Would Japan have been better off skipping the Pearl Harbor Raid - daring the US to implement War Plan Orange?

[Shortround6]

The thing is the continued isolationism of the US would be hard for the Japanese to gamble on. The US was pushing B-17s to the Philippines, one or more squadrons of A-24s were on the way. How much the Japanese knew I don't know but they did know there was a build up going on.
My own personal point of view is that they could not leave the Naval base at Cavite in operation. It was the only US repair base west of Hawaii and by Dec 7th it was home to 29 (?) US submarines making it a major threat to any ships going through the South China Sea.
The Japanese did not know how bad the US torpedoes were but dozens of long range bombers, even if just used as recon planes and 2-3 dozen submarines sitting at a choke point for Japanese shipping may have been too much of threat to ignore after the oil and steel embargoes implemented by the United States.

 

[buffnut453]

But the US wasn't stopping shipping to Japan. Embargoes back then weren't the same as embargoes today. Also, I think it unlikely that the US would take the first shot. Yes, reinforcement of the Philippines was a major threat but Japan's calculus may have been different if it's leaders knew that the US wouldn't go to war over Malaya or Singapore, and was unlikely to fire the first shot.

 

[swampyankee]

Germany would likely have demonstrated, once again, the deft and brilliant diplomacy that got even Wilson, who wanted to avoid wars that weren't about beating up people of color, to declare war in 1917. Hitler and his minions would have gotten the US involved by May 1942.

After that, it's not likely Japan would remain neutral vis a vis the US.

 

[Shortround6]

The US (and the British and Dutch) had cut Japan's ability to import oil by 90% in the Summer of 1941. The world market for oil before WW II was much more tightly controlled than now.
The British and dutch effectively controlled what is now Venezuelan oil for instance. The British controlled most of the mid east oil.
The Original embargo had started in the summer of 1940 and that applied more to high octane aviation fuel rather than fuel oil or unrefined crude oil. The US had also stopped exporting scrap steel to Japan in the summer of 1940.

The US didn't have to stop ships in the fall of 1941. The British, Dutch and US just didn't fill up any tankers they thought were going to Japan.

The problem for Japan with the Philippines was that while the US might not fire the first shot the Philippines offered an excellent base to interrupt ALL shipping from south east asia and indonesia (Dutch East indies) to Japan. Given the US objections to Japan's behavior in China which is what brought about the embargo/s in the first place would the US stand by and allow Japan to invade British and Dutch territory, and if they did, how long would it be before there was a Pannay type incident (or Reuben James) that tipped the US over the edge?
for the Japanese to allow the Philippines to be reinforced/ made stronger over the winter of 1941/42 when it was a sword across their supply lines (or future supply lines) takes an awful lot of faith on the part of the Japanese that the US would not fight.

 

[buffnut453]

Yes, I do think the US would have sat back and let the Japanese take Malaya and Singapore. I don't see isolationists in the US letting the country go to war over the loss of a few European colonies. We didn't in 1940 when the Nazis overran Europe so a few far-flung colonies aren't going to tip the balance, methinks. And if Singapore falls, then the NEI is next...which was the main prize anyhow. Again, I don't see the US going to war over the NEI.

Under such a scenario, Japan would have access to its own oil supplies. Would the US really take the first shots against unarmed civilian tankers? I don't think so.

 

[Shortround6]

The World situation had changed from spring of 1940 to the fall/winter of 1941. The US had already enacted lend-lease and the "Neutrality" patrol which effectively allowed Britain to concentrate it's escorts in the Eastern half of the Atlantic while US navy ships escorted convoys in the western half. The Japanese had signed a treaty with the Germans and Italians.

In 1940 (and before) Japan had gotten about 80% of it's oil from America so the American "embargo" was pretty easy to enforce. Once the British and Dutch went along with it there was nowhere for the Japanese to go. Seizing the Dutch oil fields in Indonesia and expecting the US to do nothing was a desperate gamble. Those unarmed civilian tankers you speak of are carrying war booty, not legitimate commercial cargo.
Once shots are fired everything goes to pot in a hurry and there the Japanese are, with American air and naval bases between the new supply areas and the home Islands.
The odds were the Japanese were going to have to secure those supply lines at some point. Do it at the beginning when the Americans are weak or wait until the Americans get much stronger in the Philippines?


The US objection to Japan was part economic, The US wanted an "open China" which meant that the US wanted to exploit China commercially rather than having the Japanese exploit China and cut the US out.

 

[VBF-13]

They needed our oil depots more than they needed our carriers. In fact, isn't that the straw that broke the camel's back--the oil embargoes?

 

[GreenKnight121]

Actually, by early 1941, War Plan Orange (WPO3) had slowly been modified to where the push west across the Pacific was actually planned for about two years after the expected "surprise attack by Orange" (due to expected mobilization/modernization and expansion requirements) - and already included "island-hopping" to establish forward air bases and temporary supply/support naval facilities!
The "turn North to fight a decisive battle off Japan" part had been removed from the WPO series by the early 1930s, while Japan still planned on the US meeting them there.

In other words - the version of WPO-3 adopted by the US in April 1941 was virtually identical to what was actually done after Pearl Harbor.

So without the Pearl Harbor attack, but still with a Japanese invasion of the Philippines, there would have been little-to-no change from what the US actually did!


Only if Japan didn't attack the US anywhere would we see a significant change from history.

See this article: War Plan Orange

 

[The Basket]

One could argue that the Japanese saw any sanctions or embargoes as an act of war in itself. But the Philippines are exactly in the perfect spot for naval interdict between Japan and her new conquests.

So it's just too much in the way to be ignored. Especially as there are choke points where torpedo bombers or subs would be in a very target rich environment.

 

[The Basket]

Love the Red-Orange plan. The Japanese can have the Pacific and the UK can get its colony back. Sigh.... One way of paying off our ww1 debt!

3 ideas to fight war with Japan.

1) Direct invasion of Japanese home islands.
2) Land war in China.
3) Naval Island hop campaign.

Japan is an island nation so naval blockade is a real threat and so commerce warfare with submarines is just the ticket.

Air bombardment to destroy industry and logistics and the Douhet theorists having a field day.

So as long as you have a sub base and an air base close enough then its time for the victory dance.

I forgot which military theorist said you eventually have to fight the main bulk of the army for final victory but USA avoided this as the main bulk was in China and again avoided an amphibious landing of the Japanese mainland.

So USA either by force majeure or luck or design played a good hand well.

 

[Conslaw]

Actually, by early 1941, War Plan Orange (WPO3) had slowly been modified to where the push west across the Pacific was actually planned for about two years after the expected "surprise attack by Orange" (due to expected mobilization/modernization and expansion requirements) - and already included "island-hopping" to establish forward air bases and temporary supply/support naval facilities!
The "turn North to fight a decisive battle off Japan" part had been removed from the WPO series by the early 1930s, while Japan still planned on the US meeting them there.

In other words - the version of WPO-3 adopted by the US in April 1941 was virtually identical to what was actually done after Pearl Harbor.

So without the Pearl Harbor attack, but still with a Japanese invasion of the Philippines, there would have been little-to-no change from what the US actually did!


Only if Japan didn't attack the US anywhere would we see a significant change from history.

See this article: War Plan Orange

I'm not disputing your claim about the revised Warplan Orange taking 2 years to accomplish, and I'm not disputing that that's exactly what the US did. I do question whether the US was "all in" on the 2-year plan. Right up until the Japanese invaded, the US was building up defenses in the Philippines. The last troops held out until May 1942. If the US airpower hadn't been grossly mishandled at the beginning of the campaign, they probably could have held out longer, but not a lot longer. US casualties in 1941-42 per wikipedia:
146,000

• 25,000 killed
• 21,000 wounded
• 100,000 captured[7]

That's a lot of servicepeople to squander on a disposable island chain.

I think MacArthur might have talked enough big shots into the believing the notion that the Philippines could be held sufficient to dump all available resources there, but isolated as they were, it was never going to be enough.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Another question might be raised that after Pearl Harbor and more importantly, after the Battle of the Coral Sea, what if the IJN suddenly got a burst of insight and did NOT attempt to attack Midway? I believe Yammamoto was looking for an action where he could bring the USN carriers to battle to destroy them as they were the guarantors of the US/Australia/New Zealand pipeline, but perhaps would look for another avenue to achieve this goal.

If memory serves, even without a battle at Midway the US was going to invade Guadalcanal, so perhaps the IJN would have lost it's carriers in the battles around the Solomons. Although I think Nimitz was looking to take out the IJN's carrier fleet ( or most of it ) before the incursions in the South Pacific.

 

[Conslaw]

It is an interesting hypothetical if the battle that was Midway took place instead in the Solomon Islands in the summer of 42. The Japanese would have potentially had all six of their fleet carriers, and the US might have had Saratoga, and maybe even Wasp. (Of course, either side could have been without one or two of their potential carriers for other reasons.) The US would have had TBM Avengers, but would not have had Midway Island and its land-based air. Personally, I think it would have been too dangerous to try to take Guadalcanal in the summer of 42 without having knocked out most of Japan's carriers first. The US only barely held on to Guadalcanal as it happened.

 

[The Basket]

In my view there is one problem with Midway is that its nowhere near any land bases. So it's on the ragged edge of logistics. No land based bombers nearby or a choke point where u can fill them with subs.

Midway was not supposed to be a carrier battle but the prelude to the carrier battle.

The Japanese had to get them cowardly timid Americans to battle and attacking Midway and threatened Hawaii was the ticket.

Any clever trick or trap wouldn't work Coz the Americans had broken Japanese code so any real attempt to trap carriers wouldn't work.

 

[VBF-13]

Another question might be raised that after Pearl Harbor and more importantly, after the Battle of the Coral Sea, what if the IJN suddenly got a burst of insight and did NOT attempt to attack Midway? I believe Yammamoto was looking for an action where he could bring the USN carriers to battle to destroy them as they were the guarantors of the US/Australia/New Zealand pipeline, but perhaps would look for another avenue to achieve this goal.

If memory serves, even without a battle at Midway the US was going to invade Guadalcanal, so perhaps the IJN would have lost it's carriers in the battles around the Solomons. Although I think Nimitz was looking to take out the IJN's carrier fleet ( or most of it ) before the incursions in the South Pacific.

They walked right into it with their eyes closed at Midway only to find themselves on their heels when we opened their eyes. I think this is a fascinating question.

 

[Conslaw]

Japan was obscenely lucky that the US Army failed to to treat seriously the initial radar warning of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. The radar did exactly what it was there to do. It bought almost an hour of early warning of the attack. The Americans could have had 50 interceptors in the air, could have had antiaircraft positions armed and non-airborne airplanes moved to better positions. Some of the ships could have gotten under way. The Japanese might have lost 50% of the aircrew from their first wave and more than that if they were foolish to go ahead with the second wave. The Combined Fleet would have been in no position to support subsequent strikes in the Indian Ocean.

The situation regarding the radar warning in the Philippines is more complicated, and I don't understand it completely, but it was another opportunity missed by the Americans. If the early warning system had worked as intended in Hawaii and the Philippines, instead of the Americans losing the majority of their air power in both places, the Japanese would have lost the majority of their naval air power including most of their deployed zero fighters, as well as their highly skilled "first team" pilots.

At Midway, the Japanese finally didn't get every lucky break. The Americans got some too, but it wasn't luck that determined the battle. As Parshall and Tully lay out in "Shattered Sword", the Americans knew they had the potential to engage at an advantage and created every advantageous condition they could. If they couldn't engage at an advantage, they had the option of not engaging at all; as even if the Japanese successfully captured Midway, they were in no position to hold it.

 

[The Basket]

Not sure how long it takes to fuel up and arm a P-40 but from scratch to a combat ready fighter would take more than a hour.
Maybe someone give a view on that?

Unless the P-40s were ready to rock and roll I can't see it.

Flak could have been fully manned and ammunition stores opened to deliver rounds and hatches on the battleships locked down to prevent flooding

One aspect of Pearl Harbour is how shallow it is so some ships were recoverable so had ships gone into deeper waters then any sinking vessels could have been lost for good with greater loss of life.