WWII air war myths (1 Viewer)

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Yes and this was demostrated directly in M4A3E8 v T-34/85 actions in Korea, not just new research. And I agree the offensive power of the M4 could be further increased from 76mm, to 17pdr or even 90mm. However to be fair the M4 was still not as well protected as the T-34 (not to mention Panther) which could be important in other circumstances though not in direct M4 76mm (well supplied with HVAP ammo) v T-34/85 combats in Korea, which were usually at pretty short range besides: in that case either could penetrate the other reliably, outcome usually depended who got off the first accurate shot.
Joe

M4 76mm is a good tank but it's available only after D Day and HVAP ammos also later, september, and in very few number. The M4 75mm was common in Europe also in '45.
 
However to be fair the M4 was still not as well protected as the T-34 (not to mention Panther)
Joe

There is some good research that shows that equivalent marks of M4 were much better for crew survivability than the T34. Certainly the waterjacket models were distinctly better than a T34/76 and could survive hull hits better than a T34/85. Crew survivability was vastly better for an M4 particulary when the floor escape hatches were welded up and later removed. Most M4s were not killed by tanks but were killed by in order A/T guns S/P guns Infantry weapons (like Panzerschrek) Mines and in 5th place Tanks. One on one a Panther would win more times against an E8 but it is not as clear cut as most books would have you believe. Thats not surprising the Panther was a heavy tank the M4 a medium but up against its most common adversary the Pz 4 the M4 won more often.
 
...but this is still no "WWII air war myths" but didn't the Russian have flying tanks...
Cimmex
 
M4 76mm is a good tank but it's available only after D Day and HVAP ammos also later, september, and in very few number. The M4 75mm was common in Europe also in '45.
and re:fastmongrel:

Those are both reasonable one hand/other hand responses to what I said. Most M4's in the NWE campaign of 1944-45 were 75mm, relatively few rounds of HVAP were available. But the basic capability of M4 76mm directly against T-34 proved pretty good when it happened*. Overall though, I see no reason to contest the idea that US medium tank development in WWII era was slightly behind Soviet. There were plus/minuses to match ups like M4 75mm v T-34/76 and 76mm v /85 but the Soviet vehicles in question were a bit earlier in each case. There was not however a big difference.

And yes of course a minority of tanks were ko'd by other tanks even in relatively 'tank heavy' theaters like the East Front, and a much smaller % in NWE where Allied tank units were mainly up against enemy infantry formations, and often in an infantry support role (especially the M4's of 'independent' tank bns de facto tied one each to US infantry divisions). But that wasn't the M4's forte either, because of its relatively light armor. The M4 was designed for and best at an armored division role in explotation: relatively fast, mobile, and reliable; rather than either an anti-tank or infantry support role. There's again no reasonable question IMO the M4's protection was found lacking by the consensus in US Army in 1944-45, aside from the (more famous) controversy about its gun power, though that was only relevant in relatively unusual tank v tank actions.

*actually per the report I quoted, the % of penetrations by 76mm HVAP and APC v T-34's in Korea was the same, though this was based just on collating combat reports, not scientific study, and no information is given in the report about what angles the various shots were at; I figure it's common sense that it was handier to have HVAP around, but it's not clear that 76mm APC was inadequate v T-34's, either.

Joe
 
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Just finished reading a biography of Robin Olds and even he was sucked in by the myth that the AVG fought the Japanese before Pearl Harbor. Very wide spread myth.
 
Great book, great man, awesome funeral - when General Titus (Eartquake McGoon) finished his eulogy at Air Force Academy on an overcast day - the clouds parted and a ray of sunshine flooded the area - NO kidding. He was the man I loved and admired most, second to my father. Christina and Ed Rasimus did one helluva job on the book.

When to get to the point where Robin shot down two FW 190s on August 15 and noted someone from the 355th FG called Zemke to confirm the scores - that was my father. Robin was one of a kind.
 
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Great book, great man, awesome funeral - when General Titus (Eartquake McGoon) finished his eulogy at Air Force Academy on an overcast day - the clods parted and a ray of sunshine flooded the area - NO kidding. He was the man I loved and admired most, second to my father. Christina and Ed Rasimus did one helluva job on the book.

When to get to the point where Robin shot down two FW 190s on August 15 and noted someone from the 355th FG called Zemke to confirm the scores - that was my father. Robin was one of a kind.

Clods or clouds? Very ironic typo considering the subject matter. . . . 8)
 
That's all to say, I don't know that I'm too eager to buy into the inference that these torpedo-bomber pilots were somehow inadequate. It does make sense to me that they aborted their torpedoes too soon, however, given what they were up against.
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That was just a comment from the Japanese according to the book. The Japanese were certainly experts in torpedo drops and their comments, if correct, should be taken seriously. I have no idea what kind of training the AAF pilots had on torpedo drops but I would guess not as good as the Navy, which would have been a shame given they were flying the most effective torpedo bombers at Midway. You are right in stating the environment in which they were operating, and the low speed and altitude requirements of those lousy torpedoes, made the situation horrendous.
 
I just wonder how many of these "myths" are being "exposed" by other myths????

There is a saying....you can fool some of the people all the time and all the people some of the time, but not all the people all the time. These so called "myths" have been accepted by some pretty well respected people, and are being ripped up by the flimsiest of evidence. Rather like the witches of salem, I fear the "crimes" against history we are "exposing" are causing the perpetration of greater crimes against history
 
I haven't read all of this one, so apologies if posted before.
Colin P. Kelly sinking the Japanese battleship "Haruna". The real heroic effort of Kelly's was holding the plane level so his crew could escape, according to Saburu Sakai.
 
I enjoyed the book about Olds from start to finish. I did feel a little sad about his story book marriage, the children and then the marital problems. It seems as if Olds was destined to be a warrior. The contrast between the way WW2 was conducted and the war in VN was stark.
 
I haven't read all of this one, so apologies if posted before.
Colin P. Kelly sinking the Japanese battleship "Haruna". The real heroic effort of Kelly's was holding the plane level so his crew could escape, according to Saburu Sakai.

Also it was believed at the time (and still by some) that Colin Kelly was was awarded the Medal of Honor. He was recommended for the MOH but received the Distinguished Service Cross.

Steve
 
Totally agree, except that, as far as I know, most of USMC dive-bombers were not SBD but SB2U.

Best regards,

Francis Marliere
They were a mixed bag. one unite of 16 SBD-1 or -2s and another of 11 SB2U-3s . IIRC, the SBDs suffered 50 pc casualties attaxking a CV and the SB2Us about 35 pc attacking a BB in the inner defense ring.

Just a footnote on these torpedo-bombers. My dad's buddy piloted these TBF/TBMs. These planes had to come in very low to the water--I'm talking under 50', or so--just to deploy their "fish" effectively. What's more, they had to come in "broadside," or, i.e., in this case, right into the mouth of those carriers' guns.

That's all to say, I don't know that I'm too eager to buy into the inference that these torpedo-bomber pilots were somehow inadequate. It does make sense to me that they aborted their torpedoes too soon, however, given what they were up against.

I would expect the VT-8 detachment to have been pretty proficient in their profession.espeocially flying an aircraft whose performance far outclassed their previous mount, however, as has been pointed out before by others, the real problem limiting their odds of survival was the dam*ed POS mk 13 which demanded an approach pretty much the same as a TBD. WIthout escort their odds were sorely lowered with or without the mk 13. Tomonaga's 10 escorted B5Ns suffered 50 pc casualties attacking the Yorktown. Of course his crews scored 2 hits IIRC. TBF armor surely played a role.
 
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That was just a comment from the Japanese according to the book. The Japanese were certainly experts in torpedo drops and their comments, if correct, should be taken seriously. I have no idea what kind of training the AAF pilots had on torpedo drops but I would guess not as good as the Navy, which would have been a shame given they were flying the most effective torpedo bombers at Midway. You are right in stating the environment in which they were operating, and the low speed and altitude requirements of those lousy torpedoes, made the situation horrendous.
Here's a typical approach. Do you now see the problem I'm seeing? It wasn't any bad torpedoes. And, while I'm sure it's beyond me to question the eyesight of those Japanese pilots, it probably wasn't our pilots, either. It was getting there, putting those unescorted torpedo-bombers into that position, while in that shooting gallery. I don't need a book to supply me with conjecture on why those pilots couldn't get a hit off on that task force. Given what they were up against, the explanation is right here. Good enough for me, anyway...
 

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Here's a typical approach. Do you now see the problem I'm seeing? It wasn't any bad torpedoes. And, while I'm sure it's beyond me to question the eyesight of those Japanese pilots, it probably wasn't our pilots, either. It was getting there, putting those unescorted torpedo-bombers into that position, while in that shooting gallery. I don't need a book to supply me with conjecture on why those pilots couldn't get a hit off on that task force. Given what they were up against, the explanation is right here. Good enough for me, anyway...

The observations of the IJN witnesses were probably biased by their experience with their own shorter range aerial torpedo. The photo you post is revealing in that it shows the restricted altitude of a torpedo attack into the teeth of AAA defense but that low altitude is somewhat effective for countering aerial attacks prior to that final approach. It remains the prime tactic of relatively defensively limited aircraft to get low when attacked by a fighter type to the present day.
The mk 13 ran barely a few knots faster than the IJN CVs and about 10-12 knots slower than the IJN counterpart. That's got to be a problem for getting reliable hits.
 
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I just wonder how many of these "myths" are being "exposed" by other myths????

There is a saying....you can fool some of the people all the time and all the people some of the time, but not all the people all the time. These so called "myths" have been accepted by some pretty well respected people, and are being ripped up by the flimsiest of evidence. Rather like the witches of salem, I fear the "crimes" against history we are "exposing" are causing the perpetration of greater crimes against history
That's a very good point but on the other hand, histories written shortly after events are heavily influenced by accounts of the participants. That's appropriate of course but should take into account the participant may be a bit distracted by the intensity of the events and a slightly less than reliable witness. Participants also see events through the soda straw of their immediate locale and may not have the best global view of the events unfolding around them. I'm not saying anything you of all people don't already know but just restating the value of the post morton along with the necessity to be a diligent reporter in balancing the two perspectives.
What I like about the forum is its continuing effort to bring both perspectives into view whether intentionally or not, by the ongoing dialectic process.

A classic case of myth meets reality is the debate that raged among naval aviators for decades about which squadron and it's pilots sunk the Kaga. First person accounts were Both misleading and very helpful but some only available well after WW2 ended. Uh oh. Sounds like the basis for a new thread or a digressive path for this one,
 
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It remains the prime tactic of relatively defensively limited aircraft to get low when attacked by a fighter type to the present day.
That's a valid point. It's certainly safer there. Those torpedo-bombers had to get there, first, though. And, even then, even if ideally they're coming into their targets broadside, at that altitude, they're flying right into those carrier's hangar deck guns. Not a pretty picture.

In a nutshell, I think our boys did everything they possibly could. Without any fighter cover, they were simply overmatched.
 
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