You are in charge of the Italian Fleet 1941.

[Freebird]

I agree with you Parsifal, the Italians should have prepared their fleet better.
The balance of power shifted a number of times due to actions / losses.

Despite numbers, Italian battleships were never considered a match for the RN battleships, with heavier firepower and radar assisted gunnery. This is why the Italian BB's never closed for a decisive battle with the RN BB's, even when they had an equal number of ships, instead the RM would withdraw.

The above site has the RN with 4 BBs in the Eastern Med in June 1940 at Alexandria. the Italians had 6 BBs - two being completed.
To offset the Italian land based aircraft the RN had 1 aircraft carrier at Alexandria.

Vinne, there are also 3 British battleships, a battlecruiser and a carrier based at Gibraltar, they could have been dispatched in event of a major assault against Malta.

That balance changed in favour of the RN after Taranto on 11 Nov 1940 - 3 BBs sunk at their moorings.
By the end of 1941, Barham had been sunk and Queen Elizabeth and Valiant had been severely damaged (sunk) in Alexandria harbour.
Only by excellent management of this event by the RN and Cunningham in particular prevented the Italians from realizing that they had a significant advantage in BBs.

The British also had 3 battleships in the Indian Ocean in Jan 1942.
They were well aware that Italy lacked the fuel to mount aggressive operations in the Med in 1942, and had the Italians been able to, the RN would have brought a couple of battleships through the Suez canal.

 

[vinnye]

I was unaware of the fuel supply situation for the Italians - that goes some way to explain their lack of aggression.
I had thought that with their newer designed BBs that they might have fancied their chances against the RNs WW1 designed ships?
Having air superiority in some ares also may have encouraged the Italians to try to draw the RN into chasing them into a trap?

The RN did have technical advantages - radar, which it used to good effect at night to surprise some Italian cruisers and the breaking of Italians signals codes etc, quite a useful advantage to have!

 

[parsifal]

I respectfully disagree with FB that Italian ships were inferior to British ships. I totally agree with regards to fuel, but also add that the italians were simply not interested in stand up fights with the RN. Until it was way too late, they wanted to preserve their fleet as a "fleet in being" until after the British had surrendered.That didnt happen, and by the time the Italians realized that they were in for a tough fight, things had changed completely for them. They went into the war as an alleged great power, were comprehensively defeated on all fronts, and by 1941 had been reduced to the position of abject lackie for the germans. Mussolini was asked by Franco in late 1940 whether he regretted getting into the fight. He didnt answer directly, just rolled his eyes in agreement. Cianos diary also reveals how the italians felt. Not even consulted over important events like Barbarossa, their command system frequently bypassed and often left behind to their fate by theiur German "allies", the Italian armed forces became firstly despondent and then openly resentful toward their leader and the Germans.

Had the Germans showed greater respect toward the Italians, giuven them greater support, above all a greater supply of oil and resources to keep the italian factories operating, shipyards building and training to continue, the italians might have again been in position to mount serious challenges to British naval supremacy by late 1941. by then Britain was on the rack herself in the Med, with a whole new TO to worry about. The Italians did mount some naval challenges, at this time, but were never willing to commit everything, boots and all in a stand up fight with the British. By the middle of 1942, it was all too late.....British naval strength had been redployed back to the med, and the Italians went into the final act of their tragic war.

 

[Freebird]

I was unaware of the fuel supply situation for the Italians - that goes some way to explain their lack of aggression.
I had thought that with their newer designed BBs that they might have fancied their chances against the RNs WW1 designed ships?
Having air superiority in some ares also may have encouraged the Italians to try to draw the RN into chasing them into a trap?

The newer Italian BB's were certainly a step up from the older ones, and had the same 15" guns as the British did.
In the autumn of 1940 the Regia Marina was on orders not to engage the RN unless they had clear superiority, concerned that they could suffer a major defeat and endanger their plans.
They were anticipating that the British would soon be defeated in the BoB, and surrender or sue for peace.
In any event, their massive ground advantage in Libya and East Africa would soon crush the British, so Malta would be of little significance anyways.

Air power was not thought to be threatening to ships, it was only really after Taranto that navies considered aircraft mch of a threat to capital ships.

The Italians did in fact mount a massive air operation against the Royal Navy at Calabria- 72 aircraft attacking on 8 July and 126 aircraft attacking on 9 July, yet the only damage was a bomb hit on the bridge of a RN light cruiser, though the ship was not put out of action.


Suppose that the Italian aircraft were attacking a British fleet in defence of Malta in the summer of 1940, why would the results be any better than they were at Calabria?

 

[Freebird]

I respectfully disagree with FB that Italian ships were inferior to British ships.

Note that I said "considered" better, not that that was the reality.

The Littorio class were certainly better than the QE's, being a generation newer and with better protection etc.
They were however brand new, and were working up in the summer of 1940. Had they been thrown into action in June, with an inexperienced crew and a new ship, there is a possibility that they would have had some breakdowns or a "Prince of Wales" failure.

I think the WWI Italian ships were inferior to the QE battleships in practice, partly due to radar advantage, veteran crews, intelligence advantages etc. The aggressive nature of the Royal Navy seemed to throw the Italians off as well. In some cases a very aggressive resistance will give the attacker pause to wonder just how strong the defender actually is.

 

[vinnye]

The newer Italians BBs had a speed advantage over their British counterparts and so in theory be able to dictact how any engagements were carried out?
This is why I said I believe that they could have tried to lure the RN into range of their land based torpedo bombers?
I know that the RN were not stupid and would most likely know what the game was - but the RN was usually aggressive and may have thought the risk worthwhile?
Given the restrictions in fuel and lack of willingness to risk a serious engaement, the RN did not have to change what they were doing - they were in control.
It was the Italians who needed to change tactics if they wanted to wrest control from the RN.

 

[parsifal]

RM was not necesarily wrong to be cautious. They would have needed to risk a lot and very likely suffered heavy losses to their fleet that would not serve italian intersts directly. once again, it would be Italaian blood being spent for German gain. thats how the italians would have viewed it.

Moreover, for the italaians to have been more aggressive in their attacks, all the traditions and expoerience that their fleet had been built on would have had to change. There was also a fundamental problem, which they never really solved. Time and again in 1941-2, the Italian fleet made ready to intercept, only to be let down by poor recce by both the LW and RA. Even basic levels of co-operation between the RM and the supporting airforces was next to non-existent. You cannot really sortie if you dont have good information on the strength and placement of the enemy fleet.

This was a fixable problem, but it needed the formation of a very sizable separate land based fleet air arm years before the Italians ever went to war. Given Mussolinios bombast on this issue, historically that was a very remote possibility.

 

[Shortround6]

The British could also afford to "trade" the Italians ship for ship IF it suited their long term goals. If the British loose 3 old Battleships in 1940/41 and the Italians loose 3 battleships the British can control the Med with what they have left (11 capitol ships until the first KVGs show up.) The Italians would never again be able to put to sea in equal numbers or close to it. They needed to preserve their fleet in case an opportunity presented itself later.

In Nov of 1940 things really swung in the British favor with the raid on Taranto, but by Jan 1942 things were looking much better for the Italians. Ships damaged at Taranto had been repaired and British losses had mounted. Three BBs added to the Fleet (Duke of York just barely) but 4 sunk and two more heavily damaged in Alexandria by The daring Italian raid. Needing to Guard against the Japanese further strained RN deployments.

This was the Italian window of opportunity. If they had thrown away several battleships trying to challenge the British in 1940 they would be in no position to challenge them at a later date.

A weaker Fleet ( or force) cannot go into action for no better reason than not to sit on their hands. Mussolini tried to jump on the French an the last minute and failed to make any real progress against rather limited opposition.

 

[DonL]

Here are a lot of mixing up facts for a wrong timeline!

1. Not one single english battleship or cruiser had a radar set at 1940, beginning 1941.
2. The Regia Marina has no oil problem until late 1941!
3. The Regia Marina had a very clear advantage after the surrender of France till Tarent.
4. As I written bevor, if the italians would attack with all their strenghts and all will Malta, at middle August till beginning September 1940, it is a matter of fact, that this will be an Italian victory!

They had 3 airborne battalion action ready at August 1940. They had superioty at battleships and cruisers from August 1940.
The Alpinis, San Marcos and Bersaglieri are equal to every other unit from the english army and the Italian Air Force had totaly air supermarcy at August 1940.
The strenghts of the Italian Air Force 10. June 1940 (excluding North Africa).

CR.32: 69
CR.42: 120
C.200: 64
G.50: 81
Fighter in summary: 334
***
BR.20: 107
Z.1007: 24
S.79: 287
Z.506: 24
Bomber in summary: 442
Plus a lot of reconnaissance aircraft , and 107 S.79, 87 fighter and 66 light bomber at North Africa.
Plus 15 Stukas at middle August at sicily

Malta didn't get any reinforcement at this time and from a simple military viewpoint and maths the Italians had;

1. the troops
2. the landingships
3. the battleships for support
4 totaly air supermarcy

to attack Malta with success at August/September 1940.

And it is only logic, if I want to attack at North Africa that I crack the lock at my direct supply line!

 

[parsifal]

Here are a lot of mixing up facts for a wrong timeline!

1. Not one single english battleship or cruiser had a radar set at 1940, beginning 1941.

I think this is basically right, though I believe Rodney was fitted with Type 79Y in 1938. Point is, radar was not extensively fitted to the battle line until 1941. However, this gave the italians no real advantage. There is a well demonstrated inferiority operating at night and during the day, the italaians could not match the accuracy of the RN gunnery, with or without radar. At Punto Stilo (ne Calabria) Warspite achieve a record by hitting Cesare at 26500 yards. Italians had problems with dispersion, fire control and a marked reluctance for their destroyers to enter any smokescreen.

Under those conditions, whilst it was difficult for the RN to achieve dominance in Mare nostrum, because of the numbers, it was also very difficult to deny sea access to the RN as well...The situation until Taranto was essentially a "stalemate", except that the Italians simply refused to take risks, whilst the RN was completely the opposite. With their carriers they achieved air superiority at sea in that six months despite the numerical advantages to the RA. wouild.

2. The Regia Marina has no oil problem until late 1941!

Bragadin says that they were suffering oil shortages that were curtailing training and full usage of the battlefleet frommuch earlier than that. Ciano also says similar things in his diary. The crisis was not acute, but it was affecting themn from a very early stage.

3. The Regia Marina had a very clear advantage after the surrender of France till Tarent.

Theoretically for about a week they did. In practice they didnt. They entered the war with just 2 BBs operational, which ramped up over the next 2 months to 4, and then finally 5 just before Taranto. They had clear numbers advantages in light forces, but were very spooked by the RN carriers .

Rapidly, the RN took steps to address this, such that by the second week of hostilities they outnumbered Italian Battlefleet, 5/2, and by the end of July 7/3. At no stage is there any evidence that the italians could get the better of the RN in open battle. They enjoyed a cl;ear superiority of numbers at Punto Stilo, but were driven from the battle, something they simply could not have done during an amphib operation. This reluctance to risk open battle was not an isolated icident, it happened again and again, and the only think that really saved the italians was the superior speed of their ships, that allowed them to escape when caught by any reasonable counter force by the RN. When robbed of speed advantages, such as at Cape Spada, they usually came off very badly.

4. As I written bevor, if the italians would attack with all their strenghts and all will Malta, at middle August till beginning September 1940, it is a matter of fact, that this will be an Italian victory!

Its not a matter of fact, its a matter of your opinion. The facts are, in fact, that the italians never attempted that, and on the few occasions they attempted to gain undisputed control of the central basin were strategically defeated (notably Punto Stilo and south of Sardinia). And historically the Italians in August/ September would have been attacking with 4 BBs available to 7 or 8 in the RN. They would have had to endure combat at Night, which the italians were very poor at doing, clearing minefields, and using (mostly) unsupported Infantry to attack a fairly well equipped and dug in defending force. that is not an easy ask, even for a big Navy like the USN

They had 3 airborne battalion action ready at August 1940. They had superioty at battleships and cruisers from August 1940.

They had superiority of Cruisers, but not battleships. They also enjoyed a big advantgae in numbers of Destroyers. The historical battles shows these advantages were not enough to win them much at all in open battle, even when they massively outnumbered the british.

With regard to airborne resources, I refer you to this site

http://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles/itaparadivs.htm


Relevantly it says

The first paratroop units were organized in Libya in 1938 under the direction of Italo Balbo and consisted of two battalions totaling approximately 300 Libyan Ascaris and 50 Italian officers.

1st Rgt. "Fanti dell'Aria" (Air Infantry)

1st Libyian Paratroop Bn. (colonial troops)

2nd Libyian Paratroop Bn. (colonial troops)

A third Libyan battalion was raised in 1940 composed mainly of Italian colonials and was assimilated with the other two existing units into the Tonini Modile Group. The Tonini Mobile Group fought at Derna in January 1941 under 10th Army command and delayed the Australian advance however was eventually destroyed at Beda Fomm in subsequent fighting.


1st National Paratroop Bn. Of Libyia (Italians)

The Alpinis, San Marcos and Bersaglieri are equal to every other unit from the english army and the Italian Air Force had totaly air supermarcy at August 1940.

There were Bersaglieri present at the beginning of occonnors offensive. they were good troops, but poorly led, like all the italian formations. They showed reasonable skills in set piece battles, such as Keren but were easily outclassed in small unit fights or in mobile operations. alpini were used in the Italian offensive of 28 october against the greeks, showed better combat capability than the line Infantry units, but fell apart like the rest in the end



The strenghts of the Italian Air Force 10. June 1940 (excluding North Africa).

CR.32: 69
CR.42: 120
C.200: 64
G.50: 81
Fighter in summary: 334

And the majority oif those were strung out in Norther italy supporting the abortive offensive into France, and many were also needed in Albania. About 40 were immediately detached to reinforce Rhodes and a similar number to Sardinia. Italian air supremacy was stretched from the very beginning and suffered attrociauous servicieability issues


***

BR.20: 107
Z.1007: 24
S.79: 287
Z.506: 24
Bomber in summary: 442
Plus a lot of reconnaissance aircraft , and 107 S.79, 87 fighter and 66 light bomber at North Africa.
Plus 15 Stukas at middle August at sicily

Same as a above, plus important to note that only a fraction of these could deply to Sicily, because of the very primitive airfield situation. Wasnt addressed until FKX airfield engineers deplyed in October.

Malta didn't get any reinforcement at this time and from a simple military viewpoint and maths the Italians had;

Incorrect. 12 Hurricanes were ferred in in mid July, and another convoy with a similar number arrived two weeks later. Malta received additional AA troops by the end of Auigust, and overall, was well supplied at that time.

1. the troops

Yes

2. the landingships

Nope, not according to their historical performance. Several modest sized operations were cancelled in leter 1940 (Corfu) and 1941 (Kotoir) due to a lack of sufficient landing craft. They had them....in miniscule numbers, enough for about a battalion....the rest were by ships boats as demonstrated in their invasion of Albania in '39.

3. the battleships for support

Outnumbered and unwilling to go toe to toe with the allies, and vulnerable to the Malta minefeilds, laid from pre-war.

4 totaly air supermarcy

Nope. they had the numbers, but could not achieve air superiority in any sense. Their aim in 1940 had been to isolate Malta. They could not achieve that, even after 6 months of effort. if anything, particulalry at sea, it was the british and their carriers, with the priceless advantages of mobility, who could claim air superiority over the central basin

to attack Malta with success at August/September 1940.

And it is only logic, if I want to attack at North Africa that I crack the lock at my direct supply line!

So many ifs here, also trying to teach a leopard to change its spots. Just too much wishful thinking for this to ever be considered a reasonable capability assessment.

 

[parsifal]

The fate of Gruppo Tonini in January 1941

These were the paratroopers mentioned, fighting alongside regs, armour, and Bersglieri in a dug in position at Derna. About 11000 defenders, pitched against approximately 5000 attacking Australians from the 19 Brigade. It wass a tough fight, but ultimately the italians were defeated (this was an article i helped to write some years ago)

Italian OB
Fteiah airfield area:
60th Bersaglieri Motorcycle Company (less 2 platoons)
an M11 medium tank platoon with 4 tanks
14th anti-aircraft battery (6 x 20mm guns)
(this, barring the tanks, was the small garrison the Australians faced in their initial attack in the airfield area)
Martuba-Derna crossroads, west of Fteiah (northern Derna line portion):
Libyan Paratroop Battalion
a 75/27 field arty battery from 10th Arty Rgt
eleven 47/32 AT guns
six 20mm guns
(this force fought tenaciously against the advancing Australians) – at the airfield
Wadi Derna (southern portion of the Derna line):
2nd Battalion, 86th Inf. Rgt., Sabratha Division
Depot infantry battalion from 115th Inf. Rgt, Marmarica Division
17th Machinegun Battalion from Brescia Division
Town of Derna:
Elements, 55th Machinegun Bn from Savona Division
18th Libyan Inf. Bn.
an artillery battery
Fort Piemonte, Fteiah plain:
2 x 75/27 guns
1 x 47/32 gun
Line of Communications December 2007
30
a machinegun platoon
Fort Rudero, Fteiah plain:
2 x 75/27 guns
1 x 47/32 gun
a machinegun platoon
Reserve:
2 platoons of 201st Bersaglieri Motorcycle Coy.
4 x 20mm guns
2 armored cars (decrepit Lancia WWI model)
a Motorcycle Carabinieri team
Derna Sector Artillery:
1st Group (=Battalion), 75/27 field guns (20 guns used in anti-tank role)
7th Group, 75/46 AA guns (7 guns)
5th 20mm AA battery
256th 65/17 light gun battery
5 x 47/32 guns
one 76/40 gun battery
two 102/45 gun batteries
one 152/45 gun battery
one 120/45 gun battery
seven Scotti light guns
Of all the Italian troops remaining in Cyrenaica many of the best of them were to be found in the Derna Area in January 1941. Two of the 4 independent (divisional) Bersaglieri motorcycle battalions, the veteran Libyan para battalion, and 2 battalions of the newly arrived 10th Bersaglieri regiment, all strengthened with large amounts of artillery and a few tanks. The Australian official history correctly identified the 10th Bersaglieri regiment, but not the other units.
Australian OB
19 X/6th XX. 2/4, 2/5, 2/6, 2/7, 2/8 bns (part of 17 X too)
January 14th to 22nd, fighting in the Derna sector was limited to patrol skirmishes.
The Australians attacked hard on Jan. 23rd-26th in the northern area. The Italian and Australian versions may differ in several details, but basically the battle went as follows: the Australians seized, not without some difficulty, the airfield facilities, but could not push farther west due to a powerful artillery barrage pinning them down and the stiff resistance put up by the Libyan paratroops and other small units. The four Italian medium tanks were soon put out of combat (Australian version) or they proved quite effective to thwart an Australian flanking move (Italian version).

On January 26th Australian elements crossed Wadi Derna, in the southern sector, and began to drive the defenders back. A counterattack launched by a weak company-sized Italian infantry force went nowhere. Alarmed by the gaping hole on Wadi Derna and the Australian push, the Italian commanders ordered a larger scale counterattack to be executed on the following day, Jan, 27th, by the 10th Bersaglieri Regiment (less one battalion).
Jan. 27th the counterattack was launched and succeeded to throw the Australians back to the eastern side of the Wadi (Australian version: running short of ammo, they had to withdraw to avoid being cut off). However, in the north the two forts Piemonte and Rudero and their tiny garrisons were battered by enemy artillery and overwhelmed by enemy infantry.
On Jan. 28th, Graziani, alarmed by the overall situation steadily getting worse, decided to break contact and withdraw. On Jan. 30th/31st, the garrison of Derna slipped off unmolested, except a few tiny rearguard elements left in place to delay the Australian advance which were obviously overrun.

On 23 January, Lt. Fiammingo, commander of 2nd Company, Libyan Paratroops Battalion, sent a group of paratroopers with a truck-mounted 20mm gun and 2 machineguns, led by Lt. Sainas to support the Fteiah airfield defenders? On the following day, during the fighting an artillery shell destroyed the 20mm gun truck (the blast is recorded even by the Australian history!) and Sainas had to withdraw to a nearby post where he found a 47/32 mm gun. After reorganizing his men, at night he returned to the battle scene, drove temporarily off the Australians and carried the bodies of the dead 20mm gun crew back to Italian lines. (Both Sainas and Fiammingo were heavily wounded in action a few days later).

And what about the Libyan paratrooper Bubakr Ramalon, awarded the Silver Medal for Valour as he was wounded twice while hurling hand grenades at the enemy, and fought on in spite of the wounds? And Libyan Sergeant Mohammed Iden, who, wounded in action, rescued under enemy fire his wounded officer as the latter was about to be captured

Some more details on Derna. It seems the toughest fighting the Derna paratroopers force was involved in took place on 25 January. It is difficult to identify the various phases of the fighting and where precisely they took place, anyway after a morning of sharp combat, in the evening after 5:00pm a heavy attack pushed back the forward posts of the Italian defensive line and some Australian companies almost managed to outflank and encircle a portion of the line. According to the Italian account, this attack was repelled thanks to local counterattacks and hand-to-hand fighting on some occasions.

A source (actually not very reliable, though: Nino Arena, History of the Italian Paratroopers) gives an Italian casualties figure for 25 January, 40 dead and 54 wounded. That the losses near Derna were at any rate severe, decidedly higher than Australian losses, is agreed by both sides.

The OH figure for the whole period from the beginning of the battle for Derna to 26 January, when the Fteiah airport was seized by the Australians and the Derna garrison folded back behind the steep cliff east of the town: 87 dead and 131 wounded. Contrary to their habit Australian and Commonwealth sources don't mention "hordes" of Italian prisoners, an omission usually signalling hard fighting and few prisoners taken.

(Gruppo Tonini was captured some days later at Beda Fomm)


Bibliography
The basis for this article was a well researched document compiled by Alessandro Gazzi , who very kindly agreed for me to use it as a primary source here.
Vicini, Diego (General), The history of the 8th Bersaglieri regiment, 1982 [not only a history of the 8th regiment but also a masterly survey of the whole campaign and all the other Bersaglieri units in Africa until 1943]
3 of the Italian Official Histories on North Africa.
Pignato Cappellano, Combat vehicles of the Italian Army, volume 2 (1940-1945). USSME, 2002 (official history).
Cappellano, F. Artillery of the Italian Army in the Second World War, Storia Militrare, 1998.
Lucio Ceva Andrea Curami. The Mechanization of the Italian Army until 1943. USSME, 1994. (official history)
[the 3 titles above translated from their Italian titles]

 

[DonL]

Here are a lot of mixing up facts for a wrong timeline!




I think this is basically right, though I believe Rodney was fitted with Type 79Y in 1938. Point is, radar was not extensively fitted to the battle line until 1941. However, this gave the italians no real advantage. There is a well demonstrated inferiority operating at night and during the day, the italaians could not match the accuracy of the RN gunnery, with or without radar. At Punto Stilo (ne Calabria) Warspite achieve a record by hitting Cesare at 26500 yards. Italians had problems with dispersion, fire control and a marked reluctance for their destroyers to enter any smokescreen.

Under those conditions, whilst it was difficult for the RN to achieve dominance in Mare nostrum, because of the numbers, it was also very difficult to deny sea access to the RN as well...The situation until Taranto was essentially a "stalemate", except that the Italians simply refused to take risks, whilst the RN was completely the opposite. With their carriers they achieved air superiority at sea in that six months despite the numerical advantages to the RA. wouild.




Bragadin says that they were suffering oil shortages that were curtailing training and full usage of the battlefleet frommuch earlier than that. Ciano also says similar things in his diary. The crisis was not acute, but it was affecting themn from a very early stage.



Theoretically for about a week they did. In practice they didnt. They entered the war with just 2 BBs operational, which ramped up over the next 2 months to 4, and then finally 5 just before Taranto. They had clear numbers advantages in light forces, but were very spooked by the RN carriers .

Rapidly, the RN took steps to address this, such that by the second week of hostilities they outnumbered Italian Battlefleet, 5/2, and by the end of July 7/3. At no stage is there any evidence that the italians could get the better of the RN in open battle. They enjoyed a cl;ear superiority of numbers at Punto Stilo, but were driven from the battle, something they simply could not have done during an amphib operation. This reluctance to risk open battle was not an isolated icident, it happened again and again, and the only think that really saved the italians was the superior speed of their ships, that allowed them to escape when caught by any reasonable counter force by the RN. When robbed of speed advantages, such as at Cape Spada, they usually came off very badly.




Its not a matter of fact, its a matter of your opinion. The facts are, in fact, that the italians never attempted that, and on the few occasions they attempted to gain undisputed control of the central basin were strategically defeated (notably Punto Stilo and south of Sardinia). And historically the Italians in August/ September would have been attacking with 4 BBs available to 7 or 8 in the RN. They would have had to endure combat at Night, which the italians were very poor at doing, clearing minefields, and using (mostly) unsupported Infantry to attack a fairly well equipped and dug in defending force. that is not an easy ask, even for a big Navy like the USN



They had superiority of Cruisers, but not battleships. They also enjoyed a big advantgae in numbers of Destroyers. The historical battles shows these advantages were not enough to win them much at all in open battle, even when they massively outnumbered the british.

With regard to airborne resources, I refer you to this site

http://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles/itaparadivs.htm


Relevantly it says

The first paratroop units were organized in Libya in 1938 under the direction of Italo Balbo and consisted of two battalions totaling approximately 300 Libyan Ascaris and 50 Italian officers.

1st Rgt. "Fanti dell'Aria" (Air Infantry)

1st Libyian Paratroop Bn. (colonial troops)

2nd Libyian Paratroop Bn. (colonial troops)

A third Libyan battalion was raised in 1940 composed mainly of Italian colonials and was assimilated with the other two existing units into the Tonini Modile Group. The Tonini Mobile Group fought at Derna in January 1941 under 10th Army command and delayed the Australian advance however was eventually destroyed at Beda Fomm in subsequent fighting.


1st National Paratroop Bn. Of Libyia (Italians)




There were Bersaglieri present at the beginning of occonnors offensive. they were good troops, but poorly led, like all the italian formations. They showed reasonable skills in set piece battles, such as Keren but were easily outclassed in small unit fights or in mobile operations. alpini were used in the Italian offensive of 28 october against the greeks, showed better combat capability than the line Infantry units, but fell apart like the rest in the end



The strenghts of the Italian Air Force 10. June 1940 (excluding North Africa).



And the majority oif those were strung out in Norther italy supporting the abortive offensive into France, and many were also needed in Albania. About 40 were immediately detached to reinforce Rhodes and a similar number to Sardinia. Italian air supremacy was stretched from the very beginning and suffered attrociauous servicieability issues


***



Same as a above, plus important to note that only a fraction of these could deply to Sicily, because of the very primitive airfield situation. Wasnt addressed until FKX airfield engineers deplyed in October.




Incorrect. 12 Hurricanes were ferred in in mid July, and another convoy with a similar number arrived two weeks later. Malta received additional AA troops by the end of Auigust, and overall, was well supplied at that time.



Yes




Nope, not according to their historical performance. Several modest sized operations were cancelled in leter 1940 (Corfu) and 1941 (Kotoir) due to a lack of sufficient landing craft. They had them....in miniscule numbers, enough for about a battalion....the rest were by ships boats as demonstrated in their invasion of Albania in '39.




Outnumbered and unwilling to go toe to toe with the allies, and vulnerable to the Malta minefeilds, laid from pre-war.



Nope. they had the numbers, but could not achieve air superiority in any sense. Their aim in 1940 had been to isolate Malta. They could not achieve that, even after 6 months of effort. if anything, particulalry at sea, it was the british and their carriers, with the priceless advantages of mobility, who could claim air superiority over the central basin




So many ifs here, also trying to teach a leopard to change its spots. Just too much wishful thinking for this to ever be considered a reasonable capability assessment.

1. Ciano is a rat that can't be trust
2. 5 Italian Battleships (partly modern) against 4 old RN battleships
3. 2 libysche and 1 Carabinieri-Bataillon
4. they had the four Sesia class plus the one older ship, capacity to 4500 troops plus equipment, with 2500-3000 troops much more equipment.
5. 12 Hurricans against 334 fighter?
6. The capacity of Sicily you will kidding me? At March 1941 there are 500 hundreds german aircrafts plus italian aircrafts!
7. RN Battleships were outnumbered at middle August to September 6/5 to 4 RN old Battleships.
8. I have written about strenghts and hearts! The Italian midddle leadership had the hearts and the strenghts, the problem was the high leadership!

Edit:

http://www.bing.com/maps/default.as...RM=Z7FD1#JmNpZD1FRTlDREFFQjA3RDE4MzEzITE0NQ==

So 2 X 6 pounder and 2 x 9,2 inch at Marsaxlokk and not any gun at Wied at Zurieq!
Very impressive, sorry for the sarcasum not a single chance against Battleship Guns

Edit:
AGAIN:
If my goal is North Africa I will attack with all my strenghts at the lock. If I'm a smart ass I declare war at x Day at August 1940 when all my surface shipps are mainly at port and my battleships and landingships are minutes away to open fire at Malta and the landing ships are minutes away from the beach!
The spoils of war doesn't inrested! (France)

 

[parsifal]

Ciano is a rat that can't be trust

Why

2. 5 Italian Battleships (partly modern) against 4 old RN battleships

Most of the BBs were not ready in June. Between June and September, the Italian fleet added or managed to commission a further 2 of the refurbished battleships, and then in October the first of the Littorios were finally worked up. other ships were commissioned but had not yet completed work up until November

3. 2 libysche and 1 Carabinieri-Bataillon

Yes, and these were grafted onto the Derna Garrison, where they put up a good fight defensively, but were overwhelmed by Australians half their number

4. they had the four Sesia class plus the one older ship, capacity to 4500 troops plus equipment, with 2500-3000 troops much more equipment.

Thats goos information, and confirms that the Italains lacked sufficient capability to get enough troops ashore to defeat the Malta Garrison, which stood at two Brigade groups.

5. 12 Hurricans against 334 fighter?

Embarrassing isnt it. Except that the Italians could never concentrate that number over Malta for a number of reasons.
They could outnumber the British, but could never really do much with it. Same thing happened to them over Greece.

6. The capacity of Sicily you will kidding me? At March 1941 there are 500 hundreds german aircrafts plus italian aircrafts!

Significant upgrades of the Sicilain airfields was needed from October. FKX began movement in October...the very first thing they did ws upgrade the airfield facilties. Until then, spot capability was very limited

In any event the important battle was around the seas, and the RA was simply untrained and badly equipped to fight that sort of fight. The RN had proven many times that italaians airstrikees were veryu innefective against moving ships, and the experiences of the illustrious in the following january showed that even the germans had difficulty hitting ships sheltering in Grand Harbour.

7. RN Battleships were outnumbered at middle August to September 6/5 to 4 RN old Battleships.

No, this is wrong and i strongly disageree. The italians did not enter the war with four operational BBs. they had just 2, the others needed to be broughht out of refit and worked up. By early July there were 3 Bbs in Force H and 4 in Alexandria, and this remained more or less the situation for the restof the year, as the italaians gradually increased the numbers of operational BBs.

The RN showed in spades at Punto Stilo their untter disdain of Italian capability. They saw a fleet off with the following strengths.

Italian Navy

2 battleships
6 heavy cruisers
8 light cruisers
16 destroyers

Royal Navy

aircraft carrier
3 battleships
5 light cruisers
16 destroyers

The results of the battle itsellf were even, but the italians followed their operational doctrine and withdrew from the battle. In an amphib they just cannot do that.

Strikes by the RA involving more than 70 strike aircraft hit the RN repeatedly, with no appreciable effect. The utter disdain of the RN to this threat is evidenced by the fact that Cunningham pursued the fleeing Italians to within 50 miles of the Calabrian Coast. for

I have written about strenghts and hearts! The Italian midddle leadership had the hearts and the strenghts, the problem was the high leadership!

Unfortunately this a bit of wishful thinking. Middle leadership, where it existed was good, but the basic problem was the shortage of good middle leadership and the generally poor relationship between the commanding generals and their men. The rations and conditions for the enlisted man in the italian army were pretty poor, whilst the conditions for officers were often palatial. This bred resentment and poor esprit de Corps in the italaian Army. There were exceptions, such as Ariete and the Bersiaglieri, but even here comparing them to men like the AIF isreally a bad joke.

 

[parsifal]

Edit:

Bing Maps - Driving Directions, Traffic and Road Conditions

So 2 X 6 pounder and 2 x 9,2 inch at Marsaxlokk and not any gun at Wied at Zurieq!
Very impressive, sorry for the sarcasum not a single chance against Battleship Guns

These relate to the Voctorian era defences at the island. Read the book i posted earlier and you will see that these defences had been substantially augmented after that. Actually the defences at malta were comparable to those at Dover and Singapore, and they were "good enough" in the finish

If my goal is North Africa I will attack with all my strenghts at the lock. If I'm a smart ass I declare war at x Day at August 1940 when all my surface shipps are mainly at port and my battleships and landingships are minutes away to open fire at Malta and the landing ships are minutes away from the beach!
The spoils of war doesn't inrested!

But italy did not go to war with a premeditated plan. they went to war opportuistically. Its that simple. If they had tried to make preprations pre-war, you have assume a quid pro quo and assume simiular prepration by the British, or assume the british asre idiots and will let you go ahead and get away with it.

The real world does not work the way you think it should I am afraid

 

[Vincenzo]

the italians got 5 BBs in operation since the operation Hats (from 31st august), they never got 6, the Doria go in operation only in january '41. in the late summer 40 probably there were 4 para btls (1 libians,1 italian in libya, 1 carabinieri and 1 regular in Italy) but the regular and the carabinieri btls were just formed in july (afair the 2 lybians were merged in 1). In late summer '40 the war with France is over and the war with greece is not started, probably it's possible add around 50% of air force in Sicily, airport situation there were 10 military fields under Sicily comand and some were in building in june '40 i think there is not large logistic trouble.

 

[DonL]

I will come back tomorow with exact datas, but the italian had 2 Littorios action ready at august 1940.
Also how can airborne troops fight at Derna at August?

You are forwarding the boring victoty literature, you should look at the exact datas!

Laut Ordersofbattle.com:
1.Dorste: regulär
2.Devon: regulär
2.West Kent: regulär
2.RIF: regulär
8.Manchaster: 1st Line TA
1.KOMR: regulär
2.KOMR: War Formed (15.01.1940)
3.KOMR: War Formed (01.07.1940 !)

hardly impressive!

 

[DonL]

the italians got 5 BBs in operation since the operation Hats (from 31st august), they never got 6, the Doria go in operation only in january '41. in the late summer 40 probably there were 4 para btls (1 libians,1 italian in libya, 1 carabinieri and 1 regular in Italy) but the regular and the carabinieri btls were just formed in july (afair the 2 lybians were merged in 1). In late summer '40 the war with France is over and the war with greece is not started, probably it's possible add around 50% of air force in Sicily, airport situation there were 10 military fields under Sicily comand and some were in building in june '40 i think there is not large logistic trouble.

Thanks that is proving my source, the attack must be at middle of august to beginning september, because no italian troops are involved at other frontlines.

Edit:

Thats goos information, and confirms that the Italains lacked sufficient capability to get enough troops ashore to defeat the Malta Garrison, which stood at two Brigade groups.

We are talking about 5 ships! If I'm looking at the capacity of the italian fleet, there are more then enough ships to support an invasion with landing troops, especialy if the landingzone is save!
The italians had an armada of small landing ships and Malta was only 40-50 miles away from Sicily at summer at the Meditrain.
This isn't the englisch channel nor the north atlantic!

 

[parsifal]

Guys

There were 6 Battleships commissioned by September, but only some of these were ready for operations.


This is the actual Order of Battle available to the italian Navy June 10th . Only 2 Battleships were ready for action with an additional 2 Littorio Commissioned, but not ready for action

Italian Naval Order of Battle June 10th, 1940

"Steel Ships" says that Caio Duillo "Recommissioned on July 15, 1940 Caio Duilio ready for action last week of August, sortied on 31 August against HMS Valiant but returned to port the next day. On September 7 she returned to sea, acting under information that the British Force H was on the move. Force H was indeed on the move but instead of eastward into the Mediterranean, it went south to the west coast of Africa on the fiasco that was the Dakkar attack. Caio Duilio was at Taranto when the Italian battle fleet was attacked by the FAA on November 11, 1940".

Battleship Andrea Doria was even later. Steel Navy again "After repairs and modernizations had been completed, the Andrea Doria was recomissioned into the Regia Marina on October 20, 1940. She was assigned to convoy duty between Italy and Libya to supply Axis troops fighting in the North African Front and took part in the First Battle of Sirte. After the Armistice in September 1943 the ship was sailed to Malta with her sistership and was interned by the Allies".

Again, I repat. For the period between June and the end of October, the Italians had not more than 4 BBs at any given time operational. In June through to the end of July they had only 2. From the begining of August they had 4, increasing to 5 from the end of Septemeber and then finally to 6 (but by then one of them was damaged).

The italians had an armada of small landing ships and Malta was only 40-50 miles away from Sicily at summer at the Meditrain.
This isn't the englisch channel nor the north atlantic

Not according to the felgrau OB I posted. Im more than a litle curious now about the amphibious capability of the italian Navy. Can you name the ships you think available and we can easily check if they are available and what their capabilities are from general reference material like Janes or Conways. If they arent commissioned and operational as at June, they are not availble for an Amphib in August.

 

[DonL]

To my sources the italians had 5 battleships ready for operation at august 1940!

Italian landing crafts available for C3
10 x PF (Piroscafo) [Aventino, Viminale, Quirinale, Italia, Milano,Tunisi,
Calino, Rosandra, Crispi, Donizzetti]
Small passenger ships. Capacity from 800 to 1,400 men.
6 x PFC (Piroscafo da carico) [ ? ]
As above, but loaded with cargo. Capacity 3,000 tons.
2 x NT (Nave traghetto) [Messina, Aspromonte]
Ex-Messina Strait railway ferries. 1,000 tons. Capacity 4-8 tanks each.
4 x MC (Motocisterna) - [Sesia, Tirso, Scrivia, Garigliano]
Thats the four landing ships I refer in my previous posts
Pre-war purpose-built LST. Utilized for artillery transport. Could carry two
75 Btys with vehicles.
5 x PM (Posamine) [Buccari, Durazzo, Pelagosa, Crotone, Vieste]
Ex-light minelayer. Makeshift bow ramp (motorcycle-able). Capacity 500 men.
2 x MN (Motonave) [Aquileia and ?]
Ex-Venice ferries. Similar to PM. Capacity 400 men.
4 x PFP (Piroscafo Piccolo) [Tabarca, Sauro, Mafalda, Argentina]
Ex-Capri ferries. As MN.
70 x MZ (Motozattera) [50 Italians, 20 Germans]
German MPF model. 250 tons, 10 knots. Armament 1x76/40, 1x20/65. Bow loading
ramp. Capacity 220 men, or vehicles for 50 tons.
30 x MV (Motoveliero)
Ex-trawlers. Makeshift bow ramp (men only). HMG-armed. Capacity 300 men, or
100 tons of supplies.
24 x MF (Motoscafo)
Ex-Venice motorboats. 20 tons. LMG-armed. Capacity 75 men.
50 x ML (Motolancia)
Littler still motorboats. 15 tons. Capacity 30 men

At least the 70 MZ = MFP are not available at 1940.

Edit:

The british fleet had 30 hours from Alexandria to Malta at 20kn (20kn are very optimistic for the old BB and DD for cruising speed), more then enough time to do the critical moves, even landing a second wave with the Sesia Class.

 

[parsifal]

I will come back tomorow with exact datas, but the italian had 2 Littorios action ready at august 1940.

By August the Royal Navy was routinely deploying 7 battleships into the Med, to the RMs 4.

Also how can airborne troops fight at Derna at August?

They were part of gruppo Tonini which was mostly colonial troops> The main parachute school for the Italians was near tripoli in Libya

You are forwarding the boring victoty literature, you should look at the exact datas!

"Boring victory literature" - hardly . anyway, matter of opinion I guess

Laut Ordersofbattle.com:
1.Dorste: regulär
2.Devon: regulär
2.West Kent: regulär
2.RIF: regulär
8.Manchaster: 1st Line TA
1.KOMR: regulär
2.KOMR: War Formed (15.01.1940)
3.KOMR: War Formed (01.07.1940 !)

hardly impressive!

[/QUOTE]

These are, I assume intell report from the Germans. if not please clarify. They appear to be battalions based on Malta. If so, what is it you are trying to say? That 2 and 2/3 of a brigade on the Island which would actually be a fairly formidable defending force. rember, in 1565, the ottomans with a force of 48000 men were defeated by a force of just 7000, of which aonly about 1500 were professional soldiers. And the Ottomans supposedly held many of the 16th century equivalents to air and naval supremacy