For offensive operations, yes. But for defensive interceptions, rate of climb and ceiling are more important, especially considering the Japanese tried bombing from high altitude. That's why the P-40Es and P-39D/P-400s were no use as interceptors at Guadalcanal, because the Japanese came in above their operational ceiling, leaving only the Wildcats as capable of getting high enough fast enough to catch them. The Spitfire V was the fastest climbing interceptor available at Darwin. By the time Spit VIIIs arrived the Allied position had changed from defensive to offensive, and the Spit VIII didn't have the range required for long-range interdiction nor escorts.Both P-40N and Beaufighter are better than Spitfire VIII if opponents are only A6M and Ki-43, because they have better range than Spit.
The May 2nd 1943 Darwin Raid actually illustrates how badly the Aussies were commanded at Darwin, with some of the blame lying with Clive Caldwell.
Firstly, the Spitfires only intercepted the Japanese after they had dropped their bombs and were withdrawing. This shows bad use of radar by ground control. Over Malta in 1942, the RAF used Park's Forward Interception Plan to defeat Luftwaffe raids using Ju88s and Bf109Gs, faster and tougher than the equivalent Japanese bombers and fighters used over Darwin. If the Malta Spit Vs could defeat the Luftwaffe with proper ground controlled interceptions (GCI) in August 1942, with a lot less warning time, then the RAAF should have over Darwin eight months later. By intercepting after the raid the Spits were committed to a stern chase and used up too much fuel before they even engaged.
Secondly, we have the Caldwell issue. As an experienced fighter leader he should have predicted the fuel problems and disengaged his squadrons earlier. But Caldwell let his inexperienced pilots carry on dogfighting with the Zeros, which was in itself a poor decision as the Zeros were not a threat to Darwin, the Japanese bombers were. And this was after the US P-40 jocks at Darwin, who had already tangled with the Zeros, had warned Caldwell that dogfighting Zeros was a bad idea. Despite having scored his victories in the Desert in the Tomahawk and Kittyhawk, Caldwell was another sufferer from "Spitfire snobbery", and simply assumed the P-40 was the issue. Caldwell and the RAAF did learn from the May 2nd raid, and after that they tended to ignore the Zeros, kept their speed high and just went for the Jap bombers.