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Calling the luftwaffe an "Ill-prepared force" is daunting.................BTW, I'd have to tell you that it's not the planes' problem (nor fault) that their designers don't know what they will be expected to do with two or three years of advance because noone told them about it. The Bf109E had a limited range because noone expected it to be escorting bombers to strategic objectives. The Ju88/He111/Do17 (excellent planes for their time, otherwise) were designed to serve tactical purposes of ground support for the benefit of the Heer, not to conduct deep strikes into the heartland of Britain (something that never was put in their specifications). Those planes were designed for a certain set of roles, which they did accomplish brilliantly. It doesn't mean they sucked or were bad because they failed to perform better when they were asked to do things that they were NEVER intended to do in the first place.
Calling the luftwaffe an "Ill-prepared force" is daunting. I'm not gonna comment this as it deserves no commentary. The Luftwaffe reigned supreme over the skies of europe between 1939 and 1942 (Even during the BoB the LW really got near victory; Dowding himself saw the abbyss coming fast to his Fighter command. Only thing that saved the day was Göring stupid regulations about close escort that rendered the Bf110 useless, and hitler's stupid decision to switch targets from the RAF to bombing civilians) and then only was slowly drained because HItler had given it too many a foe to fight in such an inferiority of numbers. If you think an "Ill prepared" force is able to do that, lord helps anyone who ever faces an "appropiately prepared" air force in a war.
Actually a military force that is not prepared to fight its enemies no matter how numerical is an "ill-prepared force". That does not make it a "bad force". I personally think that up to about 1942/1943 it is was the best Air Force in the world, but that does not mean it was "prepared" for the task at hand.
Mosquito
Cross-channel strategic campaigns were not their best card, so to speak - right ?
That wasn't under any perspective an "Ill-prepared force".
Appendix 5 in the "First Team" goes into detail about IJN carrier pilots ...
In 1944, Boone Guyton, the main test pilot for the Corsair, flew the Zero and was very impressed with it's astounding maneuverability below 220 mph
its incredible rate of climb at SL of around 4500 fpm
and it's Vmax on the deck of 300 mph.
In the comparison tests in December, 1942, between a Zero 21 and various US fighters, the Zero was superior in climb to the P38F up to about 20000 feet. The Zero against the P39-D1, the P39 was superior in ROC up to 10000 feet where the Zero gained superiority and there was no contest from there on up. All tests were not completed because the P39 ran out of fuel. Against the P51( Allison) the Zero climbed sharply away from the Mustang from 5000 to 10000 feet and from 10000 to 15000 feet. Above 15000 feet the tests were terminated because the P51 power plant failed to operate properly. Against the P40F the tests were not able to be completed because full power could not be obtained by the P40. The Zero was superior in speed and climb to the F4F4 at all altitudes above 1000 feet. Between 5000 and 19000 feet, the Zero was slightly superior to the F4U1 in ROC.
The Zero, particularly in the early war was noted for it's good ROC.
Low speed maneouverability accounted for nothing during WW2 air fights.
That's something I can't buy, FlyboyJ. The Marines and USN pilots had all appropiate training regarding teamwork and high speed tactics. True enough, they also had their good share of training on "old school" combat, but european reports coming from the other side of the Atlantic since 1939 were telling a clear story: close range, slow speed, turn based fighting was now totally outdated. Chennault only subscribed to it in China, and the whole of the air designers of the time aknowledged it. Which means, the air forces had also done it (and if the air force knew it, the pilots too because the AF sets the training courses).
The american designers took a good note of what was going on in Europe at the time. The Hellcat, F4U, P47 and P38 designs all date from dates well prior to the enter of USA into the war (the stories about the F6F being designed on basis of what was found out of the aleutian A6M2 are pure myths). If the designers knew that their new fighters had to be powerful, speedy, good in high speed and energy fighting, and that low speed maneouverability was a non-factor by then, it's only normal to think that the pilots and the US air forces of the time (USAAC, US Navy and USMC air corps) were well aware of it aswell.
It's unsurprising, remember that some american models were flying in Europe at the time. The americans were specially interested in knowing how the P-36 fared in combat in order to know what to do to improve it. Reports came telling a tale about an enemy using superior tactics and relying on high speed, suprise passes, hit and run tactics, and not entering close combats unless as a desperate last resort. American engineers took good note of that and accordingly, designed fast, heavy, powerful planes that coudln't turn exactly on a dime, but noone cared about that.
What you say about training, however, applies very well to other nations. And thats why I say that the Zero excelled in the only place of the planet it could excel at the time: DEI, Indonesia and Burma. Against the array of outdated and obsolete models present there, it already had a headstart, but when we also take in account pilot training...well, the Japanese didn't put any emphasis on team work training at all, but their adversaries were simply untrained or very poorly so. The dutch pilots were trained in the "old school" of "turning and burning" and as such were easy prey. The british knew better, but their fighter pilots at the spot at the time weren't properly trained and actually were among the lowest quality fighter pilots of the Empire at the time (no disrespect intended to them at all, but the good ones understabily were fighting over the Channel and the DEsert at the time) and weren't properly commanded either.
The USAAF present at the Phillipines was a non-factor after Clark was wiped out of the earth by japanese early bombings, but their pilots weren't top-notch either and they still were flying by the "old" tactics anyway.
The only and one group of fighters/pilots the Japanese couldn't get the upper hand on, was against the AVG. Those were top-class pilots in an obsolete plane, the P40B. But a plane that still was better than the Zero for what mattered: high speed fighting. All those pilots had to do was to keep their fights fast. And so they did. And so we can see today their kill/loss ratio: absolutely outstanding. And soon what was already known back at the States reached every frontline squadron: NEVER turn with a japanese fighter. Stay fast, dive away if attacked, slash/zoom when attacking.
And the Zero happy days were over. Forever.
Against an enemy who kept their planes fast (and if those planes were good in the role of fighting fast, of course), the japanese fighters ,notably the Oscars of the Army, but here clearly I am including the Zero aswell, were simply hopeless. Against an enemy who just tried to close the fight into a slow speed conquest they ran over the opposition, the A6M/Ki43 were simply too good in slow speed stallfights. So, the Zeros excelled in the only and one place of the whole planet where a combination of old school tactics/poor pilot training/park of garbage planes was present at that time: DEI.
Had the Japanese been in France at the time and launched a Zero sortie over the British Islands they'd been merrily chewed away by the RAF.
In any case it took the allies soon enough to understand what not to do against a Zero. The USN F4Fs were doing it by the time of Coral Sea, and only 6 months had passed since the war had started. A plane that trusts its succesfullness in the faith of an stupid enemy who doesn't learn a harsh lesson after six months is hopeless. As soon as even the most novice pilot in the Allied forces was taught "not to turn with a Zero", the plane was hopelessy obsolete. And that did happen pretty soon.
Have you looked at any flight manuals with regards to maneuvering speeds and exceeding structural limits? You don't do 4G tuns at 400 mph, at least in many aircraft you're not supposed to unless you want to bend the airframe or worse. Additionally, when you speak of Marine pilots receiveing "high speed training," do you have any indication of what "high speed" was?
Maybe hyperbole and maybe Eric Brown is full of it but he does not seem to share the opinion of RAM who seems very positive about his views
but from Brown's book, "Duels in the Sky" " Assessment: The Zeke was possibly the world's outstanding fighter at low and medium altitudes in 1941, and it was excellently suited to the demanding aircraft carrier environment
The aircraft's obvious weakness was an inability to absorb punishment from heavy caliber guns, but it did not expect to reckon with many of these."
Not bad for a "dog."
I do not recall the F4U ever being fitted with paddle blade props and Guyton does not mention it in his book and I don't believe it is mentioned in "America's Hundred Thousand."
I'm going out on a limb here but I feel the worst aircraft in WWII had a 100% mortality rate for the pilots who flew it.
The Ohka:
Was it an effective delivery device? Probably! But something about killing every person that flies in it makes it seem like the worst plane in WWII.
I'm sure no other plane (that didn't serve the same purpose I guess) had a better rate of survival.
Or how are we defining best/worst? Since this is up to 112 pages :/
GM Rico
It actually depends on speed and I also believe that within its maneuvering speed envelope an Oscar was able to sustain 4Gs.WEll, structural limits varied from plane to plane. Sustained 4Gs won't be a problem for a Fw190, for instance (sturdily built, one-piece integral structure wing, etc), but will rip apart a Ki43 oscar in no time. So, well, that varies from instance to instance.
And in 1940 - 41, you're looking at speeds between 250 - 300 mph in F2As and F3Fs - the speeds where the Zero and Oscar were in their element.AS for high speed maneouverability, I guess I have to explain myself better here (Language barrier sucks, As for the high speed training of the USN pilots, well, any "high speed" maneouver is basically conducted over the plane's corner speed. In other words: it belongs to those speeds where plane acceleration is less important than intertia/aerodynamics.
By staying at those speed brackets you rely on dive/Zoom properties of planes (Related to weight/aerodynamic considerations) rather than in powerloading. Given that US planes usually were heavy, had good aerodynamics (with some exceptions, of course) but had a marginal or worse climb rate/Acceleration, it was only natural that tactics teached to their pilots tended to focus on those "high" speeds. In general, US airmen also were given a fair bit of hints about energy management during air combat, etc.
all the best.