Aerial Recon on the Western Front

[Shortround6]

Let's try rereading that page again, I am getting TWO lens ASSEMBLIES were fitted to British camera bodies (no change in film size) and the second was lost in 1941?

What ever did the British do for the rest of the war?

You also need to compare the focal length of the camera to the film size. As a standard that most of us ar familar with a 35mm camera has a diagonal of 43.3mm and so a 42-50mm focal length lens gives a perspective about "noraml to the human eye and and 85mm lens givesa bout a 2X magnification and a 180mm-200mm lens about 4X magnification.
If you are using a 5in X 5 in frame size the diagonal is about 7in and you need a 7in focal length lens to get the same perspective as the 35mm camera has with its 43.3mm 1.7in lens. the Rb 20/30 has a field of view and perspective of around a 28mm lens on a a 35mm camera. What the big cameras have is a lot more silver crystals recording the image. Think more pixels.
However, if you use a 6in X 6in camera and use a lens with a focal length of about 17in the area of ground on the negative is 1/4 the size of the bigger camera so the silver crystals (pixels) per 100yrds of "ground" come out about the same. You do have to aim the camera better and take more frames (pictures).
trying to figure out "resolution" without figuring in image size on the negative (say the object in question is 12mm long on the negative) , quality of the film (not all film had the same grain size) film flatness, where in the the frame the desired part of the image is ( center or edge), and lens quality 70 years after the pictures were taken is asking a bit much.

 

[Shortround6]

Well there was not one known incident but four PR Spitfire are listed which are known (there may be others). How many intact German camera sets were captured by the British - four perhaps? It seems there has been quite a rush.

Try rereading it. ONE camera was fitted to 3 different Spitfires in succession. Never more than 2 Spitifires equipped with the hybrid cameras at one time. The Hybrid cameras may well have a different magnification than a "standard" camera. You can swap camera lens on some types of cameras with different film sizes but when you do the "focal" length and magnification change.

Which smaller aircraft did you have in mind having trouble fitting them? The "far heavier and bulkier" (well its sounds like a bit of a marketing slogan here - better cameras are almost always heavier and bulkier) RB x/30 series cameras were the standard fit of the Bf 109 and indeed other LW recce planes. I think the slogan was that the Bf 109 was sooooo small it was incapable mounting them.

Some Spits carried 3 of the smaller cameras. Want to try to fit 3 Rb **/30s in a 109?

I think you are mixing up cause and effect. German recon flights over England dwindled after 1941 and there was two very simple answer for that. First, they already photographed England before the war in clandestine actions and during the intense bombing operations of 1940. I am pretty sure London, Birmingham or Liverpool did not swap places by 1943. Secondly, the large scale German bomber operations after were concentrating in the MTO and in Russia - and where the bomber bombs, it needs target photo and photos showing the effect the bombing. Where it does not bomb it does not need that, ie. over England, where post-1941 the bombing actions were largely limited to brief outbursts of retaliatory raids for BC attacks on Germany. Now, Bomber Command did bomb Germany almost continously, so no big surprise there that it needed constant flight for target aquisition and damage assessment.

No, cities did NOT change places in 1943 or 1944 but more airfields were built, more training grounds were built and the ports built up shipping for the various invasions. A better idea of what was actually going on in Britain may have helped the Germans figure out Allied intentions and capability. Things a 1939 Michelin road map has no hope of telling you.

 

[Juha]

Hello Tante Ju
a) I'm little puzzled what the Fw 189 is doing in photorecon fighter discussion, its nearest RAF equavalent was Lizzy, it was better than Lizzy in army co-op work but still hopelessly slow with fairly low ceiling for the proper PR or even FR work.
b) one key rule in good PR work was constant surveilance, then it was much easier to catch a new factory/ammo dump etc. That was only way to keep in touch of the changes in enemy's capabilities and dispositions. Even if one had good info on the situation in 39-40 that would have been fairly out of date in 43-44. Have you ever wondered why it was so easy to fool Germans in June 44?
c) IMHO Spit IX and definitely Spit VII was quite capable for catching G-4/R3 that maybe the reason why KM complained the lack of constant surveilance of Scapa, or even reliable surveilance of it before KM's heavy units ops out of their lairs in Norway. KM got some nasty surpraises when heavy RN units appeared suddenly out of surveilance void.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"...one key rule in good PR work was constant surveillance"

Exactly.

 

[Milosh]

And, as has already been mentioned, the German intelligence services didn't make the best use of what they had. For example, while the Allies could photograph Berlin almost continuously, by late 1943 German reconnaissance aircraft had great difficulty penetrating as far as London and, for example, could not help the Germans work out the mean strike area of the V-1s.

I vaguely remember some counter intelligence where the Germans were fed false V-1 strike positions (iirc over shoots) and the Germans compensated so the V-1s fell short. The Germans never caught on as they could do photo recon.

 

[Aozora]

Which smaller aircraft did you have in mind having trouble fitting them?
The "far heavier and bulkier" (well its sounds like a bit of a marketing slogan here - better cameras are almost always heavier and bulkier) RB x/30 series cameras were the standard fit of the Bf 109 (the big one on the left of your picture) and indeed other LW recce planes.
I think the slogan was that the Bf 109 was sooooo small it was incapable mounting them...

They did indeed develop some smaller format cameras, mostly for low altitude work I believe. They were called Rb 32 / 7 x 9 and Rb 12,5 / 7 x 9. Different task may require different equipment. The smaller they were used in pairs in tactical fighter recons (Fw 190 and Bf 109, ie. G-8, G-10/R2), where, usually operating at low altitude, resolution was probably not a problem.

So show us evidence that the "inferior" British cameras somehow hampered their PR performance.

German Cameras

Your book does mention that the bulkier, heavier cameras did create problems:

I think you are mixing up cause and effect. German recon flights over England dwindled after 1941 and there was two very simple answer for that. First, they already photographed England before the war in clandestine actions and during the intense bombing operations of 1940. I am pretty sure London, Birmingham or Liverpool did not swap places by 1943. Secondly, the large scale German bomber operations after were concentrating in the MTO and in Russia - and where the bomber bombs, it needs target photo and photos showing the effect the bombing. Where it does not bomb it does not need that, ie. over England, where post-1941 the bombing actions were largely limited to brief outbursts of retaliatory raids for BC attacks on Germany. Now, Bomber Command did bomb Germany almost continously, so no big surprise there that it needed constant flight for target aquisition and damage assessment.

In other words after 1941 the Germans failed to keep up operational sorties over Britain thus failing to keep up with important developments such as invasion preparations, locations of important factories or research places etc etc. This constitutes an intelligence failure, regardless of how much of a priority the Russian front got. Thus, the Allies got more bang for their buck in intelligence gathering, including gathering information about the development of the V-1, German radar equipment, where important German ships were and all sorts of other info. PR wasn't just about following the bombs.

German intelligence services did make the best use of what they had, where they needed: the Eastern Front. Juha just posted an old paper showing about 12 000 RAF PRU recon sorties during the entire war. And I just found a picture of a single Ju 88D celebrating its 500th (!!) recon sortie, and another picture of a Fw 189 squadron celebrating its 1000th sortie. This should help put things in context on the scale of recon flights. As nuumann noted, the Germans had an extensive array of recon planes and made great use of them.

You've misread the paper; look again, it says 24,743 British PR sorties. It also shows that the overall British PR campaign was very effective in its mission to gather intelligence.

Yes I would say above is example of not seeing the forest from a tree.. I am pretty sure London was at the same place in 1940 through 1944, of which the LW had plenty of photograph. Even a tourist map would do.

This is completely failing to address the issue - the Germans could not determine the impact of their V-1 campaign, nor did they know where their V-1s were going because there was no PR coverage. Because of this they were deceived into lengthening the range of the V-1s so that far more of them landed in open country than than would have happened had the Germans been able to keep a regular PR watch.

The inability to photograph London was just one example; as has been pointed out the Germans completely failed in their attempts to keep constant observation of the areas from which the D-Day invasions took place. Just because they were able to map the south of England pre-war is no excuse for failing to continue that coverage throughout the war.

What they did have trouble was penetrating the airspace by the summer of 1944 - and this had some rather unrelated reasons to recce aircraft availability or performance as you may well know.

Would you care to explain why German PR aircraft had so much trouble penetrating British air space?

Speaking of performance, there is one more interesting question. What was supposed to intercept these single engined LW PR fighter-recces over British Isles? Mark VI Spitfires? I skimmed over one of these G-4/R3 "super recce" 109s losses, and they lost like - three of them in the whole of 1943?

How many 109 G-4/R3 sorties were flown over Britain? How many in 1944 and how many were shot down? What proportion of them were intercepted, damaged and turned back? Sortie to loss ratio? How effective were they at providing good coverage of their allocated targets?

 

[silence]

In other words after 1941 the Germans failed to keep up operational sorties over Britain thus failing to keep up with important developments such as invasion preparations, locations of important factories or research places etc etc. Thus, the Allies got more bang for their buck in intelligence gathering, including gathering information about the development of the V-1, German radar equipment, where important German ships were and all sorts of other info. PR wasn't just about following the bombs.

Perhaps. Or it may simply have been a case where the previous scale of operations was reduced by, say, 90%. They still did recon over Britain, but now on a small scale just to keep tabs.

 

[nuuumannn]

I think you are mixing up cause and effect. German recon flights over England dwindled after 1941 and there was two very simple answer for that.

Actually the very simple answer is that German reconnaissance aircraft were shot down over Britain in numbers. One of the big setbacks the Germans suffered during the Battle of Britain was a lack of pre-and post-raid recon. This is well documented and was part of the reason that led the Germans to believe they had virtually wiped out the RAF when they hadn't, much to their surprise.

First, they already photographed England before the war in clandestine actions and during the intense bombing operations of 1940. I am pretty sure London, Birmingham or Liverpool did not swap places by 1943.

This is a bit naive Tante and I think you can do better; During wartime, the military landscape changes over time and updated recon gives an accurate picture of what the enemy is up to. Just relying on pre-war imagery is futile. You also have nothing with which to back up that statement to prove that that is why the Germans did not photograph the UK in numbers after the Battle of Britain. I'm pretty certain the Aufklarungsgruppen didn't see it this way and did continue PR sorties over Britain throughout the war, just not in any large numbers to be effective.

German intelligence services did make the best use of what they had, where they needed: the Eastern Front. Juha just posted an old paper showing about 12 000 RAF PRU recon sorties during the entire war. And I just found a picture of a single Ju 88D celebrating its 500th (!!) recon sortie, and another picture of a Fw 189 squadron celebrating its 1000th sortie.

You're comparing apples with oranges; the PRU was a strategic recon outfit and the Fw 189s were used for in theatre tactical and pre and post battlefield strategic recon. Again, the difference is like an RF-4 and a U-2. The use of the Ju 86P is directly comparable to the PRUs and yes, it was effective, but over Britain it eventually proved vulnerable to attack by high altitude fighters - this is not to say British aircraft weren't over Germany, but the use of the Ju 86 was not continuous, particularly after Rowehl's unit's move to the Meditteranean, where they proved their worth again.

 

[Aozora]

Perhaps. Or it may simply have been a case where the previous scale of operations was reduced by, say, 90%. They still did recon over Britain, but now on a small scale just to keep tabs.

"Just to keep tabs" is not good enough for a dynamic conflict such as WW2; as nuuumannn has explained by failing to keep up a solid strategic recce campaign over Britain post 1941 the Germans lost track of what their enemy was doing then discovered far too late that they had handed the initiative back to Britain and the Americans.

 

[Tante Ju]

"Just to keep tabs" is not good enough for a dynamic conflict such as WW2;

Blah blah blah....

as nuuumannn has explained by failing to keep up a solid strategic recce campaign over Britain post 1941 the Germans lost track of what their enemy was doing then discovered far too late that they had handed the initiative back to Britain and the Americans.

They did not "fail" in it as much as you like to use the word. After 1941, Britain could not pose any serious threat to Germany, it could not hope to challange the situation and the Germans knew that. It could serve as a starting leap for the Americans, that the biggest threat about it, Britain being bankcrupt, fed, fueled paid and armed by the US and its forces in full retreat on all fronts.

On the German threat scale of ten, Britain was threat level 3 perhaps, and the USSR was threat level 9. A thorn in the side, yes, but threat?

Resources - including bombers and recon aircraft - were allocated accordingly - an occasional Ju 86, He 177, Ju 88 Me 109 recce sortie just to check if the Brits were up to something new (they weren't, the Army was having regular cups of tea, Bomber Command was struggling to hit Germany, Fighter Command was trying to figure out the meaning of life over France) would just suffice. You do not have to check daily on Birmingham wheter a new factory construction site appeared. And what "important" production facilities and "research centers" were in Britain unknown to the Germans after 1940? All of these were in the US my friend, not in Britain, and none of them could be photographed or bombed.

You can argue until the cow comes home that the Germans should have absolutely cover Britain daily, but the Germans were just not convinced of that. You mix up indiffirence with failure.

 

[stona]

But in fact on a scale of 1-10 Britain (with her allies) ended up being threat level 11, something the Germans failed to grasp in 1944 precisely because they had failed to maintain a strategic reconnaissance effort over the UK, particularly Southern England. It's one of the reasons, almost incredibly, that the D-day landings took the Germans by surprise.

Keeping tabs is not "blah,blah,blah" it is, as the original poster stated, not good enough. An on going and determined campaign of aerial reconnaissance was the only way that the Germans could have kept abreast of a dynamic and developing situation and they manifestly failed to do so. In reality the Luftwaffe's reconnaissance efforts failed even to "keep tabs".

The Luftwaffe's pre and early war reconnaissance was so good that it now forms an important part of British history, particularly research into the way agriculture has developed since that time. They did take some lovely photographs, just not of the right things at the right time!

Cheers

Steve

 

[Tante Ju]

Very interesting opinion stona. In particular the "Britain and her Allies" part. Its nice to know that the US proved such a useful auxilarry force of British legions. 8)

I would like to learn more about importants events on the Western Front that German recon failed to uncover, between 1940-1943. Would you list some of those, that would show how keeping the tabs was just, well, "not enough"? In which they failed, in your opinion - a couple of examples of those failures with evidence, perhaps?

Let me give you an example. The Germans introduced a mobile radar set, the Wurzburg in 1939, which by 1941 they had in the hundreds. The first PRU photo of said set was not until the end of the year - almost exactly TWO YEARS after in introduction, during which the British had no idea it even existed and guided night fighters and AA guns with deadly accuracy.

They finally identified a factory suspected to produce Wurzburgs in mid 1943. They bombed it and I believe, missed. The Zeppelin factory may have not even been involved with radars but V-2 parts.

Yes, failure to keep tabs and photographing vegatation comes to mind. But my point is - providing daily photography of British soldiers sipping their afternoon tea in the King's barracks was not too high on the Wehrmacht priority list, and perhaps rightly so.

 

[Shortround6]

You do not have to check daily on Birmingham wheter a new factory construction site appeared.

Weekly might be nice........or even every two weeks.

"And what "important" production facilities and "research centers" were in Britain unknown to the Germans after 1940? All of these were in the US my friend, not in Britain, and none of them could be photographed or bombed."

No new factories in Britain after 1940? How about keeping track of ship launchings? Ship repairs? New airfields? When did the British go from "struggling to hit Germany" to 1000 bomber raids? May of 1942?

There is a fine line between indifference and stupidity.

 

[Tante Ju]

Weekly might be nice........or even every two weeks.

Which they did - keeping the tabs you know.

No new factories in Britain after 1940?

Care to list a few of them that the LW missed?

 

[stona]

I'm not going to start a petty did they see this or didn't they for every year of the war.

Oberst Walter Gaul. "The last satisfactory photographic report dates from 24 May and covers the harbours of Bournemouth, Poole, Portland, Weymouth, several river mouths and the coastal waters in this region. Folkestone and Dover were also photographed. Portland, Weymouth and Poole were particularly crowded with landing craft (L.S.I, loaded with L.C.P.)"

24th of May! They set off, twelve days later, on June 5th unnoticed. That I would suggest was a catastrophic failure to "keep tabs" on the invasion fleet, even though the Germans knew it was coming.

Don't be disparaging about British and Commonwealth legions, a sad tendency particularly in more "popular" history. More of them landed on D-Day than did their American comrades. There were more Lee Enfields than Garrands, at least initially. I'm surprised to see "Private Ryan" syndrome on a forum where I would expect a firmer grasp of historical facts than that found in Hollywood.

Britain, geographically, was threat level 11 because that is where the invasion was launched from, even if the Luftwaffe missed it.

Cheers

Steve

 

[silence]

Weekly might be nice........or even every two weeks.

"And what "important" production facilities and "research centers" were in Britain unknown to the Germans after 1940? All of these were in the US my friend, not in Britain, and none of them could be photographed or bombed."

No new factories in Britain after 1940? How about keeping track of ship launchings? Ship repairs? New airfields? When did the British go from "struggling to hit Germany" to 1000 bomber raids? May of 1942?

The Germans did! V-2-launched satellites and the super telescopes on their moon base replaced mere aerial strategic photorecon! (Just like, according to the powers-that-be, they did for the SR-71; I'm still bitter about that!)

 

[mhuxt]

Heheh, and all that nooper-dooper Moonbase Alpha tech utterly missed the largest single event on the Western Front since Dieppe.

 

[Aozora]

As far as 109s shot down - just one squadron, 486(NZ) Sqn, flying humble Typhoons (and part of the British legions) shot down lemme see...

Seven of the mighty recce 109s, including two of the fantastic G-4/R3s, not to mention an Fw 190...

and here's a 109G-4/R3 shot down by Spitfire VIIs in 1943:

You can argue until the cow comes home that the Germans should have absolutely cover Britain daily, but the Germans were just not convinced of that. You mix up indiffirence with failure.

Indifference = hubris = stupidity = failure in wartime

 

[Tante Ju]

Indifference = hubris = stupidity = failure in wartime

I must assume thats a direct qoute from "A Brief introduction to British and Commonwealth armed forces doctrine in World War II".

BTW the journal posted by IIRC was a very good read, it confirms the tecnical inferiority of British camera equipment and the bad survivability of Spitfire PR aircraft in mid war. Early oxygene equipment was unsatisfactory - again, local hacks with captured German equipment are mentioned, a noteworty tendency of British PRU history.

It appears that the Spitfire PR IV was just not up to the task when the opposition became 190A/109G, even the 109F was a bit too much. Losses of PR Spits were severe, especially towards the end of 1942. When the PR XI arrived it helped a great deal and could be expected to survive, but, and that the question - the serials listings seems to indicate the XI did not really arrive in numbers until 1944.

Indeed Mark V Spitfires had it bad enough with 190/109s, being essentially an unarmed Mark V burdened with cameras doesnt make it sound any better. Essentially the only thing they could do was to turn turn turn.

There is also mention of one downside of the Spitfire which made it a curious choice for PR work - that is, the large wings blocked essentially all downward vision. This might explain British fixation with cameras pointing in every direction.

 

[buffnut453]

On the German threat scale of ten, Britain was threat level 3 perhaps, and the USSR was threat level 9. A thorn in the side, yes, but threat?

Interesting choice of words - presenting USSR as a threat. In my history books, Hitler was allied with Stalin until the former initiated Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly the USSR was Germany's main axis of effort...but use of the term "threat" makes it sound like Germany was the victim. Maybe (I hope) just a translation issue given that English isn't your first language (and I'm not being patronising, just articulating realities - I failed German at school...twice! ).

Britain being bankcrupt, fed, fueled paid and armed by the US and its forces in full retreat on all fronts.

You seem to indicate that Britain was entirely reliant on US supplies and funding. In reality, no more than 25% of British war supplies came from the US...indeed, Britain was providing war supplies to the USSR. Finally, please remember that more British Commonwealth soldiers went ashore on D-Day than did US soldiers. Britain was undoubtedly struggling in 1941 but from that point on we just kept on getting stronger...and that vast majority of that expansion had nothing to do with US supplies.

They did not "fail" in it as much as you like to use the word. After 1941, Britain could not pose any serious threat to Germany, it could not hope to challange the situation and the Germans knew that.

Again, I think you're overstating the case. I'd agree with your statement specifically during 1941 but after that point, there was a massive increase in UK and US capability to attack Germany. Did German PR increase accordingly? My gut tells me it didn't but I'd be keen to learn specifics.

Resources - including bombers and recon aircraft - were allocated accordingly - an occasional Ju 86, He 177, Ju 88 Me 109 recce sortie just to check if the Brits were up to something new (they weren't, the Army was having regular cups of tea, Bomber Command was struggling to hit Germany, Fighter Command was trying to figure out the meaning of life over France) would just suffice. You do not have to check daily on Birmingham wheter a new factory construction site appeared.

Again, I'd largely agree with your comments if we were talking about 1941 but 1942 onwards was a whole different ball-game. Bomber Command was not struggling to hit Germany during those years and the 8th AF was getting stronger and stronger. You may not need to image the cities but you do need to keep tabs on the disposition and build-up of forces, the huge expansion in the number of airfields and then the build-up for D-Day.

You mix up indifference with failure.

Maybe but I hardly think the German people were indifferent to the impact of the 8th AF and Bomber Command - and 1,000-bomber raids is not "struggling to hit Germany", indeed it's something the Luftwaffe never accomplished over Britain. Similarly the commanders of the Channel defences certainly needed better intelligence than they were served with in the run-up to D-Day. Your disparagement of the British military is, IMHO, overstated.