Aerial Recon on the Western Front

[Tante Ju]

Don't be disparaging about British and Commonwealth legions, a sad tendency particularly in more "popular" history. More of them landed on D-Day than did their American comrades. There were more Lee Enfields than Garrands, at least initially. I'm surprised to see "Private Ryan" syndrome on a forum where I would expect a firmer grasp of historical facts than that found in Hollywood.

The tendency of disparaging about British and Commonwealth legions is not that there were too Lee Enfields and erhm, Shermans on the beach, but the fact that in the next two months they seemingly did little else than camping in front of Caen, and sipping tea.

Britain, geographically, was threat level 11 because that is where the invasion was launched from, even if the Luftwaffe missed it.

Yes in 1944. No in 1940-43, a period which you peculiarly avoid.

But lets talk photo recce in the West, 1944, Chapter Arnhem, Ardennes. Nobody's recond worked like 100%.

 

[mfg495]

For some recce information have a look at my site - Airrecce The story of photographic reconnaissance

If you have any questions, please ask away.

Mick

 

[buffnut453]

There is also mention of one downside of the Spitfire which made it a curious choice for PR work - that is, the large wings blocked essentially all downward vision. This might explain British fixation with cameras pointing in every direction.

Huh? Aside from the PZL P7 and P11, show me a WWII single-engine fighter where visibility downwards isn't impacted by the wings!

You don't need to look down to do high-level PR. Pointing cameras at targets beneath you is accomplished by flying your track and keeping a consistent attitude in the rolling plane. PR pilots would put chinagraph lines on the cockpit canopy at the correct position so that, when the horizon coincided with the line, the camera was pointing straight down. It's a very simple and yet very effective means of pointing a camera - the RAF Harrier pilots rediscovered the technique over northern Iraq during Op Northern Watch.

Finally, the "cameras pointing everywhere" were for different PR roles. Vertical and split vertical installations were for high-altitude PR whereas oblique were for low-level PR. That' simply an effective way of implementing a PR airframe that can do multiple tasks.

 

[pattle]

I have never taken the trouble to look into this properly but as far as I know the Germans never discovered the Mulberry harbours under construction at Lepe Beach near Calshot, considering the size of the things I would have thought that these massive structures being built in broad daylight so close to Southampton would have been easily discovered by the Germans who would have been able to deduce something from their presence.

 

[buffnut453]

But lets talk photo recce in the West, 1944, Chapter Arnhem, Ardennes. Nobody's recond worked like 100%.

The PR was there and it captured the intelligence on German armoured dispositions. The fact that commanders ignored the intelligence is not the fault of the PR system. The PR worked, period!

 

[Aozora]

For some recce information have a look at my site - Airrecce The story of photographic reconnaissance

If you have any questions, please ask away.

Mick

Thanks Mick, some interesting information. The images of Peenemunde are interesting:

World War II Imagery

Site now bookmarked. 8)

 

[stona]

in the next two months they seemingly did little else than camping in front of Caen, and sipping tea.

Do you by chance know a Colonel Vassilievsky? He was a Soviet liaison officer who turned up at 7th Armoured Division Head Quarters. He expressed the view that the British advance was rather slow and was invited to show, on a map, the sector of the eastern front where he was fighting. It transpired that there were nine German divisions on that sector which was 600 miles long. The British officers pointed out that they were facing 10 German divisions, including 6 panzer divisions on a front only sixty two miles long.

You remind me of Soviet propagandists claiming that the best German divisions were still "on the Soviet-German front". Ilya Ehrenburg wrote in Pravda that " our allies are now seeing the Germans we have nicknamed "Totalnick", a prefabricated product that is destined for annihilation."
This despite the presence of 6 Panzer divisions as well as Panzer Lehr and the supposedly recuperating 2nd Panzer Division in France.

Again, maybe we should stick to the historical facts rather than prejudice.

I'm not particularly interested in 1940-43 aerial reconnaissance as the Luftwaffe posed no meaningful threat to the RAF's survival or the UK's means of production post BoB.
It might have taken nice photographs of our factories but it didn't flatten them. Even the raids on ports like Liverpool were little more than a nuisance, though not for the 4,000 people who lost their lives.
I'm interested in the pre-invasion period because this is when a catastrophic failure of intelligence, including aerial reconnaissance occurred.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Aozora]

The PR was there and it captured the intelligence on German armoured dispositions. The fact that commanders ignored the intelligence is not the fault of the PR system. The PR worked, period!

For Arnhem that was accomplished by low level TAC-R sorties flown by Spitfire FR Mk IXs and Mustang Is without a single loss.

Another interesting site:

Craters surround a site at Peenemunde in Mecklenburg-Vorpommem, Germany on - The Independent

 

[Glider]

Care to list a few of them that the LW missed?

More or less all of them. In Dec 1944 a Luftwaffe PR officer admitted that no air reconnaissance of British Industry had taken place for three years.

Source Hitlers Spies David Kahn page 135

This tends to knock a hole in the view that the Luftwaffe overflew every couple of weeks.

 

[Tante Ju]

For Arnhem that was accomplished by low level TAC-R sorties flown by Spitfire FR Mk IXs and Mustang Is without a single loss.

Yes. In this thread British interpretation superiority was also claimed.

Battle of Arnhem - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Due to poor intelligence, the British were told to expect only limited resistance from German reserve forces. A serious challenge to their operation was not expected and many men believed that their work would lead to the ending of the war.[18] Some—anticipating a period of occupation in Germany—packed leisure equipment in their kit or in the sea tail.[19] The optimistic mood prior to the operation would have tragic consequences however. Browning's intelligence officer—Major Brian Urquhart—obtained information from the 21st Army Group in Belgium and Dutch resistance that German armour was present around Arnhem. This was backed up with aerial reconnaissance that he ordered to be flown.[20] Browning however was dismissive and ordered his chief medical officer to have Urquhart sent on sick leave.[21] In fact, SHAEF was aware that there were almost certainly two Panzer divisions at Arnhem but with the operation looming chose to ignore them.[20] Such information would have been gleaned from Ultra intercepts that the Allied Airborne Army was not privy to and therefore could not act upon themselves.[20]

Establishing the size and dislocation of the German armored forces nearby was one primary reason for the failure of the operation.

Another interesting site:

Craters surround a site at Peenemunde in Mecklenburg-Vorpommem, Germany on - The Independent

"At a cost of 215 British aircrew members, 40 bombers, and 732 (Polish) civilian deaths in a nearby concentration camp; the air raid killed 2 V-2 rocket scientists and delayed V-2 rocket test launches for seven weeks."

Operation Hydra (1943) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

1944-07-18 Mission 481 377 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses bombed the Peenemünde experimental establishment, the scientific HQ at Zinnowitz, and the marshalling yards at Stralsund. Three B-17s were lost and 64 were damaged. Escort was provided by 297 P-38 Lightnings and P-51 Mustangs; they claim 21-0-12 Luftwaffe aircraft; three P-51s are lost and one is damaged beyond repair.[3] A Peenemünde test launch planned that day was scrapped when Test Stand VII was heavily damaged. The P-11 production calibration firing stand near Werke Süd was a complete loss, and 50 people died, including anti-aircraft soldiers.[4]

1944-08-04 Mission 512 221 B-17s against Peenemünde, 110 against Anklam Airfield, and 70 against Anklam aircraft factories; they claim 1-0-0 Luftwaffe aircraft; three B-17s are lost, one is damaged beyond repair and 94 damaged; 2 airmen are KIA, 2 WIA and 40 MIA. Escort is provided by 223 P-51s; they claim 4-0-4 Luftwaffe aircraft on the ground; 9 P-51s are lost and 1 is damaged beyond repair; 1 pilot is KIA.[3] Ten Peenemünde people were killed, including anti-aircraft soldiers. The big hangar had been damaged, including the office and laboratory wings.[4]

1944-08-25 Mission 570 376 B-17s against the Peenemünde Experimental Station (146), Neubrandenburg Airfield (108) and Anklam Airfield (73); 21 others hit Parow Airfield and 5 hit targets of opportunity; 5 B-17s are lost and 75 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 9 WIA and 45 MIA. Escort is provided by 171 P-47s and P-51s; they claim 36-0-28 aircraft on the ground; 2 P-51s are lost.[3] Repairs to Peenemünde Test Stand VII allowed launchings to resume just six weeks after the daylight raid.[4]

It is estimated that an estimated 2,754 civilians were killed in London by V-2 attacks with another 6,523 injured.

It seems more people were killed/lost while trying to stop the V-2 programme than the rocket actually killed.

 

[mhuxt]

No need to overfly old boy, they'd seen it all before.

 

[stona]

Wikipedia will only give an overview of any historical event, and not always an accurate one.

One of the rocket scientists killed was Dr Thiel. With his demise the "Wasserfall" anti aircraft rocket system effectively died (along with the A-9) for which many US bomber crews might be grateful. Neither was operational before the end of the war. I concede that the A-9 probably wouldn't have been in any realistic scenario.

The raid precipitated considerable disruption to the V-2 program. In a meeting only four days later at the highest level (Hitler, Himmler and Speer were all present) much of Peenemunde's activity was ordered to be moved to more secure locations. Test firing to Poland, R+D to Austria, though some did stay at Peenemunde, and manufacture to expensively constructed facilities in the Harz mountains.

The delay caused is estimated quite consistently by both the British and Germans. The last pre-raid German estimate for the time at which V-2 operations would commence was "summer 1944." They actually started on 8th September 1944. This fits well with Goering's statement that the delay was "six to eight weeks" and the British official history's estimate of "two months."

The real reason for the Peenemunde raid was to delay development and deployment of the V-2 rocket and this it did, everybody agrees on a figure of around two months. The bomber crews thought they were attacking a facility producing RDF equipment and countermeasures to the RAF bombing campaign.

About 2,500 V-2s were launched in the seven months of the campaign. 517 hit London and more fell in surrounding areas. It is often forgotten that more than half, 1265, fell on Antwerp, something you and Wikipedia seem to have ignored. In London 2,700 people were killed by V-2s (officially). Extend the campaign by two months and many more would have been killed both in London and Antwerp.

Edit: 3,700 civilians were killed in the Province of Antwerp, took me a while to find the figure. Antwerp was described as "The City of Sudden Death" in March 1945 in TIME magazine.
6,400 people died in London and Antwerp. Add another two months worth onto that........

It is impossible to say whether raids like that on Peenemunde was worth it. It did what it was supposed to do. The cost was high for many reasons, not least because it was one of the few occasions when the Nachjagd got lucky.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Aozora]

Not that anyone actually needs to comment on the effects of the Peenemunde bombing raids because Tante Ju has ignored the central fact; the Allies were able to detect and accurately photograph and map the Peenemunde research areas in great detail with minimal PR casualties. Compare this with the German record of being unable to detect the build up and totally successful launch of the biggest invasion fleet in history. For the Arnhem raid he claims that the poor execution of the raid was somehow the fault of the PR coverage while once again ignoring the central fact that the build up of German armour in the area was detected and photographed by low flying Tac-R aircraft; what Frost and co did with the information had nothing to do with the PR work. How many low flying German Tac-R aircraft (apart from the odd Me 262) were able to similarly penetrate Allied lines and photograph their positions?

 

[Juha]

Not that anyone actually needs to comment on the effects of the Peenemunde bombing raids because Tante Ju has ignored the central fact; the Allies were able to detect and accurately photograph and map the Peenemunde research areas in great detail with minimal PR casualties. Compare this with the German record of being unable to detect the build up and totally successful launch of the biggest invasion fleet in history. For the Arnhem raid he claims that the poor execution of the raid was somehow the fault of the PR coverage while once again ignoring the central fact that the build up of German armour in the area was detected and photographed by low flying Tac-R aircraft; what Frost and co did with the information had nothing to do with the PR work. How many low flying German Tac-R aircraft (apart from the odd Me 262) were able to similarly penetrate Allied lines and photograph their positions?

Yes, he also totally ignored the fact that because LW was unable to keep adequately watch on Scapa, KM was surprised several times by Home Fleet, first time in May 41 In Denmark Strait, 2nd time in March 42 off Lofoten and 3rd time in Dec 43 off North Cape, Even if at the first time the surprise at first produced no joy to RN and Tirpitz escaped on the second time because somewhat botched up torpedo attack, on the third time Scharnhorst was lost.

Juha

 

[buffnut453]

It seems more people were killed/lost while trying to stop the V-2 programme than the rocket actually killed.

And precisely what does that have to do with the effectiveness of Allied photo recce?

 

[Glider]

On of the key aspects of the PR in relation to the raid on Peenemunde was the importance of the 3D photos. It because of the 3D that they had some idea as to the size and importance of the V2 effort. They were able to build very accurate models of the entire site and persuade the senior ranks and the political leasers as to the importnace of the raid.
This was vital as Churchills chief scientific advisor didn't believe what was being built was possible.

 

[Njaco]

ONLY WARNING:

Things will be kept civil or vacations will be given. I can see the usual suspects starting to poke each other. This is the only warning.

 

[wuzak]

One of the rocket scientists killed was Dr Thiel. With his demise the "Wasserfall" anti aircraft rocket system effectively died (along with the A-9) for which many US bomber crews might be grateful. Neither was operational before the end of the war. I concede that the A-9 probably wouldn't have been in any realistic scenario.

British Intelligence were also receiving information from an insider at Peenemünde before the raid. This is what led to the overflights by PR aircraft.

They didn't get anything from the informant after the raid, so it would be reasonable to conclude that he was killed in the raid. British Intelligence never knew the identity of the informant.

 

[OldSkeptic]

The tendency of disparaging about British and Commonwealth legions is not that there were too Lee Enfields and erhm, Shermans on the beach, but the fact that in the next two months they seemingly did little else than camping in front of Caen, and sipping tea.

Pardon??? Was that a joke, certainly hope so. If not it flies in the face of every historical fact about Normandy.

In case some haven't actually read the history, the Allied effort was to a clear strategic plan, conceived by Monty (delivered in April '44) agreed by Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Monty was the Land Forces Commander, in charge of all the (UK, Canadian, Polish, US, etc) forces.

The plan, right from the beginning was for the UK/Canadian/etc forces to hold the North, creating a 'hinge', from which the US forces would pivot around. In other words, the US was always planned to do the breakout, with the British/etc held the Germans. That was what was planned and that was what happened. The breakout took longer than expected, mainly because of bad weather impacting the force and logistic build up (particularly the US), at one point it got so bad the US forces were rationed to only (from memory) 25 artillery shells per day.

But after the build up and then the break out, the German forces had been so written down (mostly against the British/.etc) that the advance went far faster than expected.

In fact, the original plan phase line at 90 days (basically the clearing of France) was exceeded and was done in only 75 days!! Or in other words Monty's plan worked brilliantly.
Bradley in his own book described it as (paraphrase) "the British/etc would take on the self sacrificing task of holding the Germans ......".

Remember this was planned and executed as a coordinated Allied plan. So I find it amazing that 60 plus years later people are still going on about 'slow British', etc, nonsense (you could just as justifiably accuse the US forces of being slow if you want to make that sort of argument), everyone did there jobs and did them well.
Not everything worked perfectly, uncontrollable things (eg the weather) changed timings, the Germans were their usual brilliant fighting selves, tactics were changed and adapted to circumstance,etc. But the overall strategy was flexible enough (another sign of a good plan) to handle all that and succeed.

A truly great Allied victory, sadly spoiled afterwords by some people getting all nationalistic about it and re-writing history.

 

[Milosh]

TJ does have a bit of a point as Caen was to be captured on the first day (Operation Perch).