Aerial Recon on the Western Front

[Juha]

Neither Bf 109G-4/R3 was invulnerable, I checked 3 Staffeln that were using it:

1.(F)/Aufklärungsgruppe 120, got 3 Bf 109G-4/R3s in May 43, one was lost in Oct 43 without enemy action (ohne Feindeinw.) and the last 2 in next month, one because of enemy action (durch Feindeinw.) and one without. Got 3 repaired ones in Jan 44, lost one because of enemy action in Feb 44, one was moved to another unit in March 44 and the last one in April 44. The unit operated from Stavanger-Sola at that time, so responsible the PR of Scapa.

1.(F)/Aufklärungsgruppe 122 got 2 new Bf 109G-4/R3s in Feb 43, 4 new in March 43 and 2 new more in Apr but lost also 2 in Apr by enemy action and one was moved to another unit. In May 43 it lost 2 by enemy action, one was sent to maintenance/overhaul/repairs (Überholung) and one to another unit, the last one was sent to another unit in June 43. The Unit operated from Greece at that time.


2.(F)/Aufklärungsgruppe 123 got 4 new Bf 109G-4/R3s in March 43, one new more in Apr but also lost 1 in Apr by enemy action. In June 43 lost 2 Apr by enemy action. And in Sep 43 lost the last 2 without enemy ation. Up to and incl May was based in Northern France and from Aug 43 in Northern Italy.

Juha

 

[Aozora]

continued.

The following 27 PR Mk XI were lost to engine related troubles - its noteworthy how much trouble the Merlin 70 series gave:

What TJ doesn't tell us is how many of these were relatively elderly aircraft, some over two years old.

Nor are we told that out of 211 Merlin 70 PR XIs built 21 were lost to engine trouble, or 10%;

6 of the 21 were relatively old airframes so a total of 15 relatively new Merlin 70 powered Mk XIs were lost due to engine trouble, or 7.2% hardly noteworthy.

What the list also doesn't tell us is what was the reason for the engine failure. Was it related directly to the engine or to an engine component? How many were caused by, for example, vapour lock in the fuel lines, often the cause of engines cutting out?

PL787 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 22-4-44 Benson 14-5-44 4S 25-5-44 Engine caught fire on high level PR mission and abandoned over Channel 17-7-44 F/O N S Cooper killed [TiS 2 Months]
PL797 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 22-4-44 Benson 14-5-44 400S 23-5-44 Engine cut on PR mission abandoned St.Mervieu (sic) nr Bayeux 17-7-44 [TiS 2 Months]
PL827 PRXI CHA M70 RAE 6-5-44 replacement trials aircraft for EN409 Rate of roll and continuation of compressibility trials initiated with EN409 Engine broke up in dive hit HT wires recovering and crashed Whitmoor Common CB 15-9-44 HAL recat E 24-9-44 [TiS 4 Months]
PL829 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 2-5-44 Benson 14-5-44 400S 25-5-44 eng fire in circuit Odiham hit tree crashed dbf CE 28-7-44 pilot killed [TiS 2 Months]
PL831 PRXI ALD M50 6MU 7-5-44 Benson 14-5-44 4S 30-5-44 High level PR sortie Caught fire and crashed nr Petersfield Hants CE 9-8-44 F/O R A Drapper killed[TiS 3 months]
PL864 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 7-7-44 Benson 9-9-44 NWAfrica 21-9-44 682S Engine cut on approach stalled and hit ground Ochey CE 6-1-45 [TiS 4 months]
PL882 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 1-7-44 541S 22-7-44 Engine cut over North Sea ditched 5-12-44 [TiS 5 months]
PL901 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 28-7-44 Benson 16-8-44 542S 28-8-44 Engine cut on PR mission crashlanded nr East Grinstead Surrey FACE 6-1-45 SOC 12-1-45 [TiS 5 Months]
PL913 PRXI M70 6MU 23-8-44 Benson 5-9-44 16S 14-9-44 FACB 17-11-44 HAL 1401Flt 16-1-45 engine cut force-landed Salzwedel 29-1-46
PL953 PRXI M70 6MU 2-9-44 Benson 21-9-44 4S 19-10-44 Engine cut crashlanded nr Tilburg 29-10-44 [TiS 1 month]
PL964 PRXI ALD M70 9MU 2-10-44 1PP Benson 17-1-45 16S 8-2-45 Engine cut on take-off crash-landed Teuge FAAC 5-8-45 [TiS 7 Months]
PL996 PRXI ALD M70 1PP Benson 18-11-44 MedAAF 309FTU Engine caught fire on ferry flight abandoned nr Troyes 10-12-44 [TiS 1 month]
PM135 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 11-12-44 eng fire ground running Benson CE 31-12-44 [TiS 1 Month]
PM152 PRXI M70 1PP Benson 22-1-45 4S 22-2-45 Engine caught fire on take-off Mill CE 22-3-45 [TiS 1 month]

Spitfire PR Mk IXs in service 11 months and over: 7

EN154 PRXI 3774 CHA M61 FF 21-12-42 33MU 22-12-42 1PRU Benson 15-1-43 541S 21-2-43 FAAC 19-2-44 HAL 8OTU 1-7-44 engine failed on takeoff force-landed Woodbine Farm Haverford West CE 11-5-45 SOC 25-5-45 [TiS 28 Months]
EN414 PRXI 4046 CHA M61 FF 28-2-43 46MU 4-3-43 Benson 14-3-43 1OADU 5-4-43 NWAfrica 8-4-43 Engine cut forcelanded at Forli CE 26-5-45 SOC 31-5-45 [TiS 26 Months]
EN425 PRXI 4114 CHA M63 FF 17-3-43 6MU 20-3-43 1PRU Benson 27-3-43 1OADU 29-4-43 Gibraltar 1-6-43 Middle East 30-9-43 Engine cut ditched off Rhodes 24-5-45 [TiS 26 Months]
EN682 PRXI 4629 CHA M63 FF 11-8-43 6MU 17-8-43 Benson 2-9-43 ros 7-9-43 542S engine failed wheels up landing nr Billingshurst Station Sussex CE 2-8-44 [TiS 12 Months]
PL774 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 27-3-44 1OADU 6-5-44 ACSEA 18-5-44 9FU Engine cut on ferry flight bellylanded 15m E of Bone 22-7-45 SOC 6-9-45 [TiS 14 Months]
PL758 PRXI CHA M63 AAEE 28-2-44 cool trials with reduced area rad exit duct Fitt FXII rud Benson 20-8-44 4S 31-8-44 HAL 6-2-45 recat E SOC 3-9-45 bboc SFU Honiley 7-3-46 engine failed wheels up landing nr Warwick 19-7-46 FA SOC 25-7-46 [TiS 29 Months]
PL828 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 30-4-44 Benson 13-6-44 400S 6-8-44 Attack on Eindhoven airfield CAC 1-1-45 Engine lost power on PR mission bellylanded at Blankenberg FAAC 21-3-45 HAL recat E SOC 14-9-45 [TiS 11 Months]

PL763 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 12-3-44 1OADU 28-3-44 ? MedAAF 11-4-44 682S Caught fire taxying at San Severo 12-10-44 [TiS 6 Months - no evidence this was engine related]

Now, this thread is about PR operations over Europe, so why include aircraft based outside of that theatre?

PL860 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 30-6-44 1OADU 24-7-44 NWAfrica 27-8-44 ACSEA 6-9-44 Caught fire in air and crashed Mount Lavinia Colombo Ceylon 30-12-44[TiS 6 Months]
PL776 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 23-2-44 1OADU 4-4-44 ACSEA 17-4-44 681S Engine cut bellylanded nr Whaiknyaung 28-3-45 SOC 26-4-45 [TiS 12 Months]
PL858 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 19-6-44 Benson 3-7-44 1OADU 17-7-44 MedAAF 20-7-44 ACSEA 8-8-44 681S Engine caught fire abandoned nr Kalewa 2-1-45 SOC 6-9-45 [TiS 14 months]
PL997 PRXI M70 Benson 25-11-44 1OADU 7-12-44 Middle East 17-12-44 ACSEA 10-1-45 681S 6RIAF 7RIAF Engine cut on take-off crashlanded Kohat CE 14-2-47 SOC 27-3-47 [TiS 27 months]
PL960 PRXI M70 6MU 9-9-44 Benson 21-9-44 1OADU 30-9-44 NWAfrica 2-10-44 Middle East 8-10-44 ACSEA 8-10-44 681S Caught fire and abandoned off Ceylon 30-12-44 [SOC 27-2-47] [TiS 3 months]


A more relevant question is what the heck has any of this to do with the effectiveness of PR over Europe during WW2?

 

[Airframes]

With reference to post #61, and the ludicrous statements by Tante Ju, and the progressive statements, I believe this member should one day wake up from the dream he is in, open the door of the Fantasy World he lives in, and go out and do some real research.
The complete 'package' of photo recce used by the allies, and in particular, the RAF during WW2, was excellent, and the progressive development of lenses, and the silver halide grain of the Kodak Aerographic film, allowed superb results. The fine-grained silver halides used at the time were approaching the supreme quality of the Kodak 'T-Grain' silver halide emulsion, not released publicly until the early 1980s, with virtually the same type of film emulsions, in 9 x 9 inch format, and the same camera types, still in use until the late 1990s !
Of course, our member will probably 'pooh pooh' this, and spout more b*ll*cks, seemingly derived from associates in whatever revisionist group he belongs to.
Please, either accept facts, or b*gg*r off and play with your other deluded friends.

 

[vinnye]

Pattle, I am not sure if your remark related to the British General Lucas was a sarcastic response to the previous generalizations about the British Infantry or not.
Lucas was in fact American, from Wiki ;
In the Spring of 1943, Lucas was sent overseas as a deputy to Eisenhower, and briefly took command of II Corps (9–19 September 1943). On 20 September 1943, Lucas was given command of VI Corps, taking over from Major General Ernest J. Dawley. On January 22, 1944, from the deck of the cruiser USS Biscayne, Lucas was relieved of command after Operation Shingle, the amphibious landing at Anzio. Lucas was highly critical of the plans for the Anzio battle, believing his force was not strong enough to accomplish its mission. His confidence was not reinforced when the mission was scaled back by last-minute orders and advice from his commander, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, who told him not to "stick his neck out". After nine days of preparation to reenforce his position and four weeks of extremely tough fighting, Lucas was relieved by Clark and replaced with Major General Lucian K. Truscott as the commander of VI Corps at Anzio. Lucas spent three weeks as Clark's deputy at Fifth Army headquarters before returning to the United States.

So it would seem the accusation that Anzio was a bloodbath due to the inertia caused by the British is completely false.
Many of the screw ups in Italy were of US origin - particularly Mark Clark who caused the timidity in the first place, then when the breakout happened, he went for glory in Rome rather than trapping the Germans before the could retreat and dig in again!

 

[pattle]

Pattle, I am not sure if your remark related to the British General Lucas was a sarcastic response to the previous generalizations about the British Infantry or not.
Lucas was in fact American, from Wiki ;
In the Spring of 1943, Lucas was sent overseas as a deputy to Eisenhower, and briefly took command of II Corps (9–19 September 1943). On 20 September 1943, Lucas was given command of VI Corps, taking over from Major General Ernest J. Dawley. On January 22, 1944, from the deck of the cruiser USS Biscayne, Lucas was relieved of command after Operation Shingle, the amphibious landing at Anzio. Lucas was highly critical of the plans for the Anzio battle, believing his force was not strong enough to accomplish its mission. His confidence was not reinforced when the mission was scaled back by last-minute orders and advice from his commander, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, who told him not to "stick his neck out". After nine days of preparation to reenforce his position and four weeks of extremely tough fighting, Lucas was relieved by Clark and replaced with Major General Lucian K. Truscott as the commander of VI Corps at Anzio. Lucas spent three weeks as Clark's deputy at Fifth Army headquarters before returning to the United States.

So it would seem the accusation that Anzio was a bloodbath due to the inertia caused by the British is completely false.
Many of the screw ups in Italy were of US origin - particularly Mark Clark who caused the timidity in the first place, then when the breakout happened, he went for glory in Rome rather than trapping the Germans before the could retreat and dig in again!

Oh yes sorry, thanks for putting me right on this one, somebody must have slipped something in my tea.

 

[silence]

Oh yes sorry, thanks for putting me right on this one, somebody must have slipped something in my tea.

Maybe that's why James Bond once blamed tea for the downfall of the British Empire (can't remember in which book, though...)

 

[OldSkeptic]

Montgomery's plan once Caen had not fallen as planned was, in his words, "to assault to the West of the river Orne and to develop operations to the South and South-East, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of First US Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg........"

At the final presentation at St Pauls on the 15th May (where in attendance were the King, Churchill Eisenhower, BCoS, all the relevant other generals, admirals, air commanders, etc.) Monty presented the final plan (agreed with all the relevant people beforehand of course). This included the famous 'phase lines' map.

There was, obviously much to it, breakdowns of all the German forces, what Rommel would do, what Hitler would allow, etc, etc.

"Turning to the wall maps he gave his strategic intentions for 'the development of Operations up to D +90, outlining again the manner in which th British and Canadians wouyld 'contain' the maximum enemy forces facing the eastern flank of th bridgehead' while the Americans 'once though the difficult bocage country' were to 'thrust rapidly towards Rennes', seal off the Brittany peninsula and wheel round towards Paris and the Seine, pivoting on the right flank of the British 2nd Army..."

Master of the Battlefield, Hamilton, page 588. Sources available in many places, including the PRO and so on.

So I really don't know how there can even be the single bit of doubt that this was the strategic plan from the very beginning agreed by all parties, JCoS, Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradly, et al.

Not sure how it can be clearer that he planned it this way. Oh sure many of the sub tasks took longer than expected, for example Caen fell in D+33 instead of D Day, but then again St Lo (a US responsibility) fell on D +45 instead of D +9 (but no one ever talks about US soldiers stopping for coffee all the time). But the overall plan and its final results were actually achieved faster than planned ( D+75 rather than D +90).

Interesting those earlier phase lines were drawn up by a junior officer who had asked Monty where to put them and he just said basically anywhere. When he wrote his plan (which he did personally) he only used D +90 as a goal, he knew that some sub-goals would take longer than expected and some less. After all he had fought the Germans far too often to ever underestimate them.

Another interesting thing was that Caen (forever used to beat up Monty) was only a class B objective for D-Day itself. A 'nice to have' but not absolutely necessary (as was proven by actual results). The first priorities were to get a good bridgehead and for all the armies to link up (obviously).

The US supply build up (which was probably the single biggest cause of the delays in the 'break out') started running into problems even before they lost their Mulberry on the 19th June. On the 8th June they were already '2 tide behind now' (Bradley).

Note that the British and Canadians were 'containing' the German, not just defending. They made continual attacks to force them to keep their Panzer divisions there, otherwise the Germans (as they tried to do) would replace them with infantry and then move them against the American. hence all those attacks. All the while the Canadians were (and why oh why do they never get any credit???) doing the same, consolidating territory and steadily pushing (and up against the SS, hence some of the bitterest fighting in the war).

So I repeat, this was an Allied operation, with am Allied strategic plan that covered them all, led by Monty who was the Allied commander. They all had their roles and, despite various setbacks (the US supply issues added at least 4 weeks to everything), succeeded brilliantly.
So why all this desperate desire to re-write history to 'prove' than the British were just a bunch of incompetent bumblers forever stopping for tea (and the Canadians were never even there), while the 'bold thrusting' Americans got fed up and 'on their own initiative' came up with their own plan, broke out and won the war.

This is so ridiculous that it is not funny. A simple look at the map would show that it was impossible. The German forces were concentrated in the North east, breaking through all those was impossible, but they could be contained.

For the sake of a (ridiculous) argument: say the plan was for the British/Canadians to break though .. and they did it (about one chance in a Million I'd say). What were the Americans supposed to do? Take a holiday, go swimming on the beaches, go straight east and link up with the forces from the South of France and have a big party? It would have basically excluded them from the war. When both the British and Canadians were running out of men? Nonsense and no general would have agreed to that plan even if someone had been daft enough to propose it (in fact I can imagine Monty declaring such a person as 'useless' and firing them immediately).

Montgomery was a complicated character. One of his flaws was an inability to admit when he was wrong.

Definitely complicated, but isn't it funny that he was one of the few who actually admitted he was wrong though. For example, he admitted in his own book that he made a mistake over Antwerp. Can't recall any others at his level who admitted such things in their own books....

 

[GrauGeist]

Yeah, that's right...the Americans came and saved all of Europe while the timid commonwealth troops gratefully hid behind the advancing American soldier. YaY we saved the world...

I'm trying to see where that was posted in this thread and I'm also trying to see how it pertains to Aerial Recon over Europe...

 

[OldSkeptic]

Yeah, that's right...the Americans came and saved all of Europe while the timid commonwealth troops gratefully hid behind the advancing American soldier. YaY we saved the world...

I'm trying to see where that was posted in this thread and I'm also trying to see how it pertains to Aerial Recon over Europe...

It was a response to TJ's comment

The tendency of disparaging about British and Commonwealth legions is not that there were too Lee Enfields and erhm, Shermans on the beach, but the fact that in the next two months they seemingly did little else than camping in front of Caen, and sipping tea.

Not going to allow that sort of historical nonsense, especially since no one else pulled him up on it.

The recon stuff being well handled by the others here, some great stuff which I have enjoyed reading. In summary I think the key difference was that air recon was a high priority first for the British (thank you Cotton) then the Americans when they came in. Hence they put serious effort into it.

They had some technical advantages over the Germans which helped a lot (eg a Mossie could survive over Germany, a Ju-88 couldn't over Britain).
But they key was the importance they put into it . This gave them a key strategic (and later tactical) advantages.

Their more integrated intelligence (and of course the redoubtable RV Jones) meant they got more out of the info as well. His book gives some good examples where information from resistance organisations was used to help target things for photo recon ... and vice versa of course.

 

[Aozora]

Now, if you though the PR XI was bad, here is the PR Mark III and IV - the major PR type of 1941-1943.

The only one claiming the PR Mk XI's record was bad is Tante...

the PR Mark III . 17 produced. Nine shot down.

PR Mark IV

1941 97 PR Mark IV ... 44 lost to enemy action (45%) 7 to engine failures...
1942 136 PR Mark IV... 32 lost to enemy action (23,5%), mostly in the same year and in the MTO.

Given the less than steller "research" into the Mk XI...these are all of the PR Mk IVs FTR on PR missions (assumption that all were "shot down" or "lost to enemy action" but not stated in records):

R7035 PRIV 1838 HEA M45 Benson 9-7-41 Cv PRIV Type D 23-12-41 1PRU Leuchars 19-2-42 FTR PR mission Stavanger 18-3-42 1 Month
R7036 PRIV 1856 HEA M45 HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV Type C 1PRU Benson 8-7-41 FTR PR mission Bremerhaven 12-4-42 9 Months
R7037 PRIV 1901 M45 HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 16-7-41 Cv PRV 1PRU Benson 16-12-41 Missing PR mission Cherbourg - Le Havre 3-6-42 10 months
R7038 PRIV 1922 HEA M45 HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 19-7-41 1PRU Benson 9-8-41 Missing PR mission Wilhelmshaven 16-9-42 13 months
R7039 PRIV 1943 HEA M45 HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 1-8-41 1PRU Benson 18-8-41 Missing PR mission French/Spanish frontier 10-9-41 1 Month
R7040 PRIV 1944 HEA M45 HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 2-8-41 1PRU Benson 12-8-41 Missing PR mission Brest 2-12-41 4 Months
R7041 PRIV 1945 HEA M45 HAL Cv PRIV FF 6-8-41 1PRU Benson 17-8-41 541S 1-10-42 Missing PR mission Kristiansand 12-1-43 15 months
R7043 PRIV 1971 HEA M45 HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 9-8-41 1PRU Benson 21-8-41 Missing PR mission Kiel 30-9-41 1 month
R7044 PRIV 1972 HEA M45 HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 13-8-41 1PRU Benson 22-8-41 541S 12-11-42 Missing PR mission Stadlandet 13-1-43 17 Months
R7056 PRIV 1997 HEA M45 HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 14-8-41 Henley 1PRU Benson 28-8-41 Missing PR mission Trondheim CE 12-4-42 7 months

R series = 10

X4500 PRIV 1617 HPA M45 1PRU 10-7-41 Missing from PR mission Stavanger and Kirstiansand 1-9-41 2 months
X4502 PRIV 1632 HEA M45 1PRU 29-6-41 CB 1PRU 13-9-41 1PRU 18-11-41 140S Army Coop 22-4-42 Missing from PR mission to Cherbourg 2-6-42 12 months
X4503 PRIV 1644 HEA M45 1PRU 3-10-41 Missing on met flight 16-3-42 5 Months

X series = 3

AA781 PRIV 1998 HEA M45 1PRU 28-8-41 Missing PR mission Vegesack 1-8-42 12 Months
AA783 PRIV 2000 HEA M45 1PRU 30-8-41 HAL 8-11-41 Benson 6-2-42 Missing PR mission Wilhelmshaven 14-3-42 4 Months
AA787 PRIV 2044 HEA M45 1PRU 6-9-41 Missing PR mission Katwijk 23-2-42 5 months
AA792 PRIV 2077 HEA M45 1PRU 13-9-41 Missing PR mission Brest 7-12-41 3 Months
AA795 PRIV 2113 HEA M45 1PRU 25-9-41 Missing PR mission Amiens 24-4-42 4 months
AA796 PRIV 2115 HEA M45 1PRU 25-9-41 HAL 12-12-41 mods 1PRU 12-12-41 Missing PR mission Brest 30-12-41 18 days
AA797 PRIV 2148 HEA M45 1PRU 1-10-41 HAL 30-11-41 mods 1PRU 10-12-41 Missing PR mission Trondheim SOC 3-4-42 4 Months
AA798 PRIV 2143 HEA M45 1PRU 1-10-41 GAL 2-2-42 PRU St.Eval 6-2-42 Crashed on PR mission en route Rotterdam Wickham Berks FACE 12-4-42 2 Months
AA800 PRIV 2145 HEA M45 1PRU 1-10-41 HAL mods 1PRU 8-12-41 Missing from PR mission to Bergen 30-7-42 8 months
AA802 PRIV 2147 HEA M45 Henley 1PRU 5-10-41 Missing from PR mission to Bremen 7-9-42 SOC 8-9-42 11 months
AA804 PRIV 2166 HEA M45 1PRU 7-10-41 HAL 30-11-41 mods 1PRU 7-12-41 Missing PR mission Dusseldorf 28-12-41 2 Months
AA806 PRIV 2195 HEA M45 1PRU 19-10-41 543S 30-9-42 Missing PR mission Cherbourg 28-10-42 12 Months
AA809 PRIV 2207 HEA M45 1PRU 19-10-41 543S 30-9-42 Missing PR mission Lorient CE 13-2-43 16 Months
AA810 PRIV 2203 HEA M45 1PRU 19-10-41 Missing from PR mission to Trondheim 5-3-42 4 Months
AA814 PRIV 2221 HEA M45 1PRU 26-10-41 Missing from PR mission to Kiel 17-8-42 10 Months

15

AB119 PRIV 2259 HEA M45 1PRU 6-11-41 Missing PR mission St.Malo 18-4-42 5 months
AB120 PRIV 2270 HEA M45 1PRU 6-11-41 Missing PR mission Kiel 11-8-42 9 Months
AB121 PRIV 2271 HEA M45 5MU 11-11-41 1PRU 27-6-42 542S 30-9-42 Missing ops CE 3 Months
AB125 PRIV 2304 HEA M45 5MU 26-11-41 543S 22-1-43 Missing PR mission Rotterdam 10-2-43 15 Months
AB127 PRIV 2299 HEA M45 8MU 18-11-41 1PRU 20-4-42 Missing PR mission Trondheim 10-5-42 1 Month
AB128 PRIV 2300 HEA M45 8MU 18-11-41 1PRU 8-3-42 543S 30-9-42 Missing PR mission Bordeaux 28-2-43 11 Months
AB129 PRIV 2318 HEA M45 8MU 23-12-41 1PRU 8-3-42 Missing PR mission Bordeaux 20-5-42 2 Months
AB301 PRIV 2357 HEA M45 5MU 5-12-41 1PRU 5-4-42 Missing PR mission Lilbeck 30-7-42 3 months
AB307 PRIV 2394 HEA M45 6MU 15-12-41 1PRU 17-1-42 Missing PR mission St.Malo 10-4-42 3 months
AB309 PRIV 2401 HEA M45 6MU 17-12-41 1PRU 9-3-42 541S 30-9-42 Missing PR Cherbourg - Le Havre believed shot down by flak nr Caen 6-11-42 8 Months
AB312 PRIV 2426 HEA M45 1PRU 2PRU Egypt 17-3-42 Missing 19-10-42 7 Months
AB314 PRIV 2427 HEA M45 FF 23-12-41 9MU 29-12-41 1PRU 3-5-42 Missing PR mission to Trondheim forcelanded Funasdalen Sweden and interned 4-8-42

12

Total built 1941 FTR = 40 plus one lost in India

AA793 PRIV 2091 HEA M45 1PRU 1OADU 5-5-43 India 31-5-43 FTR ops Bombay 30-9-43

so not too much of an overestimate

1942 pdn:

BP881 PRIVT 2540 M45 FF 28-1-42 9MU 30-1-42 Benson 28-8-42 1PRU 1-9-42 541S 30-9-42 Missing (Rotterdam) 8-2-43 FH74.70
BP883 PRIVT 2553 M46 FF 31-1-42 1PRU 6-2-42 2PRU Middle East 14-3-42 Malta 6-9-42 Missing (Crete) 22-9-42 SOC 19-10-42
BP887 PRIVT 2581 HEA M46 FF 11-2-42 (W camera) 8MU 13-2-42 CRD RAE 24-2-42 1PRU 18-4-42 Missing (Hamburg) 17-8-42
BP914 PRIVT 2673 HEA M46 FF 14-3-42 1PRU 25-3-42 Malta 3-5-42 CA ops 4-5-42 1PRU Middle East 69S [Missing (Mersa Matruh) 6-8-42]
BP916 PRIVT 2707 HEA M46 FF 20-3-42 1PRU 25-3-42 2PRU Middle East 5-6-42 Missing (Sidi Barrani) 16-6-42
BP924 PRIVT 2762 HEA M46 FF 1-4-42 (X camera) 5MU 3-4-42 1PRU 16-4-42 Missing (Cuxhaven) 28-8-42
BP933 PRIVT 2819 HEA M46 FF 15-4-42 1PRU 18-4-42 Middle East 5-6-42 601S FACB 28-6-42 FTR ops 26-10-42
BP934 PRIVT 2831 HEA M46 FF 16-4-42 1PRU 18-4-42 47MU 25-5-42 Corabella 16-6-42 Takoradi 30-7-42 Middle East 11-8-42 FTR 13-10-42

8

BR411 PRIVT 2843 HEA M46 FF 18-4-42 1PRU 19-4-42 Benson 19-4-42 Middle East 5-6-42 Missing (Crete) 22-9-42
BR423 PRIVT 2936 HEA M46 FF 15-5-42 (W camera) 9MU 16-5-42 Benson 2-9-42 Gibraltar 6-11-42 EAfrica Missing (Kairouan) 31-12-42
BR426 PRIVT 2971 HEA M46 FF 19-5-42 (W camera) 9MU 22-5-42 1PRU 6-9-42 47MU 12-10-42 Benson 31-10-42 Porthreath 6-11-42 ff Malta 7-11-42 Middle East 11-11-42 69S Shot down in sea by Bf109s Sgt Howard dead in dinghy ops 18-12-42 FH111.10
BR430 PRIVT 2996 HEA M46 FF 30-5-42 Benson 31-5-42 47MU 18-6-42 Wallsend 21-7-42 Takoradi 15-8-42 Middle East 2-9-42 2PRU FAC2 21-9-42 682S Missing over Crete or Greece 14-2-44
BR433 PRIVT 3020 HEA M46 FF 6-6-42 1PRU 8-6-42 9MU 27-6-42 FACB 29-7-42 HAL Benson 6-8-42 Middle East 1-3-43 Missing (Piraeus) 20-3-43
BR435 PRIVT 3034 HEA M46 FF 11-6-42 1PRU 14-6-42 47MU 6-7-42 Wallsend 21-7-42 Takoradi 15-8-42 major repair 2-9-42 Missing (Crete) 23-9-42 SOC 14-10-42
BR644 PRIVT 3068 HEA M46 FF 20-6-42 1PRU 26-6-42 47MU 25-7-42 Nigerstown 24-8-42 Takoradi 3-10-42 Middle East 1-12-42 Forcelanded in Turkey on PR mission over Aegean 26-9-43
BR645 PRIVT 3070 HEA M46 FF 22-6-42 1PRU 24-6-42 47MU 15-7-42 Nigerstown 24-8-42 Takoradi Middle East 12-11-42 Crashed nr Berka returning from PR sortie 26-9-43
BR649 PRIVT 3101 HEA M46 FF 27-6-42 (W camera) 45MU 29-6-42 Benson 2-9-42 Porthreath 31-10-42 Gibraltar 6-11-42 Missing (Tunis) 20-11-42 [BUT belly-land 17SP 12-10-43]
BR663 PRIVT 3195 HEA M46 FF 24-7-42 1PRU 25-7-42 FF Middle East 13-8-42 Malta 6-9-42 FTR ops 4-4-43
BR669 PRIVT 3245 HEA M46 FF 12-8-42 39MU 13-8-42 Benson 20-9-42 544S 3-10-42 Damaged by flak and abandoned 3m off Cap Ferrat 13-11-42

11

BS359 PRIVT 3302 HEA M46 FF 28-8-42 (X camera) 6MU 29-8-42 Benson 8-9-42 47MU 11-10-42 Malta 6-11-42 69S FTR ops 15-11-42 P/O Jennett missing
BS367 PRIVT 3492 HEA M46 FF 13-10-42 1PRU 16-10-42 Malta 6-11-42 69S Missing (Taranto) 10-11-42 SOC Flt/Lt Coldbeck Pow SOC FH19.30
BS495 PRIVT 3594 HEA M46 FF 6-11-42 1PRU 13-11-42 Porthreath 6-12-42 ff Malta 12-12-42 ? 4PRU Missing (Bizerte) 17-12-42 SOC 31-12-42
BS500 PRIVT 3683 HEA M46 FF 25-11-42 Benson 30-11-42 Porthreath 9-12-42 Malta Missing on PR from Malta 12-1-43

4

21 overestimated by 11.

Total FTR = 61

NOT the 76 guesstimated by Tante.

 

[mhuxt]

For some recce information have a look at my site - Airrecce The story of photographic reconnaissance

If you have any questions, please ask away.

Mick

Do you have sortie totals by unit, or by aircraft type? Would be a great help...

 

[nuuumannn]

They had some technical advantages over the Germans which helped a lot (eg a Mossie could survive over Germany, a Ju-88 couldn't over Britain). But they key was the importance they put into it . This gave them a key strategic (and later tactical) advantages.

I agree and disagree with this statement; from what I've learned, German recon was very efficient, more so in terms of in-theatre, tactical and pre-and post-battle recon than out-of-theatre strategic recon, but this was no less efficient than Allied efforts, just not as consistent. Like I said earlier, the Aufklarungsgruppen were far more sophistcated in their approach than the Allied units, with dedicated weather recon aircraft, high speed aircraft and general spotter recon machines. The Germans also had these assets before the British. In order to launch the offensives they carried out, photo recon was paramount and questioning the importance of it is foolish as it was of very high importance to the Germans and in light of the successes of the PRUs (a different kettle of fish to the average Aufklarungsgruppen - granted) we do tend to forget how good German recon was. They had more dedicated camera equipped photo recon aircraft than the Allies to begin with, but this number declined for obvious reasons.

I wouldn't be too hasty to single out the Ju 88 as being inefficient compared with the Mossie as a recon aircraft; the effectiveness of German recon aircraft shouldn't really be in question as British recon losses over enemy territory was also high - although the Mossie was a better performer than the Ju 88, nevertheless, the issue was that British air defences improved to an extent that German aircraft could not operate satisfactorily over Britain. The key reasons for the downfall of German out of theatre strategic recon - and yes, they had their specialised unit like the PRU, before Sidney Cotton came along and it was formed as a branch of the Abwehr and it produced extraordinarily complete images of future enemy countries' defences during peacetime and also during wartime over North Africa, Italy and crucially over Russia produced very good coverage of these countries - was numerous.

Firstly, Allied air superiority made high altitude overflights over Allied held territory unsustainable. Secondly, the chaotic organisation of the Reich meant intel wasn't keenly shared between departments. Thirdly, the dissemination of intel was not done with the same flexibility owing to the rigid structure of German organisation. Fourthly, as the war wore on, military effort by the Germans became more and more difficult, so, naturally, the efficiency of almost every military organisation within the Reich declined.

One aspect that causes us to disregard German PR is the scant attention it gets in the press. Very few dedicated books have been produced on the Aufklarungsgruppen by comparison to British recon in particular, especially the PRUs and Mr Cotton, but , like I said, the German photo recon was of no less importance to them, was well equipped and technically very efficient and equally as capable as that of the Allies during the war.

 

[OldSkeptic]

By and large I agree with you nuuumann. The Luftwaffe did have advantages at first, no doubting that by any means.

What I meant was that the Allies focus and their greater total priority applied meant over time they matched and then exceeded the Luftwaffe (jnc weather recon and all the others).
It was that usual German fragmentation thing again, throwing away their initial advantages.

Not being able (or willing) to do photo recon over Britain in the lead up to D-Day was a criminal failure of them. But caused by poor decisions made in 41 42. While the Allies kept getting better they stayed static.

I have absolutely no doubt that if they placed similar priority on it they would have been able to maintain a good capability right to the end, albeit their lack of a fast twin would have caused issues with VLR recon in contested airspace. Both Spit and Mossie high altitude recon (particularly later models with 2 stage Merlins and Griffons) really were pretty immune to to whatever the Germans could do, despite (by mid 43) their formidable air defences.

Take the Mossie ones, flew before night and day raids, then afterwards with very acceptable loss rates (far far lower than the bombers).
The low level people had a much tougher job of course (as did anyone doing low level stuff.

But, bit like the aircraft production race, the Allies won the air recon race too, despite staring from behind.

But Cotton should be given a heck of a lot of credit. Getting and converting some Spits (against air 'establishment' opposition) was a stroke of genius. Stripping guns (etc) out for fuel tanks and careful attention to details like polishing (etc) to gave them the speed to survive. he was a clever man, sadly treated (like Dowding, Park, etc) badly.

Fortunately the British air establishment quickly recovered from their earlier opposition, really thanks to the quick pickup by the intelligence organisations and the demand from the RN (who always had Churchill's ear), to the point where the first Mossies were PR ones.

From that point on (41) they British (later followed by the US) started to pull ahead. Even the better tactical recon the Germans had eroded in North Africa, Malta etc (the whole Med war), plus the superb (and never recognised) pioneer work by Army Coordination Command (using Mustangs mostly). By early '43 the Allies were well ahead in both areas, strategic and tactical.

Thanks greatly to the early work by the 'first' North African Generals and then Monty (who was a bit of an obsessive about it as you would expect) on the 'demand' side. And the great work by people like Tedder and Cunningham on the 'supply' side. So much so by the time of Alemein, the Commonwealth knew Rommel's entire order of battle and where they were, which made their artillery and air attacks so devastating.
Which also meant that they managed total tactical surprise, not just in timing but where they attacked.

So 39, 40 Germans were way ahead. 41 the British were catching up and pulling ahead in the strategic side, 42 they caught up and had pulled ahead in the tactical side. By 43 (and the US had came to the party in a big way and became excellent as well very quickly) the Germans weren't even in the game, in the west at least.

I quoted Monty's May address before (for another reason) but in it he listed all forces (each divisions, etc) facing the western Allies and where they were (not perfectly but to a high degree of accuracy). Largely due to the Allies dominance of photo recon (enigma was not so useful then for that because the Germans could, and did, use landlines so much).

 

[Juha]

One can find few PR losses incl. what happened from here: Allied Wrecksites

Juha

 

[Tante Ju]

I have absolutely no doubt that if they placed similar priority on it they would have been able to maintain a good capability right to the end, albeit their lack of a fast twin would have caused issues with VLR recon in contested airspace.

Hmm.

Both Spit and Mossie high altitude recon (particularly later models with 2 stage Merlins and Griffons) really were pretty immune to to whatever the Germans could do, despite (by mid 43) their formidable air defences.

Well at least in case of the Spitfire PR IV and PR IX it was already shown that they were simply not immune to that mysterious force that caused them to fail to return from operations (credits to Aozora's meticulous research work pointing out that that it is not "proven" that it had anything to do with German air defences).

So 39, 40 Germans were way ahead. 41 the British were catching up and pulling ahead in the strategic side, 42 they caught up and had pulled ahead in the tactical side. By 43 (and the US had came to the party in a big way and became excellent as well very quickly) the Germans weren't even in the game, in the west at least.

However, the relative number of PR sorties posted cast some serious doubts on that assessment, though I of course agree about 1943 (if we limit our understanding of "West" to England and not include to MTO).

 

[pattle]

Just a quick question and nothing important but if anyone can give an answer to it then it will cure my curiosity. In Ben Mcintyre's Agent Zig Zag, the true story of Eddie Chapman, Chapman was said to have parachuted into Britain from a fast flying German recon plane said to have been a Focke Wulf. I am think this was actually probably a Ju 88, I would be grateful for any information anyone may have.
Or to ask a more general question what sort of aircraft did the Germans use to deliver agents into Britain? I am aware that some German agents came by sea via Spain or Portugal.

 

[OldSkeptic]

Hmm.

Well at least in case of the Spitfire PR IV and PR IX it was already shown that they were simply not immune to that mysterious force that caused them to fail to return from operations (credits to Aozora's meticulous research work pointing out that that it is not "proven" that it had anything to do with German air defences).

However, the relative number of PR sorties posted cast some serious doubts on that assessment.

I didn't say they were totally immune , just that the loss rate was acceptable.

Galland, I have quoted this here before in this forum, was that he admitted that until they got the 262 they could do nothing about them .. and he was talking about Mossies, which meant both the daylight bombers and recon ones.

I posted what he said, which (not going to do it again, check my posts or get the book) was that he was overruled (again by Goering who put 2 JGs onto it, specially for daylight Mossies ... and never shot a single one down). Now by the time he was talking about they were all nearly recon one, though Goering was obsessing about the fact of the bombing (brilliant propaganda exercise) of the attacks in 43 ... in daylight, forced all the NAZI leadership into shelters, the Germans used to say "Fatty can't even stop a few Mosquitos". Goebbels was obsessed about them in his diaries.


Spits at 40,000ft+ level (higher than the Mossies) what could take them down? Nothing basically, which is why the British used them into the early 1950s as the early Gen 1 2 jets could not get up there.

 

[Tante Ju]

I didn't say they were totally immune , just that the loss rate was acceptable.

Galland, I have quoted this here before in this forum, was that he admitted that until they got the 262 they could do nothing about them .. and he was talking about Mossies, which meant both the daylight bombers and recon ones.

OS, I am sure Mosquito crews would have been delighted if Gallands post war exaggrevation would have been true, but it just weren't - PR Mossies were shot down like anything else, they were after all slower than PR Spits, and even the latter were shot down in numbers.

Spits at 40,000ft+ level (higher than the Mossies) what could take them down? Nothing basically, which is why the British used them into the early 1950s as the early Gen 1 2 jets could not get up there.

Well for example 109G-1s at 46,000 feet... These (along some other similar types) were pressurized high altitude fighters with NO2 boosting and it was what they were meant for after all.

 

[Aozora]

Well at least in case of the Spitfire PR IV and PR IX it was already shown that they were simply not immune to that mysterious force that caused them to fail to return from operations (credits to Aozora's meticulous research work pointing out that that it is not "proven" that it had anything to do with German air defences).

Just pointing out that the assumption held by some that ALL PR aircraft were shot down by the defences isn't what the records actually say. Nor did anyone else ever try to make out that the PR Spitfires operated with total impunity until Tante made that claim here (#123).

Well for example 109G-1s at 46,000 feet... These (along some other similar types) were pressurized high altitude fighters with NO2 boosting and it was what they were meant for after all.

So lets see some reputable, properly researched figures for high flying Mosquitos and Spitfires proven to have been shot down by 109G-1s.

 

[Juha]

So Tante Ju
what is your explanation, why were Germans so out of touch of reality on Allied OoB in June 44 that they were fooled for a couple months to believe that Normandy landing was a possible diversion or why time to time LW was unable before and during KM BB sorties, not an usual occurrence, PR Scapa to find out was Home Fleet BBs there or not?
And as I wrote in the message #47, 109G-4/R3 suffered from the fact that it could carry much less internal fuel than PR Spits from PR ID/PR IV onwards.

Juha