10 million order for PBY parts in May of 1940. For comparison the 43 planes supplied to the Finns was valued at $3 million. It was also in May 1940 that Brewster leased a 217,000sq ft hanger at Newwark airport for final assembly and in June of 1940 they got an eight story building of 482000sq ft across from original factory.

Some production figures for the Buffalo and the Wildcat from 1941.

month...............Buff............Wildcat
Feb...................22................25
March................35................25
April..................35................47
May..................35................37
Aug..................26................31
Sept.................39................18

Some of the Brewster figures include Foreign deliverys. April was the only month that Grumman exceeded 40 Wildcats for the year. Brewster might have only got the contract for 103 F2A-3s becasue Grumman couldn't build Wildcats fast enough and to keep Brewster going and expanding for later production. Work starting at the end of March for a new factory on a 400 acre site in Johnsville , PA.

As to the wing, I think, but could be wrong that the P-36/P-40 wing could be seperated into halves. Wiether the only one half could be fitted to the plane at a time I don't know but even if it couldn't the ablity to ship and store the wings as "halves" would have been an advantage.
The Idea of using the space between the front and rear spars as the fuel tank ( using heavy gauge metal to cover the top, bottom and ends) was quite inovative for the time and offered about a 200lb weight savings over the seperate tanks used in the Wildcat. While quite acceptable for peacetime use or for civilian planes the idea does kind of loose it's appeal for combat when it proved difficult to rig the the intergral tanks with selfsealing material or repair combat damage to the tanks. Replace the whole wing rather than pull damaged tank from wing/ fuselage and replace tank.
The one piece wing might not have been as big an issue if repairs could have been done to the wing and systems without replacement of the entire unit.

 

[buffnut453]

Elvis, mea culpa! You're right - the 4x50cals didn't come in until the F2A-2. The only reason I can think of for having a different weapon would be lack of space - perhaps the internal reconfiguration of the -2 provided sufficient latitude to put in the larger calibre weapon.

Brewster had a long history as a carriage works building first horse-drawn vehicles and later automotive bodies. However, their aviation expertise was far less extensive - if memory serves, they started out as a subcontractor building wingtip floats for seaplanes. As for the production facilities, the Brewster factory was quite reasonable for the low-rate production of the inter-war period but it operated on multple floors of a factory building and hence was totally unsuited to mass production requirements of total war (although they still did quite well compared to Grumman in 1941 as observed by Shortround6). I believe the key problems were lack of quality control (the RAF encountered a number of faults with delivered airframes that were just down to shoddy manufacturing processes) and disharmony between the union-led workforce and the management. At one point, delivery of RAF Buffalos was totally disrupted due to a union strike - imagine how that was received by the UK which was at war at the time and needed every aircraft it could get.

Finally, the F2A-3 is a fascinating subject. As far as I know, the design was driven by the USN to extend the range/endurance of the -2. It certainly was not a Brewster-led proposal to "improve" the aircraft.

Yours aye,
Mark H (LKBS)

 

[Elvis]

Shortround,

AFAIK, no USN pilot was ever "dissatified" with the performance of the Buffalo.
Upon reflection, some may have lamented the want for a different airplane, when recalling a certain situation, but I've never read any reports that ever said anything to the extent of "The Brewster Buffalo is a lousy fighter plane".
So I'm not sure where your line of thinking came from, as far as the USN being dissatisfied with the Buffalo's performance.
What happened was the advent of the F6F.
Once the Hellcat hit the scene, it made just about everything else in the USN's inventory obsolete, except maybe for the Corsair, and they'd already given those to the Marines.
The reason for the strife between Brewster and the US Government was that Brewster never fully delivered on their orders.
As Buffnut mentioned, there was some internal strife and the main plant used an antiquated format for contructing their planes.
Even though you showed several months in 1941 where production was at least in step with Grumman, you have to remember those are (for us) pre-war figures.
Once we got mixed up in brawl, we needed much more significant productioin numbers and even though there were various plants, they were "stages" rather than full production facilities, so if anything, even the added floor space was used ineffciently.
What gets me, is how Brewster was able to keep the goverment enticed for so long.
Shows ya' just how slick those salesmen were and should also serve as insight into the governments perception of the lethality of the Buffalo.
----------------------------------------------------

Buffnut,

I didin't know Brewster's history went back that far. Maybe I was just thinking of their Aeronautical division.
Thanks for the insight.
My question about the single .30 caliber gun, is why have it, when 3/4 of your armorment is the superior .50 cal machine gun.
It would've made better sense to simply have 3-50's and use the extra space for more ammo, or some other purpose.
I guess another case of "coulda, shoulda, woulda".
BTW, its my understanding that the advent of the "-3" was generated by pilot input. It seems USN pilots preferred "flying tanks" to something that could actually dogfight with the Zero.





Elvis

 

[Juha]

Hello
IMHO the .30mg in F2A-1 wasn't there because of space restrictions. At least Finns were able to put a .5 hmg in its place in 42-43 when weapon situation allowed that. On the other hand at least USAAC had in 30s policy to arm its fighters with one .5 and one .30 cowling mg.

on Brewster, IIRC there were labour disputes at the new factory even in 1942 or 43 when USA was in war. IIRC the shop steward of the factory gave some radical statements.
Juha

 

[gepp]

Breda Ba.88 would be a shot for number 1 spot i read the maximum horizontal speed of 250 km/h (155 mph) and in some cases and several units were even unable to take off at all ,they had to strip it down of its rear machine gun,observer,bombs and some fuel,lessening the weight so it could fly or perform better but aircraft's performance didn't achieve good results so it ended up being stripped of useful equipment, and scattered around operational airfields as decoys for attacking aircraft.

 

[Shortround6]

Shortround,

AFAIK, no USN pilot was ever "dissatified" with the performance of the Buffalo.
Upon reflection, some may have lamented the want for a different airplane, when recalling a certain situation, but I've never read any reports that ever said anything to the extent of "The Brewster Buffalo is a lousy fighter plane".
So I'm not sure where your line of thinking came from, as far as the USN being dissatisfied with the Buffalo's performance.
What happened was the advent of the F6F.
Once the Hellcat hit the scene, it made just about everything else in the USN's inventory obsolete, except maybe for the Corsair, and they'd already given those to the Marines.
The reason for the strife between Brewster and the US Government was that Brewster never fully delivered on their orders.
As Buffnut mentioned, there was some internal strife and the main plant used an antiquated format for contructing their planes.
Even though you showed several months in 1941 where production was at least in step with Grumman, you have to remember those are (for us) pre-war figures.
Once we got mixed up in brawl, we needed much more significant productioin numbers and even though there were various plants, they were "stages" rather than full production facilities, so if anything, even the added floor space was used ineffciently.
What gets me, is how Brewster was able to keep the goverment enticed for so long.
Shows ya' just how slick those salesmen were and should also serve as insight into the governments perception of the lethality of the Buffalo.
-------------------------------------------------

Elvis

I think we have a bit of mis-understading here, I was not refering to the "performance" of the 'Brewster airplane ' but the "performance" of the "Brewster company".

Yes those numbers are for "pre-war' production but then very few Buffaloes were delivered after Pearl Harbor.
Production by year for the Buffalo and some other US fighters

year........1938.....1939......1940.........1941......1942
Navy.........1..........11.........42...........108.........1
Export.......0...........0.........124..........201.........21
P-38..........0..........1...........1............207......1479
P-39..........0..........1...........13...........926......1932
P-40.........1...........0..........778..........2248.....3854
P-47.........0...........0...........0..............1.........532
P-51.........0...........0...........0............138........634
F4F..........0...........1...........106.........324.......1447(by G)
F4U..........0...........0............1............0..........178
F6F..........0...........0............0............0............0 edit>10<

All the other companies were doing a mad scramble for factory space, tools, and workers. THis is where Brewster fell down. But not until the Buffalo had past the scene (at least production wise).
Brewster by mid 1941 held contracts for 1052 SB2A dive bombers with the US Navy order for 140 having been placed on Dec, 24 1940. And Brewster was named as the second source for Corsairs on Nov 1 1941.
Good salesmanship or was the Navy not yet upset enough with Brewster? Or that desperate?
I think that we can also see that the advent of the F6F had nothing to do with the Buffalo's lack of further orders.
Now maybe Brewster was delivering Buffaloes late according to contract dates, but it sure didn't stop the Navy from giving them more contracts in 1940-41-42 for other types of of aircraft did it?

As to the .30cal MG. I beleive it was a hold over from earlier requirements. Many US fighters from the late 20s to mid 30s carried either twin .30s or replaced one .30 with a .50 for one of each. with engines of 450-700hp there might not have been enough power to to carry the weight of two .50s without too big an impact on performance.

 

[Marcel]

Shortround,

AFAIK, no USN pilot was ever "dissatified" with the performance of the Buffalo.
Upon reflection, some may have lamented the want for a different airplane, when recalling a certain situation, but I've never read any reports that ever said anything to the extent of "The Brewster Buffalo is a lousy fighter plane".

Well, there sure were some complains about the A-3. I have some accounts somewhere from US pilots saying they liked the A-2 but thought the worst of the A-3.
The British weren't all too pleased with their B339E's either, noting their lack of performance. On the other hand, there were British pilots praising the B339D's for their superior performance over the B339E. It comes down to the fact that customisation of the customer was often the cause of the bad performance. The second reason was the lack of suitable engines, so having to use lower rated ones. For instance the B339-23 had a 1000hp G5B while being heavier while the D had a 1200 hp and was lighter.