80 years ago, Harris about a whirlwind. (1 Viewer)

SaparotRob said:

I insist the Alaskas were large cruisers. So there.

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You're not the only one. Drachinifel a couple of weeks ago did an entire video on the Alaska class. Toward the end of it he addresses the argument as to whether the class should be regarded as a large cruiser or a battlecruiser. Using the usual criteria of what constituted a battlecruiser based on actual battlecruisers built, the Alaska class was really a large cruiser and not a battlecruiser.

33k in the air said:

You're not the only one. Drachinifel a couple of weeks ago did an entire video on the Alaska class. Toward the end of it he addresses the argument as to whether the class should be regarded as a large cruiser or a battlecruiser. Using the usual criteria of what constituted a battlecruiser based on actual battlecruisers built, the Alaska class was really a large cruiser and not a battlecruiser.

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I Believe in Norman Freidman's books it may show up in the Cruiser Volume?
In any case it was described as being an enlarged cruiser from the design perspective.

The layout of the armor has thicker armor than a cruiser but does not show the multiple layers or sub division of a battleship.
It was a scaled up cruiser and not a scaled down battleship.

Thumpalumpacus said:

The Oil and Transportation Plans? Not so much…..

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And your source for this profoundly scholarly statement is…what…exactly?

Looking for the connection between Harris, whirlwinds, the Admiral Graf Spee and the Alaska Class cruisers (said whilst furiously leafing through reference books...)

Admiral Graf Harris of the Alaska Class Whirlwind...

nuuumannn said:

Admiral Graf Harris of the Alaska Class Whirlwind...

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Ah, yes, the Whirlwind, the forgotten sister ship of the Thunder Child, the famous Martian tripod killer!

33k in the air said:

Ah, yes, the Whirlwind, the forgotten sister ship of the Thunder Child, the famous Martian tripod killer!

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Ah, but it wasn't a battleship, nor was it a pocket, apparently...

JDCAVE said:

And your source for this profoundly scholarly statement is…what…exactly?

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The tussle he had over the Transportation Plan was common knowledge, I had thought. I think it was The Bomber War, from Robin Neillands, who cites Harris's own memoirs in this regard, where I read it. I haven't read Harris's memoirs. there's this from JSTOR as well:



Your sarcasm aside, it should be noted that I've never claimed scholarly provenance, and was simply expressing my personal opinion based on the reading I've done over the years.

pbehn said:

Harris was echoing Churchill's words of July 1941

We ask no favours of the enemy. We seek from them no compunction. On the contrary, if to-night the people of London were asked to cast their vote whether a convention should be entered into to stop the bombing of all cities, the overwhelming majority would cry, "No, we will mete out to the Germans the measure, and more than the measure, that they have meted out to us." The people of London with one voice would say to Hitler: "You have committed every crime under the sun. Where you have been the least resisted there you have been the most brutal. It was you who began the indiscriminate bombing. We remember Warsaw in the very first few days of the war. We remember Rotterdam. We have been newly reminded of your habits by the hideous massacre of Belgrade. We know too well the bestial assault yon are making upon the Russian people, to whom our hearts go out in their valiant struggle. We will have no truce or parley with you, or the grisly gang who work your wicked will. You do your worst and we will do our best." Perhaps it may be our turn soon; perhaps it may be our turn now.

We live in a terrible epoch of the human story, but we believe there is a broad and sure justice running through its theme. It Is time that the Germans should be made to suffer in their own and cities something of the torment they have twice in our lifetime let loose upon their neighbours and upon the
world.

America’s National Churchill Museum | Winston Churchill's Do Your Worst; We'll Do Our Best Speech

View the full text of Winston Churchill's Do Your Worst and We'll Do Our Best speech given on July 14, 1941.

www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org

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Good speech.
Whatever they say about Harris and Churchill and Bomber Command's " controversies" or errors... There are times and places when strong will and resolve is all that matters.
Later on, when dust settles we can argue about the fate of Hamburg - or Belgorod.
(Writing from Kyiv after another missile strike).

Thumpalumpacus said:

The tussle he had over the Transportation Plan was common knowledge, I had thought. I think it was The Bomber War, from Robin Neillands, who cites Harris's own memoirs in this regard, where I read it. I haven't read Harris's memoirs. there's this from JSTOR as well:

View attachment 672282

Your sarcasm aside, it should be noted that I've never claimed scholarly provenance, and was simply expressing my personal opinion based on the reading I've done over the years.

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I am in the middle of a move right now. My books are in boxes, but more importantly, my desktop computer is not available to me right now…

I apologize for my sarcasm, but I have become cantankerous in my old age and I'm tired of people making blanket statements without supporting details. I appreciate you have now provided a source. Biddle's paper is a notable source on the controversy, but is by no means the only interpretation of what went on during the winter months of 1944 and early 1945. Please understand that I have spent the past almost 30 years researching my father's operations during those times and I have 20-30,000 pages of contemporary wartime documents that I have examined. I wish to make the following points:

1) most researchers reference Webster and Franklin's Strategic Air Offensive, on the exchange between Harris and Portal on Oil strategy. We/they are constrained by what W and F May, or may not have included. Much is lost, in my opinion without looking further. Henry Probert's biography on Harris provides more detail. Personally, I'd like to see these communications more readily available.

My take on the exchange of these communications? Portal was positioning his legacy for historical review. He realized his culpability and involvement in promulgating the Area Bombing policy in the first place and he wanted history to view him in the positive light of the oil plan. He had a willing and vocal foil to take the blame and Harris was that man. In my opinion he knew exactly how Harris would respond. And here we find ourselves…debating this still! "Let history be the judge" and all that!

2) Harris was not officially included in the correspondence on "Ultra" intelligence. He did not have clearance on this intelligence. He was never told the source of these details.

3) Historians have focused on the readily available material on Harris's belligerence and seemingly less so on what he actually did. Davis is far more complimentary on Harris, noting he was efficient with the number of bombers sent to targets. You don't neeed to send a force of 1000 bombers to a small oil target. Bomber Command put considerable effort into the oil offensive, with the caveats noted below…

4) For Duisburg December 18, 1944 Dad commented: "And then we went away on another leave and believe me that one was much appreciated, because we had some "funny" trips [as in peculiar trips]. They were disturbing trips. The weather was so bloody awful. It was just terrible. And I remember we came back from that, only to find that our aircraft "B"-Baker [KB.779] had been shot down and was missing when we were away on leave. And the "new" "B"-Baker was a clapped-out old plane—KB.721 and we did not like it at all. Our next trip, Number 16, was to Duisburg, where "Met" again boobed."
The important point here is: the weather was terrible for much of the winter months. The only oil targets that could be attacked were by either Oboe or GH. A Huge constraint on the oil strategy. However you could continue to attack cities. Harris makes the points on weather and other tactical considerations concerning oil targets.

5) Harris pointed out you couldn't just focus on a single type of target or the enemy would putt all his resources onto that. You can't only bomb oil targets. Also, they were small, difficult to find. Only 5-Group, with their low level marking methods could hit distant targets, and only in suitable weather.

6) The weather also severely constrained photo reconnaissance. The "Night Raid Reports" continually record that photo rec was not available for several weeks affecting the interpretation of the effects of a raid. How does a commander decide whether to attack again without this critical information?

7) going back to 2) and 3), above, the intelligence was not as reliable as you may think. Dad bombed the Scholven plant on Dec 29, and according to the German Historian, Ralf Blank, the plant had not been operating for several months by that time. Other plants in the Ruhr were non operational. More research needs to be done on this. Callum?

8) Consensus was by no means universal on the level of priority for Transportation. It was way too spread out. Harris was not the only detractor against the plan. Parks Hayes pointed out that the USAAF, recorded many "Area Type" attacks as directed on "Marshalling Yards" when in fact they were H2X attacks on cities. It just so happens that most Marshalling yards are in the centre of cities. They were no different than the attacks by Bomber Command on cities. Bomber Command attacked the Dortmund Ems Canal at Lagbergen countless times with considerable losses. This was a highly defended and difficult target. And part of the Transportation System.

So I'm sure there is more, but that's all I have for now, and I regret, once again, I'm doing this from memory…

Let me say in closing, you said you had not read Harris's account. You absolutely should, before you judge him. The navy put demands on him, the army put demands on him, the Air Ministry, Ministry for Economic Warfare, and there was the constant haranguing from Sidney Buffon, Chief of Bombing Operations. He didn't suffer fools and history certainly records that. Incidentally, Bufton, squashed the publication of Harris's Despatch on War Operations. It wasn't published until 2004, I believe. it too is an excellent read.

Edit: I wish to add that Harris made some serious errors in judgement. In my view, his stubbornness in continuing the Berlin Offensive was a serious mistake.

Jim

EwenS said:

Sorry Geoffrey you have forgotten about the attacks on some of the assembly sites like Watten & Wizernes before they were able to become operational with 8th AF also targeting Sottevast.

A-4/V-2 Hardened Bunkers in France - V2ROCKET.COM

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True, but then again the Air Forces did not think they were attacking V2 installations, given the V1 operations going on. The 8th Air Force thought it was after a Labor Camp. As far as the RAF was concerned the targets were under the generic Construction Works, with Wizernes and Watten as Large Site. Watten was Z.3001, Wizernes Z.3090, the notes for Watten on 25 August 1944 have A/P 036H 027V in X1/A/1/3. 617 Squadron did the raids of 19 and 24 June, 17 and 25 July. The 19 June raid also had 9 pathfinder Mosquitoes from 8 Group (2 with Oboe mark I, 7 with mark II) to drop flares and a Lancaster from 463 squadron to take photographs, along with the 2 Mosquitos and 18 Lancasters from 617 squadron.

Raid Data from Richard Davis, (N) = Night, NB = No Ball, DD/MM/YYYY. Weights are short tons, RAF incendiaries are target markers.


The English speaking world called the German Armoured Ships Pocket Battleships (and used Packet Bottleship as an insult for other navy ships), the owners tend to have naming and classification rights, Panzerschiff.

Harris was an enthusiastic supporter of minelaying, which probably had more effect on U-boat availability than bombing raids. He, like many, objected to the formation of pathfinder units, the RAF has a mindset of avoiding elite units, then made sure the pathfinders were given what they needed to do their job. Then later he allowed 5 Group to come up with its own target marking ideas and seems to have enjoyed the competition that generated between the different people involved, while 3 Group became the GH user. Harris proved the systems to put large numbers of bombers over a target. Spaatz tended to sent a representative to SHAEF meetings, Harris was more into attending in person, Eisenhower noted Harris to be the more helpful.

Harris also put up a fight against the oil campaign then did the bombings to the point all assigned targets were considered knocked out, but it took Portal to ask for more targets to be assigned to Bomber Command, after which Bomber Command largely took the lead. The 8th Air Force could also have done more attacks, according to the USAAF the top three target categories for the 8th air force has oil/chemical/rubber targets appearing in the top three for the first time in July 1944, at number 2 after industrial areas, it stayed number 2 in August, behind airfields, dropped completely out in September, was number 2 again in October after marshalling yards, made it to number 1 in November, number 3 in December 1944 and January 1945, then number 2 in February and March 1945.

The heavy bomber commanders all objected to the 1944 transport plan and they were largely correct, the raids on French marshalling yards did not do a lot to German army supply, as the trains involved were made up in Germany and returned there. Best stopped by strikes against the trains themselves, tracks and things like bridges. For stopping an economy the marshalling yards were important, along with canals and inland ports given the amount of barge traffic.

The Battle of Berlin was the big defeat, the final attempt to win via air power alone, I would like confirmation but as far as I can tell in 11 months of combat 21st Army Group had comparable numbers of men killed and many more wounded than Bomber Command's total war casualties. So you can see the way Harris could justify the idea to himself at least but he was after one of the most difficult targets to reach, to accurately mark and, like London, with a great capacity to absorb the damage inflicted, plus having a below average amount of heavy industry, to work the raids needed to force the population to revolt or the government to collapse.

Throughout WWII the airmen managed to push back the boundaries of flyable weather, but did not do as well when it came to bombing accurately. Some RAF oil strikes were reclassified area attacks because of the weather. The night of the Dresden raid the RAF hit Bohlen, around 60 miles from Dresden, thick icing cloud meant the raid was so considered a failure no post raid reconnaissance was done. Of 524 8th Air Force raids, 203 encountered blind bombing weather and of course the better weather was reserved for attacks on occupied countries, so around 42% of the bombs the 8th dropped on German were aimed visually, 45% by H2X, attacks on French targets were 80% visual aiming. It is one thing to say hit with precision, another to do it consistently, the rise of electronics meant by end 1944 the night bombers were proving more accurate, on average, than the day ones, which is stil not saying that much, plus dropped heavier bombs, more incendiaries and stayed over the target longer helping to suppress damage control. When you look at the 8th Air Force's campaign, it missed the summer of 1942, it lost sizeable forces to the Mediterranean in 1943, had Overlord support in 1944 and the war ended before the summer of 1945, made it that much harder to prove the concept, coupled with the set backs of underestimating fighter escort needs and the effects of weather.

The usual results of area raids were not very cost effective, only when the damage started to be more than the repair crews could cope with did area raids more consistently "work", as minor damage could often mean knocking out a factory for a long time until a repair crew became available. Harris was aware the loss of production at Coventry was mostly due to the disruption of energy supplies and dislocation of the workforce, not damage to factories. Saturation finally did happen, Bomber Command half way point for bombs dropped on Germany was end September 1944, the 8th was mid November 1944.

In the end the allies found hitting the bulk communication links, rail and water, was the most effective way to stop an economy but it required all types of airpower and in quantities well above pre war ideas. It became the main 1944/45 bombing plan. With cities having expanded and absorbed many marshalling yards into the urban area the difference between an area strike and a marshalling yard attack tended to be theoretical, more depended on the weather. Similar for ports. The Dresden raid was officially after the city and rail facilities.

Harris was apparently not cleared for Ultra until 1945, so he was unaware of how much the Luftwaffe was informing the allies on the effects of the oil attacks, instead he was receiving the usual "reliable" reports, ones he knew had often been very wrong, especially when it came to the various claims of weak points whose destruction would cause great problems for the Germans.

If Harris had been transferred near the end of 1943 there is little doubt he would have a very good military reputation, the number of people killed on the ground is always going to mean questions about the campaign. He set his command up for failure in late 1943 and early 1944, after which he was very reluctant to undertake deep raids, no more Main Force to Berlin, with Dresden done under direct orders. The marking techniques the command developed meant it could attack targets in France in the first half of 1944 to help Overlord while minimising French casualties, doing better on average than the day bombers. After having probably the most realistic view of bomber capability in late 1943 he largely missed the growth in power during 1944, expecting Autumn and Winter weather to prevent effective attacks on the oil targets for example. In 1944/45 he followed orders, helped the ground forces, kept up the mining and protested long and loud that the only way to destroy the bits that really matter was to knock almost everything flat in the major German cities, which detracts from the achievements Bomber Command had in the period.

Even in September 1944 only 40% of Bomber Command's effort was against targets in Germany. It was October onwards, as the weather closed in headed for a record breaking winter that the command could fully focus on Germany. That meant plenty of area raids, whether labelled as such or not and if you look at the percentage of the 8th Air Force bombs dropped in 8/10 cloud or worse they compare percentage wise to the number of declared Bomber Command area raids. Whatever Harris believed in the final year of the war, his ability to skew overall operations was marginal given the orders about targets and effects of weather.

The Battle of Berlin and the failure to change in 1944 put serious holes in Harris' reputation as a military commander, and even with statements like he did not want to kill the elderly, women and children as they are a drain on the economy, for many people the numbers killed in the bombings calls into question the entire campaign, with Harris well set up as the head bad guy.

JDCAVE said:

I am in the middle of a move right now. My books are in boxes, but more importantly, my desktop computer is not available to me right now…

I apologize for my sarcasm, but I have become cantankerous in my old age and I'm tired of people making blanket statements without supporting details. I appreciate you have now provided a source. Biddle's paper is a notable source on the controversy, but is by no means the only interpretation of what went on during the winter months of 1944 and early 1945. Please understand that I have spent the past almost 30 years researching my father's operations during those times and I have 20-30,000 pages of contemporary wartime documents that I have examined. I wish to make the following points:

1) most researchers reference Webster and Franklin's Strategic Air Offensive, on the exchange between Harris and Portal on Oil strategy. We/they are constrained by what W and F May, or may not have included. Much is lost, in my opinion without looking further. Henry Probert's biography on Harris provides more detail. Personally, I'd like to see these communications more readily available.

My take off the exchange of these communications? Portal was positioning his legacy for historical review. He realized his culpability and involvement in promulgating the Area Bombing policy in the first place and he wanted history to view him in the positive light of the oil plan. He had a willing and vocal foil to take the blame and Harris was that man. In my opinion he knew exactly how Harris would respond. And here we find ourselves…debating this still! "Let history be the judge" and all that!

2) Harris was not officially included in the correspondence on "Ultra" intelligence. He did not have clearance on this intelligence. He was never told the source of these details.

3) Historians have focused on the readily available material on Harris's belligerence and seemingly less so on what he actually did. Davis is far more complimentary on Harris, noting he was efficient with the number of bombers sent to targets. You don't neeed to send a force of 1000 bombers to a small oil target. Bomber Command put considerable effort into the oil offensive, with the caveats noted below…

4) For Duisburg December 18, 1944 Dad commented: "And then we went away on another leave and believe me that one was much appreciated, because we had some "funny" trips [as in peculiar trips]. They were disturbing trips. The weather was so bloody awful. It was just terrible. And I remember we came back from that, only to find that our aircraft "B"-Baker [KB.779] had been shot down and was missing when we were away on leave. And the "new" "B"-Baker was a clapped-out old plane—KB.721 and we did not like it at all. Our next trip, Number 16, was to Duisburg, where "Met" again boobed."
The important point here is: the weather was terrible for much of the winter months. The only oil targets that could be attacked were by either Oboe or GH. A Huge constraint on the oil strategy. However you could continue to attack cities. Harris makes the points on weather and other tactical considerations concerning oil targets.

5) Harris pointed out you couldn't just focus on a single type of target or the enemy would putt all his resources onto that. You can't only bomb oil targets. Also, they were small, difficult to find. Only 5-Group, with their low level marking methods could hit distant targets, and only in suitable weather.

6) The weather also severely constrained photo reconnaissance. The "Night Raid Reports" continually record that photo rec was not available for several weeks affecting the interpretation of the effects of a raid. How does a commander decide whether to attack again without this critical information?

7) going back to 2) and 3), above, the intelligence was not as reliable as you may think. Dad bombed the Scholven plant on Dec 29, and according to the German Historian, Ralf Blank, the plant had not been operating for several months by that time. Other plants in the Ruhr with non operational. More research needs to be done on this. Callum?

8) There was not a universal consensus on the level of priority for Transportation. It was way too spread out. Harris was by no means the only detractor against the plan. Parks Hayes pointed out that the USAAF, recorded many "Area Type" attacks as directed on "Marshalling Yards" when in fact they were H2X attacks on cities. It just so happens that most Marshalling yards are in the centre of cities. There were no different than the attacks by Bomber Command on Cities. Bomber Command attacked the Dortmund Ems Canal at Lagbergen countless times with considerable losses. This was a highly defended and difficult target. And part of the Transportation System.

So I'm sure there is more, but that's all I have for now, and I regret, once again, I'm doing this from memory…

Let me say in closing, you said you had not read Harris's account. You absolutely should, before you judge him. The navy put demands on him, the army put demands on him, the Air Ministry, Ministry for Economic Warfare, and there was the constant haranguing from Sidney Buffon, Chief of Bombing Operations. He didn't suffer fools and history certainly records that. Incidentally, Bufton, squashed the publication of Harris's Despatch on War Operations. It wasn't published until 2004, I believe. it too is an excellent read.

Edit: I wish to add that Harris made some serious errors in judgement. In my view, his stubbornness in continuing the Berlin Offensive was a serious mistake.

Jim

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As I said, I generally hold a favorable opinion of Harris and try not to judge him too harshly based on his occasional obstreperousness. Thanks for this reply, which gives me more insight.

SaparotRob said:

I insist the Alaskas were large cruisers. So there.

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They were definitely larger than most. I looked at pics of an Alaska that was so big it had roads and everything as well as trees growing onboard to add camo. That is big.

Hunting down and killing cruisers is a battlecruiser function.

Thumpalumpacus said:

Hunting down and killing cruisers is a battlecruiser function.

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True. But traditional battlecruisers had other features that the Alaska class doesn't have. Drachinifel's video covers this starting at 36:13 of the video mentioned earlier.

33k in the air said:

True. But traditional battlecruisers had other features that the Alaska class doesn't have. Drachinifel's video covers this starting at 36:13 of the video mentioned earlier.

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I know, I watched it when it came out. Suffice it to say I don't fully agree with his reasoning.

Thumpalumpacus said:

Hunting down and killing cruisers is a battlecruiser function.

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Yes, no, maybe.

Taking it here.

Shortround6 said:

Yes, no, maybe.

Taking it here.

Battlecruisers vs Cruisers

Yes, no, maybe? SMS Emden about 4,000 tons depending on load, 10 X 4.1in guns, 23.5 kts (in good condition) Arguably German's most successful cruiser raider of WW I. There was sort of a hierarchy going on. Light cruisers (3rd class?) were supposed to be hunted down by 2nd class cruisers...

ww2aircraft.net

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Thanks!

Thumpalumpacus said:

Yes, and pickup trucks are called trucks, but no one is going to confuse a Ford F-150 with a Kenworth. Bravo, you've noticed they both share a word!

Anyway, back on topic. The main thing I didn't like about his mindset was the dismissal of almost any targets that weren't cities. Anything other than dehousing, he seemed to label "panacea target" and fought tooth-and-nail against it. Sometimes they were indeed panaceas -- the ball-bearing strikes, imo, fit that description. The Oil and Transportation Plans? Not so much.

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There were many targets that could be termed "panacea" targets by Harris, he did attack them. The thing is with these targets you need to hit them precisely and massively. To do that usually involved massive losses. Two months after Harris was appointed 12 Lancasters attacked a U boat engine plant at Augsberg, 7 were lost 5 damaged with little damage to the factory. The Dams raid lost 8 out of 19 aircraft. The Emms canal raid (operation Garlic) lost 5 out of 8 aircraft and the canal wasnt damaged. 617 squadron was an elite unit, they were selected as the best of the best and given extra training to make them better, you cannot lose half of the people you send out on every raid, because you cannot readily replace them and the unit was getting a reputation as a suicide squad. There were many war winning "plans", but most were beyond the capability of bomber command or the joint allies.

pbehn said:

617 squadron was an elite unit, they were selected as the best of the best and given extra training to make them better, you cannot lose half of the people you send out on every raid, because you cannot readily replace them and the unit was getting a reputation as a suicide squad. There were many war winning "plans", but most were beyond the capability of bomber command or the joint allies.

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It would be better to say that 617 came to be considered an elite unit. Contrary to what was portrayed in the film there was not nearly so much "selection" by Gibson. To quote from "A Hell of a Bomb"

"The reality was different. His choice was restricted to 5 Group and men were posted in regardless of whether they had volunteered or not. He did not know all the pilots, not all crew members were decorated and some had not even finished one tour, let alone two. Some of them were 'posted across the station' from 57 Sqdn, including its entire C Flight, despite protests."

EwenS said:

It would be better to say that 617 came to be considered an elite unit. Contrary to what was portrayed in the film there was not nearly so much "selection" by Gibson. To quote from "A Hell of a Bomb"

"The reality was different. His choice was restricted to 5 Group and men were posted in regardless of whether they had volunteered or not. He did not know all the pilots, not all crew members were decorated and some had not even finished one tour, let alone two. Some of them were 'posted across the station' from 57 Sqdn, including its entire C Flight, despite protests."

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I wasnt really referring to the film but John Nichol's book "Return of the Dambusters" what 617 squadron did next. The Emms canal raid hit them hard, there were heavy losses on the dams raid, but they breached two dams, there were proportionately heavier losses on the Emms canal raid for no effect at all.