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[drgondog]

Hi Bill,

Do you have an electronically readable copy of Report 85? All I have is the pdf that looks like a digitized copy of a dot matrix printout. Unfortunately, most OCR programs can't read that. So, we are left mostly with the pdf of Report 85 only.

Just curious to analyze it, and I understand if you decline to share it if you have it.

I have seen some references, with regard to overclaiming, that show most of the bad overclaiming comes when pilots are relatively green, and it gets noticeably better as they become veterans and more accurately assess the situation as they become accustomed to aerial combat. Then their accuracy gets very good if they survive into senior veteran status.

I'm sure the first P-38s into combat were more concerned with getting the P-38 into combat mode while not getting shot down than watching what was going on.

Best regards, - Greg

Greg - I am about 75% complete with non-ETO 85 list. My efforts were diverted with latest book and Frank Olynyk gave me his data base through 1944. He would have given me all of it but I was too focused on P-51 comparisons in 1944. I reached out in March but he passed before ollowing up.

IF I complete it I will send to you.

The P-51 may have been the best plane, but almost all USAAF in NW Europe transitioned to it during mid to late 1944, so almost all victories were going to be for P-51 just as there were so many of them. P-51 pilot losses for ground attack is rather grim statistics, and shows why the pilots complained about those missions of low strategic value in 1945. But yet in Korea 1952 USAAF still thought P-51 as ground attack made sense.

Actually, there were about the same number of P-47 FGs (13) as P-51 FG 16) at the very end of 1944 in NW Europe (9th and 8th FC). What you may have been thinking was the comparison for dedicated escort roles. That said, through D-Day there nearly twice as many P-47 FGs than P-51s.

True that P-51s suffered more losses than any other types strafing airfields. That said, the number a/c destroyed on the ground by P-51s versus losses yielded nearly a 2:1 credit to loss ratio over P47 (5.6 to 3.7). The disparity in losses primarily due to shorter range of the P-47 for strafig attacks.

 

[GregP]

Hi Bill! PM sent. Cheers.

 

[taly01]

Its interesting if P-51 were not used for strafing what else could have been used? I do not think there were enough A-20/26 in Europe, and if it would have suffered probably the same losses as been a larger target, although having twin engine redundancy.

And yet the mighty F4U fared no better at ground attack than the Mustang in Korea, suffering an identical loss rate for CAS.

Thats interesting, and negates the argument against water/air cooled engines, although in Korea 1950's I believe the strikes were not going deep into enemy territory so a P-51 with leaky cooling had a chance to return to own lines.

Kill/loss ratios are mostly for air command planners and propaganda, if a unit is not claiming > 2:1 they are likely loosing. Personally I don't mind the idea of making an enemy plane run from the battle as a kind of victory, but there has become an obsession with "confirmed kills".

 

[drgondog]

Its interesting if P-51 were not used for strafing what else could have been used? I do not think there were enough A-20/26 in Europe, and if it would have suffered probably the same losses as been a larger target, although having twin engine redundancy.

The loss rate of A-20/A-26 for P-51 airfied strafing missions would have approached 10

Thats interesting, and negates the argument against water/air cooled engines, although in Korea 1950's I believe the strikes were not going deep into enemy territory so a P-51 with leaky cooling had a chance to return to own lines.

They very early strikes were from rapidly lost bases in ROK, Midway to Pusan the F-51 strikes were from Japan - until well after Inchon landings. For at least a year the Mustang ranges were far longer than carrier ops

Kill/loss ratios are mostly for air command planners and propaganda, if a unit is not claiming > 2:1 they are likely loosing. Personally I don't mind the idea of making an enemy plane run from the battle as a kind of victory, but there has become an obsession with "confirmed kills".

Malarkey. Despite the overclaiming by VIII BC, accuracy was extremely important for Intelligence to continue predicting strength of enemy forces.

The 'obsession' had several dimensions.Pilot wishes to be an ace or otherwise regarded - and the 'overclaimer' is often treated with contempt.

The statement 'if not claiming 2:1' is losing? Why would you say that? Planners actually WANT accurate info.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Does the same correlation between recognition and mission performance apply to bomber crews? Does telling a bomber squadron's crews how accurate their last mission was lift morale more than seeing how many fellow crews didn't return from the last mission lowers morale?

Teamwork wins wars not individuals. One of the complaints the Wehrmacht made about the Luftwaffe in the Desert was that the fighter pilots were running up their scores by picking off Hurricanes pilots rather than breaking through the escorts and attacking the Real targets, the Bostons and Blenheim's. Much safer to bounce the Hurricanes and scoot. The Star of Africa made most of his claims against single seat fighters leaving the bombers to the real work relatively unmolested.
The Palm Sunday Massacre is a prime example of fighters performing as a team and the results of that had a greater effect on the course of the war than all of Marseille's victories. reed
Without bombers (and to a lesser extent transports and recon) there is no reason for fighters to exist.
I am appalled by the thought that a Nation whose pilots would willingly sacrifice their lives by diving onto an enemy ship and whose bomber crews suffered grievous losses on virtually every mission had to cajole their fighter pilots into doing their duty.

 

[drgondog]

Without bombers (and to a lesser extent transports and recon) there is no reason for fighters to exist.
I am appalled by the thought that a Nation whose pilots would willingly sacrifice their lives by diving onto an enemy ship and whose bomber crews suffered grievous losses on virtually every mission had to cajole their fighter pilots into doing their duty.

Reluctantly I disagree. Tactical doctrine adopted by RAF Desert Air Force and to an extent copied by AAF held that the role of Fighters was threefold. First was battlefield air superiority, second was interdiction and third was recon.

 

[Peter Gunn]

They very early strikes were from rapidly lost bases in ROK, Midway to Pusan the F-51 strikes were from Japan - until well after Inchon landings. For at least a year the Mustang ranges were far longer than carrier ops

Again something that gets overlooked when considering relative loss rates, sorties etc. I don't belittle the Corsair drivers what so ever, kinda' we're all in this together sort of thing. But family history has all been Air Force so my attention always strays that direction. That Mustangs ops were longer ranged than carrier ops is no surprise at all.

On a side note, dad's cousin flew F-80's with the 49th FBW, once had the top of the nose on his Shooting Star "removed" by NK flak, the old girl brought him home though.

 

[SplitRz]

And yet the mighty F4U fared no better at ground attack than the Mustang in Korea, suffering an identical loss rate for CAS.

Its a bit of a topic creep (and maybe worthy of a separate thread - admins?). But this has struck a chord with me.

I knew a chap called Blunden many years ago (he played croquet with my parents). Lovely chap and highly experienced retired FAA pilot (and later, senior officer). He mentioned his Korea war service (in which I later found out he was mentioned in dispatches for his attempt to rescue a crashed pilot). As a 'plane nerd I was of course immediately transfixed and sat down with him to ask about his flying experiences. He flew a variety of aircraft during his service - including Seafire, Firefly and Sea Fury from, if memory serves, HMS Triumph.

I commented that it always seemed a bit perverse to me that the Firefly with a liquid cooled engine was tasked with ground attack, when the Fury could carry the same weight in ordinance but had a radial. His response was 'so what?'. His experience was that in actual combat conditions, a Bristol Centaurus radial was not measurably less vulnerable to a disabling hit than a liquid cooled engine. One might be a more resilient, but it also tended to make a bigger target. He said that by this stage of aircraft design, liquid cooled engines had armoured radiators and cooling lines - so the practical differences in resisting small arms fire were minimal. Being hit my anything bigger usually meant the difference was academic either way.

So in the light of that, the lack of discernible difference between P51 and F4U performing CAS seems to make sense. The idea that radial engined aircraft are inherently more resistant to damage has become something of an accepted trope and perhaps needs to be clarified.

 

[drgondog]

Its a bit of a topic creep (and maybe worthy of a separate thread - admins?). But this has struck a chord with me.

I knew a chap called Blunden many years ago (he played croquet with my parents). Lovely chap and highly experienced retired FAA pilot (and later, senior officer). He mentioned his Korea war service (in which I later found out he was mentioned in dispatches for his attempt to rescue a crashed pilot). As a 'plane nerd I was of course immediately transfixed and sat down with him to ask about his flying experiences. He flew a variety of aircraft during his service - including Seafire, Firefly and Sea Fury from, if memory serves, HMS Triumph.

I commented that it always seemed a bit perverse to me that the Firefly with a liquid cooled engine was tasked with ground attack, when the Fury could carry the same weight in ordinance but had a radial. His response was 'so what?'. His experience was that in actual combat conditions, a Bristol Centaurus radial was not measurably less vulnerable to a disabling hit than a liquid cooled engine. One might be a more resilient, but it also tended to make a bigger target. He said that by this stage of aircraft design, liquid cooled engines had armoured radiators and cooling lines - so the practical differences in resisting small arms fire were minimal. Being hit my anything bigger usually meant the difference was academic either way.

So in the light of that, the lack of discernible difference between P51 and F4U performing CAS seems to make sense. The idea that radial engined aircraft are inherently more resistant to damage has become something of an accepted trope and perhaps needs to be clarified.

I agree FWIIW. The challenge regarding blank vulnerablity to ground fire in ETO is that no one was really devising metics to analyze vulnerability. The Foot print area for airfield strafing by Mustangs in spring and summer 1944 were the concentrated airfields out of P-47 range - hence at the least a Mustang had 400-700mi t limp home, contrast P-47 tactical radius for strafing of 300-400 mi. The same footprint 'difference' between F4U and P-51 but on a smaller scale, particularly for 1950-51.