Here are a lot of mixing up facts for a wrong timeline!
I think this is basically right, though I believe Rodney was fitted with Type 79Y in 1938. Point is, radar was not extensively fitted to the battle line until 1941. However, this gave the italians no real advantage. There is a well demonstrated inferiority operating at night and during the day, the italaians could not match the accuracy of the RN gunnery, with or without radar. At Punto Stilo (ne Calabria) Warspite achieve a record by hitting Cesare at 26500 yards. Italians had problems with dispersion, fire control and a marked reluctance for their destroyers to enter any smokescreen.
Under those conditions, whilst it was difficult for the RN to achieve dominance in Mare nostrum, because of the numbers, it was also very difficult to deny sea access to the RN as well...The situation until Taranto was essentially a "stalemate", except that the Italians simply refused to take risks, whilst the RN was completely the opposite. With their carriers they achieved air superiority at sea in that six months despite the numerical advantages to the RA. wouild.
Bragadin says that they were suffering oil shortages that were curtailing training and full usage of the battlefleet frommuch earlier than that. Ciano also says similar things in his diary. The crisis was not acute, but it was affecting themn from a very early stage.
Theoretically for about a week they did. In practice they didnt. They entered the war with just 2 BBs operational, which ramped up over the next 2 months to 4, and then finally 5 just before Taranto. They had clear numbers advantages in light forces, but were very spooked by the RN carriers .
Rapidly, the RN took steps to address this, such that by the second week of hostilities they outnumbered Italian Battlefleet, 5/2, and by the end of July 7/3. At no stage is there any evidence that the italians could get the better of the RN in open battle. They enjoyed a cl;ear superiority of numbers at Punto Stilo, but were driven from the battle, something they simply could not have done during an amphib operation. This reluctance to risk open battle was not an isolated icident, it happened again and again, and the only think that really saved the italians was the superior speed of their ships, that allowed them to escape when caught by any reasonable counter force by the RN. When robbed of speed advantages, such as at Cape Spada, they usually came off very badly.
Its not a matter of fact, its a matter of your opinion. The facts are, in fact, that the italians never attempted that, and on the few occasions they attempted to gain undisputed control of the central basin were strategically defeated (notably Punto Stilo and south of Sardinia). And historically the Italians in August/ September would have been attacking with 4 BBs available to 7 or 8 in the RN. They would have had to endure combat at Night, which the italians were very poor at doing, clearing minefields, and using (mostly) unsupported Infantry to attack a fairly well equipped and dug in defending force. that is not an easy ask, even for a big Navy like the USN
They had superiority of Cruisers, but not battleships. They also enjoyed a big advantgae in numbers of Destroyers. The historical battles shows these advantages were not enough to win them much at all in open battle, even when they massively outnumbered the british.
With regard to airborne resources, I refer you to this site
http://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles/itaparadivs.htm
Relevantly it says
The first paratroop units were organized in Libya in 1938 under the direction of Italo Balbo and consisted of two battalions totaling approximately 300 Libyan Ascaris and 50 Italian officers.
1st Rgt. "Fanti dell'Aria" (Air Infantry)
1st Libyian Paratroop Bn. (colonial troops)
2nd Libyian Paratroop Bn. (colonial troops)
A third Libyan battalion was raised in 1940 composed mainly of Italian colonials and was assimilated with the other two existing units into the Tonini Modile Group. The Tonini Mobile Group fought at Derna in January 1941 under 10th Army command and delayed the Australian advance however was eventually destroyed at Beda Fomm in subsequent fighting.
1st National Paratroop Bn. Of Libyia (Italians)
There were Bersaglieri present at the beginning of occonnors offensive. they were good troops, but poorly led, like all the italian formations. They showed reasonable skills in set piece battles, such as Keren but were easily outclassed in small unit fights or in mobile operations. alpini were used in the Italian offensive of 28 october against the greeks, showed better combat capability than the line Infantry units, but fell apart like the rest in the end
The strenghts of the Italian Air Force 10. June 1940 (excluding North Africa).
And the majority oif those were strung out in Norther italy supporting the abortive offensive into France, and many were also needed in Albania. About 40 were immediately detached to reinforce Rhodes and a similar number to Sardinia. Italian air supremacy was stretched from the very beginning and suffered attrociauous servicieability issues
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Same as a above, plus important to note that only a fraction of these could deply to Sicily, because of the very primitive airfield situation. Wasnt addressed until FKX airfield engineers deplyed in October.
Incorrect. 12 Hurricanes were ferred in in mid July, and another convoy with a similar number arrived two weeks later. Malta received additional AA troops by the end of Auigust, and overall, was well supplied at that time.
Yes
Nope, not according to their historical performance. Several modest sized operations were cancelled in leter 1940 (Corfu) and 1941 (Kotoir) due to a lack of sufficient landing craft. They had them....in miniscule numbers, enough for about a battalion....the rest were by ships boats as demonstrated in their invasion of Albania in '39.
Outnumbered and unwilling to go toe to toe with the allies, and vulnerable to the Malta minefeilds, laid from pre-war.
Nope. they had the numbers, but could not achieve air superiority in any sense. Their aim in 1940 had been to isolate Malta. They could not achieve that, even after 6 months of effort. if anything, particulalry at sea, it was the british and their carriers, with the priceless advantages of mobility, who could claim air superiority over the central basin
So many ifs here, also trying to teach a leopard to change its spots. Just too much wishful thinking for this to ever be considered a reasonable capability assessment.