A Critical Analysis of the RAF Air Superiority Campaign in India, Burma and Malaya in 1941-45

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The RAF lost about 1300 of all types, the Luftwaffe about 1800.

That site says 1385 to 'enemy action' plus 404 'operational' and 280 'non operational'. However, one thing I do know about the Luftwaffe is that they did not typically list for example crash landed but repairable aircraft as losses, and that might be another 50% or more of losses. Similar for planes that land with say, 70% damage but made it back to base. True for the Luftwaffe they could get those planes back in action but from the point of view of an RAF pilot a crash landed plane would still count as a legitimate victory I think.
 
Still bad, over 60% was a write off.
 
Still bad, over 60% was a write off.

Ok 59% then the precise percentage is rather arbitrary isn't it? - the point is that heavily damaged and / or crash landed planes were not typically listed as losses by the Luftwaffe which skews the victory confirmation process. I think a crash landed aircraft should count as a victory from the point of view of the pilot that put bullets into it even if it only had one bullet hole in the radiator.

I suspect this would turn into a deep debate but from what I have read even the 70% or as much as 90% were not always necessarily listed as lost. Quite a few were kept around in a repair queue and later destroyed or abandoned when they had to flee the airfield (and many of the more lightly damaged aircraft were later repaired by DAF mechanics and used for evaluation testing or training, sometimes as squadron 'hacks' or just flown around for fun). At one point almost every DAF squadron had some kind of 'pet' Axis plane or three.

So in those cases even a 10 or 20% damaged plane was ultimately 'lost' as a result of combat though it may never have been reported as such. Some were listed as 'destroyed by own forces', sometimes not.

All this happened on the Allied side as well of course at some points.
 
Perhaps you can provide more detail on the Luftwaffe's determination of what constituted a write-off and what was considered repairable?
Since we seemed to have moved away from the main topic of discussion, did any of you realise that the Russians wooden fighters were probably only good for a about a year max because of the weather conditions on the Eastern Front before they got written off. It was either that or they over-boosted and destroyed the engines. They cost about a third to a half of their Luftwaffe opponents to build.
 
Since we seemed to have moved away from the main topic of discussion, did any of you realise that the Russians wooden fighters were probably only good for a about a year max because of the weather conditions on the Eastern Front before they got written off. It was either that or they over-boosted and destroyed the engines. They cost about a third to a half of their Luftwaffe opponents to build.
For planning purposes the UK used as a rule of thumb, that in Europe 50 fighters were needed to keep a squadron in the front line for six months.
 
For planning purposes the UK used as a rule of thumb, that in Europe 50 fighters were needed to keep a squadron in the front line for six months.
That wouldn't surprise me. That certainly explains what happened to all those Spitfire Vb's that were built.
 
Just read some personal accounts of Hurricanes in Singapore, Java, and Burma,

The pilots did not consider the Hurricane to be inferior to the Oscar and the Zeke. They even escaped Zekes by outclimbing them. They found out the hard way they could not turn with them, but their biggest problem was that they were heavily outnumbered, 5 to 1 or more just for the fighters.

By early 1944 the RAF had 1000 Hurricanes operational in India and Burma. For the type of war in Burma the Hurricane was considered to be just about perfect, used in attacking small targets. Their overwhelming superiority in numbers in the air changed the situation and that seemed to be linked also to Japanese reversals and heavy losses in the Pacific. The Japanese could no longer regard Burma as a high priority because they were getting their butts shot off elsewhere. P-47s began to replace some of the Hurricanes in 1944 but some squadrons served with Hurricanes right to the end of the war, and most had hardly seen an enemy aircraft.
 
Just read some personal accounts of Hurricanes in Singapore, Java, and Burma,

The pilots did not consider the Hurricane to be inferior to the Oscar and the Zeke. They even escaped Zekes by outclimbing them. They found out the hard way they could not turn with them, but their biggest problem was that they were heavily outnumbered, 5 to 1 or more just for the fighters.

By early 1944 the RAF had 1000 Hurricanes operational in India and Burma. For the type of war in Burma the Hurricane was considered to be just about perfect, used in attacking small targets. Their overwhelming superiority in numbers in the air changed the situation and that seemed to be linked also to Japanese reversals and heavy losses in the Pacific. The Japanese could no longer regard Burma as a high priority because they were getting their butts shot off elsewhere. P-47s began to replace some of the Hurricanes in 1944 but some squadrons served with Hurricanes right to the end of the war, and most had hardly seen an enemy aircraft.

Commonwealth pilots always thought there was rough equality between the Hurricane II and A6M2.

Hurricane losses to the Ki-43 have to be looked at in the context of overall Hurricane numbers in theatre and the tactical situation.
 
Perhaps you can provide more detail on the Luftwaffe's determination of what constituted a write-off and what was considered repairable?

Something I read many years ago. Damaged was assessed as a %. Only the very basic damage was repaired by the unit (10% comes to mind). All other was sent to a repair depot. 60% and over was sent to a salvage depot.

Juha2, a member here, might have more detail.
 
Something I read many years ago. Damaged was assessed as a %. Only the very basic damage was repaired by the unit (10% comes to mind). All other was sent to a repair depot. 60% and over was sent to a salvage depot.

Juha2, a member here, might have more detail.

it's how it's listed in the Shores books 10-100% damage. but in the Med, and I'm sure at some point in Russia too, they clearly didn't always have the luxury of sending planes to a repair depot and quite often tried to repair them on the spot. Same for the Allies - when they moved from base to base you'd often see columns of trucks trundling along with disassembled planes in them.

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Attrition was certainly high both from damage and mechanical issues / lack of parts or supplies. Typical compliment on a given day for a squadron might be 4 -6 aircraft. This was true for both Allies and Axis.
 
Don't know what the Americans had but the British had a system in place for damaged a/c. Differing amounts of damage that couldn't be repair onsite went to specific places.

As for your photo, those are going to a repair or salvage depot.
 
Don't know what the Americans had but the British had a system in place for damaged a/c. Differing amounts of damage that couldn't be repair onsite went to specific places.

As for your photo, those are going to a repair or salvage depot.

That photo was plucked from google randomly, but I have nearly identical ones in several books - in fact I have Hurricanes on exactly the same kind of trailers (they called them Queen Mary trailers), which are going from the old squadron base to the new one.

Royal_Air_Force_Operations_in_the_Middle_East_and_North_Africa%2C_1939-1943_CM2240.jpg

That one was being salvaged from a crash landing site and was later put back into action.

50976498ae4b50ca8d53bcc2437d4460.jpg

Another hurricane

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and another

SPIT-DAMAGE.jpg

A spit


This is also how they hauled wrecked planes from salvage sites and brought them back to the squadron airfield for evaluation.

I'd love to know how you know those are going to the depot.

S
 
A pilot who was at Java described a Hurricane coming in to land when some Oscars suddenly appeared and set the Hurricane on fire. The pilot pulled up to about 800 ft and bailed out successfully. The Oscar then pulled up sharply and broke up.

That is not the only case in which Oscars were seen to break up in a dive.
 
The Hurricane had an excellent roll rate and could out roll the Zero.
That seemed to vary with the fact that the design called for the portions of the aileron's nose to be completely sealed where the hinge-brackets are mounted. This seems to be a matter of workmanship and consistency, as some ailerons were quite light and other's quite stiff.
Is this figure accurate as there were other charts that displayed different figures?
That was only one test of several and they were actually doing before and after testing of a G-suit. After the G-suit was worn the Spitfire could outmanoeuvre the Zero
So if the pilots could physically tolerate high g-loads, they would get inside it? Did this apply at all speeds or at all but low speeds?
the Australian tests are flawed in that the Spitfire was not allowed to use overboost hence the low speeds.
Which would be used in real combat...
 
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No, the 90-gallon tank was used for combat. The 170-gallon tank was solely for ferrying.
The 170 was the one that looked like a cheese-wheel with a fairing behind it hanging underneath the belly right?

Last I checked the problem with the proposals for using slipper tanks and rear-tanks was that the speed of the plane was limited to around 240 mph. While it'd fly comfortably at that speed, if it got jumped by enemy fighters, it may not have been able to gain speed quick enough to fight effectively. When the P-38's, P-47's, and P-51's were used, they generally flew at around 300 mph which allowed much better combat performance (and used essing to stay with the bombers).
The drag penalty imposed by slipper tank carriage was relatively high compared to the later 'torpedo' style drop tanks that were mounted on struts clear of the fuselage
Why didn't they use those more?

Also, why didn't they fit the 20 gallon tank used on the PR.IV?
 
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