1930's Japanese Navy - What would you have done differently?

[Garyt]

The 99-1 was firing a shell of about equal weight as Hispano, so it might got the same marks just based on that. It would score significantly lower than the Hispano II, though, in the USN equation.

Rate of fire was about 80% of the Hispano, so maybe a 2.4 or so prior to range issues. Tough to factor in the lower muzzle velocity. For contact fused HE or HEI rounds, it makes no difference for damage. It obviously effects accuracy at range, though closer it does not effect it much. Similar to the problems with the German Mk108, though it had a bigger payload and even lower velocity. The 20mm would be pretty effective against less agile bombers though.

Come to think of it, with a 60 round drum, maybe you don't want to use the 20mm cannon at range to conserve ammo.

I'm surprised they did not replace the twin 7.7mm with a pair of 13.2mm's, these were fairly similar to the US .50. And it's only about an extra 40 pounds per gun, plus of course the ammo. Seems like it would make a lot more sense than the 7.7mm's.

In case the Yamatos are cancelled, scraping the old battlewagons will put the IJN in a big disadvantage.

Considering there was very little battleship surface combat during the war, it would not really hurt the Japanese. Only the Kongo class saw much combat other than the Suriago straight massacre.

For the battleships to be effective as AA, there would need to be a change in doctrine, where the Japanese stay in formation to rely on AA as opposed to scurrying around to avoid being hit. I'm not sure how well the strategy would have worked for the Japanese unless they had dramatically upgraded their AA capabilities.

 

[Shortround6]

I'm surprised they did not replace the twin 7.7mm with a pair of 13.2mm's, these were fairly similar to the US .50. And it's only about an extra 40 pounds per gun, plus of course the ammo. Seems like it would make a lot more sense than the 7.7mm's.

Two things.

one, it was a question of timing. The Japanese copy of the Browning .50 wasn't ready in 1941/42.

two, the ammo is more of a problem than the gun/s. .50 cal ammo (or it's 13.2mm equivalent) weighs about 5 times what most rifle caliber mg ammo weighs. SO you have increase the gun weight by 80lbs (which does not include mounts, ammo boxes, chutes, gun heaters, etc) and 100rpg of 13.2mm ammo will weigh what the 500rpg of 7.7mm amo did. Guns run dry in about 10-12 seconds. US. 50 cal ammo weighed about 30lbs per hundred so going to 200rpg adds another 60lbs. More ammo????
The US .50 didn't like synchronization much and had a rather low rate of fire when firing through a prop. Did the Japanese fix it or just put up with it? Two 13.2s at 450-500rpm or two 7.7mms at around 800rpm?(assuming the 7.7mm guns lost about 100rpm due to the sychonization gear)

 

[parsifal]

The thing about the Japanese procurement particualalry for the navy, is that they tended to be just a little too cute at times. often they would issue a design spec that just couldnt be met within the treaty limits, go off and design a ship that in some way or another was deficient, and then go back and have to undertake tremendously expensive fixes to try and rectify those faults.

In 1934 this faulty design and development process shot to the forefront with the capsizing of the torpedo Boat Tomodzuru, due to fudging of thge stability cals. this might work to deceive an opponent, but you cant deceive the laws of physics that dictate ship stability issues. Ships like the tomodzuru had to be basically built twice to achieve a satisfactory outcome, and this sort of thing happened repeatedly.

Getting the design right, and not trying to hide the true nature of a design, would have yielded massive resources for the Navy and army. Its not an exaggeration to claim the navy could have maintained the same force structure fopr about 30% less outlay, or convewrsely, have been 30% stronger than it was historically, if the Japanese had not tried to hide the true characterisitcs of their ships.
Thi8s was a freebie, representing no loss for the japanese fleet.

Another glaring area of wastage was in the doctrine surrounding their submarinbe fleet. The IBoats of the IJN were perhaps the most advanced submarines in the world in 1941, designed with massive endurance and a sea speed of about 24 knots. They were designed to attack the US fleet as it advanaced across the pacific, attack, then move ahead, then attack again and so on. Would have worked against the 20 knot WWI drednoughts of the pacific fleet, but against fast moving fast carrier groups, was throughly outdated. In reality the japanese should have studied the german model more closely and used their subs to attack US merchant shipping. This was the USNs achilles heel, just at it was for the Japanese. Smaller subs, better able to attack shipping should have been the way pursued by the Japanese.

Having decided to attack the US, and build their CAGs around the Zeke, an offensive fighter if ever their was one, the Japanese needed to have ready by june 1942, an aircraft more suited to defensive operation....sacrificing range for protection and durability. They never really got to that

 

[tomo pauk]

...

Considering there was very little battleship surface combat during the war, it would not really hurt the Japanese. Only the Kongo class saw much combat other than the Suriago straight massacre.

Due to unavoidable battle damage, and need for modifications through war, IJN cannot expect to have all of their listed BBs available all the time. That would make 6 BBs too few for the needs of a major navy in the vast expanses of Pacific and, partly, Indian ocean. In case the IJN cannot muster BBs to support lighter surface units, Allied BBs can have a field day once encountering Japanese cruisers.

For the battleships to be effective as AA, there would need to be a change in doctrine, where the Japanese stay in formation to rely on AA as opposed to scurrying around to avoid being hit. I'm not sure how well the strategy would have worked for the Japanese unless they had dramatically upgraded their AA capabilities.

IJN needs a change in doctrine.
They need to forget luring the USN in a decisive battle, their subs need to go out and kill merchant ships, they need to realize that trained manpower is the greatest asset, they need to bulk up the number quality of AA suite on their ships.
IJN created a most powerful offensive naval arm in the world, so they have an idea how much the damage that can do to surface units. Expecting that USN won't make steps in similar direction is just lulling themselves in a false security.

 

[Garyt]

Shortround6 wrote:

US. 50 cal ammo weighed about 30lbs per hundred so going to 200rpg adds another 60lbs. More ammo????
The US .50 didn't like synchronization much and had a rather low rate of fire when firing through a prop. Did the Japanese fix it or just put up with it? Two 13.2s at 450-500rpm or two 7.7mms at around 800rpm?(assuming the 7.7mm guns lost about 100rpm due to the sychonization gear)

I'd look at 250 rounds or so, so maybe 150 pounds extra or so including rounds and gun? As far as synchronization, the A6M5? I think it was that carried the 2 13.2mm's used wing mounted versions, even retained one of the cowl mounted 7.7 mm's.

Parsifal wrote:

Getting the design right, and not trying to hide the true nature of a design, would have yielded massive resources for the Navy and army. Its not an exaggeration to claim the navy could have maintained the same force structure fopr about 30% less outlay, or convewrsely, have been 30% stronger than it was historically, if the Japanese had not tried to hide the true characterisitcs of their ships.
Thi8s was a freebie, representing no loss for the japanese fleet.

Was this perhaps though experimentation, pushing the envelope and in some cases overstepping parameters? Japanese vessels always seemed
to push it to the limit as far as how much armament could be crammed on a vessel.

Another glaring area of wastage was in the doctrine surrounding their submarinbe fleet. The IBoats of the IJN were perhaps the most advanced submarines in the world in 1941, designed with massive endurance and a sea speed of about 24 knots. They were designed to attack the US fleet as it advanaced across the pacific, attack, then move ahead, then attack again and so on.

Again, the decisive battle idea, they were looking for a revised Pacific version of Jutland, or maybe another Tsushima. Their subs had great range, speed, size, best torpedoes. They lacked in diving depth though. They would have been better to focus lees on size and more on diving depth, and of course a complete change of tactics.

 

[Garyt]

Due to unavoidable battle damage, and need for modifications through war, IJN cannot expect to have all of their listed BBs available all the time. That would make 6 BBs too few for the needs of a major navy in the vast expanses of Pacific and, partly, Indian ocean. In case the IJN cannot muster BBs to support lighter surface units, Allied BBs can have a field day once encountering Japanese cruisers.

I really don't think battleships were that important or that a fleet of such was needed. Now, convincing the Japanese top brass of that might be another story. If you take out Pearl Harbor, and have a US/Japan Naval conflict with the US Battleships say in early '42, and give the Japanese 2 more Shokaku class carriers, I think the battleships would be in dire straights, given the quality of the Japanese torpedo bombers and the dearth of US AA at the time. Actually, the American fleet in general would be in dire straights in this situation.

Perhaps a later war American task force with modern battleships and better AA could threaten a later war Japanese carrier force - but they would need air superiority, otherwise you have another Leyte with the roles reversed.

 

[Shinpachi]

The battleship Yamato would be necessary at least as a symbol of IJN like a skyscraper at the time of around 1940 but Commander Nagumo for his carrier fleet. As he was an aged, conservative and stubborn navy man, he was unable to understand how to operate his air force effectively well. Win or lose, he lost not a few good chances to beat opponents fatally during the battle of Indian ocean and later in Midway. If I had been Yamamoto, I would have left the authority of command to Genda from the beginning of Pearl Harbor as he was trusted by his airmen and would not have missed any chances. Just my impression.

 

[Garyt]

The battleship Yamato would be necessary at least as a symbol of IJN like a skyscraper

Well, aside from the Gambier Bay, both the Yamato and the nameless skyscraper sunk the same amount of opponents surface vessels

Genda certainly would have been a better choice, I don't know if Japanese tradition and naval tradition would allow that to be a possibility.

 

[Shinpachi]

Any tradition is not iron rule, Garyt.

 

[Garyt]

Any tradition is not iron rule, Garyt.

Seems like with the Japanese Navy, tradition was pretty close to iron rule. And I'm not speaking of tactics, as you had forward thinkers like Genda and less forward thinker like Nagumo as in any other navyy.

I'm speaking more of a rigid social structure that would prevent a more junior officer from assuming command.

Not sure of the veracity of this, as it is Wikepedia, but interesting to throw into the mix IMO:

An air power advocate from the time he attended the Japanese Naval Academy, Genda urged Japan's pre-war military leaders to stop building battleships (which he believed would be better used as "piers" or scrap iron) and concentrate on aircraft carriers, submarines, and supporting fast cruisers and destroyers. Above all, Genda thought that modern and large naval air fleet would be necessary for survival if Japan was ever to fight a war with the United States and the United Kingdom as well as their allies. However, Genda's rank—captain—was too low to be of much strategic influence.

You know Shinpachi, after reading this perhaps Genda's best role would have been as top man in the Japanese Navy. LOL

 

[parsifal]

BTW - Heavy Cruisers. Torpedoes or no Torpedoes? There was not going to be that huge decisive battle the Japanese had so geared up for, at least not in the way they thought it would unfold. So Torpedoes or no? I'd have to say no, other than perhaps if they really scaled back on battleships giving the heavy cruisers something for opponent's battleships to worry about is not a bad idea.

Another question too - There were 4 old battleships that did not see a ton of action, the Fuso/Yamashiro and Ise/Hyuga. I'm not sure what would be gained from scrapping them, but would that be worth it? I guess what I am asking is what could be done with the raw materials gained from scrapping these vessels?

Heck, even if you get 10 or so Destroyer Escorts for the cost of scrapping one it may not be that bad of an idea. The manpower and support costs at least would be saved.

If this is done and the Yamato's not built, you have the 4 Kongo's and the 2 Nagato's only as far as Japan's battle fleet is concerned.

This is one case where the Japanese got things absolutely right. if you look hard enough you will find a lot of statements from the allied surface admirals about how envious they were that the IJN cruisers carried TTs and they didn't. Surface battles were a very common occurrence in the pacific, more common than the carrier battles, and most often these fights were not fought at the maquis of Queensbury distances. most often they were fought at night more as bar room brawls than a distinguished duel. And in those situations the Japanese ability to fire large salvoes of Long lances made the difference. Moreover every class of warship that was big enough to do so, was given a torpedo capability. Its what made old ships like CL Nara in many respects more dangerous than most of the allied Heavy cruisers. If the Kirishima had connected with a Long Lance during the 2nd battle of guadacanal, it would have beaten two new USN BBs single handedly. TTs make that much of a difference.

Japanese moreover viewed their CLs as Destroyer leaders, rather than elements of the gunline. As gun cruisers they were pretty restricted, but as torpedo carrying leaders they were very dangerous ships .

Unquestionably, carrying torpedoes was the right decision. By the time the US fast carriers started to bite, in the latter half of 1944, it was allover anyway, and removal of the TTs in favour of more AA was a pointless and hopeless situation.

The Jap[anise did in fact get their decive battles......three times actually, and each one they lost.

The refurbished battleships were considered the core of the battle fleet, and were not committed primarily because of fuel shortages, but even idle they served a fleet in being purpose. Sometimes you have to just pay the piper, and that's one of those situations.

Scrapping or not building battleships to ostensibly build more carriers would be a waste of resources, since the IJN never had enough planes or pilots to fully equip the carriers they had. the loss of four flat tops at midway was not really a big deal.....but the loss of 250 planes and about 130 aircrew was a crippling blow to the Japanese FAA

 

[Garyt]

Scrapping or not building battleships to ostensibly build more carriers would be a waste of resources, since the IJN never had enough planes or pilots to fully equip the carriers they had. the loss of four flat tops at midway was not really a big deal.....but the loss of 250 planes and about 130 aircrew was a crippling blow to the Japanese FAA

Well, putting out carriers instead of battleships also comes with the assumption of a ramped up pilot training program to be able to equip these additional carriers with trained pilots.

I've heard regarding Midway that almost as important as lost pilots were the aviation groundcrews. With Japan being not nearly as industrialized as the US, mechanics were not easy to come by. And most of these crews were lost with ships unlike the aviators, of who many escaped.

In regards to the Torpedo cruisers - yes indeed the torpedoes were a threat, but when looking at true performance as too ow many vessels were sunk by torpedoes, it seems the score is pretty close to even when looking at the amount of Japanese heavy cruisers that were sunk due to ignition of the torpedo lockers by enemy fire.

As far as the light cruisers go, yes, I'd certainly keep the torpedoes on them, and of course the destroyers as well.

 

[Garyt]

A brief history of Japanese Cruisers having problems with their own torpedoes

6 June 1942: Mikuma is hit by bombs, fire breaks out among the torpedoes, torpedoes explode, ship sinks. (Sister Mogami, also bombed that day, has already jettisoned her torpedoes and survives.)
11 October 1942: Furutaka hit by American naval gunfire at night, fires almost immediately break out among her torpedoes, illuminating the ship, apparently drawing more gunfire. Ship is sunk.
3 April 1943: Aoba is hit by bomb from a B-17, torpedoes explode, ship is beached to avoid total loss. Later salvaged.
25 October 1944: Mogami hit by two American 8-inch shells. Fire breaks out, she collides with Nachi (her third collision of the war), then her torpedoes explode. She is bombed and torpedoed again by American aircraft, and finally must be scuttled.
25 October 1944: Suzuya is missed by bombs, but fragments from near misses ignite fires among her torpedoes, torpedoes explode, ship sinks.
25 October 1944: Abukuma is hit by 3 bombs dropped by B-24s. Fires detonate 4 Type 93 torpedoes, ship sinks.

 

[Shortround6]

The Japanese long lance torpedo was in a class by itself, think of it as the WW II Tomahawk cruise missile. It was part of the Japanese battle plan in a way that Allied torpedoes could never be.

BUT to have a reasonable chance of inflicting the needed damage on the American fleet it needed to be fired in very large numbers. This means as many ships as possiable carrying and firing the max number of torpedoes.

Quite a few ships have been lost due to their own weapons/equipment. In Fact, for battleships (including pre dreadnoughts) more battleships blew up due to their own ammo exploding in harbor than were ever sunk by gunfire only in action.
Rather puts a spin on the whole worth of the battleship doesn't it

 

[Shinpachi]

You know Shinpachi, after reading this perhaps Genda's best role would have been as top man in the Japanese Navy. LOL

I would agree with you, Garyt, if his commander had not been Nagumo but more modest guy.

That may sound realistic but there was another fact that Isoroku Yamamoto himself already broken the IJN tradition which had been built up by sons of peasants since 1872 by nominating Nagumo as the commander of the carrier fleet. Nagumo could have been a more honorable commander of the 2nd flleet for his age and career in tradition. Why not for Genda?

 

[Garyt]

Quite a few ships have been lost due to their own weapons/equipment. In Fact, for battleships (including pre dreadnoughts) more battleships blew up due to their own ammo exploding in harbor than were ever sunk by gunfire only in action

I'm aware of that, but the ammo for main guns was protected far better than the torpedoes and their reloads. Or at least on capital ships, destroyers had little armor. and the Japanese torpedoes were more volatile than the american torps.

BUT to have a reasonable chance of inflicting the needed damage on the American fleet it needed to be fired in very large numbers. This means as many ships as possiable carrying and firing the max number of torpedoes.

Yeah, that decisive battle thought process. Really, I think that's one issue that hurt the Japanese was their strong focus on the decisive battle, leaving them not as flexible for other types of engagements. But indeed arming most of your vessels with torpedoes was required for this strategy.

The type 93 torpedoes were indeed very good, better range and much faster than their American counterparts. But if you look at the numbers launched, hits and damage caused, they seem to have fallen a bit short of expectations. Navweaps has an interesting article on this.

 

[parsifal]

Any weapon system carried on ships has a risk associated with it, and the japanese, with their relatively weak Damage Control, and their emphasis on torpedo armament will inevitably suffer losses from them. Type 93s were oxygen powered and carried a warhead twice the size of most allied types, so this made them very effectiver at sinking ships. if the warhead goes off at the wrong time, its still going to do a lot of damage. but the logic "they are dangerous things, therefore they shouldnt be carried" is just so cockeyed I wonder why we are even discussing it. All weapons are dangerous. The most serious risk for carriers are fuel carried, bombs carried, and aircraft carried. Does that mean carriers should not carry bombs aircraft or fuel? A very dangerous weapon carried by Destroyers with no benefit to a surface naval battle were the ASW weapons they carried. The risk to ships that carried them was very great. In 1939 Ive just finished writing up an account of a British DD, where the holding straps for the DCs came loose, allowing one of the DCs to roll off the stern and explode under the ship, The heaving effect from the detonation caused another two DCs to break free and also explode, almost causing the stern to blow off. Not only that but two other ships nearby also very extensively damaged. On the basis of the arguments being presented here, that means that British DDs were faulty because they carried DCs. Its a totally non-sequita argument, buts its a headline grabber because it looks cute.

Another example of how dangerous own weappon systems can be are mines. The stories of own losses to these weapons are prodigious, but it would be foolhardy to argue that because they are dangerous to own forces, they ought not be used. The best example of their danger in my opinion was the loss of the French ML Cruiser Pluton in 1939. Not only was the ship itesl lost whilst alongside in Casablanca, eight other warships were lost from the explpoding mines. by the logic here, the French should have scrapped all their mine stocks and ceased laying mines. In one month alone, October 1939, mines accounted for the loss of 3 of the 5 Uboats sunk to that point in the war......but without mines there would have been no such losses. Friendly fire is a fact of life, and LL are no exceptions, but neither are they an unnaccepotable risk, given thge benefits they confe4rred.

What isnt brought out are the intangible benefits brought about by Japanese Torpedo techs. Ive read in various accounts that the fear of Long Lance probably lengethened the war by over a year......thats 25% of Japanese resistance capability denied at a stroke. Further, some of their best efforts in air attacks came from their air launched torpedoes, which benefitted greatly by the efforts put into the Long Lance torpedoes. japanese contact pistols and casings as well drive mechanisms and gyro systems were reliable, accurate, strong. Whereas US topedoes required a launch speed of around 90 knots and a drop height not exceeding 60 feet (it got a bit better later on) for a percentage chance of a true run of about 40%, Japanese air launched torpedoes could be launched at 350 knots from drop heights of up to 250 feet, and still have about a 90% chance of running true. These torps used the same depth keeping, casing design etc as the LL. Take away the LL development, and you lose all that.

As far as the argument that the Japanese should abandon half its battlefleet in favour of carriers, and at the same time wave its magic wand to increase pilot outputs. Well for the latter part of the war, that holds true, but in the context of the 1930s, it was simply beyond the Japanese capability to do this. Both the IJN and the USN spent the entire lead up for war preparing for a jutland style decisive battle, the so called Mahanist battles (an American it ought to be pointed out). The US Pacific Fleet was at Pearl Harbour 7th December 1941, for precisely the reason of implementing its Plan Orange strategy....an advance across the Pacific with Battleships the focus. It only abandoned the strategy because the losses at PH forced it to. Nobody expected the makeshift hit and run carrier attacks to work as well as they did.

For the Japanese, faced with severe treaty limits that more or less guranteed US superiority of numbers, and placed very severe restrictions, by category, reducing the battleship numbers is akin to tying another arm behind your back. Scrapping a battleship doesnt mean in the early 1930s that you can build carriers in their place....it just means you have less battleships. On December 29, 1934, the Japanese government gave formal notice that it intended to terminate the treaty. Its provisions remained in force until the end of 1936 and were not renewed. Japan effectively ignored the treaty from the end of 1936 and began to benefit materially from that walk out from roughly 1938. Thats not a lot of time to benefit from a scrapped battlefleet. Certainly not enough time to significantly alrter or improve the carrier numbers or more importantly aircrew numbers

Japans solution to the treaty limits placed on her was to maximise quality. She knew that every ship, every aircraft, every torpedo, had to 3/2 times better than the US material, or better, and she set down the path that entailed. She had probably achieved that advantage by December 1941. She was correct to follow the idea of seeking the decisive battle pre-December 1941, because that was the only way she could hope to defeat the US....a short sharp shock and awe war, which incidentally wasa the same war the US wanted to fight

 

[Garyt]

The Jap[anise did in fact get their decive battles......three times actually, and each one they lost.

Indeed they did, Parsifal, but none turned out to be anything like the planned surface vs surface engagements.

If you are looking at Midway, Philipine Sea and Leyte Gulf as the 3 major engagements, None of them other than Leyte had any real type of surface to surface action. And at Leyte, the Japanese airpower was non-existent which made the Japanese fleet target practice for US strike aircraft. Never once was there the decisive surface to surface action that was looked for.

Of course the main reason behind this was that between roughly 1930 and the 1940's, airpower had become the deciding factor. And really when the plan for a decisive battle was influencing the design of the fleet, the carrier planes were light and of not much threat to armored surface vessels. And pretty well every navy around the world had aircraft carriers thought of as scouts at this time. I guess one could think they should have realized planes would get bigger, stronger, faster, and more of a threat, but on other coutry really thought this way around 1930.
I think what made a huge difference is that with America's industrial base, they were able to react quicker and in more force with both new ships and changing existing ships to adapt more to the carrier style of naval combat.

 

[Garyt]

Parsifal, I am not by any means stating the Japanese should have given up on or not researched or not equipped their ships with the long lance. BUT what I am questioning is whether they should have been deployed on cruisers, particularly heavy cruisers. If you look at kills vs. being killed, the use of long lances on Heavy cruisers did not seem to make much sense. On Destroyers and light cruisers - absolutely. I just question the idea of arming your heavy cruisers that way.

I understand the why - the decisive battle launch of 100's upon hundreds of torpedoes, at night I think the plan was, by cruisers and destroyers to weaken the american battle line for a daylight gun engagement. But perhaps the Japanese would have fared better by following the American plan of no torpedoes aboard heavy cruisers.

 

[Shortround6]

The difference between the Japanese and the Americans was that the Japanese planned to fire the Long Lance torpedoes from beyond gun range or at least very early in the gun gun dual between surface ships, minimizing the danger of taking a hit to the torpedoes. The Shorter range of the American torpedoes meant that they stood a good chance of taking gun hits before getting into torpedo range and getting rid of them.

Most of you examples of ships being lost to their own torpedoes are from aircraft bombs which weren't anywhere near the threat in the late 20s/early 30s when the Japanese Cruisers were designed and built.