N4521U
Colonel
Pizza and Rum................. what a thought!
You are in charge of the Italian Fleet 1941.
- Thread starter vinnye
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davebender
1st Lieutenant
Italy made a bunch of amphibious landings from 1911 onward. How did they put troops ashore at Tripoli, Tobruk, Derna, Khoms, Benghazi, Dodecanese Islands, Balearic Islands etc.?
Shortround6
Major General
Ships boats?
Coming along side a dock?
Putting 1500 sailors into Tripoli against minor resistance ( what shore batteries of pill box/MG emplacements were there?) is a far cry from assaulting defended beaches or harbors on Malta.
Malta may have been "lightly" defended in 1940 compared to what it was later but it's defenses were well above what the Turks had in place in North Africa in 1911.
Coming along side a dock?
Putting 1500 sailors into Tripoli against minor resistance ( what shore batteries of pill box/MG emplacements were there?) is a far cry from assaulting defended beaches or harbors on Malta.
Malta may have been "lightly" defended in 1940 compared to what it was later but it's defenses were well above what the Turks had in place in North Africa in 1911.
also italian capability would be best of theat in 1911, and if italian ask to surrender to viceroy/governor?
what is the strenght of malta defence in summer '40?
- Thread starter
- #25
vinnye
Senior Airman
I don't believe that Italy could manage an invasion on its own in 1940. Germany was busy finishing off France and trying to do so with Britain or launch its own invasion, therefore was unlikely to offer much help.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
September 1939 Malta Garrison.
I doubt it was much bigger during June 1940.
Malta, 03.09.1939
Malta Brigade. 4 infantry battalions attached.
.....2 Devon
.....1 Dorset
.....2 Rwk
.....2 RIF
Four British infantry battalions won't stop a serious enemy invasion. Speed of the invasion will be determined by how fast Italian Navy and Air Force can reduce enough coastal batteries to clear a landing beach.
I doubt it was much bigger during June 1940.
Malta, 03.09.1939
Malta Brigade. 4 infantry battalions attached.
.....2 Devon
.....1 Dorset
.....2 Rwk
.....2 RIF
Four British infantry battalions won't stop a serious enemy invasion. Speed of the invasion will be determined by how fast Italian Navy and Air Force can reduce enough coastal batteries to clear a landing beach.
- Thread starter
- #27
vinnye
Senior Airman
I am not that familiar with the geography of Malta, but I have seen some film that shows quite a lot of coastline has cliffs.
So how much coastline would be able to have a seaborne landing?
From what I have seen on documentaries, Malta was probably at its weakest during Spring / Summer 1942 - lack of convoys supplying food, ammo etc.
So how much coastline would be able to have a seaborne landing?
From what I have seen on documentaries, Malta was probably at its weakest during Spring / Summer 1942 - lack of convoys supplying food, ammo etc.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
Malta - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
121 square miles. 30 square miles per British infantry battalion.
With a British troop density that low you can land almost anywhere in small units. You can also land or parachute troops into clearings. 4 infantry battalions cannot be everywhere at once so Britain must rely on counterattacks to eject an invading force.
121 square miles. 30 square miles per British infantry battalion.
With a British troop density that low you can land almost anywhere in small units. You can also land or parachute troops into clearings. 4 infantry battalions cannot be everywhere at once so Britain must rely on counterattacks to eject an invading force.
DonL
Banned
This is a myth which is cultivated in victory literature, also in this forum, but it has nothing to do with the hard facts.
The Italian Navy had a full fleet of landingships. The Sesia Class
Axis History Forum • Sesia class landing ships
With the four modern and the one older (five ships/Forza Navale Speciale) you can bring very easily 2500-3000 men with howitzer, ATG, smal vehicles and supply at the first wave directly to the beach to fight for a proper landingzone. Also they can come back in 12-15hours (Sicily-Malta) with the next wave plus supply.
This myth that Malta was impregnable 1940 and 1941 is realy ridiculous and a very well proganda from victory literature.
The X Fliegercorps at Sicily (from January 1941 till June 1941) was able to totaly isolate Malta. The people were starving and no single supply convoy reached Malta. From the hard military facts of ships, troops and planes, it would be much easier to invade Malta then Crete! Both can be reached at 1940/41 also to my opinion simultaneously if the Italians were willing to deploy troops and insert their whole fleet to cover such a szenario.
Shortround6
Major General
Mr Bender was apparently referencing "landings" carried out by the Italians in the Italian-Turkish war of 1911-12 as "experience" of their amphibious warfare capability. Obviously the ships you refer to did not exist in 1911-12.
Malta was far from impregnable 1940 and 1941 but landing 2500-4000 men in a the first wave is a very chancy proposition. You are basically pitting 5 battalions of attackers against 5 battalions of defenders in 1940 plus what ever airborne troops the Italians had. You are also gambling that the 5 landing ships can also get back off the beach (something a number of American landing ships failed to do) and NOT get hit by shore batteries or RN ships.
Much depends on how much the RN is willing to risk and what the Italian Navy is willing to risk. With the arrival of the Luftwaffe in Jan 1941 things look much darker for the RN.
Malta was far from impregnable 1940 and 1941 but landing 2500-4000 men in a the first wave is a very chancy proposition. You are basically pitting 5 battalions of attackers against 5 battalions of defenders in 1940 plus what ever airborne troops the Italians had. You are also gambling that the 5 landing ships can also get back off the beach (something a number of American landing ships failed to do) and NOT get hit by shore batteries or RN ships.
Much depends on how much the RN is willing to risk and what the Italian Navy is willing to risk. With the arrival of the Luftwaffe in Jan 1941 things look much darker for the RN.
parsifal
Colonel
We can get some idea of the historical italian capability by their operations during the operations imediately before and after italy's entry.
Albania
The original Italian plans for the invasion called for up to 50,000 men supported by 137 naval units and 400 airplanes. Ultimately the invasion force grew to 100,000 men supported by 600 airplanes. Not all the forces committed were involved in the landings....about 10-15000 men were in the initial assault forces. There was no prepratory bombardment (the Italians didnt think of that......) and no evidence of advanaced landing craft....it was all done from ships boats and lighters that came from Taranto. On April 7 1939 the italian troops, led by General Alfredo Guzzoni, invaded Albania, attacking all Albanian ports simultaneously. The largest garrison defeing these ports was a scratch force of 360 militia men, under the command of a man named Lupo and defending the port town of Durres. This pathetic force held up the invasion forces for over 24 hours. There were 65 units in Saranda, 40 at Vlorë, 38 in Durrës, 28 at Shëngjin and 8 more at Bishti
Greece
During the invasion of greece in late 1940, the italians planned an amphibious assault of Corfu using landing craft, and some of their tiny marine forces. The assault was intended to be in roughly reinforced battalion strength, but was cancelled at the last minute and never went ahead. Not sure why.
During the Greco Italian war, Italian forces invaded Greece and made limited gains. At the outbreak of hostilities, the Royal Hellenic Navy was composed of the old cruiser Georgios Averof, 10 destroyers (four old Theria class, four relatively modern Dardo class and two new Greyhound class), several torpedo boats and six old submarines. Faced with the formidable Regia Marina, its role was primarily limited to patrol and convoy escort duties in the Aegean Sea. This was essential both for the completion of the Army's mobilization, but also for the overall resupply of the country, the convoy routes being threatened by Italian aircraft and submarines operating from the Dodecanese Islands.
Nevertheless, the Greek ships also carried out limited offensive operations against Italian shipping in the Strait of Otranto. The destroyers carried out three bold but fruitless night-time raids (14–15 November 1940, 15–16 December 1940 and 4–5 January 1941). The main successes came from the submarines, which managed to sink approximately 10 Italian transports. On the Italian side, although the Regia Marina suffered severe losses in capital ships from the British Royal Navy during the Taranto raid, Italian cruisers and destroyers continued to operate covering the convoys between Italy and Albania. Also, on 28 November, an Italian squadron did undertake a bombardment of Corfu, while on 18 December and 4 March, Italian task forces shelled Greek coastal positions in Albania in support of their by now retreating army.
Yugoslavia
During operations against Yugoslavia, the italians again considered and planned an invasion of Kotor, but was cancelled again, allegedly due to inadeqiate resources, particulalry landing craft.
British perspective and preprations
In his book "Malta and British Strategic Defence Policy 1925-43, douglas Austin writes that British defence policy for the island estimated (rather optimistically as it turns out) that the italians had the ability to land across opposed coastline about 12000 Infantry, with no heavy weapons or tanks available until a port was captured.
From 1925 to 1935, the landward defences of the island were in a very run down state, ut plans at least were drwn up to raise up to 2 militia brigades from thje local population in the event of war. Priority was very low, because at that time Italy posed no real threat to british interests. however this situation changed from 1935 to 1939, following the italian transgressions in Abysynnia.
Defences were so weak in 1936 that the JPC considered that a rapid coup de main by the italians would probably succeed. At that stage there was less than a battlaion of ground troops about 24 AA guns, no fld artillery and about 30 coast defence guns.
The Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) undertook a study in 1936 that confirmed the vulnerability to seizure by the Italians in the event of surprise attack. In 1937-8 these bleak predictions persisted, even though the strength of the lanward defences were by that time starting to increase. By 1937, the possibility that a war with Germany and Italy was being considered, and further possible conflicts with Japan at the same time were being factored into the assessments. These triple headed threats made re-supply a very difficult proposition in the mind of the RN.
Changes in this assessment began to appear with the RNs Strategic Assessments Committee (SAC) in April 1937. Talks were due with the French where it was being considered that pre-emptive action against Italy in the time of war might be possible. Prophetic words really…The general idea was that in the event of a two headed war, Italy would be picked off as the weaker partner in the Axis alliance.
From here there was a steady hardening of resolve in the British camp. By wars outbreak, the Malta landward defences were about two understrength brigades. Given the difficulties the Italians had with much smaller and probably lower quality opposition in Greece and Yugoslavia, I think it very difficult that a rapid coup de main at the beginning of hostilities was entirely feasible. Particularly so, since the british response tended to over-estimate Italian abilities, and the british counter –preparations were made specifically to thwart such a move by the Italians.
I think a far more realistic option was for the Italians to ready their fleet more effectively than they did. Half the battle fleet was in reserve at the outbreak of the war, and it took many months for this situation to be addressed.
Albania
The original Italian plans for the invasion called for up to 50,000 men supported by 137 naval units and 400 airplanes. Ultimately the invasion force grew to 100,000 men supported by 600 airplanes. Not all the forces committed were involved in the landings....about 10-15000 men were in the initial assault forces. There was no prepratory bombardment (the Italians didnt think of that......) and no evidence of advanaced landing craft....it was all done from ships boats and lighters that came from Taranto. On April 7 1939 the italian troops, led by General Alfredo Guzzoni, invaded Albania, attacking all Albanian ports simultaneously. The largest garrison defeing these ports was a scratch force of 360 militia men, under the command of a man named Lupo and defending the port town of Durres. This pathetic force held up the invasion forces for over 24 hours. There were 65 units in Saranda, 40 at Vlorë, 38 in Durrës, 28 at Shëngjin and 8 more at Bishti
Greece
During the invasion of greece in late 1940, the italians planned an amphibious assault of Corfu using landing craft, and some of their tiny marine forces. The assault was intended to be in roughly reinforced battalion strength, but was cancelled at the last minute and never went ahead. Not sure why.
During the Greco Italian war, Italian forces invaded Greece and made limited gains. At the outbreak of hostilities, the Royal Hellenic Navy was composed of the old cruiser Georgios Averof, 10 destroyers (four old Theria class, four relatively modern Dardo class and two new Greyhound class), several torpedo boats and six old submarines. Faced with the formidable Regia Marina, its role was primarily limited to patrol and convoy escort duties in the Aegean Sea. This was essential both for the completion of the Army's mobilization, but also for the overall resupply of the country, the convoy routes being threatened by Italian aircraft and submarines operating from the Dodecanese Islands.
Nevertheless, the Greek ships also carried out limited offensive operations against Italian shipping in the Strait of Otranto. The destroyers carried out three bold but fruitless night-time raids (14–15 November 1940, 15–16 December 1940 and 4–5 January 1941). The main successes came from the submarines, which managed to sink approximately 10 Italian transports. On the Italian side, although the Regia Marina suffered severe losses in capital ships from the British Royal Navy during the Taranto raid, Italian cruisers and destroyers continued to operate covering the convoys between Italy and Albania. Also, on 28 November, an Italian squadron did undertake a bombardment of Corfu, while on 18 December and 4 March, Italian task forces shelled Greek coastal positions in Albania in support of their by now retreating army.
Yugoslavia
During operations against Yugoslavia, the italians again considered and planned an invasion of Kotor, but was cancelled again, allegedly due to inadeqiate resources, particulalry landing craft.
British perspective and preprations
In his book "Malta and British Strategic Defence Policy 1925-43, douglas Austin writes that British defence policy for the island estimated (rather optimistically as it turns out) that the italians had the ability to land across opposed coastline about 12000 Infantry, with no heavy weapons or tanks available until a port was captured.
From 1925 to 1935, the landward defences of the island were in a very run down state, ut plans at least were drwn up to raise up to 2 militia brigades from thje local population in the event of war. Priority was very low, because at that time Italy posed no real threat to british interests. however this situation changed from 1935 to 1939, following the italian transgressions in Abysynnia.
Defences were so weak in 1936 that the JPC considered that a rapid coup de main by the italians would probably succeed. At that stage there was less than a battlaion of ground troops about 24 AA guns, no fld artillery and about 30 coast defence guns.
The Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) undertook a study in 1936 that confirmed the vulnerability to seizure by the Italians in the event of surprise attack. In 1937-8 these bleak predictions persisted, even though the strength of the lanward defences were by that time starting to increase. By 1937, the possibility that a war with Germany and Italy was being considered, and further possible conflicts with Japan at the same time were being factored into the assessments. These triple headed threats made re-supply a very difficult proposition in the mind of the RN.
Changes in this assessment began to appear with the RNs Strategic Assessments Committee (SAC) in April 1937. Talks were due with the French where it was being considered that pre-emptive action against Italy in the time of war might be possible. Prophetic words really…The general idea was that in the event of a two headed war, Italy would be picked off as the weaker partner in the Axis alliance.
From here there was a steady hardening of resolve in the British camp. By wars outbreak, the Malta landward defences were about two understrength brigades. Given the difficulties the Italians had with much smaller and probably lower quality opposition in Greece and Yugoslavia, I think it very difficult that a rapid coup de main at the beginning of hostilities was entirely feasible. Particularly so, since the british response tended to over-estimate Italian abilities, and the british counter –preparations were made specifically to thwart such a move by the Italians.
I think a far more realistic option was for the Italians to ready their fleet more effectively than they did. Half the battle fleet was in reserve at the outbreak of the war, and it took many months for this situation to be addressed.
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- Thread starter
- #32
vinnye
Senior Airman
I agree with you Parsifal, the Italians should have prepared their fleet better.
The balance of power shifted a number of times due to actions / losses.
Royal Navy in the Mediterranean 1940-1941
The above site has the RN with 4 BBs in the Eastern Med in June 1940 at Alexandria. the Italians had 6 BBs - two being completed.
To offset the Italian land based aircraft the RN had 1 aircraft carrier at Alexandria.
That balance changed in favour of the RN after Taranto on 11 Nov 1940 - 3 BBs sunk at their moorings.
By the end of 1941, Barham had been sunk and Queen Elizabeth and Valiant had been severely damaged (sunk) in Alexandria harbour.
Only by excellent management of this event by the RN and Cunningham in particular prevented the Italians from realizing that they had a significant advantage in BBs.
The balance of power shifted a number of times due to actions / losses.
Royal Navy in the Mediterranean 1940-1941
The above site has the RN with 4 BBs in the Eastern Med in June 1940 at Alexandria. the Italians had 6 BBs - two being completed.
To offset the Italian land based aircraft the RN had 1 aircraft carrier at Alexandria.
That balance changed in favour of the RN after Taranto on 11 Nov 1940 - 3 BBs sunk at their moorings.
By the end of 1941, Barham had been sunk and Queen Elizabeth and Valiant had been severely damaged (sunk) in Alexandria harbour.
Only by excellent management of this event by the RN and Cunningham in particular prevented the Italians from realizing that they had a significant advantage in BBs.
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davebender
1st Lieutenant
It's a bad idea to assume Italy would stupidly attack strongest Malta defenses head on.
Italy would have naval and air superiority. They can land anywhere they want on any of the three islands. Tiny British garrison will be split among the islands or else Italy gets ungarrisoned islands without opposition.
After Italy has one island it's all over but the crying as other two islands are within artillery range. Italy will set up heavy artillery just as Japan did opposite Corregidor Island during spring of 1942.
Army artillery has the accuracy which naval and air bombardment lack. They will systemically pulverize British defenses on next island before landing just as Japan did to Corregidore.
parsifal
Colonel
Im assuming your proposing a coup de main from the very beginning oof the war.
They have to....the key to control is the port. without it they cannot get heavy equipment and decent levels of supply. They had some LCs but not enough for more than a single Battalion,. as evidence by their planning of contemporary operations. Everything else is by ships boats.
"Tiny British garrison" is 2 brigades at the beginning, significantly reinforced in the early months of the war through to 1942. And they are not strung out allover the island(s), they were concentrated in a central location protecting the vital infrasstructure on the islands.....the ports, the gun emplacements and the airfields . There are minefields iin place from before the very first day that the italians will have great difficulty inpenetrating except along a narrow predictable path and with a great deal of time needed to clear them . the sweeping operations will take days or weeks to complete, and will be a dead giveaway of their MLA. Necessarily they will need to assault on a predictable narrow front. In that time the british fleet, which easily outnumbered the italians by a significant margin (there were only two Italian BBs in commission at the outbreak of the war, with the remainder commissioned from reserve or refit over a roughly 3 month period) will be met by at least 6 British BBs and 3 carriers.
You need a port to do that. Italy has no significant cross beach re-supply or heavy equipment capability or very limited. Setiing up on one of the outer islands is a very bad idea. The RN will use them for target practice, as they sit there starving and out of ammunition. . The artillery on the island (in place from 1938) will outrange and outgun anything the Italians are likley to bring to bear.
The Italans had nothing like the Japanese in terms of sealift and across the beach capability. the japanese had acecess to a port from day 1 in the Philipines,as they did in malaya. The situations are just not comparable. A comparable scenario would be a direct asault of Singapore.
Shortround6
Major General
Perhaps a few tourist photos will show what the Italians were up against.
a Malta "beach"
The North west Shore of the small Island of Comino with the the Island of Gozo in the background. Please note that the two inlets are with Vicker's machine gun range of the larger Island.
Mellieha Bay beach on the main Island.
View going the other way.
The Island in the Back ground may be Comino.
The Italians CANNOT land anywhere they want let alone get heavy weapons and supplies ashore. Practical landing sites are restricted and well known.
The Japanese did not have to LAND their artillery from ships/boats within artillery range of Corregidor.
It took only 27 days from the fall of Bataan to take Corregidor and most of the men on Corregidor were in very bad physical condition.
It would NOT take the RN 27 days to mount some sort of relief expedition.
For the Italians to take Malta in the Summer of 1940 was NOT impossible but it was certainly not going to the walk in the park that some are making it out to be.
Against the British lack of preparedness you have to balance the Italian lack of preparedness. If they were really ready to go to war in May/June of 1940 they would have had 1 or two more battleships ready for action and their army would have been much more prepared than it was for the actions in the French Alps.
parsifal
Colonel
There are some parrallels in history relating to Malta. The siege of Malta in 1565 saw 6100 defenders, including just 500 elite Knights Hospitaller and rest basically chaff defeat a force of over 48000 invading ottomans which included a force of the elite Jannisaries. The Ottomans were unable wrest control of the ports, and had to fight hard to capture the fortress strongpoints over the island. Ottoman records suggest they used over 130000 cannon bals during the year long battle. Eventually the turks gave up, and were defeated, losing 16-20000 men in the process. Even though its 500 years old it gives a pretty good illustration of just how difficult a place this ilsand would be to take...
However it needs to be conceded that Napoleon in 1798 succeeded in capturing the island, after a short and dispirited fight by the islanders.
This campaign saw the 300 knights and around the same number of village milita initially ranged by a fleet with 30000 french soldiers embarked (part of the Egyptian invasion forces, which in turn was a stepping stone in the planned ivasion of India). I do not believe all these frenchmen were used in the assault, I have read that about 2-3000 were used in the assault. The militaia promptly deserted and surrendered, and about 100 of the Knights of french nationality also changed sides. There simply were not enough defenders, being so heavily outnumbered.
Maltas french garrison surrendeed to the British after a two year blockade, and a revolt from the local population
However it needs to be conceded that Napoleon in 1798 succeeded in capturing the island, after a short and dispirited fight by the islanders.
This campaign saw the 300 knights and around the same number of village milita initially ranged by a fleet with 30000 french soldiers embarked (part of the Egyptian invasion forces, which in turn was a stepping stone in the planned ivasion of India). I do not believe all these frenchmen were used in the assault, I have read that about 2-3000 were used in the assault. The militaia promptly deserted and surrendered, and about 100 of the Knights of french nationality also changed sides. There simply were not enough defenders, being so heavily outnumbered.
Maltas french garrison surrendeed to the British after a two year blockade, and a revolt from the local population
Freebird
Master Sergeant
Nothing - it is virtually impossible for the Italians to control the Mediterranean, given the circumstances at the time.
They cannot control the Med while the British have a superior fleet at Alexandria.
1.)It is all but impossible for the Axis to capture Egypt, given the extreme difficulties in supplying the Afrika Corps Italian Army eastward.
2.) The Italian Navy will fail, not because they lack brains or courage, but because they lack fuel.
RegiaMarina.net has a good analysis of the problem:
Oil Fuel Shortage
What it boils down to is that by Feb 1941 the Italian RM fuel situation is in crisis mode, and can thereafter conduct only limited operations.
Malta's role has been built up to legend, but in fact from early 1941 the Britiah were forced to withdraw the bulk of Malta's strike/bombing aircraft, and thereafter the main function of aircraft was self defence.
The critical British disruption of Rommel's supplies was by naval action night bombing, neither of which could be done based at Malta.
Even with the capture of Malta, the Africa Korps just can't keep an army supplied for a sustained attack into Egypt
davebender
1st Lieutenant
Difficult to imagine Britain allowing her navy and merchant marine to be whittled down during BoB. That's exactly what would happen if Italy were prepared for war during June 1940.
Shortround6
Major General
That is a might big 'IF".
And it cuts both ways.
British have 14 battleships/battlecruisers Minus damages from the Norway campaign?) in the summer of 1940, No KGVs are ready yet but 5 ships are building.
Germans have how many battleships/battlecruisers after the Norway campaign? ZERO?
Italians have 2 battleships historically and how many in this theoretical scenario? 3? 4? 5?
British may have an opportunity to to knock the Italian fleet out of the war in the summer of 1940 with this Invasion plan. They sure don't need 12 capitol ships to stop a German invasion fleet.
And it cuts both ways.
British have 14 battleships/battlecruisers Minus damages from the Norway campaign?) in the summer of 1940, No KGVs are ready yet but 5 ships are building.
Germans have how many battleships/battlecruisers after the Norway campaign? ZERO?
Italians have 2 battleships historically and how many in this theoretical scenario? 3? 4? 5?
British may have an opportunity to to knock the Italian fleet out of the war in the summer of 1940 with this Invasion plan. They sure don't need 12 capitol ships to stop a German invasion fleet.
parsifal
Colonel
Difficult for you to imagine, but the historical record shows that your imagnation is misplaced.
The facts are that throughout the battle Of Britain ther was a steady reinforcment of the Med forces in voth the eastern and western basins, and that whilst the italians could claim dominance in the central basin, this was never any real impediement to the British projecting force into this area. The Italians at no stage ever enjoyed sea control to the extent that they could undertake any significant amphibious operation more than a few miles from their own bases. Malta was outside that very limited radius.
Up to June 24th the western basin was covered by the French fleet. Even as the french were in the death throws of defeat, their fleet was being aggressively used to contain the italian fleet. There is not likelihood of italian action wahilst the French fleet reamins part of the Allied force structure.
Some time between June 20-24, Force H forces were concentrated at Gibraltar. Initially the Force was built around HM Ark Royal Renown and 3 DDs arrived to be augmented by the 8 DDs already on station at the port. By June 28, the force had ben further reinforced by a further 2 BBs a CL and a further 4 DDs, which by my calculation brings the total force structure to 1 A/C 2 BBs, 1 BC, 1 CL and 15 DDs. By July3 , the Force consisted of at least 1 A/C 2 BBs, 1 BC, 2 CLs and at least 11 DDs. The Med fleet had been similalrly reinforced, with 4 battleships and 1 a/c in July.
The RN at this time was in fact able to completely dominate the central Basin from the point of view of sea control, because they outnumbered the Italian Fleet 2 carriers to 0, and the italian battle fleet 7:3. The Italians held the paper advantage in light forces, but as events were to show, this advantage never amounted to much in reality.
The decision was taken to reinforce Malta and in Operation 'Hurry'. Force H now reinforced by a further 8 DDs, the carrier Argus and 2 CAs, carried out an operation to get the first meaningful air power elements to the island. Carrier "Argus" flew off 12 Hurricanes from a position southwest of Sardinia. This was the first of many reinforcement and supply operations, often bitterly fought to keep Malta alive and in the fight against Axis supply routes to their armies in North Africa. Now, as in the future, cover from the west was provided by Force H. The opportunity was taken for "Ark Royal's" aircraft to hit Sardinian targets. In the middle of the month (July), Mediterranean Fleet battleships "Warspite", "Malaya" and "Ramillies" bombarded Italian positions around Bardia in Libya, just over the border from Egypt.
There was a second reinforcment operation to Malta from the west two weks later, Operation "Hats" saw 4 Merchant ships deliver supplies, a/c and ground units to the island. The operation was protected by Force H, at that time with a strength of 2 carriers, 2 BBs, 1 BC, 4 cruisers and 16 DDs. there was no interference by the italians to thjis operation. RN activity around the island was so intense and effective that in the first month of operations the itlians had lost no less than 11 submarines....10% of their submarine fleet mostly around Malta.
The first serious clash between the italians and the British occurred on the 9th July at the battle Of Punit Stilo (also referred to as the Battle Of Calabria). Forces involved were as follows:
Force A was made up of the 7th Cruiser squadron and HMAS Stuart under Admiral Tovey; Force B commanded by Vice Admiral Andrew Cunningham who was the Commander in Chief of the entire Mediterranean Fleet; and Force C commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Pridham-Wippell.
3 battleships: Warspite, Malaya, and Royal Sovereign.
5 light cruisers: Orion, Neptune (damaged), HMAS Sydney, Gloucester (damaged), and Liverpool.
1 aircraft carrier: Eagle.
16 destroyers: Nubian, Mohawk, Hero, Hereward (damaged), Decoy (damaged), HMAS Stuart,[32] Hyperion, Hostile, Hasty, Ilex, Dainty, Defender, Juno, Janus, HMAS Vampire, and HMAS Voyager.
The destroyer HMS Escort was sunk in the Western Mediterranean where Force H was providing a feint and demonstration against Sardinia to distract the Italian fleet from the sailing of the Allied convoys. She was torpedoed on 11 July by the Italian submarine Marconi during Force H's return passage.
Regia Marina force commanded by Vice Admiral Inigo Campioni.
2 battleships: Conte di Cavour and Giulio Cesare (damaged).
6 heavy cruisers: Zara, Fiume, Gorizia, Pola, Bolzano (damaged), and Trento.
8 light cruisers: Eugenio di Savoia, Duca d'Aosta, Muzio Attendolo, Raimondo Montecuccoli, Alberico da Barbiano, Alberto di Giussano, Duca degli Abruzzi, and Giuseppe Garibaldi.
About 16 destroyers, among which Vittorio Alfieri, Artigliere, Lanciere, Leone Pancaldo, Dardo, Sestri Ponente, Freccia, Saetta and Strale.
This battle was not decisive, but it was still an allied victory. it completely exposes what the Italian swar strategy was with regard to their fleet. they had absolutely no desire to risk significant losses to their fleet fighting the British. the expectation at the time was that the British were about to be defeated by the germans, and no losses to the RM should be risked asa result. Standing toe to toe with the RN at that time was seen by the RM leadership as totally unecessary and specifically to be avoided. Despite materially giving as good as they received, the italians ended the battle having retreated from the battle and forfeiting control of the sea. From that standpoint it was an unequivocal demonstration of who was in control of the seas around Malta at that time.
Mediterranean Fleet pursued to within 50 miles of the south west Italian coast off Calabria before withdrawing.
How anyone can argue that it was even possible for the italaians to be able to excercise any semblance of sea control at this time, let alone exercise enough to undertake an extremely difficult amphib operation whilst denying sea access to the RN is beyond me. arguing that the BOB and threat of invasion at home somehow curtailed reinfocement of the med, or operations in the med is also patently untrue. The British never showed any signs of evacuating the med or denuding the commands of forces. Quite the opposite actually.
