Would Japan have been better off giving up Guadalcanal early?

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

The Japanese Navy had to do everything in darkness for the supply at Guadalcanal. So any ship has to get in and get out before first light.

This was due to enemy air power.

The obvious use of transports was negated as they were too slow and vulnerable and would be caught in daylight by airpower.

So either destroyers or submarines were used. Subs offered very little cargo capabilities but they could submerge in daylight. And they did offer better than nothing.

It was then up to the destroyers and the 'Tokyo Express' to pick up the slack. So they had oil barrels lashed together full of supplies which could fit in an oil barrel and thrown overboard. Hopefully the barrels could be fished out by the IJA on the shore. Or not as the case may be. The Destroyer would then chug on and hopefully be out of range of airpower and be in friendly water before sun up.

The evacuation of Guadalcanal was surprising smooth as the Americans either misjudged or misread the tea leaves and the evacuation met a lot less resistance than it should have.
 
In hindsight Guadalcanal should have been given up earlier, but I think what happened was a case of "just two more weeks", the Japanese Command always thought they were on the verge of capturing Henderson Field "soon" and as each attempt failed it was "just two more weeks" and we'll have it, that finally blew out to some 4 months.

What bugs me was the callous losses of transports in the big push of November 42. This was really desperate stuff for 1942.
 

Probably the biggest impact of the war on Germany on the South Pacific theater was the turning down of Kenney's request for P-38s (Arnold said if he supplied the P-38s the invasion of Africa would have to be delayed, maybe a good idea?). With P-38s, with their range, speed,and altitude and domination of Japanese fighters, would have completely changed the Guadalcanal/ New Guinea theater. No more high altitude reconnaissance/bombing, no unchalanged long range raids out of Raubal, air space over Guadalcanal would be dominated by USAAF, Navy, and Marine forces. With kenney's offensive force of B-17s, B-25s, B-26s, Beaufighters and A-20s, and with covering force of P-38s, Japanese surface fleet would have to stay well away, no more Tokyo express. In addition, Raubal itself would almost become untenable. But, no P-38s came.
 
Kenney had very little to do with the Guadalcanal campaign. That was COMSOPAC's ball game. Sure, he tried to interdict Rabaul, but simply did not have the forces in 1942 to suppress it. He was concentrating on supporting the Aussie forces in New Guinea hanging onto Port Moresby and Milne Bay and slowly pushing the Japanese back to Buna.
 

You're right that my opinion has more than a dash of hindsight -- but it also has some sound military theory behind it, starting with "know thy enemy" and following with ensuring sufficient mass of force to move them where you want them. I think their overly complex plans lent themselves to defeat in detail, another problem addressed by military precepts.

I am certainly judging their decisions with hindsight -- you're sure right about that -- but also in keeping with those three maxims, which I think lends my opinion some value.
 

Exactly. Japan lost everything with the first A/C attack on Pearl Harbor. There was no way for them to win. By the time the first bomb fell we already had enough naval power in the water or keels laid/on order to take back the Pacific. And that was just the start. This was demonstrated when the modern American ships with radar arrived to stop the Japanese from effectively using the seas around Guadalcanal. AND if the TF commanders, one at least, had actually BELIEVED the radar and used it properly the Japanese would have fared far worse in one or two engagements. The Japanese kicked to wrong dog... I think by the time they abandoned the "Canal" some in the higher command knew that it was over.
 

I think Adm Lee's great strength was his knowledge about radar -- shown to good effect in destroying Kirishima in a night battle -- expertise that other American admirals lacked.
 
Admiral Lee was a GUNNERY officer and drilled ALL his gun crews. The 5.38" turrets were hitting Kirishima at their extreme range along with the 16" rifles. The Dude once took out three snipers! Got to see Drachinifel's vid. Can't remember the exact title. I think Night Action figures prominently in the title.
 

I'll look it up, I generally like his vids if not always his delivery.

ETA: Pretty sure I've watched it, if this is what you've got in mind:
I remember an old book talking about his schooling in radar when CXAM first came about. When you couple that with an emphasis on gunnery, any opponent of his was probably in for rough sledding.
 
Last edited:
While we're on the topic, does anyone know of a good book covering this particular battle? I've read the countless synopses, but I'd really like some detailed reading about the battle leading to the loss of Kirishima.
 
That looks like it. I like his delivery. My mom raised me an Anglophile. Something to do with her growing up in the NYC public school system during World War 2. I was the only kid in school humming "Rule Britannia".
You are right about his knowledge of radar and use of of it. In that video, he explained many of its concepts to his officers and technicians. I'm going to go watch it again.
 
SaparotRob said:
I like his delivery. My mom raised me an Anglophile. Something to do with her growing up in the NYC public school system during World War 2.
Click to expand...

I spent four years schooling in Iran, 2 1/2 at an international school, where my English teacher (as well as a couple of others) was actually English. Also, as an adult, had a girlfriend for a few years originally from Ealing on the West End of London. I enjoy how Brits use the language; it's Drach's snark that I find sometimes grating. The Brit term for it is "too clever by half".

All the same, he gives not just solid facts, but interesting insights.

And he's also a good interviewer. If you haven't already, check out his Zero vids -- there's two long ones, one an hour, one two-plus, both worth the watching, where he interviews a guest about the plane.
 
Last edited:
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 1 (members: 0, guests: 1)

Similar threads

W
What effect would a cross channel tunnel have on WW2?
Replies
17
Views
871
Airframes
Z
Cleaning up after WWII
Replies
7
Views
873
special ed
S
A
1938/1939, USA, England, France - Would Have? Could Have? Should Have?
3 4 5
Replies
81
Views
5K
Thumpalumpacus
A
Realistic options for Japan 1937-41
2
Replies
36
Views
3K
yosimitesam
A
Interwar examples where a heavy presence might have made a difference?
Replies
9
Views
1K
Shortround6
S
Menu
Log in
Register