Would Japan have been better off giving up Guadalcanal early? (1 Viewer)

[The Basket]

The Japanese Navy had to do everything in darkness for the supply at Guadalcanal. So any ship has to get in and get out before first light.

This was due to enemy air power.

The obvious use of transports was negated as they were too slow and vulnerable and would be caught in daylight by airpower.

So either destroyers or submarines were used. Subs offered very little cargo capabilities but they could submerge in daylight. And they did offer better than nothing.

It was then up to the destroyers and the 'Tokyo Express' to pick up the slack. So they had oil barrels lashed together full of supplies which could fit in an oil barrel and thrown overboard. Hopefully the barrels could be fished out by the IJA on the shore. Or not as the case may be. The Destroyer would then chug on and hopefully be out of range of airpower and be in friendly water before sun up.

The evacuation of Guadalcanal was surprising smooth as the Americans either misjudged or misread the tea leaves and the evacuation met a lot less resistance than it should have.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The evacuation of Guadalcanal was surprising smooth as the Americans either misjudged or misread the tea leaves and the evacuation met a lot less resistance than it should have.

The Americans detected the increased activity but interpreted it as the build-up for another offensive on the island.

 

[taly01]

In hindsight Guadalcanal should have been given up earlier, but I think what happened was a case of "just two more weeks", the Japanese Command always thought they were on the verge of capturing Henderson Field "soon" and as each attempt failed it was "just two more weeks" and we'll have it, that finally blew out to some 4 months.

What bugs me was the callous losses of transports in the big push of November 42. This was really desperate stuff for 1942.

 

[davparlr]

L

In Hornfischer's book he makes an interesting case that the "Germany First" strategy existed mostly in the minds of the politicians given that both the Army and the Navy were pushing a Pacific agenda. I'm not sure I agree and he doesn't give any deployment data to back up that assumption but I'm not sure that the US was sending 85% of everything vs Germany. If so for my own curiosity I'd like to see the data to support that as I always assumed that most of production when to the ETO/MTO first.

Probably the biggest impact of the war on Germany on the South Pacific theater was the turning down of Kenney's request for P-38s (Arnold said if he supplied the P-38s the invasion of Africa would have to be delayed, maybe a good idea?). With P-38s, with their range, speed,and altitude and domination of Japanese fighters, would have completely changed the Guadalcanal/ New Guinea theater. No more high altitude reconnaissance/bombing, no unchalanged long range raids out of Raubal, air space over Guadalcanal would be dominated by USAAF, Navy, and Marine forces. With kenney's offensive force of B-17s, B-25s, B-26s, Beaufighters and A-20s, and with covering force of P-38s, Japanese surface fleet would have to stay well away, no more Tokyo express. In addition, Raubal itself would almost become untenable. But, no P-38s came.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Kenney had very little to do with the Guadalcanal campaign. That was COMSOPAC's ball game. Sure, he tried to interdict Rabaul, but simply did not have the forces in 1942 to suppress it. He was concentrating on supporting the Aussie forces in New Guinea hanging onto Port Moresby and Milne Bay and slowly pushing the Japanese back to Buna.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

In hindsight Guadalcanal should have been given up earlier, but I think what happened was a case of "just two more weeks", the Japanese Command always thought they were on the verge of capturing Henderson Field "soon" and as each attempt failed it was "just two more weeks" and we'll have it, that finally blew out to some 4 months.

What bugs me was the callous losses of transports in the big push of November 42. This was really desperate stuff for 1942.

You're right that my opinion has more than a dash of hindsight -- but it also has some sound military theory behind it, starting with "know thy enemy" and following with ensuring sufficient mass of force to move them where you want them. I think their overly complex plans lent themselves to defeat in detail, another problem addressed by military precepts.

I am certainly judging their decisions with hindsight -- you're sure right about that -- but also in keeping with those three maxims, which I think lends my opinion some value.

 

[Icorps1970]

OR, to look at it another way, how clever of the allies to give up the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore and the East Indies in order to give Japan an insoluble defensive problem when the US giant woke up the Arsenal of Democracy.

Japan was bound to lose. The 'turning point' was Pearl Harbour. What-ifs just change the route to the inevitable conclusion.

Exactly. Japan lost everything with the first A/C attack on Pearl Harbor. There was no way for them to win. By the time the first bomb fell we already had enough naval power in the water or keels laid/on order to take back the Pacific. And that was just the start. This was demonstrated when the modern American ships with radar arrived to stop the Japanese from effectively using the seas around Guadalcanal. AND if the TF commanders, one at least, had actually BELIEVED the radar and used it properly the Japanese would have fared far worse in one or two engagements. The Japanese kicked to wrong dog... I think by the time they abandoned the "Canal" some in the higher command knew that it was over.

 

[SaparotRob]

I think the problem with both sides was that they thought they knew the enemy but instead were really giving in to their long held prejudices and biases.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Exactly. Japan lost everything with the first A/C attack on Pearl Harbor. There was no way for them to win. By the time the first bomb fell we already had enough naval power in the water or keels laid/on order to take back the Pacific. And that was just the start. This was demonstrated when the modern American ships with radar arrived to stop the Japanese from effectively using the seas around Guadalcanal. AND if the TF commanders, one at least, had actually BELIEVED the radar and used it properly the Japanese would have fared far worse in one or two engagements. The Japanese kicked to wrong dog... I think by the time they abandoned the "Canal" some in the higher command knew that it was over.

I think Adm Lee's great strength was his knowledge about radar -- shown to good effect in destroying Kirishima in a night battle -- expertise that other American admirals lacked.

 

[SaparotRob]

Admiral Lee was a GUNNERY officer and drilled ALL his gun crews. The 5.38" turrets were hitting Kirishima at their extreme range along with the 16" rifles. The Dude once took out three snipers! Got to see Drachinifel's vid. Can't remember the exact title. I think Night Action figures prominently in the title.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Admiral Lee was a GUNNERY officer and drilled ALL his gun crews. The 5.38" turrets were hitting Kirishima at their extreme range along with the 16" rifles. The Dude once took out three snipers! Got to see Drachinifel's vid. Can't remember the exact title. I think Night Action figures prominently in the title.

I'll look it up, I generally like his vids if not always his delivery.

ETA: Pretty sure I've watched it, if this is what you've got in mind:

I remember an old book talking about his schooling in radar when CXAM first came about. When you couple that with an emphasis on gunnery, any opponent of his was probably in for rough sledding.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

While we're on the topic, does anyone know of a good book covering this particular battle? I've read the countless synopses, but I'd really like some detailed reading about the battle leading to the loss of Kirishima.

 

[SaparotRob]

That looks like it. I like his delivery. My mom raised me an Anglophile. Something to do with her growing up in the NYC public school system during World War 2. I was the only kid in school humming "Rule Britannia".
You are right about his knowledge of radar and use of of it. In that video, he explained many of its concepts to his officers and technicians. I'm going to go watch it again.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I like his delivery. My mom raised me an Anglophile. Something to do with her growing up in the NYC public school system during World War 2.

I spent four years schooling in Iran, 2 1/2 at an international school, where my English teacher (as well as a couple of others) was actually English. Also, as an adult, had a girlfriend for a few years originally from Ealing on the West End of London. I enjoy how Brits use the language; it's Drach's snark that I find sometimes grating. The Brit term for it is "too clever by half".

All the same, he gives not just solid facts, but interesting insights.

And he's also a good interviewer. If you haven't already, check out his Zero vids -- there's two long ones, one an hour, one two-plus, both worth the watching, where he interviews a guest about the plane.

 

[space dodo]

shoot just realized wrong battle

 

[SaparotRob]

shoot just realized wrong battle

Said Guy D'Oyly-Hughes.