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[Thumpalumpacus]

I think it's the loss-registers, for both aircraft and pilots. This is of course a strategic-level counting. If I'm killing more of your pilots than you are killing mine, I am winning. Which particular pilot getting the credit, shit, they can fight that out at the O-club.

Counting coup is a thing that goes back thousands of years, and probably more ... but who is the most Sierra Hotel is not as important as who is winning the damned war.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I'd still like someone to tell me exactly what a victory credit IS. I don't care if an aircraft gets recovered in whole or in part to fly later. If someone shoots it out of the fight enough to make it land or crash land, then he or she deserves a credit. So, before we address all the stuff above, we seriously need to address what constitutes a victory credit.

Perhaps they DID exactly that and the difference in opinion between the victory credits board and the author above is what all the commotion is about.

Our credits, or anyone else's for that matter, don't have to add up to their losses. If we shoot down a plane that is later repaired and flies again, it STILL got shot out of the fight. If it landed with damage enough to prevent further flight at that time, then it got shot down. Shot down does not necessarily mean "destroyed," it means shot down.

If someone shoots down a plane and it belly-lands, if that doesn't count as a victory, what do we want the pilot to do, expend his small store of ammo destroying the crashed plane for sure and hunting down and killing the pilot? Or maybe the crash landing is enough and he needs to get back to his wingman, escort, mission, or whatever.

Any comments?

If you are comparing fighter effectiveness it has to be on the same basis. This is the problem of claim vs kills. You know your own losses, but claims are an estimate. While you can calculate extraordinary claim to loss ratios for USN aircraft if you take the Japanese claims vs their losses, they have a high claim to loss ratio as well.

The fallacy of assuming claims are kills is illustrated by Lundstrom in his Book " The First Team Guadalcanal Campaign"

"For the whole action against TF-16, US Claims for strike aircraft destroyed in aerial combat totaled fifty-two (Fifteen more than the Japanese had)"

Another more extreme example is the claims made by the 8th Airforce in October 1943. October 1943 was an unmitigated disaster for the 8th Airforce culminating in the 2nd Schweinfurt raid. During an 11-day time frame from the October 4 mission to Frankfurt to the October 14 mission to Schweinfurt the 8th claimed to have destroyed 791 fighters. If this were true, they had won. The Luftwaffe in the west would have ceased to exist as viable force. According to Zaloga in "Operation Pointblank 1944" the Luftwaffe's frontline strength in the West on September 30, 1943, was:

In an 11 day period they claimed thay had shot down more than half the German Air force. This beyond decimation.

 

[GregP]

I think it's the loss-registers, for both aircraft and pilots. This is of course a strategic-level counting. If I'm killing more of your pilots than you are killing mine, I am winning. Which particular pilot getting the credit, shit, they can fight that out at the O-club.

Counting coup is a thing that goes back thousands of years, and probably more ... but who is the most Sierra Hotel is not as important as who is winning the damned war.

There is a direct correlation between recognition for aerial victories and pilot performance, and has been since WWI. The Japanese found out the hard way that not acknowledging great pilots resulted in less than stellar motivation. Every other air force knew that and praised good performance. In fact, it works on all forms of human endeavor.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

There is a direct correlation between recognition for aerial victories and pilot performance, and has been since WWI. The Japanese found out the hard way that not acknowledging great pilots resulted in less than stellar motivation. Every other air force knew that and praised good performance. In fact, it works on all forms of human endeavor.

Recognition is useful, but destroying the enemy's ability to fight is what wins wars. And with all the overclaiming that goes on in aerial battles, counting unverified claims as important may be good insofar as morale is concerned, but I stand by my comment that it's the loss registers that matter on this subject, rather than claims. That was the point of my post.

 

[33k in the air]

It's also a matter of how tho pilots are treated. If you leave them in combat, fighting until they are either killed or too wounded to fly anymore, the pilot pool is eventually going to shrink to nothing. No matter how good a pilot may be, sooner or later he'll run into someone better, or make a mistake that gets him shot down. That experience and knowledge is now lost.

If those experienced pilots are rotated out to instruct the next crop of fighter pilots, the knowledge can be passed on by those who know it first-hand.

 

[GregP]

Recognition is useful, but destroying the enemy's ability to fight is what wins wars. And with all the overclaiming that goes on in aerial battles, counting unverified claims as important may be good insofar as morale is concerned, but I stand by my comment that it's the loss registers that matter on this subject, rather than claims. That was the point of my post.

You sound like the Japanese commanders.

Everyone else operated differently.

When you're the only one out of many going your direction, you may be right and you may be mistaken. 100 : 1 you are mistaken.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

You sound like the Japanese commanders.

Everyone else operated differently.

When you're the only one out of many going your direction, you may be right and you may be mistaken. 100 : 1 you are mistaken.

I had thought it obvious that I was speaking from the historical and not the operational perspective. When we want accurate data for kills and losses, do we trust claims, or do we look at losses documented by the operators of said aircraft?

 

[Reluctant Poster]

There is a direct correlation between recognition for aerial victories and pilot performance, and has been since WWI. The Japanese found out the hard way that not acknowledging great pilots resulted in less than stellar motivation. Every other air force knew that and praised good performance. In fact, it works on all forms of human endeavor.

I didn't realize millennials have been around that long

 

[33k in the air]

There is a direct correlation between recognition for aerial victories and pilot performance, and has been since WWI. The Japanese found out the hard way that not acknowledging great pilots resulted in less than stellar motivation. Every other air force knew that and praised good performance. In fact, it works on all forms of human endeavor.

Does the same correlation between recognition and mission performance apply to bomber crews? Does telling a bomber squadron's crews how accurate their last mission was lift morale more than seeing how many fellow crews didn't return from the last mission lowers morale?

 

[GregP]

I had thought it obvious that I was speaking from the historical and not the operational perspective. When we want accurate data for kills and losses, do we trust claims, or do we look at losses documented by the operators of said aircraft?

I agree with the need for accurate information. It is essential for correct decision making, but that has nothing to do with recognition of Aces / good pilots.

You can be an Ace and also be accurate or inaccurate, and you can be accurate or inaccurate and be an Ace or not.

Every study of air combat has shown the direct correlation between recognition of combat results and the combat results themselves. It's why they have medals and awards.

I thought that was obvious, too.

No intento disparrage you; I just disagree that recognition is unimportant.

In the end, it makes little difference whether you and I are right or wrong, and there is no desire to fight about it. Just observation of what has historically worked.

 

[SaparotRob]

I didn't realize millennials have been around that long

He is wise beyond his years.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Every study of air combat has shown the direct correlation between recognition of combat results and the combat results themselves. It's why they have medals and awards.

I thought that was obvious, too.

No intento disparrage you; I just disagree that recognition is unimportant.

I didn't say that recognition is unimportant, Greg. You'll search my posts in vain for that claim.

 

[drgondog]

Since my table started this debate, let me say a few words.
First - it is data that was compiled painfully by encoding ALL ETO Victory Credits of enemy aircraft destroyed in the air for World War II by US Fighter Pilots (only). The tables you read from Mike Williams site was sent to him prior to completing and publishing "Our Might Always - History of the 355th FG World War II. I made some corrections in conjunction with current USAFHRC updated records through 2012 and tweaked it once again before Ipublished "P-51B: NA Bastard Stepchild that saved the 8t AF".
Second, the Victory Credits published from USAF Study 85, as described above, were the Parsed Claims sent from FGs to the 8th and 9th AF Victory Credit Boards and duly evaluated and adjudged as Destroyed, Probable, Damaged, No Award. The required documentation included the Enounter Report stating date, tme location, type aircraft, US Combat Unit and Officer plus witness signature, also included legible gun camera film and/or eyewitness statement as witten in encounter Report citing the below testimony.

The criteria included but not limited to The aircraft lost a major compoent required to sustain flight (wing, empennage); or the pilot was seen to bail out;, or the aircraft and pilot were observed to crash (this is where it got tricky as post war it was determind that LW salvaged only when >60% damaged beyond repair); or the aircraft was seen to blow up (multi example of loss of flight component).

Notably, one Primary source for USAF 85 was the 8th AF Victory Credits Board Final Report. The only changes USAF team made were a.) eliminate duplicate records contained therein, b.) spell check for correct name and ID, and c.) formally review and adjudge returning POW/Evadee testimony as contained in their Questionairre and de-briefing. In those cases the rules were the same as Ecounter Reports, namely eyewitness corroboration.

Third, The Victory Credits for Ground Destruction for the 8th AF arise from the 8th AF Final Victory Credit Board of Septemer 1945. The Ground credits IMO are the ones with broadest probability range. That said, only a/c seen to burn and or blow up were issued a credit. Notably my father's 355th not only scored the highest totals but also pioneered many tactics and intelligence gathering tools adopted by other FGs. Probably the most important was to task one fighter from each squadron to orbit and capture the attacked airfield with gun camera 'on'. These films were used by I/O to layout the aircarft in position, review each pilot's 'claims' parse the duplicates, and make final decsion re: Dest, Dam, NC - then package film and airfield layout showing desroyed aircraft as well as pilot roster associated with each claim.

Last but not least, I collaborated with several conterparts to extract LW losses as reported by LW, with names dates and units. I have about 10 significant air battles and developed tables to present 8th AF bomber losses, 8th FC CLAIMS (pre reviews), 8th AF FC Losses, Reported LW Claims and Losses by pilo, unit and time/ place.

I presented one such example for Mike Wiliams detailing April 24, 1944 big battle inbound and around Munich if you want to looksee. It has corrections in Our Might Always - but minor to the overall examination.

Comparisons showed GROSS overclaim for 8th AF BC, SIGNIFICANT overclaim for LW (in order of 40-50%) to actual US losses, and for US Fighters about 85% actual LW losses to claim, and about 92% actual LW to award. Some battles that I researched, such at May 12, July 7, September 11 were more difficult to pinpoint US unit allocation of credits because VIII FC groups were 'everywhere'. The November 26 mission was more like April 24 in that only 2 US FGs were concentrated in the 40 mi furball.

Notably, VCs were initially awarded to early 8th AF pilots when chasing and Fw 190 seen to emit lots of smoke, snap into an inverted flat spin and enter a cloud. On or about july 1943, the VC board uderstood that the Fw 190 was easily capable of recovery, and it wqas tougher to assign even a damaged award.

No other US combat orgs were as diligent as 8h and 9th with respect to definition of destroyed, nor articles of proof required to award a victory credit.

 

[GregP]

Hi Bill,

Do you have an electronically readable copy of Report 85? All I have is the pdf that looks like a digitized copy of a dot matrix printout. Unfortunately, most OCR programs can't read that. So, we are left mostly with the pdf of Report 85 only.

Just curious to analyze it, and I understand if you decline to share it if you have it.

I have seen some references, with regard to overclaiming, that show most of the bad overclaiming comes when pilots are relatively green, and it gets noticeably better as they become veterans and more accurately assess the situation as they become accustomed to aerial combat. Then their accuracy gets very good if they survive into senior veteran status.

I'm sure the first P-38s into combat were more concerned with getting the P-38 into combat mode while not getting shot down than watching what was going on.

Best regards, - Greg

 

[PAT303]

To muddy the waters more is when it "seems" an aircraft is going down, smoking, burning, but get's it pilot home it shouldn't count as a kill but many times a pilot was given a credit for this situation

I remember reading that during the BoB 109 pilots would claim Spitfires that started belching black smoke as a kill yet the smoke came from the Spit pilot pushing the throttle through the gate on over boost.

 

[PAT303]

Destroyed - never to fly again

Only issue is the British had factories that repaired written off aircraft and put them back into service, they were called Civilian repair units and one was at the Morris motor works, they repaired some seriously damaged aircraft, so what do we class as never to fly again?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Only issue is the British had factories that repaired written off aircraft and put them back into service, they were called Civilian repair units and one was at the Morris motor works, they repaired some seriously damaged aircraft, so what do we class as never to fly again?
View attachment 678132

Initially they were written off, shot down, crashed - it's a kill!

BUT how can you correlate that airframe being restored and then informing the enemy - "hey you shot down my plane but I fixed it and put it back in service." That's the enigma...

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I remember reading that during the BoB 109 pilots would claim Spitfires that started belching black smoke as a kill yet the smoke came from the Spit pilot pushing the throttle through the gate on over boost.

Exactly. Same thing happened during the Korean War when F-86s pumped a bunch of .50 into MiG-15s and they flew away smoking hydraulic fluid (because the tank was on the top of the fuselage) and were thought to be destroyed.

 

[drgondog]

Since my table started this debate, let me say a few words.
First - it is data that was compiled painfully by encoding ALL ETO Victory Credits of enemy aircraft destroyed in the air for World War II by US Fighter Pilots (only). The tables you read from Mike Williams site was sent to him prior to completing and publishing "Our Might Always - History of the 355th FG World War II. I made some corrections in conjunction with current USAFHRC updated records through 2012 and tweaked it once again before Ipublished "P-51B: NA Bastard Stepchild that saved the 8t AF".
Second, the Victory Credits published from USAF Study 85, as described above, were the Parsed Claims sent from FGs to the 8th and 9th AF Victory Credit Boards and duly evaluated and adjudged as Destroyed, Probable, Damaged, No Award. The required documentation included the Enounter Report stating date, tme location, type aircraft, US Combat Unit and Officer plus witness signature, also included legible gun camera film and/or eyewitness statement as witten in encounter Report citing the below testimony.

The criteria included but not limited to The aircraft lost a major compoent required to sustain flight (wing, empennage); or the pilot was seen to bail out;, or the aircraft and pilot were observed to crash (this is where it got tricky as post war it was determind that LW salvaged only when >60% damaged beyond repair); or the aircraft was seen to blow up (multi example of loss of flight component).

Notably, one Primary source for USAF 85 was the 8th AF Victory Credits Board Final Report. The only changes USAF team made were a.) eliminate duplicate records contained therein, b.) spell check for correct name and ID, and c.) formally review and adjudge returning POW/Evadee testimony as contained in their Questionairre and de-briefing. In those cases the rules were the same as Ecounter Reports, namely eyewitness corroboration.

Third, The Victory Credits for Ground Destruction for the 8th AF arise from the 8th AF Final Victory Credit Board of Septemer 1945. The Ground credits IMO are the ones with broadest probability range. That said, only a/c seen to burn and or blow up were issued a credit. Notably my father's 355th not only scored the highest totals but also pioneered many tactics and intelligence gathering tools adopted by other FGs. Probably the most important was to task one fighter from each squadron to orbit and capture the attacked airfield with gun camera 'on'. These films were used by I/O to layout the aircarft in position, review each pilot's 'claims' parse the duplicates, and make final decsion re: Dest, Dam, NC - then package film and airfield layout showing desroyed aircraft as well as pilot roster associated with each claim.

Last but not least, I collaborated with several conterparts to extract LW losses as reported by LW, with names dates and units. I have about 10 significant air battles and developed tables to present 8th AF bomber losses, 8th FC CLAIMS (pre reviews), 8th AF FC Losses, Reported LW Claims and Losses by pilo, unit and time/ place.

I presented one such example for Mike Wiliams detailing April 24, 1944 big battle inbound and around Munich if you want to looksee. It has corrections in Our Might Always - but minor to the overall examination.

Comparisons showed GROSS overclaim for 8th AF BC, SIGNIFICANT overclaim for LW (in order of 40-50%) to actual US losses, and for US Fighters about 85% actual LW losses to claim, and about 92% actual LW to award. Some battles that I researched, such at May 12, July 7, September 11 were more difficult to pinpoint US unit allocation of credits because VIII FC groups were 'everywhere'. The November 26 mission was more like April 24 in that only 2 US FGs were concentrated in the 40 mi furball.

Notably, VCs were initially awarded to early 8th AF pilots when chasing and Fw 190 seen to emit lots of smoke, snap into an inverted flat spin and enter a cloud. On or about july 1943, the VC board uderstood that the Fw 190 was easily capable of recovery, and it wqas tougher to assign even a damaged award.

No other US combat orgs were as diligent as 8h and 9th with respect to definition of destroyed, nor articles of proof required to award a victory credit.

Greg - I am about 75% complete with non-ETO 85 list. My efforts were diverted with latest book and Frank Olynyk gave me his data base through 1944. He would have given me all of it but I was too focused on P-51 comparisons in 1944. I reached out in March but he passed before ollowing up.

IF I complete it I will send to you.

oops wrong post

 

[Peter Gunn]

The P-51 may have been the best plane, but almost all USAAF in NW Europe transitioned to it during mid to late 1944, so almost all victories were going to be for P-51 just as there were so many of them. P-51 pilot losses for ground attack is rather grim statistics, and shows why the pilots complained about those missions of low strategic value in 1945. But yet in Korea 1952 USAAF still thought P-51 as ground attack made sense.

And yet the mighty F4U fared no better at ground attack than the Mustang in Korea, suffering an identical loss rate for CAS.