A more effective Dec 1941 preemptive attack on the USA

EwenS said:

At the Quadrant conference in Quebec in the Allies concluded that the defeat of Japan would occur in late 1946

Click to expand...

By 1946 Stalin will have invaded all of Korea and Manchuria, and likely began to look hungrily at western Europe.

Don't need no excuse go to war with Japan.

Cos it's a Tuesday good enough for me.

A key is Russo Japanese war surprise attack on Port Arthur.

So maybe got some form the IJN doing sneak attacks on fleets in port.

Admiral Beez said:

Japan's generals and admirals may have dreamt up the idea seizing the DEI. But no, Japan never had any plan to utilize the DEI oil fields. Japan had no means of getting the oil from the DEI to Japan, had very few petrochemical engineers who knew what to do with the oil fields and oil, and depended on the Dutch to first not sabotage and then operate the pumps and refineries.

It's akin to the Africans attacking and seizing the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean farms from their European descendan owners. Sure, the prize looked inviting, the breadbasket of Africa with super productive farms. But once the locals seized the land, and chased off those with the expertise, the farms collapsed, and the nation went into famine. That's what Japan did in the DEI, rampaging through and hardly getting any oil back to Japan. The IJN benefited somewhat as they could refuel their ships at the well heads, though once the refineries were destroyed the IJN had to use engine-destroying pure crude.

The DEI was stupidly planned for. It's as if Japan's leadership forgot to ask their nascent petrochemical industry what was needed and most importantly what was possible. It's noteworthy that late war air strikes aside, once the USN's submarines sank the few oil tankers Japan had, the allies mostly ignored Sumatra and the oil fields, so much for a strategic asset.

Click to expand...

You need to do a bit more research.

Japan did have a plan to bring the DEI oilfields and refineries back into use. And by and large succeeded in doing so in the first year or 18 months of the war before it all started to fall apart.

All the DEI oil facilities were in Japanese hands by the end of March 1942. Within a few months of the capture of the first oilfields Japan was dispatching teams of its engineers to get the oilfields, and more importantly the refineries, back on line. The numbers of personnel involved was in the thousands. One such group was lost when the ship carrying them to Borneo was torpedoed by a US submarine in May 1942.

In 1940 the DEI wells had produced some 65.1 million barrels of oil. The Dutch successfully destroyed most of the oilfields between Dec 1941 and March 1942. From that low base point, in the year to 31 March 1943 Japanese efforts restored 40% of that output. And it increased further after that.

Refineries were a more difficult matter. Of the 5 largest refineries in the DEI, one, at Palembang in southern Sumatra, was captured virtually intact and was back up and running in 3 months. It was a major supplier of avgas. 2 others were operating at reduced capacity by Sept 1942. Another began limited production in Jan 1943. Until allied action began against them further improvements were made. Only one was so badly damaged that it was only towards the end of the war that it began operating again. In the year to March 1943 those refineries processed 60% of the DEI crude produced, mostly for products needed for the war like avgas and fuel oil for ships.

As for moving this oil, Japanese tanker tonnage actually increased during 1942 and 1943 despite rising losses toward the end of 1943. The Allies campaign specifically against tanker traffic didn't begin until late 1943.

The first bombing raid against the refineries at Balikpapan took place in Aug 1943 (the Shady Lady raid from northern Australia, until then the longest bombing mission of the war). But it was mid-1944 before the Allies had advanced far enough to make these raids a regular event. Britain's carrier raids against Sumatran oil targets didn't begin until April 1944. The RN continued to hit Sumatran refineries most notably in Dec 1944 and Jan 1945, culminating in Operations Meridian I & II. Refineries are however difficult targets to put out of business long term, and the Japanese were able to restore some level of production. B-29s also carried out strikes against oil targets in the Singapore area in March 1945.

Most sources concentrate on how oil imports to Japan fell dramatically during the war. However that fails to take account of how the Japanese operated. Instead of shipping it all back to Japan for distribution to the fleet etc, in 1942 and 1943 it shipped it direct from the DEI refineries to places like Truk and Rabaul. When those bases got closed down in Feb 1944 and Nov 1943 respectively due to Allied actions, the Japanese reacted by relocating the bulk of there major fleet units from Japan to Singapore from Feb 1944, causing a major panic for British forces in the Indian Ocean. But it placed them next to the oil they needed to operate. Later in 1944 the Japanese began burning crude oil in their ships from certain oilfields so further reducing the demand for refined product. The survivors only withdrew to Japan at the beginning of 1945.

Both the IJAAF and the IJNAF took a large part of their pilot training to the DEI to be near their source of avgas.

Ultimately it was the Allied advance in New Guinea and subsequent invasions of the Philippines in Oct 1944 and Tarakan, Brunei Bay and Balikpapan in Borneo between May and July 1945 that firstly limited production and then brought those major oil producing facilities in Borneo back under Allied control. Efforts were immediately begun to get them producing again, which would have eased Allied supply problems during the invasions of Japan.

Postwar the US produced an Oil Report in relation to Japan. The following study seeks to make sense of some of the figures from that and elsewhere. The conclusion it reaches is that Japan's problem was not shortage of oil itself, but a difficulty in moving what it was producing, a problem that slowly got worse as the war went on for a variety of reasons.

You may also be interested in this from the Combined Fleet website

War ain't like dusting crops.

I am quite conservative in my war plans...unless it's against the French. I am going nuclear first second against them baguettes.

Anyway.....

No certainly Japan would get to the oil fields or the oil fields would be intact.

Problem with planning for war is that it goes to heck in a handcart very quickly. Even the Japanese were gobsmacked with the quick conquests.

So to my conservative, French nuking eyes, Japan could be not getting any oil from anywhere and that's bad news.

Really informative post, EwenS. Nicely ties things together for a better perspective for me. A lot of my "facts" now seem to be of the alternate kind.

The Basket said:

War ain't like dusting crops.

I am quite conservative in my war plans...unless it's against the French. I am going nuclear first second against them baguettes.

Anyway.....

No certainly Japan would get to the oil fields or the oil fields would be intact.

Problem with planning for war is that it goes to heck in a handcart very quickly. Even the Japanese were gobsmacked with the quick conquests.

So to my conservative, French nuking eyes, Japan could be not getting any oil from anywhere and that's bad news.

Click to expand...

And we all know that was said with affection.

SaparotRob said:

Really informative post, EwenS. Nicely ties things together for a better perspective for me. A lot of my "facts" now seem to be of the alternate kind.

Click to expand...

This is the internet.

I want nonsense not facts

Noob.

The Basket said:

This is the internet.

I want nonsense not facts

Noob.

Click to expand...

You Sir, have posted the Ultimate Reply.
You have humbled me.
I'm gonna use that line to respond to GrauGeist one day.

33k in the air said:

The declaration you cited does NOT appear anywhere within the 14-part message the Japanese diplomats delivered on December 7th.

You can read the entire translated contents of that 14-part message here.

Click to expand...

Let's read the full text of the document handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2:20 p.m., December 7, 1941:

"Memorandum

1. The government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific Area.
2. The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measure the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.
3. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.
4. Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pace with Germany and Italy.
   However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regimes. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.
   Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.
5. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.
6. Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:
   1. The Government of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
   2. Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
   3. Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
   4. The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.
   5. The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
   6. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.
7. As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.
   The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.
8. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constitutes an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.
9. It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.
   On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, cause undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:
   1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and impose (sic) one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
   2. Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual condition it seems only a utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force their immediate adoption.
      Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.
   3. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states - 'Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.' It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.
   4. The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area through peaceful means.
   5. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane that military pressure.
   6. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position in has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia have for the past two hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo- American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.
   7. The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above- mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries, - Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China,, and Thailand, - excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.
   8. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiations. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.
   9. *(sic) In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.
   10. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneous ly with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.
   11. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's effort toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interest by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation.
   12. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
       The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

Japan had the idea of killing their politicians they didn't like.

Gekokujo.

Japan is going to conquer the world. So anyone who stands in the way is bad. Anyone whose goal is world domination is good.

So Japanese soldiers invading Korea and China against any orders is actually in the right because world domination is what should be happening. Washington naval treaty is bad because it goes against world domination.

Any junior officer who acts Gekokujo is in the right if his actions are meant to strengthen Japan. Even if that means killing senior officers or politicians or starting war.

He is an example to follow.

Admiral Beez said:

Sounds like how the Americans tried to turn the Afghans into a fighting force to defeat the Taliban on Afghan soil. With even less success. If your side has no cohesion it doesn't matter how much money you throw at them.

Click to expand...

I see no similarity, really. The Republic of China received only $1.6 bln of $50.1 bln of lend-lease supplies in the last 3 years of their 8 years war against the top military power. Earlier support was even less significant. The country was almost mortally wounded but despite that, it tied up a huge enemy force (up to 1 mln) even before Joe "Vinegar" Stillwell and other Americans took an active part in events. Imagine just half of that Japanese force released and sent to Burma, to the Pacific or elsewhere.
The Republic's institutes did lack cohesion and yes, it was corrupted beyond the Western standard. But more money "thrown at them" could make a big difference.

nuuumannn said:

This was Nimitz, not MacArthur. This is what MacArthur had to say about Island Hopping:

"My strategic conception for the Pacific Theater, which I outlined after the Papuan Campaign and have since consistently advocated, contemplates massive strokes against only main strategic objectives, utilizing surprise and air-ground striking power supported and assisted by the fleet. This is the very opposite of what is termed "island hopping" which is the gradual pushing back of the enemy by direct frontal pressure with the consequent heavy casualties which will certainly be involved. Key points must of course be taken but a wise choice of such will obviate the need for storming the mass of islands now in enemy possession. "Island hopping" with extravagant losses and slow progress... is not my idea of how to end the war as soon and as cheaply as possible. New conditions require for solution and new weapons require for maximum application new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past."

Douglas MacArthur - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Click to expand...

MacArthur wanted to do a head on charge at Rabul in 1942

GrauGeist said:

Let's read the full text of the document handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2:20 p.m., December 7, 1941:

"Memorandum

1. The government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific Area.
2. The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measure the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.
3. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.
4. Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pace with Germany and Italy.
   However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regimes. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.
   Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.
5. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.
6. Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:
   1. The Government of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
   2. Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
   3. Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
   4. The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.
   5. The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
   6. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.
7. As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.
   The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.
8. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constitutes an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.
9. It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.
   On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, cause undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:
   1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and impose (sic) one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
   2. Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual condition it seems only a utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force their immediate adoption.
      Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.
   3. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states - 'Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.' It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.
   4. The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area through peaceful means.
   5. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane that military pressure.
   6. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position in has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia have for the past two hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo- American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.
   7. The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above- mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries, - Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China,, and Thailand, - excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.
   8. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiations. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.
   9. *(sic) In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.
   10. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneous ly with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.
   11. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's effort toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interest by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation.
   12. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
       The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

December 7, 1941"​

Note the final statement (my bold).
This document was "re-examined" in 1999 and it was surmised to be not a declaration of war by a college professor.

However, if we go back to the final statement (in bold) coupled with the Imperial decree issue to the Japanese public that morning AND the Japanese military's actions against U.S. and British possessions on 7 & 8 December 1941, then it becomes rather clear what the Empire of Japan had in mind: war.​

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That is NOT what you cited in post #143. In that post, you cited a direct declaration of war, given two hours after the attack. The text of that declaration does NOT appear in the text of the 14-part document, as you and I both evidently agree.

So, was that direct declaration of war intended to be given IN ADDITION to the 14-part document? (Wouldn't that really make it a 15-part document?) Or was that declaration something else entirely and not part of any of the communications that were to be delivered by Japan's diplomats in Washington and some sort of confusion is taking place?

MiTasol said:

You may be correct on fuel and metals only and I will have to look for how it was done but my memory is that rubber, oil and metals from other countries were prevented from reaching Japan because of a naval blockade.

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I'm afraid your memory is incorrect. The Brits and the Dutch joined voluntarily in refusing to trade rubber, oil, bauxite, and tin produced in their colonies in Southeast Asia -- precisely because they too saw Japan's depredations upon Vichy Indochina as a direct threat to their own holdings (especially the Dutch, who'd already been defeated by the Germans just as France had been).

Further to that, us Americans literally did not have the military power (in the Asiatic Fleet) to enforce a blockade upon those three nations, even regionally.

Ours was an embargo of American resources being sold and shipped to Japan only. That isn't an act of war, although it almost certainly decided the Japanese to strike south -- especially once the Dutch also cut off oil sales.

Escuadrilla Azul said:

That the military were willing to accept high casualty figures didn't mean that the politics were willing to do so. Neither that it could go forever if the bags keep coming and the public opinion chance the mood.

Is my understanding that to avoid a high casualty count one of the leading reasons to drop the Nules, at least officially.

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The McArthur supporters in the military convinced the politicians that Admiral Halsey's plan to bypass the Philippines and immediately strike hard on Japan when the Japanese had little home defense was wrong.

This automatically meant that the American body count would be much higher and the war much longer. Fortunately for the US the nukes were developed and cut the war shorter than it could have been but if Halsey was correct the war would have been over months before Hiroshima. Maybe he was right and maybe not. We can never know.

To his supporters McArthur had to personally retake the Philippines and his ego was more important than casualties. Also remember that the photo of McArthur being the first US soldier to land on the Philippines was taken by an Army photographer who was already on land, no doubt with many support troops to ensure McArthur was not shot by a sniper during this staged photo op.

33k in the air said:

That is NOT what you cited in post #143. In that post, you cited a direct declaration of war, given two hours after the attack. The text of that declaration does NOT appear in the text of the 14-part document, as you and I both evidently agree.

So, was that direct declaration of war intended to be given IN ADDITION to the 14-part document? (Wouldn't that really make it a 15-part document?) Or was that declaration something else entirely and not part of any of the communications that were to be delivered by Japan's diplomats in Washington and some sort of confusion is taking place?

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What's hard to understand?

The document delivered to the state department was in a language used for state to state dialog.

The Imperial decree delivered was worded for the public.

Both meant war.

The main problem with the state department message was that it was too complex in it's wording and the timely delivery of the document. That fault lies with the Japanese Foreign Ministry, not the Japanese delegate.

The document was to be delivered one half hour prior to the start of military operations and it was intended to read in such a manner that "since the U.S. won't negotiate, then war is the result".

It should be noted as well that there's a difference between "island-hopping" as envisioned in the various WPOs and "leap-frogging" as practiced by both MacArthur and Halsey, wherein strong-points were preferably bypassed in favor of attacking weaker points which lay upon communications lines.

Any archipelagic campaign of necessity requires island-hopping. What made "leap-frogging" different was the idea of avoiding strong-points when possible. Leap-frogging was a military application of the "hit 'em where they ain't" principle, when done right. Thus Rabaul was isolated but not assaulted, Truk was neutralized but not conquered, and so on. It's sound operational art that allows for defeat in detail, and in one sense is sort of like blitzkrieg on the seas. Both MacArthur in NG and Halsey in the SI practiced it when they were in the mood to be smart.

GrauGeist said:

The document was to be delivered one half hour prior to the start of military operations and it was intended to read in such a manner that "since the U.S. won't negotiate, then war is the result".

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I personally think it was worded in such a manner as to be deliberately ambiguous -- capable of being read as either "this means war" (which I think Hull and others understood) or being read as a break in negotiations or even diplomatic relations short of war.

In either event, the decision for war was taken by Japan well before the note.

Thumpalumpacus said:

It should be noted as well that there's a difference between "island-hopping" as envisioned in the various WPOs and "leap-frogging" as practiced by both MacArthur and Halsey, wherein strong-points were preferably bypassed in favor of attacking weaker points which lay upon communications lines.

Any archipelagic campaign of necessity requires island-hopping. What made "leap-frogging" different was the idea of avoiding strong-points when possible. Leap-frogging was a military application of the "hit 'em where they ain't" principle, when done right. Thus Rabaul was isolated but not assaulted, Truk was neutralized but not conquered, and so on. It's sound operational art that allows for defeat in detail, and in one sense is sort of like blitzkrieg on the seas. Both MacArthur in NG and Halsey in the SI practiced it when they were in the mood to be smart.

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Bypassing strongpoints also allowed a progressive campaign instead of trying to neutralize the defenders, saving both time and lives.

Capturing strategic locations that were of benefit to the campaign was essential and ultimately led to Iwo Jima and Okinawa, which gave a good example of why the well defended islands earlier in the campaign were bypassed and left to "die on the vine".

GrauGeist said:

Bypassing strongpoints also allowed a progressive campaign instead of trying to neutralize the defenders, saving both time and lives.

Capturing strategic locations that were of benefit to the campaign was essential and ultimately led to Iwo Jima and Okinawa, which gave a good example of why the well defended islands earlier in the campaign were bypassed and left to "die on the vine".

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Right. Only fools directly attack points of strength (cf. Kursk, Verdun, etc).

When you think about it, it's infiltration on a large scale, and it's smart. The Japanese themselves practiced this in the early part of the war, and Blitzkrieg was built around the idea of avoiding strongpoints where possible and surrounding them where it wasn't. Operation MIchael too in 1918. Flow around the strength and weaken it from behind. It ain't that complimacated if you're thinking right.