WWII air war myths

According to Hooton, Eagle in Flames, the Luftwaffe flew 15,330 bomber sorties against Britain from 1 July - 29 September. There were 8,200 bomber sorties in October, 7,050 in November, 4,100 in December, total 34,680

Bomber Command flew 2338 sorties in July, 2605 in August, 3239 in September, 2414 in October, 2007 in November, 1441 in December, total 14,044

Total BC sorties for the whole of 1940 were 22,743, still far below what the Luftwaffe flew against Britain alone in the second half of the year.

As to fighter numbers, the Luftwaffe had a large superiority in front line fighters at the start of the BoB. Britain had more aircraft in storage than the Germans, but total numbers were still in Germany's favour. The Luftwaffe had nearly all their fighter force deployed along the channel facing 11 Group, which had only about 40% of the RAF's deployed fighters.

Thanks for those numbers on bomber sorties. I thought as much but was going to look them up before posting,not something I can do at work

Your last sentence is exactly the point I've been trying to make.

Cheers
Steve

How many RAF Coastal Command sorties were flown in that area?

davparlr said:

The Japanese were impressed by the attackers courage but not their expertise, dropping their torpedoes too far out. No damage was done.

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Just a footnote on these torpedo-bombers. My dad's buddy piloted these TBF/TBMs. These planes had to come in very low to the water--I'm talking under 50', or so--just to deploy their "fish" effectively. What's more, they had to come in "broadside," or, i.e., in this case, right into the mouth of those carriers' guns.

That's all to say, I don't know that I'm too eager to buy into the inference that these torpedo-bomber pilots were somehow inadequate. It does make sense to me that they aborted their torpedoes too soon, however, given what they were up against.

davebender said:

How many RAF Coastal Command sorties were flown in that area?

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And Missions flown by Avro Ansons or Lockheed Hudsons count as WHAT in the BoB, target opportunities for the Luftwaffe?

Should we count HE 59 or Arado 196 missions flown in the area?

Maybe we should tot up the Luftwaffe's Air-Sea rescue missions too

Steve

BC and CC flew the following operational sorties in 1940 9takeen from varley, reading a graph...so figures are accurate, ut approximate

Jan: 150
Feb: 175
Mar: 310
Apr; 740
May: 2300
Jun: 3100
Jul: 2200
Aug: 2450
Sep: 3100
Oct: 2400
Nov: 1900
Dec: 1250

I dont have a full set of figures for FC or the LW. however the LW flew over 4000 sorties in the last week of may alone. They flew a similar number in the days around Adlertag, and one source claims the LW flew 88000 sorties during the BoB.


The figures that I do have for FC show that in May they flew 4500 sorties, and on adlertag, they flew about 900 sorties

Al the evidence point to the lW heavily outnumbering the RAF in terms of available frontline strength, and by extension in the sortie rates thay were able to maintain until the last week of September, when they really began to fall away badly

Sorties per day

Jan: 150 > 5 per day
Feb: 175 > 6 per day
Mar: 310 > 10 per day
Apr: 740 > 25 per day
May: 2300 > 74 per day
Jun: 3100 > 103 per day
Jul: 2200 > 71 per day
Aug: 2450 > 79 per day
Sep: 3100 > 103 per day
Oct: 2400 > 77 per day
Nov: 1900 > 63 per day
Dec: 1250 > 40 per day

muscogeemike said:

What about:
4. The Japanese always greatly outnumbered the USMC in the Pacific
5. The China Air Task Force and the 14th AF were "Flying Tigers"

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Just to nitpick at a couple.

4. But who really says that? Moreover it implies this is a misconception specific to the Marines which I don't buy either. Japanese ground forces were outnumbered almost all the time 1937-1945, win, lose or draw, in terms of OOB strength in overall campaigns or battles. And I think this is broadly recognized in case of all the later Allied offensive campaigns, and fairly well recognized that it was true even in most of the early Japanese offensives. There might be a few cases where there is such a myth, or arguably so (eg Wake, where the Marine force has often been described as outnumbered, though the Japanese landing component in the final attack was comparable in number to the Marine defending force, clearly outnumbered by the total of Americans on the island; OTOH the Japanese had the support of significant naval/air contingent but the Marines no outside help, and lots of men in those ship crews). But even to the extent there is a misconception about Japanese land force numbers, I don't think it would be specific to battles v the Marines.

5. This is a matter of opinion. Veterans of the AVG and their famlies and partisans vehemently insisted/insist that the "Flying Tigers" moniker belongs only to them. The veterans of the CATF/14th AF disagreed, as did and do Chinese veterans of the Chinese-American Composite Wing(s) of the 14th AF. And in fact even today the US 14th AF, now the designation of the USAF component of US Space Command, still uses the nickname.

Here's an air myth: 'the key loss for the Japanese at Midway was all the air crews who went down with the carriers rather than the carriers themselves'.
In fact the Japanese lost per one detailed account exactly as many airmen at Midway as the US carrier force did (110 each IIRC), so the US actually lost more aviators counting the Marine and Army flyers from Midway Island v. just a handful of additonal non-carrier airmen (floatplane crews) lost by the IJN. And OTOH the Japanese hadn't really fully replaced those 4 carriers by the time of the Battle of Mariana in 1944, were weakened by mainly lower quality ersatz carriers. There was a more costly loss of a/c maintenance crews at Midway, and the IJN could less afford to lose even 110 carrier fliers than the USN could, but AFAIK there was a genuine longstanding myth that a large % of the aviators on those carriers had gone down with them, which was not true.

Joe

Joe


were the aircrews that were on the carriers that sank rescued? I believe your revelation, but it does come as a surprise

OK, how about the myth of the inherent superiority of German engineering over anything the Allies could come up with? And how the Allies just overwhelmed better equipment with masses of inferior planes? I have heard that bull since I was a little kid. And not just aircraft either, ships, guns, cook stoves, ad infinitum!

So the Allies DIDN'T overwhelm with numbers?

parsifal said:

Joe


were the aircrews that were on the carriers that sank rescued? I believe your revelation, but it does come as a surprise

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Not only rescued after or as the ships went down but non-essential personnel were removed in most cases even earlier as remaining crews tried to save the ships.

The breakdown of airmen given in Peattie "Sunburst" attribued to the research of Jim Sawruk in turn from the Japanese book 'Midowei Kaisen' and various other accounts and records where he apparently tracked it down to names of all air men present and those killed. I also give the total crew losses per other sources:
Akagi: 7 airmen (3 in the air, 4 went down with the ship), 263 total crew lost
Kaga: 21 (8 and 13), 814
Soryu: 10 (6 and 4), 713
Hiryu: 72 (64 and 8 ), 383
So it's not a myth that many men, 2000+, were lost when the ships went down, but only 29 were airmen. Of course only Hiryu was able to launch a strike v the US carriers which took heavy losses; the earlier strike on Midway by a/c from all 4 carriers, and the CAP actions, resulted in only moderate a/c and aircrew losses.

Joe

R Pope said:

OK, how about the myth of the inherent superiority of German engineering over anything the Allies could come up with? And how the Allies just overwhelmed better equipment with masses of inferior planes? I have heard that bull since I was a little kid. And not just aircraft either, ships, guns, cook stoves, ad infinitum!

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Sometimes the Allied equipment was better technically sometimes the Axis equipment was better. However the Allies with some exceptions could always afford to replace lost men and equipment something the Axis couldnt do with there much smaller resources. If the Germans had concentrated on churning out large numbers of standardised competent equipment as the Allies did I dont think the war would have gone any different.

It does come down to numbers in the end the Axis had to win quick or lose slow. The combined economic output of the US, the British Empire and Commonwealth and the Soviet Union was about 10 times greater than the Axis. Plus the Allies had free access to the Neutral worlds resources.

JoeB said:

JHere's an air myth: 'the key loss for the Japanese at Midway was all the air crews who went down with the carriers rather than the carriers themselves'.
In fact the Japanese lost per one detailed account exactly as many airmen at Midway as the US carrier force did (110 each IIRC), so the US actually lost more aviators counting the Marine and Army flyers from Midway Island v. just a handful of additonal non-carrier airmen (floatplane crews) lost by the IJN. And OTOH the Japanese hadn't really fully replaced those 4 carriers by the time of the Battle of Mariana in 1944, were weakened by mainly lower quality ersatz carriers. There was a more costly loss of a/c maintenance crews at Midway, and the IJN could less afford to lose even 110 carrier fliers than the USN could, but AFAIK there was a genuine longstanding myth that a large % of the aviators on those carriers had gone down with them, which was not true.

Joe

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Joe, that"s my understanding as well from a number of reliable sources IIRC First Team and Shattered Sword.
I think the general consensus is that Guadacanal is the campaign that really broke the back of the flower of IJN aviation. IIRC, The IJN CV wings were stripped from their flight decks and used to reinforce the Rabaul contingent and suffered heavy losses. But I don't recall exactly when in the campaign that happened.

fastmongrel said:

Sometimes the Allied equipment was better technically sometimes the Axis equipment was better. However the Allies with some exceptions could always afford to replace lost men and equipment something the Axis couldnt do with there much smaller resources. If the Germans had concentrated on churning out large numbers of standardised competent equipment as the Allies did I dont think the war would have gone any different.

It does come down to numbers in the end the Axis had to win quick or lose slow. The combined economic output of the US, the British Empire and Commonwealth and the Soviet Union was about 10 times greater than the Axis. Plus the Allies had free access to the Neutral worlds resources.

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FM, I recently saw or read somewhere that the Oft maligned Sherman iwas very underrated and far more effective than typically given credit for, particularly against German armor. Just what I recall hearing. Not about aircraft but Germain to the general point.

oldcrowcv63 said:

FM, I recently saw or read somewhere that the Oft maligned Sherman iwas very underrated and far more effective than typically given credit for, particularly against German armor. Just what I recall hearing. Not about aircraft but Germain to the general point.

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Your right oldcrow new research is showing that the Sherman was easily the equal of the T 34 and the panzer MkIV and when fitted with the bigger 76mm guns particulary the British 17 pounder was able to handle the Panther and Tiger series. Even the Tommy Cooker legend turns out not to be entirely true yes Shermans burnt but so did every other tank in roughly similar proportions and actually when the water jacketed ammo storage came into use the Sherman had the best crew survivablity ratio of any tank except the British Churchill. As an ex tanker one of the most important things in a tank is the ability to take damage and to be able to bail out when things go wrong. Getting out of a Sherman was childs play compared to some especially when a loaders top hatch was fitted.

Of course the Tiger and Panther are sexier but for all that the Sherman was the better all round tank. The Allies understood after some false starts that a reliable tank in large numbers to support infantry is how you win battles. Sexy big expensive unreliable tanks that can kill another tank at 2 miles are no use if your infantry is without protection. My opinion is its hard sometimes to nail down a war winner but the solid reliable dull old Sherman M4 series was definitely a war winner.

parsifal said:

Al the evidence point to the lW heavily outnumbering the RAF in terms of available frontline strength, and by extension in the sortie rates thay were able to maintain until the last week of September, when they really began to fall away badly

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Again yes. The rates fell in September because they had lost the battle,something else that has,for some reason,become contentious in the last ten tears or so.

Cheers

Steve

fastmongrel said:

Your right oldcrow new research is showing that the Sherman was easily the equal of the T 34 .

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Yes and this was demostrated directly in M4A3E8 v T-34/85 actions in Korea, not just new research. And I agree the offensive power of the M4 could be further increased from 76mm, to 17pdr or even 90mm. However to be fair the M4 was still not as well protected as the T-34 (not to mention Panther) which could be important in other circumstances though not in direct M4 76mm (well supplied with HVAP ammo) v T-34/85 combats in Korea, which were usually at pretty short range besides: in that case either could penetrate the other reliably, outcome usually depended who got off the first accurate shot.

And as mentioned the use of gasoline as fuel had a marginal impact on tank survivability. Ammo propellant was the key combustible, and even the rubber of tracks or on road wheels (latter would be set on fire mainly by napalm in case of T-34's hit with that weapon by a/c in Korea, for example). Diesel fuel and even engine lube oil would eventually go up in a propellant fire, or even a rubber fire. Again in Korea a comprehensive US Army study of tank v tank actions estimated that the survival rate of tank crews of knocked diesel fueled KPA T-34's was much lower than of ko'd gasoline fueled M4's and M26/46's, though it involved many other factors beside fuel type.

The key advantage of gasoline tank engines was uniformity of fuel supply with much more numerous soft skinned vehicles, as long as they were gasoline fueled, as well as abillity to use existing airplane and car engine production to boost tank production in US in WWII (eg. small a/c radial engines used in M4 and M4A1, and the five car engine arrangement of M4A4). The biggest drawback was shorter range of a gasoline v diesel tank.

Joe

oldcrowcv63 said:

I think the general consensus is that Guadacanal is the campaign that really broke the back of the flower of IJN aviation. IIRC, The IJN CV wings were stripped from their flight decks and used to reinforce the Rabaul contingent and suffered heavy losses. But I don't recall exactly when in the campaign that happened.

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I counted JNAF fighter pilot, only, losses by name from the listing in Hata/Izawa's book. In studying the 1942 New Guinea campaign report by report in JNAF records, I found the H/I listing for that campaign almost though not quite complete; I assume it's similarly mostly complete overall:
Pearl Harbor: 9
Philippines: 14
Malaya: 2
DEI/Bismarks/raids Australia through Feb: 19
New Guinea/raids Australia March-up to Coral Sea: 16
Ceylon: 6
Coral Sea: 7
Midway/Aleutians raids: 24
NG/Aus after Coral Sea>end '42:39
G'canal (including carrier battles) to end '42: 122

I know no reliable number for total IJN fighter pilots in this period. The JNAF as a whole reported having about 3,400 pilots of all kinds in 1940 including those rated as pilots but still in training units; ie there were perhaps on order of 1,000 JNAF fighter pilots in Dec 1941. So 258 front line pilots was quite significant, and of course including a much higher % who had significant combat experience (for example Tainan AG, most experienced and successful group Dec 41-Aug 42, though taking a fair number of losses already, but worn down heavily after that at G'canal and essentially disbanded late in the year).

But, really 'breaking' the IJN fighter force by end of 1942 might be an overstatement, though not exactly a 'myth'. A lot of good JNAF fighter units remained by the end of '42, just as the stats indicate most prewar pilots had not been lost. That's shown in cases like the 'Valentine's Day Massacre' in Feb '43 (F4U's and P-38's badly defeated by 204th AG) or the 202nd (formely 3rd) AG's heavy fighter combat advantage v Spitfires over Darwin in 1943. But even in holding their own in kill ratio, actually, v Allied fighters in second half 42 and into '43 in some cases, the JNAF was losing badly as the Allies could replace and increase strength so much faster. By November '43 the Japanese were forced to send their pretty well trained second generation of carrier fighter sdns to Rabaul, where they were pretty much wiped out in the following months. Then a relatively poorly trained third generation was left to fight from the carriers in 1944; meanwhile the Allied quantitative advantage had wided greatly as well. The 122 figure includes a significant number of losses from Sho, Zui, Ryujo, Junyo and Zuiho groups in the carrier battles of the G'canal campaign, but besides Hiyo's group (after ship's mechanical casualty) the land based Zeroes met in the G'canal campaign in 1942 were from dedicated landbased groups.

Joe