WWII air war myths

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And then there's the obvious corollary to that, which is that consideration of first hand accounts from both sides will tend to cancel out some of the distortions. A lot of myths grow from the natural availability of first hand accounts on only one side, during or just after a war. But emphasizing one side's first hand accounts so heavily over the other's becomes a less and less excusable technique to learn history as time goes on.

Also myths are not often random errors. They often serve to promote some story or angle which their proponents want to be told, and that's sometimes for good reason during a war. But again as time goes on it becomes less valid.

This is true for example with myths like Colin Kelley/Haruna, the need for *some* kind of real heroics, as understood in those times, in a very dark period. In today's American (and I think Western) culture a military man can be a maximal hero just for doing what Kelley actually did: risking and in the event losing his life to give his crewmen a better chance to survive. But in those days there was still some idea that a hero had to actually strike a hard blow at the enemy. Just being a heroic victim was a lesser achievement than it is now.

And for example the outright myth of heavy JNAF pilot losses at Midway, or the semi-myth of a JNAF fighter arm crippled by the end of 1942, when coined during WWII, were not just totally objective attempts to find and tell the facts. They were also optimistic assessments designed to boost morale. The same is true of the semi-myth that Zeroes could be defeated easily just by changing tactics. This overstatement was in part to give Allied pilots more confidence. That's not to say any of those ideas were attempts to manipulate pilots' psyche by some 'higher ups'; the ideas in many cases came from pilots, from leaders among pilots. Part of winning is convicing yourself you're as good as your opponents. Leading a fighter squadron is not the same task as trying to understand history as objectively as possible decades later. But the latter is what, IMHO, we should be doing now.

The problem again is not that these wrong or semi-correct ideas were current during the war. It's only a problem if people *now* refuse to reconsider and modify, not necessarily reject, them in light of facts from the other side.

Joe
 
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One of the biggest myths however, is that fighters are the main cause of losses for either side. They are not, well, usually are not. far more significant are what might be termed "attritional losses". Fighter attacks in the air might account for up to 40% of total losses, but more typically account for about 30%. Depending on the situation and ther nationality, flak might account for 25-40% of losses, whilst non combat losses....losses due to things like navigation errors, running out of fuel, or engine failure, landing/take off accidents, inclement weather, just failing to return, often accounted for as much as 50% of total losses. Its important to remember that aircraft of all combabtants were routinely overloaded and pressd to points beyond their design limits....

For the Western alliances, an airframe typically had a shelf life of just over 10 months in 1944. For an Me 262, Ive read (but cannot confirm) that engine rebuilds were needed every 10 hours of flight time. Thats rough;ly once every 3rd or fourht flight

And then we have write offs due to excessive damage to the airframe. During Barbarossa , for the first three months of the campaign, combat losses for the Luftwaffe were about 300 a/c. Yet by the conclusion of Smolensk, according to the sources I have, the LW was down to less than 1000 airworthy machines and total losses operational and noncombat combined were over 1000 a/c. Similar problems beset the Japanese....well in fact it was affecting everyone really, but only the allies had the logistic base to cope with that attrition. The Luftwaffe for example, in the phoney war suffered about a monthly attrition rate of about 7% of the toal force structure, without significant combat. Thats everything, including retirements but it is still a very large number, and virtually none due to direct allied activity.
 
Marshall_Stack said:
Myth: The P-39 was a tank buster.
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Yes re: Typhoon, the distinguishing myth wrt P-39's and tanks was that it was *supposed* to be a tankbuster, or mainly ground attack a/c, in Soviet service, when actually they used it as a general purpose fighter w/ no particular emphasis on the ground attack role generally or tanks specifically.

Typhoon units in NWE were heavily (though not entirely) devoted to ground attack and a particular specialty was attacking tanks; it's just the results that are controversial. But other such threads have gotten into whether even (relatively) big gun-armed German/Soviet tank busting a/c on the East Front actually destroyed a lot of tanks either. Some well informed (about a/c guns) fans of those devices had written on their sites and various fora stuff pointing up the low kill rates of rocket armed fighter bombers v tanks, but seem to just assume the theoretical capabilities of (say 30-37mm) gun armed a/c made them a lot more effective. Soviet info about the effectiveness of German air strikes on their tanks seems to call this into question. The 30-37mm gun type of concept might still have been more effective than rocket concept, but it seems its real kill rate has been subject to less scrutiny.

Joe
 
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Jenisch said:
The Corsair being called "whistling death" by the Japanese is a myth or not?
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Almost certainly made up on the Allied side, as was 'whispering death' nickname the Japanese supposedly gave the Beaufighter.

And these cases are sort of the mirror images of the semi-myths of quickly tamed JNAF fighter threat, 'Zeroes blow up from one bullet hit' etc. To buy those nicknames as really having been Japanese, you have to envision Japanese airmen as coining names sort of 'celebrating' their fear of the enemy, and emphasizing his strength. Yet Allied airman told stories (over)emphasizing the weaknesses of their opponents. The second seems a lot more to me like human nature in a military organization which hasn't lost its morale, and by all accounts individual Japanese military men believed their assumed superiority in moral and spiritual factors could still win the day even later in the war. Those nicknames just don't seem plausible as having been coined by the Japanese. But anyway AFAIK neither of them has ever been found in a Japanese language source from the period.

Joe
 
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I doubt that the name "whispering death" comes from a japanese source, however the makeup of Japanese airmen was fundamentally different to western persona. They were heavily influenced by their bushido warrior codes, which stressed prowess in battle, and the warrior code. Honouring your enemy was integral to all of that.

In western culture there was an element of that, but it was far less romantic and prvalent than was the case in the Japanese services. Far more emphasis was being given to the technocratic aspects of flying....survival, working as a team, using the technology to advantage. Like all generali zations, its danger is that we assume that one nationality had all one trait, and another nationality all of another. truth is, the Japanese had elements of "technocracy" while the allies possessed elements of the "airborne knights of the sky" personas. But what i am referring to is the emphasis, what elements of a national persona tended to dominate thinking for that force....
 
The Japanese were different, but I don't see the differences as actually making it at all likely that Japanese air units would attach fearsome names to Allied a/c.

We might have included 'bushido' as another semi-myth. The basic code of conduct of Japanese miltiary men through the Pacific War was, at least in theory, the Imperial Rescript for Soldiers and Sailors, of 1882. In that period a new Japanese society was being built, with no more Samurai; and OTOH the Samurai code hadn't applied to commoners. The Rescript is an example of a re-manufactured kind of national belief system, but it was taken quite seriously in the Meiji Period. And the Rescript told military men to honor enemies in a way that would be easily recognizeable to any culture: by treating them humanely, not just in some abstract sense or conditional on their non-surrender. And this was the case in RJ War, by and large. But after Meiji period the in fact newly manufactured Japanese society changed, to where the kind of brutal and xenophobic military attitudes seen in Sino-J and Pac War's became more prevalent. There was in fact much less emphasis on 'honoring' enemies in either abstract or concrete ways. And then it's also tricky that Japanese society took another turn post 1945, and many expressions of respect for Pac War enemies we read now were written long after the war.

It was not in character actually for WWII Japanese military forces to view their enemies with much if any more respect than Western military men had for the Japanese: grudging where unavoidable. The two sides were different in many ways, but I believe you're mistaken to think the typical Japanese attitude of the time was a lot different in that particular aspect.

As far as technical or technology mindedness, I don't see how it would directly affect something like nicknames for Allied planes. But, you cannot make any generalization about technical mindedness including both IJN and IJA. The IJN was perhaps the *most* technologically minded navy in the world in the interwar period. It had always somewhat so since the modern service's birth in the Meiji Period but that characteristic intensified in the wake of the naval treaties post WWI. The IJN was practically obsessed with technology (night optics, oxygen torpedoes, big DD's, midget subs, long range bombers [Type 96 Rikko far longer range than any other in 1937], underwater trajectory shells, the Zero itself) as a way to offset USN numerical superiority. And pre-war JNAF training emphasized technical understanding by a pilot of his a/c and its engine more than Western training, not less, though it's unclear if this had practical benefit. The Anglo-Americans achieved technological superiority in almost all relevant areas v IJN *during* WWII, but did so largely by bring to bear resources *outside* their own navies, like academia and 'tech companies', where Japan was far weaker than the combined Anglo-Americans at that time.

The IJA OTOH was probably below average in emphasis on technology among major armies.

Joe
 
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I read a book about U.S. Naval aviators captured and held on the island of Chichi-jima. The author claims that they were killed and eaten by the Japanese. He also claimed that the Japanese were the only army in ww2 that had to be ordered not to eat their own soldiers. If true, this would be bizzare to the extreme. If not, it would be equally bizzare that someone would even come up with that.
Has anyone else ever heard of this?
 
It's mentioned in Flyboys by Bradley. I also just read quite a bit about it in a book whose name escapes me. A lot of it appears to stem from the Japanese being left on their own and expected to live off of the land. It talked mainly about other races being eaton, but dead Japanese were also consumed, though it did mention that it was suspected some of the "dead" Japanese were helped getting into that condition.
 
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We might have included 'bushido' as another semi-myth.
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It may be a myth, but it was believed by at least portion of the japanese military. Pictures of Japanese officers carrying swords into aircraft is a direct reference to the medieval code of the bushido




I disagree. The changes that you mention occuring during the meiji restoration were the aboration, not that which followed. Japanese history from 1550 through to 1850 was xenophobic, inward looking brutal and anti-western....exactly what it was during the war.



Respect for your enemies was in fact a fairly small component of the bushido code. It was more to do with generation of the warrior spirit, and a big part of that was about insilling fear in your enemy. That was achieved by brutal behaviour and strict discilpline....allegiance to the Daimyo etc.



It was fundamentally different, which is best displayed in their treatment of the chinese and the Allied POWs. That mentality was just as prvalent amongst their flyers as it was in their more general military. Honour to the warrior class was paramount, and Japans flyers were their paramount warriors.

The allies had no such illusions. They honoured their flyers, and their military generally , but the fundamental difference that existed between Japanese society and western culture is that the military in western culture was never given to placing their military at the very centre of their society. Moreover, and linked to this, the jpanaese demanded complete obedience within the military structure, whereas for the western military men, initiative, was never completely suppressed to the same extent as it was for the japanese. The Japanese were less imaginative, but more obedient, that is no myth


As far as technical or technology mindedness, I don't see how it would directly affect something like nicknames for Allied planes.
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I agree

But, you cannot make any generalization about technical mindedness including both IJN and IJA. The IJN was perhaps the *most* technologically minded navy in the world in the interwar period.
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I dont see how you can say that. There were many areas that the Japanese did excel, and put great effort into technological advance. But there were many areas where they lagged badly, but worse, even when faced with stark defeat, seemed slow to adapt their conceptions of warfare and what they needed to do to survive and win. Nowhere was this more evident than in their attitudes and efforts in ASW. The Japanese failed singulalry to come to terms with this threat, and more than any other single battle, cost them dearly. They were so wedded to the concept and need for the "decisive battle" that they just coulf not adapt their thinking to deal with the problem. they had witnessed and studied Jutland down to the most minute detail. They had also witness the Convoy battles of 1917, and yet failed to take any action in the development of their post war navy. And this is just one area that they failed....As a consequence it is very difficult to argue that the japanese Navy (apart from its R&D areas) was a technologically minded force at all really



Which are all very narrowly focussed on winning the one big decisive battle, and which all made various sacrifices in their technological development that eventually led to their undoing. The shortcomings of the Zero are well known, the shortcomings of their torpedoes less well known, but evident just the same. Japanese torpedoes were the most effective in the war, but that efficiency came at a cost....they were too large for warships smaller than a DD to carry. The airborne torpedoes were still superior, but that edge is a lot less than one might expect. Japan was also wasteful in its expenditure of resources. The development of the yamatos and the Mogamis as well as the tomodozuru classes is typical of that wasting of resources. The japanese paid virtually no attention to ease of production, consequaently many items were shown to be exepensive to produce

And pre-war JNAF training emphasized technical understanding by a pilot of his a/c and its engine more than Western training, not less, though it's unclear if this had practical benefit.
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Image and belief has nothing to do with the levels of training. The Japanese flyers were the best trained in the world at the beginning of the war, but that does not mean they didnt believe in the ceremonial hocus pokus that characterized Japanese society, ofr the warrior class mentality that also permeated their organizations at that time.



If the military establishment in th west had been resistant to change such external applications of outside thinking would not have been as enthusiastically and quickly bsorbed as they were. The western militaries were far quicker in accepting and absorbing military change and doctrinal changes than the Japanese ever were. In fact i would go so far as to say that the Japanese were almost incapable of changig their doctrine

The IJA OTOH was probably below average in emphasis on technology among major armies.
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I agree, but I would simply say the IJN was almost as bad in accepting change when such change was needed. ]
 

During the advance across the Owen Stanleys, the advancing Australians came across repeated and systematic cases of bodies that had been "butchered" for food. It was assumed that the victims were already dead when so interfereed with, though witness statements from the natives suggest that wounded unable to be carried were sometimes murdered and then consumed.

Cannibalism amongst the IJA was no myth.
 
Well this seems to have drifted far from your original (seeming) point of explaining the plausibility of the Japanese giving fearsome to names to Allied a/c due to their culture. Some of your statements now seem to pretty directly contradict that as in 3, which IMO means you've moved further torward the truth, because it was in fact particularly unlikely that the Japanese would do something like call an Allied plane by a name implying it was to be feared, even compared to other air arms, who probably wouldn't do it either.

Anyway on a few other points,
1. and 2. Every modern nation has a national myth of its past, not 'myth' is sense of the 'air myths' we're speaking of here, but some semi-true story that expresses what that nation thinks it is or wants to be. It never exactly coincides with the real past. Just the fact that typical Japanese officers, commoners, would ape the habits of Samurai gives you a hint about that. That belief 'they were like the Samurai' came from the national myth created in the Meiji period, which was no aberration whatsoever, but the basis of a new society created not all that long before those 1940's men were born. Their actual ancestors weren't Samurai, they were peasants who counted for nothing, by and large. Their idea of what the Samurai was and how he should act was a mixture of history and national myth of the Meiji period, as modified (or mutated perhaps) by particular social developments between then and WWII. It's somewhat like Americans speaking of 'our traditions of the Old West', which had no actual place in the direct family lineage of the vast majority of Americans. But that's part of our national myth: the *story* of the Old West does have an impact.

Japan was inward looking from around the 1620's to 1850's, which isn't just to nitpick but to recognize that attitudes ca. 1550 were quite different again; Japan a major trading country at that time. And an expanisionist culture and a hermit culture are not the same thing at all; that was a real change. As far as brutality the English in the 16th century still half hung, castrated and mutilated to death live victims, and put down rebellions with mass killings. Once you go back a few centuries that was pretty much universal behavior when rulers thought it necessary.

I think this discussion also gets back to leftover Allied WWII propaganda (which doesn't mean 'false', but just simplified story to get across and have adopted by the audiecne the 'necessary' POV). 'The Japanese were just like that via their culture', when in fact the 16th century culture of Japan had no more really direct impact on 20th century behavior than in the West. There were real events in Japanese history which caused the social/political changes which manifested in Japanese policy and behavior in the 30's-40's. Of course some also had roots much further back, but it's way oversimplified to characterize as just a resumption of 'normal' after an 'aberration', which also logically implies that current Japanese society is another 'aberration', IMO a very hard to support thesis in the face of any facts or direct experience in modern Japan.

4. Actually Japanese airmen were mostly enlisted men, as opposed to mostly (and eventually almost exclusively) officers in Western air arms and had less prestige if anything.

5. I can say it because it's historically true. The IJN had a particular strategy, decisive fleet battle in a short war. But in pursuit of that strategy in the interwar period it was definitely more focused on finding technological silver bullets than the relatively more complacent RN and USN were. *During* WWII as I said, the RN and USN could use resources in civilian society, academia and industry, to make technical advances the Japanese couldn't nearly match (Japanese progress being further hindered by destructive competitiveness between IJA and IJN). Japan didn't have the same capability to make rapid technical advances in war, but the IJN was not less institutionally focused on technology as an answer to it key goal than other navies; it was more focused on it.

Also, it is true that ASW and commerce defense generally were a blind spot in Japanese naval thinking for a long time before WWII. But besides being a completely different issue than whether the outlook was 'romantic' or 'technical', the IJN's theory of beating the USN in a decisive naval action in a short war, while ultimately unsuccessful and perhaps unrealistic, was more realistic than the idea of winning a war of attrition v the US by successfully defending Japanese commerce for a long time.

Joe
 
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