WW2 Aviation Mythbusters

[parsifal]

I would argue that the attack by Bettys and Nells on PoW, Repulse and her destroyer escorts (force Z) was divided over time: about 3 waves divided over two ships meant that never more than 9 aircraft had to be dealt with simultaneously, the same as Bismarcks situation.

To answer this statement, i referred to "The Rising Sun - The Decline and Fall Of the Japanese Empire 1936-45" John Toland Bath Press 1990, 937 pages. I also used Pacific War John Costello, New york, 1981, 741 Pages; Naval Weapons Of WWII John Campbell Conways Maritime Press 1985, 402 pages, and for Aircracraft Data I used "Encyclopedia of Aircraft in WWII"Paul Eden and Soph Moens, SDilverdaler Books 2002, 1152 Pages. i also used some Internet sources and one or two other sources for more detailed information. For the RN strikes I used mostly Corelli Barnett

The attacks on PoW and Repulse

The first attack, which consisted of two squadrons, one of which attacked the Prince of Wales, and the other attacked Renown was by either 17 Nells or 18 Bettys. ( aircraft attacked each Battleship in a single wave, attempting to bracket the shipsby attacking in waves at right angles to each other. Commander Takao commanding one of the squadrons, described how his unit was left largerly unscather whilst the other squadron, attacking the other ship (the PoW) was engulfed and badly affected by AA fire the 9 Bettys occurred at 11:07, and saw 9 Betty bombers of the Genzan Air Corps concentrate their attacks on the Repulse and about 9 attacking the PoW. This group of 18 aircraft attacked in one wave. Takao states that all of the flak was concentrated on one group, resulting in the loss of 4 aircraft, but there was virtually no interference on the second group. the second group approached the PoW and Repulse I think from astern, in a cloud bank, that allowed them to get to within 2 miles before they needed to emerge from that cloud. Torpedos were launched at 1800 yards (approximately). The attack laste all of 4 minutes. There was little opportunity to use Light AA fire against this attack, thoough it did occur.

Another Group in the 2nd wave that attacked after midday under the command of Lt Iki, also attacked as a single group of nine aircrafdt, attacking at the same time. agains the Japanese used anvil tactics to maximise the chances of a hit , concentrating thjis time on the Repulse. Launch ranges were the same at 1800 yds.

Becasue the Japanese launched at the range that they did, there was not a lot of opportunity for the Light flak to engage. There was some, but not much....perhaps all of 30 seconds. The Japanese tactics of attacking simultaneously for those early attacks limited the engagement time for the british flak .

The Swordfish attacks against the bismarck are not comparable, because the british attacked in echelon (more or less singly). The British did this because with the limite numbers of aircraft they wanted to maximise the chances of crippling the ship. Corelli Barnett describes the attack on the bismarck as follows: "At 2035 the strike force reached the Sheffield, which informed them by aldis lamp that the bismarck bore 110* distant 12 miles . At 2040 the Swordfish flew on toward that target, in six subflights in line astern.

As the 15 swordfish neared the bismarck they ran into a thick bank of cloud . This forced each sub flight to approach indepently and attack separately". According to Barnett, the attacks by the Swordfish on the bismarck took half an hour, whereas the attacks by the Japanese, whilst overall lasting several hours, tended to be short sharp, high internsity attacks lasting obly a few minutes.

The swordfish aircraft , unlie the japanese closed to about 700 metres before launch. this subjected them to some Light Flak fire, moreso than the Japanese suffered

The speed advantage of the Nell vs Swordwish was was marginal, torpedo release limits dictated attack speed and while the Japanese torps were best in this area they still restricted the aircraft. The swordfish's manouverabillity may even have outweighed its slowness and the Nells physical size made it a bigger target to hit. In anycase the attack profile involved a dive that tended to trow of FLAK.

Ah no, not correct. The Nell had an attack speed of 150 mph, the Swordfish about half that. it was the speed of the aircraft not the torpedo release limits that dictated exposure times. The Type 91 Mod 2 aerial torpedoes used against the PoW and Repulse had an effective max range of 2000 yards, a drop speed of 300 knots and a max launch height of 400 feet. The British MkXII torps used against the Bismarck had a top launch speed of 150 knots amax launch height of 300 ft and a max effective range of 1500 yards

AFAIKT PoW hit its attacker AFTER they had released their weapons and were crossing the bow or egressing the target area.

That does not line up with the reports given by Lts Takao and Iki. Both these commanders reported that most of the flak was fired from as early as possible. I agree that it is hard to determine if the aircraft losses were before or after launch, but firing on the Jpanese began well before launch, and appears to be quirte effective given low hit to launch percentages.

Bismarcks three radars were out of action, PoW Air defense radars bar one was out of action. Bismarcks radar failed due to shell shock after engaging Norfolk just like PoW died from shell shock after engaging Bismarck. A few issues hadn't been resolved yet on both sides. Had Bismarks radars been working her defense may have been better against the swordfish.

Quite possibly given the relatively better performance of the tirpitz a year later. However, this does not explain the relatively poor showing of the bismarcks flak in her final battle. Fact remains there were no losses to the FAA, and hit to launch percentages are high

The FuMO 23 radar had a beam width of about 6 degrees but by carefully maximizing returns an opperator could get a bearing to within 1 degree. He could also get range to 70m and pass this on to the predictors via telemetry. Obviously this is not really excellent but it is better than optical ranging. So I think

Latter Seetaks added a type of lobe switching that greatly increased accuracy and some versions added height finding. Bismarks radar/FLAK integration was already there but somewhat crude

.

We would have to assess the effectiveness of Tirpitzs flak shoots again FAA aircraft later in the war, which is not appropriate here. I have my dooubts that tirpitz was markedly better against the second generation FAA aircraft of the war, such as firefly or Avenger.

 

[Siegfried]

I would question the accuracy of Tollands article in some regards.

The Swordfish did not attack at 75mph. In fact they entered a dive iniiated from about 4000-5000 yards that gave them considerable speed and helped them evade an attack.

The 15 swordsifish did not approach to 700m, that was at least the track run length of the torpedo the closest they got was about 1000m.

They swordfish did not attack individually, they attacked in flights of 3 though as some got seperated and they attacked individually of course this tends to split the defences.

The Swordfish disappeared between waves and could often not been seen.

The reason that "light flak" was not used much by PoW was not so much the 1500m range that the Japanese used to release their torpedos but that the that the light FLAK was the 40mm Pom Pom which had a low muzzle velocity and desultary ballistics not better than the 20mm C38 used on German quad guns. The 40mm Boffors was an infinetly better weapon.

Tirpitz repelled the 12 Alabacore Torpedo bombers in March 1942 and sot down 2 by that time she had the following advantages over Bismark
1 4 modern triaxial directors instead of just two proiperly integrated into the FLAK system.

2 Her 8 triaxially stablised heavy FLAK gun mounts were all of the same type and fully debugged.
3 Her concentration of light FLAK had been increased by subsituting twin 2.0cm guns with a new type of gun with twice the rate of fire in a quad mount and increasing the number of mounts.
4 Her radar was far more deeply integrated into her FLAK systems.
5 Her 3 Seetakt radars now had precision direction finding due to a type of lobe switching and could detect the bearing of a target to within a fraction of a degree though they could not yet provide elevation data.

One 'myth' is that the allies had vastly better radar, blind fire radar and systems than the Germans did or rather than Bismarck did at that time.

The reality however is that these miracle allied devices only came in to service much latter in the war when the Germans had also introduced some of them.

PoW was unable to defend itself; the bomber may havd been faster but she had the advantage of calm seas, good visibillity (except for partial could cover for the level bombers on one run)

The extreme torpedo parameters you cite are not simultaenous and require tight constaints: a release at low altitude requires a slower release for instance as does one at high altitude.


The kind of radar systems needed to repell torpedo bombers did not exist in the RN or KM in the first half of the war. That only 4 torpedoes sunk PoW is remarkable when one considers that Bismarck needed to be scuttled after a dozen hits.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I would question the accuracy of Tollands article in some regards.

The Swordfish did not attack at 75mph. In fact they entered a dive iniiated from about 4000-5000 yards that gave them considerable speed and helped them evade an attack.

Can you tell us what "considerable speed" is?

From memory, a Swordfish drops its torpedo at a very slow speed, even in a dive you're not looking at much more than 100 mph. It had a top speed of 139 mph, and with a torpedo under it's belly it wasn't flying even close to that speed, so enlighten us!

 

[Juha]

A dozen torpedo hits on Bismarck?
the 9 torpedoplanes fron Victorious during the night 24-25 May got one midship hit, on 26 May the 15 Swordfish from Ark Royal got 2 hits, CA HMS Dorsetshire hit her twice IIRC, that makes 5 torpedo hits.

And PoW was hit by 6 or 7 torpedoes. And there are torpedo hits and torpedo hits, the first hit on PoW happened at the worst possible place, near a propeller shaft strut, that hit had catastrophic consequences. There were also some serious design flaws in the torpedo defence system of PoW, that's true.

Juha

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Also, the cocks had been opened, and the scuttling charges fired, before Dorsetshire hit Bismarck.

 

[parsifal]

I dont think ther is any argument that the bismarck was tough ship,,, tougher than the PoW. However this toughnes did not save her, and she was disabled with far less aircraft, using less effective torpedo ordinance.

What the two events plus the experiences at Pearl and Taranto did was to prove the basic obsolescence of Battleships unsupported by air cover. Ther was no such thing as an impregnable defence for Battleships.

That applies to both the allies and the Axis fleets. Arguing that this defensive system, or that defensive system was impregnabale, or vastly improved is a nonsense when you break down every engagement against undefended battleships. Sometimes losses were higher, sometimes the attackers missed, the germans in protecting their last remaining battleship (the tirpitz) were particulalry good at this. But then Tirpitz was, as a generalization not used except as a"fleet in being" which gave special and significant advantages to the Germans, which I suspect were more significant than her technological improvements.

I think the Allied experiences were more relevant to the development of Naval Warfare in the latter part of the war. Battleships were relegated to act as part of the screen, providing AA support to the new capital ships, the carriers. Here their inherent stability and heavy firepower were significant. Sth Dakota is credited with the greatest number of victories in a single day....14 a/c shot down (for which she received a unit citation). by far the most important role for flak until the arrival of the kamikaze was to break up attacks and decrease the accuracy of the bombers. CAP was at least as important in defensive measures, and really came into its own fighting the Kamikazes.

All of this is interesting, and gives some indication as to the capabilities and future directions of the fleet defence problem in the war. It still doesnt explain why the bismarcks effort was so poor in comparison to later efforts by the germans themselves, or the Allied examples that been chosen. sure, there were some mitigations, like the poor weather, but IMO the flak from the Bismarck should have been more effective than it was. Bad weather is even more of an issue for the aircraft flying in it than the flak firing at those aircraft, yet the Swordfish achieveed a hit ratio far higher than anything we have looked at yet. It gets back to this issue....was the low speed of a swordfish something the Germans had not accurately taken into account at that stage? What caused this debate was johns claim that the the speed was not an issue. if not, what was the issue that made the Bismarcks shooting so poor as it was.

 

[Siegfried]

A dozen torpedo hits on Bismarck?
the 9 torpedoplanes fron Victorious during the night 24-25 May got one midship hit, on 26 May the 15 Swordfish from Ark Royal got 2 hits, CA HMS Dorsetshire hit her twice IIRC, that makes 5 torpedo hits.

And PoW was hit by 6 or 7 torpedoes. And there are torpedo hits and torpedo hits, the first hit on PoW happened at the worst possible place, near a propeller shaft strut, that hit had catastrophic consequences. There were also some serious design flaws in the torpedo defence system of PoW, that's true.

Juha

PoW was hit by only 4 torpedos not 5 or more. The wreck has been investigated, you are using older out of date sources.

Bismarck was hit by a minimum of 6 with over 9 claimed. Non threatened her hull integrity.

She was scuttled when she no longer had reasonably functioning weapons to fight back.

Here is a list of all known/possible torpedo hits (not counting claims by Vian's destroyers ) as may by Jose' Rico who runs the KBismarck forum.

24 May. Midnight. Hit by one 18 inch MK XII torpedo on the starboard side, amidships.

26 May. 2047-2115 hours. Hit by two (or three) 18 inch MK XII torpedoes. One torpedo (or two) hit the port side amidships, and another hit the stern in the starboard side. As a result of this attack both rudders jammed at 12º to port. Lütjens only reported 2 hits but Müllenheim-Rechberg always said that he heard 2 hits before the final hit in the stern.

27 May. 0958 hours. Possible torpedo hit to port. Rodney claimed a hit; the Germans deny it.

27 May. 1000 hours. Possible hit to the starboard side. Claimed by Norfolk; the Germans deny it.

27 May. 1022 hours. Hit on the starboard side by two 21 inch MK VII torpedoes fired by Dorsetshire from 3,000 meters (3,280 yards).

27 May. 1037 hours. Hit on the port side by one 21 inch MK VII torpedo fired by Dorsetshire from 2,200 meters (2,400 yards).

27 May. 1039 hours. Bismarck sinks.

 

[Juha]

Hello Siegfried
my source on PoW was Garzke's and Dulin's Battleships. Allied Battleships in WW II (1990 corrected and updated edition), the survey of the wreck was made in 1966 IIRC, so what was your source?

Juha

 

[Siegfried]

I dont think ther is any argument that the bismarck was tough ship,,, tougher than the PoW. However this toughnes did not save her, and she was disabled with far less aircraft, using less effective torpedo ordinance.

What the two events plus the experiences at Pearl and Taranto did was to prove the basic obsolescence of Battleships unsupported by air cover. Ther was no such thing as an impregnable defence for Battleships.

It still doesnt explain why the bismarcks effort was so poor in comparison to later efforts by the germans themselves, or the Allied examples that been chosen. sure, there were some mitigations, like the poor weather, but IMO the flak from the Bismarck should have been more effective than it was. Bad weather is even more of an issue for the aircraft flying in it than the flak firing at those aircraft, yet the Swordfish achieveed a hit ratio far higher than anything we have looked at yet. It gets back to this issue....was the low speed of a swordfish something the Germans had not accurately taken into account at that stage? What caused this debate was johns claim that the the speed was not an issue. if not, what was the issue that made the Bismarcks shooting so poor as it was.

Bismark's FLAK system was quite capable of taking on any aircraft of any speed. The claim that her computers were unable to take into account the Swordfish's slow speed is simply not true.

The Bismarcks FLAK predictors (the two forward ones) were among the most advanced in the world at the time and her systems more advanced than the RN's HACS. They were triaxially stabalised (not just biaxially), they had optics to accuately measure azimuth, elevation and range of target referenced to gyroscopic north and taking into account the ships considerable 30 knot speed. This tracked information was converted from spherical co-ordinates to cartesian by an analog computer and then the velocity in 3D measured. The system was what is called fully "tachymetric" in that it not only measured the position of the target but its speed as well. These conversions were usually done using 3D cams for ballistics, trigonometric data with the x,y,z co-ordinates and u,v,w speeds represented as shaft turns. The position of the aircraft could then be 'synthesised' for any time in the future, (ie the system was 'synthetic'). Ballistics data encoded on to cams (eg superelevation and shell flight time) was then used to obtain a firing solution: an intitial estimate allowing for time to set the fuze and load the shell was entered into thr system and this told us where the aircraft would be in x seconds time. This point was aimed for and the flight time used to setr the fuse and set a firing time. The solution was conveted to spherical co-orindates and passed to the guns which were also physically triaxially stablised guns.

2 The problem was that bismark had only 2 of the 4 intended directors (temporarily) since the advanced ones were sent to the USSR this allowed the 15 swordfish respite from the more effective directors.

3 The 4 rear FLAK turrets MAY have had a technical problem that prevented them from firing at low or surface targets: it was an alignment isssue that bugged the new powr controlled rear 4 10.5cm flak.. See the AVKS 700 report.

So Bismark basically went to sea with the whole rear half of her FLAK not fully functional due to an inferior temporary director, a new FLAK mount with teething issues that prevented half her guns firing at low flying or surface targets and incomplete integration of the FLAK with the radar especially with the rear, more elemental directors.

4 In addition here twin 2.0cm C30 FLAK had not been yet upgraded to quad 2.0cm C38 FLAK guns which had 4 times the rate of sustained fire.

5 Finally the high level of radar integraion and high level of radar accuracy required was not yet in place. No navy had this though the RN had been very foresightfull in pushing type 282 radars into its pom pom directors at the time these lacked high precision and lobe switching.

Radar needed to be dramatically improved with range accuracy better than 10 meters. The German Wurzburg D was close to this in mid 1941 but not generally fitted to ships. It was likely around 1943-44 the neccesssary radar performance started to become available.

 

[Siegfried]

Hello Siegfried
my source on PoW was Garzke's and Dulin's Battleships. Allied Battleships in WW II (1990 corrected and updated edition), the survey of the wreck was made in 1966 IIRC, so what was your source?

Juha

Several surveys since then, including publications in the royal institute of maritime architects.
Try:

http://www.pacificwrecks.com/ships/hms/prince_of_wales/pow-stern-damage.pdf

 

[vanir]

One of the KGV crew said that their biggest problem was that the KGV (and all ships in the class) were still being run up to full working status. They weren't quite there yet, and he said the entire RN was quite a bit intimidated by the fact the Bismarck hadn't been at sea for very long and was not only completely run up to battlefield prowess, but the gunnery was élite. He said they straddled every ship bearing on it without too much trouble by the second volley, the KGV withdrew when one of the turrets lost action (malfunction, problems with the rangefinders on all of them too, other details you people know more than me). The impression I got was that he, speaking for the RN as he claimed was very scared of that ship.

You guys know way more about this than me, so excuse me if I'm piping in with extreme ignorance.

 

[pbfoot]

One of the KGV crew said that their biggest problem was that the KGV (and all ships in the class) were still being run up to full working status. They weren't quite there yet, and he said the entire RN was quite a bit intimidated by the fact the Bismarck hadn't been at sea for very long and was not only completely run up to battlefield prowess, but the gunnery was élite. He said they straddled every ship bearing on it without too much trouble by the second volley, the KGV withdrew when one of the turrets lost action (malfunction, problems with the rangefinders on all of them too, other details you people know more than me). The impression I got was that he, speaking for the RN as he claimed was very scared of that ship.

You guys know way more about this than me, so excuse me if I'm piping in with extreme ignorance.

Its pretty easy when you have only one ship

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Here's a page with Swoardfish info.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ot...h/request-fairey-swordfish-manuals-19907.html

 

[parsifal]

Hi siegried


Well, if the Bismarcks AA suite was markedly inferior to her theoretical, or likley AA suite, we will need to have a look at the flak performance of her near sister, Tirpitz, on the few occasions that she was attacked. We may have to accept the inherent innacuracy of the situations that she was attacked in port, with all the land based assistance she derived from that, since there were only a few occasions when she was attacked at sea.

The RAF attacks in 1942

During 1942, there were four attempts made by the RAF to attack and sink the Battleship Tirpitz.

The first was on 30/31st January 1942 when Stirling aircraft from 15 and 149 Squadrons, along with Halifaxes from 10 and 76 Squadrons participated in 'Operation Oiled', an attack against the Tirpitz as she lay in Fættenfjord in Norway.

Flying from an advanced air base in Scotland (RAF Lossiemouth), seven Stirlings from 15 and 149 Squadrons took off at 0030 hrs. Weather conditions were not good with cloud from sea level to 20,000 feet. One of the Stirlings reported having seen the mast tops of Tirpitz, but was unable to gain sufficient height in order to drop it's bomb load. All the Stirlings returned safely to base. The Halifaxes, four from 10 Squadron and five from 76 Squadron started taking off at 0204 hrs. All four of the 10 Squadron aircraft had to return to base before reaching the target due to lack of fuel. The five 76 Squadron Halifaxes reached the target area, but weather conditions prevented them from locating the target. All aircraft returned to base with the exception of one 76 Squadron Halifax which ditched in the North Sea just off the coast from Aberdeen. The crew were all uninjured and were rescued by the Aberdeen Lifeboat.

On the night of 31 March 1942 34 a/c from BC and Coastal Command attacked the ship whilst she lay in asenfjord near Trondheim. 6 aircraft failed to return. The details of these losses are as follows:

From 10 Squadron:
W1043 ZA-F flown by Squadron Leader F D Webster DFC and crew and W1044 ZA-D flown by P/O Blunden and crew. No contact was had from either aircraft after leaving base, however, research shows that both these aircraft were shot down in the Hemnefjord area.

From 35 Squadron:
R.9438 TL-H, flown by F/Sgt Bushby and his crew. This aircraft had made it back over the North Sea almost to Shetland from the Tirpitz, but crashed in to cliffs at Fitful Head on Shetland killing all the crew.

R.9496 TL-L, flown by F/Sgt Archibald and crew, and W1015TL-P, flown by F/Sgt Steinhauer and crew were reported as missing. What happened to them was not observed by any other Squadron members, however, locals in Norway witnessed both these aircraft crash.

From 76 Squadron:
R9453 MP-K flown by Squadron Leader Burdett and crew were last heard from en route back to base passing over Sumburgh and are believed to have ditched in the sea somewhere off Sumburgh Head.

Despite their best efforts, little or no effective damage had been inflicted on Tirpitz during the March 30/31 attack.

As can be seen from the following map giving the positions of the aircraft lost in this raid, Tirptiz's defences had no impact on these losses

 

[parsifal]

In April 1942 there were two attacks on consecutive nights made by Halifaxes from 10, 35 and 76 Squadrons, and Lancasters from 44 and 97 Squadrons on the nights of 27/28th April and 28/29th April.

The attack on the 27/28 April cost 5 a/c. again however there is little evidence to support that Tirpitz was active in the defence. as the attached digram shows, she was heavily defended by land based defences, and subsequent PRU overflights showed no signs of near misses or hits. BC had completely missed the target.

The next night the same crews made another attempt the next night. Again the tirptiz played no active part in the defence, as the aircraft were subsequently found to have bombed Lofjord, some 5 miles to the North of the target. two aircraft were lost in this attack

 

[parsifal]

At 0917 on 9 March 1942 Tirpitz was attacked by the strike force of 12 torpedo-carrying Albacores under the command of Lieutenant-Commander W. J. Lucas from the aircraft carrier Victorious. The attack failed and 2 Albacores was shot down. . Much chastened but undamaged, Tirpitz continued at full speed for the shelter of Vestfjord/Bogen, where she arrived later the same day, while the remaining Albacores returned to Victorious.

The details of this attack are worth noting. The attacking air group was severely lacking in training, and attacked from downwind, and astern. The headwinds were recorded as "strong". i estimate above 40 mph headwinds with that description. The closing speed was, in any event below 50mph for the attacking Albacores, which made the attackers extremely vulnerable. the lack of training meant the attackers were not low enough to take advanatage of the rough seas. Torpedoes were the newer Mk XV which had roughly twice the explosive power of the pld Mk XIIs, and a launch range of about 1750 yds. It is believed the Albacores launched at about 1400 yds....considerably further out than the Ark Royals CAG.

However, in credit to the tirpittzs AA crews they did shoot down two a/c and there were no torpedo hits. I would argue the lack of hits was more likley the low level of training for the crews more than enything, but the a/c losses are undeniable. very hard to say and highly debataebale that the tirpitz's AA suite had anything to do with his however.

The attack from first engagement took about 20 mins to complete. The attacking albacores, because of their very slow rate of closure, spent a long time within the firing zone of the battleship. I would dispute that the AA fit had much to do with the improved kill rate of the tirpitz that day

Ther was never another opportunity to attack the tirpitz at sea. All subsequent attempts were made whilst she was in harbour, with all the additional protection that afforded her.

Perhaps the best reaction as to the effectiveness of the tirptiz's defences can be gleaned from Admiral Ciliax's reaction. he was thoroughly shaken by the experience, and displayed a marked reluctance to risk the great ship again in similar circumstances. Hitler henceforth would not allow German heavy ships to operate at sea if Allied carriers were known to be about.

 

[parsifal]

03 April 1944: At 0528, Tirpitz is attacked by 40 bombers from the carriers Victorious, Furious, Emperor, Searcher, Fencer, and Pursuer. She is hit by 10 bombs of 225 kg and 4 of 775 kg. 132 dead and 316 wounded.

By 1944 tirpitz presented an exceptionally difficult target. She was firmly ensconced behind multiple torpedo nets, and was birthed close to cliffs in a very narrow fjord. There were numerous smoke generators to hide her. in additin to the 68 guns of her own defences she was protected by well over 100 shore based guns, land based radar and searchlights

The bombers on this occasion was the Barracuda....attack speed 172mph, able to carry 2000 lbs of bombs, able to act either as a a torpedo bomber, level bomber or divebomber.

The air plan for the attack was complex. 2 strikes were to be made by 2 wings of 21 Barracuda torpedo dive-bombers, No. 8 wing normally in Furious and No. 52 wing in Victorious, but to meet the requirements of the flying programme it was necessary to use both carriers simultaneously. In order that the wings should fly together 1 squadron from each wing had to be exchanged between the carriers, so for this operation 827 squadron was housed in Victorious in place of 831 squadron who went to Furious. To obtain the maximum effect on Tirpitz it was decided to use 4 types of bomb. 11 aircraft were each to carry three 227 kg (500 lb) SAP, 5 aircraft one 726 kg (1,600 lb) AP, and 5 aircraft either three 227 kg (500 lb) MC or 272 kg (600 lb) A/S bombs. Released from above 1,067 meter (3,500 feet) the 726 kg (1,600 lb) AP bombs were calculated to pierce the battleship's armoured deck, from 610 meter (2,000 feet) the 227 kg (500 lb) bombs should pierce the upper deck and do serious damage above the armoured deck, the 227 kg (500 lb) MC bombs were primarily for effect against personnel manning the AA guns and were therefore carded in the first aircraft to attack in each strike, and the 272 kg (600 lb) A/S bombs would have the same effect if they hit or if near misses should do underwater damage. In the actual attack 9 aircraft of the first strike carried 227 kg (500 lb) SAP and seven 726 kg (1,600 lb) AP and in the second strike 13 aircraft carried 227 kg (500 lb) SAP and only 3 carried 726 kg (1,600 lb) AP. Because of the light wind at take-off only two, not three, 272 kg (600 lb) A/S bombs could be carried per Barracuda.


Victorious was also to fly off 10 Corsairs with each strike to act as fighter escort for the Barracudas and because she was operating more aircraft than she was designed to do the first strike had to be parked on deck for some time prior to take off, an undesirable necessity as the deck was very wet and spray and sleet were freezing on it. Detailed briefing of all the air-crews had been carried out while at sea on 1 April.


At 0416 the first of the Corsairs of 1834 squadron took off from Victorious, followed 8 minutes later by the Barracudas of 827 and 830 squadrons (No. 8 Wing) from the 2 fleet carriers. At the same time 20 Wildcats took off from Searcher and Pursuer and 10 Hellcats from Emperor (800, 881 and 882 squadrons) while Seafires from Furious and Wildcats from Fencer formed a protective umbrella over the force. By 0437 the aircraft had formed up and headed 120° for their target.

As the strike was approaching her, Tirpitz was weighing anchor before going to sea on more post-repair trials. The second anchor was coming in when it was seen that the smoke screen ashore was beginning and 32 aircraft were reported as heading south at a distance of 69 kilometer (43 miles). The alarm was sounded, guns manned and at 0528 the first aircraft were in sight while only a very thin smoke screen covered the fjord. No fire had been observed as the aircraft had flown over a destroyer and merchantman in Lange Fjord but flak began to interfere with the attackers some 5 kilometer (3 miles) from their target. As Tirpitz first sighted the aircraft they were beginning their attack. The Corsairs remained at 3,048 meter (10,000 feet) to cover the Barracudas against counter-attack but the Wildcats and Hellcats came in low over the hills, straffing the battleship with 0.5 machine-gun fire as the Barracudas began their bombing dives at 0529. The attack was made in 2 columns along the fore-and-aft line of the target as practice had shown that errors of range exceeded errors of line. The bombs were meant to be dropped from a height above 914 (3,000 feet) meter to ensure the penetration of the armoured deck but in their enthusiasm and determination to achieve accuracy most of the pilots dived much lower than this. The attack lasted exactly 1 minute. There were 6 direct hits and 3 probable hits and the battleship's upper deck was left bloody with wounded men.

As the first strike were attacking the second strike were taking off. 19 Barracudas from 829 and 831 squadrons (No. 52 Wing), 10 Corsairs from 1826 squadron, 19 Wildcats from 896 and 898 squadrons and 10 Hellcats from 804 squadron. At 0537 they formed up and made for Tirpitz whose smoke screen was visible when they were still 64 kilometer from the target. This proved to be no deterrent. At 0635 the Hellcats again attacked the battleship's AA positions on flak suppression while the Wildcats sprayed the unprotected bridge and upper deck with bullets for a minute before the Barracudas came in to the attack. By 0637 it was again all over, 8 definite and 5 probable hits being claimed, but the 726 kg (1,600 lb) bomb which hit the bows failed to explode. The fighters followed the example of their predecessors by again shooting up the German ships and shore installations as they presented themselves on the return flight. There was no interference from the German Air Force. By 0758 all the aircraft had landed back on their carriers except for 2 Barracudas shot down, 1 in each strike, and 1 damaged Hellcat deliberately ditched. British casualties were 9 killed.

Vice-Admiral Moore had planned to repeat the attack on the next day but in view of the damage caused to Tirpitz and the fatigue and reaction of his air-crews after so successful an attack he revised his original intention and ordered a return to base. By 1630 6 April 1944 most of the force was back in Scapa Flow, with only Searcher, who had an engine defect, and the fleet oilers and their escorts remaining to come safely home some 10 hours later.

Given the above results...just two aircraft hit by flak, and 14 confirmed hits from 40 aircraft, I do not concur that the tirpitz displayed a marked improvement over ther bismarck in her defensive arrangements. perhaps we should add this to the list of myths in this thread. Compared to the performance of the Soth Dakota in a similar time period....14 kills, the performance of the tirpittz was positively miserable

 

[Siegfried]

. Compared to the performance of the Soth Dakota in a similar time period....14 kills, the performance of the tirpittz was positively miserable

If the smoke generators are working the attack aircraft can't see the Tirpitz and the Tirpitz can see them. In this case the smoke generators had been switched on too late and did more to protect the aircraft than the tirpitz.

The Tirpitz's claims are solid. The practice of straffing and FLAK suppression had become common. Extra armouring to protect the FLAK crews aboard Tirpitz had been placed but not delivered and so many of the Tirpitz's FLAK crew were killed. Sth Dakotas claimed kills no doubt need to be taken with a grain of salt. USAAF B-17 gunners once claimed over 100 kills when precisely 2 aircraft had been lost; this tends to happen with multiple gunners firing at the same target and claiming the same kill. I say the claim is on the nose.

Attacks against Tirpitz on 22 August cost 2 Barracudas and 4 corsairs.

In December 1944, the Sth Dakota's battery was upgraded, with 72 20mm and 72 Bofors. Sth Dokota original AAA armament was weak: much weaker than the earlier Bismarck's.

 

[parsifal]

Sth Dakotas claimed kills no doubt need to be taken with a grain of salt

The claim for 14 kills is already an adjusted figure for the South Dakota, based on a study made after the action itself. It can be considered as accurate a tally as can be achieved. The claimed figures were 26 shoot downs. Moreover, this exceptional day was nowheree near her late war AA update. She achieved this tally during the Battle Of Santa Cruz.....26 October 1942


"The first enemy attack was concentrated against the Hornet. South Dakota operated near the Enterprise to provide her protective fire against the attacking aircraft. At 1045 Task Force 16 was attacked by a group of dive bombers. Approximately an hour later the task force was again attacked, this time by some 40 torpedo bombers. A third aerial assault was made with both dive bombers and torpedo bombers, coming in at 1230. South Dakota suffered a 550 lb (250 kg) bomb hit on top of her number one turret. When the action was broken off that evening, the American forces retired toward Nouméa, New Caledonia. The South Dakota was credited with downing 26 enemy planes. She had fired 890 rounds of 5 inch, 4000 rounds of 40mm, 3000 rounds of 1.1 inch and 52000 rounds of 20mm ammunition during the action. Captain Gatch made the following assessment of the relative effectiveness of each weapon type in bringing down enemy aircraft during the action: 5 inch: 5%, 40mm and 1.1 inch: 30% and 20mm: 65%

Sth Dakotas effort is not comparable to the long range efforts by either Bismarck, Tirpitz or Force Z. The Japanese on that day were pressing home their attacks with fanatical determination, closing to point blank range in an attampt to get to the carriers. They succeeded in one instance by sinking the Hornet, they failed against the enterprise. Despite that her efforts are impressive, and demonstrate, by operational results that her AA suite and Fire Control arrangements were far superior to anything any of the other combatants possessed, including the Germans.

In December 1944, the Sth Dakota's battery was upgraded, with 72 20mm and 72 Bofors. Sth Dokota original AAA armament was weak: much weaker than the earlier Bismarck's.

Thats interesting. The record set by BB57 occurred in October 1942, just 10 days after she had been declared operational in the Pacific. At that time she had 40x 40mm or 1.1 in, and 40 x 20mm plus her as built 5/38 AA suite. She did not have the later AA directos that were also fitted later in the war.

Even with, as you describe it "an AA suite far weaker than the Bismarcks", she outperformed the German ships (ie both Bismarck with, as you claim her inferior AA directors, and Tirpitz with, as you claim her improved AA arrangements) ships by many orders of magnitude. On the day of her record, Enterprise survived an attack by close to 100 attackers, determined, well trained, and fanatical. bismarck was hit 15 attackers and missed every one of them, allowing the attackers to close to 731 yards in one case (and an average of 1000 yds before release according to you). In the case of Tirptiz, in two seprate incidents, one at sea, and one with another 100 guns to support her own effort, she shot down 4 aircraft out of 92 possible targets, travelling more slowly.

The Tirpitz's claims are solid

How? There is no evidence to this point to support that. For all the effort put into her, we currently have a score of 4 a/c for her gun crews. There were destroyers in both the USN and the RN with better tallies than that. I have the details of her September efforts and will post them separately once I have dug them out

I am amazed that you would cling so stubbornly to the claim she (the Tirpitz) was an effective AA platform even when confronted with evidence like this. sure, in theory she had an impressive AA defence, but its the results you need to stop and have a glance at. Her efforts in the field are not good. Neither were her sisters. Despite all the sophistication that you talk about, and the expense that you dont, she was not very successful at all in conducting AA defences.

 

[Juha]

Several surveys since then, including publications in the royal institute of maritime architects.
Try:

http://www.pacificwrecks.com/ships/hms/prince_of_wales/pow-stern-damage.pdf

Thanks for the interesting link, still better one is this http://www.pacificwrecks.com/ships/hms/prince_of_wales/death-of-a-battleship-a-re-anlaysis.pdf

So it seems that there was only 4 torpedo hits plus damage from several near misses. But as I wrote the first hit, on port side near stern, was into worst possible place and had catastrophic consequences, as shown by the fact that even if PoW got 3 more hits on her starboard side it capsized to port even if the effectiveness of her starboard side anti-torpedo system was weakened by counterflooding before the 3 hits.

Juha