You are in charge of the Italian Fleet 1941.

[Freebird]

freebird check your data, Barham was a Scapa Flow until 28 august, sail to Gibraltar and arrive the 2nd september, Sovereign was sent for refit the 16th august at arrive to Aden had 1 boiler operational, actually she stay to work in various bases, only the 1st december was sent to join to Halifax Escort Force

From what I have seen is Valiant at Alexandria and Barham at Gibraltar in August of 1940.
Royal Sovereign was at Puna Stilo, so did all her boilers but one fail in the next month?

There is not a single prove or anything elese to claim, that England had the capacity in radio transmission intelligent at summer 1940.

Yes, they were reading Italian naval ciphers

20th august add Renown (so 5)
29th august add Valiant (so 6)
from 2nd to 6th september add Barham (so 7)
6th september left Resolution/Barham (so 5)
15th october add Barham (so 6)
obviously after Taranto night the landing on malta are impensable

You never said 31 August, you said August. Littorio and Vento were decalred operational 2 August, but continued work up excercises throughout most of August. First operational usage of these two ships that i know of was against "Hats", where they put to sea briefly before retiring having not fired a shot.

However for some time in August, Battleship Cesare was undertgoingt repairs from damage received from the 15" hit(s) she had suffered at Puno Stilo. So the correct, or most correct answer to "how many Battleships in August" is 4, not 5.

Guys, I'm not sure that there is a disagreement about the RM here.
There might have been a misunderstanding so let's not get hung up on it OK?

The Italians have 3 battleship at the beginning of Aug while Cesare is under repair, 4 battleships by August 9 or so, then 5 in September with Duilo re-commisioned (by the end of Aug), and 6 with Doria ready around October 20.

So the Italians will have at best the same number of battleships, and possibly one less

 

[Vincenzo]

freebird:
Barham: HMS Barham, British battleship, WW2
Valiant: HMS Valiant, British battleship, WW2
R. Sovereign: HMS Royal Sovereign, British battleship, WW2

for the italian ciphres they only reading enigma machines ciphres, that were in very limited use, (commonly ere used book codes) only with german deployement this becoming more common and ultra can get usefull information from march 41: March 1941

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal i've not said 31 august? you are a false be ashamed, my post 55 of 14/3 never modified, my post 64 15/3 never modified. not fired a shot so you want count not present its? so we can count not present all the british BB no fired a shot? The Cesare go in Sea in both the operation and i never writed that in august the italian had 5 BBs again you are false i writed that were 5 in september.
i'm waiting for my omissions

Not ashamed, my friend, im not the one trying to rewrite history. Im not trying to cast the italian fleet as anything other than what it was. In any event, even if you were referring to the whole of August, the two modern BBs, despite being declared operational, does not mean they were finished actual work up. It means, "for the most part we are ready". It doesnt mean "we are at the peak of our game and ready to take on a superior number of British Battelships in a most difficult operation". They were ready for that by 31 August

The Cesare go in Sea in both the operation and i never writed that in august the italian had 5 BBs again you are false i writed that were 5 in septembe

Ah yes, you are right about your claim, but according to my sources, Cesare did not put to sea until 27 September after Punto Stilo. That meant for the whoile of August she was not ready (you claimed she did) and most of September she was either still reparing or getting back to operational efficiency

Bottom line is this, the Italians never enjoyed enough of an advantage (and in fact never had ANY advantage) to risk most of their fleet on a sea copntrol operation that would leave them exposed to massive retaliatiuon by the Brits. Even on those many occasions when they gave battle with an advantage in numbers, they relinquished control of the ocean, relying on their superior speed to get them out of trouble (most of the time that worked, on a few occasions it went horribly wrong). If they were engaged in an amphib operation that takes many days to complete, they dont have the luxury of withdrawing, without losing their amphibious fleet. As I recall, you were one of the people claiming it would be an "easy" operation, and that ther were no significant landward defences to worry about. Sorry, but wrong and wrong. They (the Italians) did have enough lift capacity to put a lot of people offshore, but its the transition from ship to shore that is the problem. They had very limited (offensive) minesweeping capability (which in any case in this hypothetical are being used as makeshift transports, so for this scenario their capability is close to zero), and the ability to put about a regiment across the beaches, except in ships boats. They had some additional capability akin to the british effort at Suvla in 1915 ( where makeshift LCIs were used and were cut to pieces by the few companies of Turks defending). It would have been a sheer massacre, and anyone still insisting it was possible should be the ones being ashamed of themselves

 

[N4521U]

With Me in charge, the fleet will surely be lost, soon!

 

[parsifal]

Something I just missed. I went back to the original thread defintiion. why are we arguing about what is possible in 1940, when the the thread is specifically 1941?

How did that happen guys?

 

[Wavelength]

I's probably my fault. I suggested the most important move they could have made was to take Malta. Then it was pointed out that it was more viable in 1940. Even in 1941 they should have taken Malta even if it required heavy German assistance IMO.

Beyond strategic moves, on the tactical level simply fighting things through to a decision may have payed dividends in some cases. When Halsey took command during the Guadalcanal campaign he stated that the navy had been too adverse to taking risks and loosing ships. Halsey took risks and the fleet payed a heavy price in blood and treasure but things eventually turned for the better.

 

[DonL]

No I was the man who wrote most of the things parsifal critize or what get him annoyed.

What I don't understand is, that his arrogance is back in post 83 at a normal discussion.
After official papers and sources 2 BB's were declared action ready beginning august, how on earth anybody can deny this only it doesn't suit his opinion?

Again my sources and researches came from profesional military men of the general stuff of the Bundeswehr, who have done the researches at archivs.
After this sources five italian BB's were action ready at end of August beginning September.
Also the numbers of Post 68 are complete wrong. The range between Siracusa and Malta is 150km or 81 naut. miles.
After official papers to operation Hercules, the planed time for the journey was 12 hours at 8kn. from Siracusa to the landing point with the Ships I have posted.
The same ships were action ready august 1940 after official research at archives excluding the 70 Motozatteras.

Also I'm highly aware of the pileboxes, but the pileboxes can be taken through BB and Cruiser guns, also through howitzers which were part of the equipment of the landing troops and through attacks of italian planes, which they had more then enoughs, even german/italian stukas since end of august 1940.

I can't understand the personal and offended attack at post 83 only through a normal discussion and researched facts.
I will end here, because to me the discussion will get back personal and I don't want this, but I have learned it get only not heated if the facts are suiting, if other facts were posted the rough calling is back.

 

[Vincenzo]

parsifal are you again wrong Cesare go in operation the 31 august : British, read all (i've also on paper and in italian source), i'm curious what are your source?

 

[parsifal]

Given that this whole issue is Off Topic, I am not going to respond to any further comments. Restrict your conversations to On -topic issues, specifically, what the Italian Navy could do better in 1941. Im happy to respond in an approproriate thread that deals with options in 1940, or if the thread author is happy to conintue discussions, he needs to say so.

Sorry guys, but i am not going to be party to yet another hijacked thread

 

[Vincenzo]

Smart people before give false info and after run away with off topic excuse.

 

[tomo pauk]

This forum saw many threads drifting away off topic (or 'off topic'), nothing wrong with that if the posts bring out good data and spirited discussion, but not a flame war and name calling. So be it for 1940, 1941 or 1942, having a discussion about RM in this particular thread does not seem like something earth shaking.

 

[vinnye]

After Taranto, the balance of naval power shifted quite significantly in favour of the Royal Navy. They could not operate with impunity due to the lack of air superiority in a lot of the Mediterranean - especially whilst the LW were operating from Sicily. But if the Italians were to attempt a landing on Malta, I would have expected any such operation to be challenged - probably at night by the RN as this would reduce the risk to their ships from the air.
Later in 1941, the loss of Barham and the damage to Queen Elizabeth and Valiant at Alexandria would have given the Italian fleet a greatwe chance for success in ant landings.

 

[parsifal]

Its a whole different ballgame in 1941, particularly after the entry of japan. That and the successful chariot attacks into Alexndria and Gibraltar were, after several failed attempts, highly successful. The RN managed to to hide the extent of the damage done to here remaining battleships, so in the context of this thread, what the italians needed was better intell in alexandria and Gibraltar.

For a brief period, the RN did not have sufficient strength to counter the italians, and if an all out effort had been mounted in late 1941, or early 1942 (already off topic) I think there was a good chance of success. The RM of 1942 was not the bunch of amateurs they were in 1940, they were a battlehardened force that ought not be underestimated. Leadership had been vastly improved, they tended to be careful, but thorough. If Rommel had been rained in and not go toes to toe with the allies in Crusader, becaome a team player sharing resources to achive a common strategic outcome, it may well have been possible to pull off an upset and take the island by combined airborne and amphibious assault.

That I can agree with. Pie in the sky ideas about non-existent italian capability in 1940 is just so much hot air.

 

[DonL]

Pie in the sky ideas about non-existent italian capability in 1940 is just so much hot air.

Hard facts from archive sources are not hot air, your claims about 1940 are not very substained.

By the way Malta is vulnerable from March 1941 till the operation Crete.
Even a simultaneous landing with Crete could be managed, also the Italian had back two more battleships at Mai 1941, and the german 21. airborne division is available.
The landing fleet existed since August 1940.

This victory literature about the impregnableness of Malta and the lack of Axis possibilitys through the "mighty" RN, which could not even stop the Invasion of Crete is nothing then hot air to me.

 

[Freebird]

Given that this whole issue is Off Topic, I am not going to respond to any further comments. Restrict your conversations to On -topic issues, specifically, what the Italian Navy could do better in 1941. Im happy to respond in an approproriate thread that deals with options in 1940, or if the thread author is happy to conintue discussions, he needs to say so.

Sorry guys, but i am not going to be party to yet another hijacked thread

Do you have an answer to the question of what Italy could have done in 1941 OTHER than an attack on Malta?

After Taranto, the balance of naval power shifted quite significantly in favour of the Royal Navy. They could not operate with impunity due to the lack of air superiority in a lot of the Mediterranean - especially whilst the LW were operating from Sicily. But if the Italians were to attempt a landing on Malta, I would have expected any such operation to be challenged - probably at night by the RN as this would reduce the risk to their ships from the air.
Later in 1941, the loss of Barham and the damage to Queen Elizabeth and Valiant at Alexandria would have given the Italian fleet a greatwe chance for success in ant landings.

Vinnye, could you answer Parsifal's question?

Would you like to continue the thread as "What Italy could do in Aug 1940?" (as in an attack on Malta) or would you prefer that we do it on a separate thread?

 

[parsifal]

Do you have an answer to the question of what Italy could have done in 1941 OTHER than an attack on Malta?

The italians excelled at attacks by unconventional forces, particulalry Maile. I think a more considered development of these capabilities, backed up by a better intelligence effort at the ports being attacked, would have achieved good results for small cost.

I know you disagree, and I do respect your POV concerning the importance of Malta. It has certainly been overstated in the post war wash up. however, I still believe that Malta WAS the key to the TO. Its mere existence enabled continual implied threats to the Axis suply lines and forced them to take defensive steps, such as convoy and occupied so much of their air force, that it made other more ambitious plans un achievable until it was captured. The Axis failure to capture it was not just, or even predominantly a failure by the RM. they knew from an early stage they needed to take it, but they never did get proper support from the Germans to pour the necessary resources needed to achieve its capture. The Italians do share some of the blame however. In 1941-2 they needed to take risks and accept losses, something they were never really happy to accept, in order to clamp shut the blockade of the island. There was always a trickle of just enough to keep the island supplied, and this needed to be quaterised in order to win the crucial battle of the Theatre.

Thats why these guys aree attempting to re-write history. if they can win that argument they know they can then claim that the British should never have won the battle....we didnt win....they just chose to let us win. Its a blatant power play, and Im having none of it. The Axis lost for good reasons, and not all of it has anything to do with superior Allied resources. thats a part of the issue, but not all of it. There are some elements of their war that the italians, and the germans, completely botched, and this was one of them.

 

[vinnye]

I am happy to go along with whatever you guys wish - either restrict this thread to 1941 and use the other thread to debate 1940?

 

[vinnye]

I doubt that Hitler would have given the go ahead for an airbourne invasion after Crete - the losses were too high.
The Italians use of midget submarines was remarkable - extremely brave men using a horrible weapon that they themselves called "the pig".
I agree that one of the reasons for the Italians not being able to be more pro-active with their fleet was the lack of intelligence about how effective their actions were.

 

[Freebird]

I am happy to go along with whatever you guys wish - either restrict this thread to 1941 and use the other thread to debate 1940?

What other thread?

Ah, OK there ia another thread started here:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/malta-1940-a-36422.html

 

[VBF-13]

I am happy to go along with whatever you guys wish - either restrict this thread to 1941 and use the other thread to debate 1940?

I know The Maltese Falcon was 1941.