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So....how was the F-15 cockpit heat?
The V1 had a guidance system called Ewald II under testing, the 3 ground stations for the first one had already been built. Ewald I was a beacon mounted on 5% of V1 at the beginning of the campaign and 50% at the end. Ewald was a simple beacon meant to allow correction of the aim of subsequent missile. However Ewald II was a proper midcourse guidance system. At a certain point on the missiles flight path Ewald would emit a single coded radar pulse at a predetermined time and 3 ground stations would calculate the missiles position from the time difference. There are few if any ways of jamming this kind of transmission since there is no IFF interrogation pulse to trigger spoofing of . The ground stations would then calculate a correction and this would be sent as single set of impulses and recorded on an endless loop magnetic tape on the V1. Accuracy would depend on how close to target the course correction was made but if actual midcourse of the V1 max range it was probably 2km but if within say 10km I imagine about 1% of that.
Ewald II had been developed for the BV246 Haggelkorn (Hailstone) glide bomb but was not ready in time. The missile was developed with the "Radischien" (Raddish) radio/radar homing seeker but I think it would have made a reappearance when the Ewald II system was operational. Range was about 150km when launched from a Fw 190.
Extended range versions of the V1 either used a reduced warhead or a disposable turbojet that Porsche and BMW were developing 109-005. The reduced vibration would have increased accuracy. Vibration caused difficulty.
The plain pulse jet was also receiving improvements and was expected to exceed 830km (500mph) at sea level. Most V1 developed reed valve faults within minutes of launch that dropped their speed from 390 mph to within the interception envelop of allied aircraft.
The most accurate long range missile probably would have been the A4b winged version of the V2. Not only could it be guided midcourse it could be manoeuvred during it terminal phase and was to have an accuracy of better than 80m. It used a giant Wassermann early warning radar laid on its side. The early V2 with the LEV-3 guidance system had a theoretical capability of 4.5km accuracy when tested (worse due to double cross system) but the SG-66 gimballed system with better gyros was expected to get a CEP of 500m radius as was the vollzirkel boost phase beam riding guidance system.
The V1 and V2 put in to service with interim guidance systems nearly 9 times less accurate than the ones they were intended to ultimately receive.
Isn't it pressurized and air conditioned? They need the air for the g-suit, and the electronics like to be kept comfy.So....how was the F-15 cockpit heat?
Isn't it pressurized and air conditioned? They need the air for the g-suit, and the electronics like to be kept comfy.
Wait! Am I getting my F-15s confused?
Just don't forget to heat the windscreen if descending after a long cruise at high altitude ...
My claim still stands, no Spitfire ever appeared with heated guns before September 1942 so the JU89 would have been invincible over the UK 1939-1942
It clear that the Ju 89 could have been a 4 engine bomber about as good as the Lancaster or Halifax especially as better engines became available and it might directly evolved into a Ju 289 with a 4000 mile range.
The other issue is, of course, that high altitude bombers couldn't reliably hit a target much smaller than a major city. Before PGM, accurate high-altitude bombing was more myth than reality.
You have become really confused between "I found a map of oil" and "here is where the Luftwaffe got aviation fuel from".
The vast majority of Luftwaffe fuels came from three sources only:
1) Prewar imports (gone by 1941)
2) Captured stocks (all used up in Russia)
3) The hydrogenation plants
A miniscule proportion came from crude oil obtained from Germany or other nations, its actually so small that I cant even quantify it
because it resides in the "other" category of the charts and graphs.
SNIP.
As was stated earlier, the USSR can relocate their factories as far away from the front as needed to be kept out of range from any bomber force. Assuming a critical 1941-1943 timeline, there is still no long range fighter escort in existence that would be able to mitigate mission losses.
It is pressurized and air conditioned. Good ole MacAir looked out for us pilot types. Bleed air was used for pressurization, external tanks to force them to feed, heating & cooling, G suit and chest suit (I never plugged that damn thing in), as well as canopy defog and external water removal (no windshield wiper, just high speed air blown over the exterior windscreen). If you left the canopy heat on too long you could melt the windscreen.
Cheers,
Biff
They (the Allies) didnt really understand the sources of German aviation Gasoline until very late in the war (although many guessed correctly). They knew there were synthetic plants, but didnt know which ones were being used and in what capacity for which fuel type. (eg. almost none of the Fisher-Tropsch synthetic plants output went into aviation fuel).
Its a bit difficult to separate bombing coal and the sythetic fuel plants as they BUILT the synthetic plants next to all the major coal mines. (for obvious reasons).
As an aside, before the war one engineer (Professor Steinmann at Berlin Hochschule) said "hmm maybe we shouldnt put all the fuel plants OVER ground next to the coal mines as it will be really obvious were they are..."
The Nazi leadership replied "Nah.. it`ll be fine!"
Research tip, if you want to understand Luftwaffe fuels - read up on the "Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft", which had NOTHING to do with Economic Research and was basically a cover-name for the Luftwaffe/Wehrmacht/Kriegsmarine fuel distribution network; but in reality ended up basically mostly a tool of the Luftwaffe.
It was not so simple. Please consider what has happened in real history.
1. USSR has relocated a lot of factories that were threatened by German ground advances, indeed. At the same time, the industry in non-occupied areas remained where it was, with very little exception. To move all factories just to avoid bombing raids was a luxury the Soviets could not afford economically. Aviation works, for example, once moved, could not return to normal production schedule for many months. I dare say that such a project would be more costly and longer than the relocation of the UK factories to Canada.
2. USSR had vast territories but with poor infrastructure. There were not so many places in the rear where the factories could be relocated or built up from scratch. Power supply, raw materials, reliable railway link, enough rolling stock, qualified labour force, etc... It was all in deficit.
3. Historically, Luftwaffe bomber force operated almost with impunity against major Soviet industrial centres within the range, except Moscow and Leningrad.
Soviet PVO has failed to protect factories even in such important cities as Gorky (including its famous GAZ), Yaroslavl, Saratov.
According to this excellent book (I wish it was translated in English) www.shorturl.at/hnop1 operation Carmen II of Luftwaffe in June 1943 resulted in the loss of production of almost 2,000 tanks (mostly T-34) and of 20,000 metric tons of fuels in that year, complete stoppage of T-80 tank production, immediate loss of 31,000 metric tons of fuel, etc. Just for comparison: combined fuel stock of 5 fronts of the Red Army before the Kursk Battle was about 21,000 metric tons.
Tire factory in Yaroslavl (the main supplier of tires and wheels for artillery) did not resume production until September 1943.
GAZ has stopped for almost 2 months and its annual output of tanks, trucks, APC, and of various supplies to other plants has dropped by from 150% to 400% between the categories, according to official statistics (which were considered too "optimistic" by post-Soviet historians).
Saratov air factory No.292 has reached the pre-bombing rate only in October.
Flour mills in Gorky stayed idle until September leaving the Red Army and Leningrad without 200,000 metric tons of flour.
Critically affected was the production of ball bearings, artillery units, ammunition, components of aircraft and tank, and not just in the bombed areas but all across the network of the factories. Etc...
Losses of Luftwaffe: 17 aircraft of 733. Bombing raids from 04th to 22nd June, in the night time, without fighter escorts.
So, in the nutshell.
Yes, the relocation was possible but it was of enormous difficulty for the USSR.
German bomber force consisting of Ju-88 and He-111, once given the task, could hit the Soviet industry very hard and met very little opposition.
So, why didn't it happen? The Ju 89 was far too slow, terribly defended and with a bomb load less than that of an He 111, I doubt it most sincerely.
SNIP
Both these aircraft would have had a 20mm tail gun or two and caused considerably times more loses to the RAF fighters than the rifle calibre MG15 and MG81 on the He 111, Do 17Z and Ju 88A1. The rifle calibre guns had minimal effect and one imagines the MG131 had it been in service might have caused more harm and been more effective.
I totally agree with this plus the slower rate of fire and the gun being far more cumbersome to handle. In addition the arc of fire of a 20mm would be far less due to the much bigger bulk of the 20mm breach inside the very limited space inside the bomber. Reloading the gun would be a major issue as well as early war 20mm were drum fed.The trouble is you would still have a bloke standing behind the gun trying to calculate the lead and deflection angles of a Spit or Hurri flying in three dimensional space in the fractions of a second it took them to flash by while he himself is doing the same, the most likely outcome of fitting 20mm cannons in a 1940's bomber would be the gunners would miss with bigger bullets.
They key however, as I see it is you need a long range escort, that could be the drop tanks on the Bf 109 and Bf 110 but I suspect the Fw 190 with Jumo 211 or DB601 would be needed for long range.
The trouble is you would still have a bloke standing behind the gun trying to calculate the lead and deflection angles of a Spit or Hurri flying in three dimensional space in the fractions of a second it took them to flash by while he himself is doing the same, the most likely outcome of fitting 20mm cannons in a 1940's bomber would be the gunners would miss with bigger bullets.
He 177 didn't show up until they had the Mg 151, however the very early He 177s only had an MG 131 in the tail.How did that work in the He177, at least some of which had a 20 mm gun for the tail gunner?
Since the Luftwaffe is now flying heavier bombers over Britain, how much earlier will the RAF get 20 mm guns into its Spitfires?