Aerial Recon on the Western Front

British Intelligence were also receiving information from an insider at Peenemünde before the raid. This is what led to the overflights by PR aircraft.

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The discovery that Peenemunde was the centre of German rocketry and missile experiments was made by accident as much by intention. The British knew the Germans had been developing rockets; Polish intelligence had reported 'flying torpedoes', and at Peenemunde itself strange earthworks were photographed in 1942, although their purpose was unknown. Peenemunde was initially thought to be connected to explosives and fuel production, but it was on a PR flight to photograph the railway yards at Stettin that had been on the receiving end of bombing in late April 1943 that the PR Mossie crew left their cameras running as they skirted the north coast of Germany, unknowingly capturing a cylindrical object emerging from a building whilst overflying Peenemunde. In the next frame it was gone. In mid May 1943 a PR sortie over Peenemunde revealed more of these cylindrical objects, which the interpreters at Medmenham correctly deduced were rockets.

It seems more people were killed/lost while trying to stop the V-2 programme than the rocket actually killed.

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And if Peenemunde had not been attacked then there would have been even more rockets and larger losses of life on the receiving end of them.

OldSkeptic said:

Pardon??? Was that a joke, certainly hope so. If not it flies in the face of every historical fact about Normandy.

In case some haven't actually read the history, the Allied effort was to a clear strategic plan, conceived by Monty (delivered in April '44) agreed by Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Monty was the Land Forces Commander, in charge of all the (UK, Canadian, Polish, US, etc) forces.

The plan, right from the beginning was for the UK/Canadian/etc forces to hold the North, creating a 'hinge', from which the US forces would pivot around. In other words, the US was always planned to do the breakout, with the British/etc held the Germans. That was what was planned and that was what happened. The breakout took longer than expected, mainly because of bad weather impacting the force and logistic build up (particularly the US), at one point it got so bad the US forces were rationed to only (from memory) 25 artillery shells per day.

But after the build up and then the break out, the German forces had been so written down (mostly against the British/.etc) that the advance went far faster than expected.

In fact, the original plan phase line at 90 days (basically the clearing of France) was exceeded and was done in only 75 days!! Or in other words Monty's plan worked brilliantly.
Bradley in his own book described it as (paraphrase) "the British/etc would take on the self sacrificing task of holding the Germans ......".

Remember this was planned and executed as a coordinated Allied plan. So I find it amazing that 60 plus years later people are still going on about 'slow British', etc, nonsense (you could just as justifiably accuse the US forces of being slow if you want to make that sort of argument), everyone did there jobs and did them well.
Not everything worked perfectly, uncontrollable things (eg the weather) changed timings, the Germans were their usual brilliant fighting selves, tactics were changed and adapted to circumstance,etc. But the overall strategy was flexible enough (another sign of a good plan) to handle all that and succeed.

A truly great Allied victory, sadly spoiled afterwords by some people getting all nationalistic about it and re-writing history.

Click to expand...

Hmmm....

According to Carlo d'Este in "Decision in Normandy":

1. "Contrary to most later interpretations of Montgomery's master plan, his remarks then and later did not reflect a defensive posture around Caen or a ploy to use the city as a hinge. Rather, he wanted strong and aggressive offensive action to ensure protection of the critical and vulnerable British flank. As the plan unfolded was later formally presented, the Montgomery strategy called for the Second British Army to hold and pivot at some point while US forces drove south and eventually turned eastwards when the Loire, the southern flank of the American advance, was reached. Bradley's recollection was that Montgomery 's concept was not defensive and that his early orders and discussions did not contain reference to Caen as a hinge upon which the British would hold and pivot. As will be seen, no one else connected with the planning or execution of OVERLORD recalls any such indication either." [pp 74-75]

2. It was during THUNDERCLAP that Montgomery first developed his estimate that the Normandy campaign could be over in three months. At no time did Montgomery emphasize or refer to a holding action around Caen or to a deliberate policy of drawing in Rommel's reserves." [pg 77]

3. "Montgomery's close friend,Sir James Grigg, the Secretary of State for War, was not misled: 'Of course Montgomery's original idea was to break out of the bocage country around Caen in the first few days after landing - it would be idle to deny that...'" [pg 206]

4."Chester Wilmont, one of Montgomery's most eloquent advocates ... [a]lthough accepting the premise that Montgomery never wavered in the pursuit of this main strategic purpose [to harry the Germans, keeping them unbalanced and eventually sapping their defenses] wrote that: '...he did modify and change the means by which he sought to achieve it. After the war, however, over-anxious to defend himself against American criticism, he asserted that 'the operations developed in June, July and August exactly as planned.' In making this claim, Montgomery does himself less than justice, for his real genius as a commander was shown inthe way he varied his day-to-day policy to meet the unpredictable situation caused by bad weather ... and tactical failure or slowness on the part of both British and American troops.'" [pp 207-208]

5. "[Group Captain T.P.] Greave disputes Montgomery's intention that this strategy was included in the original pre-D-Day planning: 'It is true he helped the attack to the west and he deserves credit for that, but when he says that was his plan, he is stating his second reconsideration. As a result of his failure to take Caen his area became very congested ... Original plan was to run out great armored fingers around Caen. When the German came in they would be enfiladed. [We] were to get the humps beyond Caen so as to control the terrain." [pg 209]

6. "[Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, Royal Navy] bluntly contradicts Montgomery: ' Montgomery's talk of of his original intentiion to hinge on Caen is absolute balls. Monty is a great operational commander. When he was checked in his original intent of taking Caen he had the idea of doing the other operation. I believe the second thing shows greater insight and don't see why he doesn't tell the truth.'" [pp206-207]

7. "What Ellis [in the official history] is that ... [d]efensive strategy after invasion was precisely what Montgomery had hoped at all costs to avoid." [pg 210]

8. Finally, "Montgomery had not intended to create a myth when he vigorously defended his actions in Normandy, and there is no reason to doubt that he firmly believed his plan provided the firm framework of the Allied victory. Despite his public image of disdain and aloofness from these quarrels, Montgomery was deeply distressed by the criticism of Ingersoll, Correlli Barnett, R.W.Thompson, Tedder, Bradley and others. Without question it led to a hardening of his attitude that his reputation would suffer considerably unless he resolutely defended himself. Nevertheless, his refusal ever to admit that the campaign had not gone 'exactly according to plan' was paid for at the cost of his credibility." [pg 501]

Aozora said:

As far as 109s shot down - just one squadron, 486(NZ) Sqn, flying humble Typhoons (and part of the British legions) shot down lemme see...

*snip*

Seven of the mighty recce 109s, including two of the fantastic G-4/R3s, not to mention an Fw 190.

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There was nothing mighty about them, they were just like other recon 109s, but had two droptanks and could go pretty much anywhere. Of course they could be shot down just like anything else, just like PR Spitfires that operated at high losses, contrary to popular beliefs.

Now, much have been said about how supposedly PR Spitfires roamed free over Europe. This was especially not true for the early PR Marks, but not even the much hyped Mark XI was operating in peace.

Its story is much like that of the two staged Spitfire fighters - production was very slow initially and the type appeared only in small numbers, most of them being produced in 1944. The early ones (1943 series) all had the Merlin 61 or 63 and were not that hot. The Merlin 70 engined variant begun to appear in the spring of 1944 only and even though it had improved high altitude performance - and unfortunately so did the new high altitude Luftwaffe fighters that appeared at the same time.

The production numbers are telling.

1942: 10 were produced in the last two months of the year, of which 4 were shot down on mission and one was lost to engine failure.
1943 production amounted to a whopping 61 aircraft up to August 1943, all with M61/M63 engines. 12 of them, or exactly 20% of the production was shot down, three further planes were lost to engine failures and a number of others to misc reasons (accidents, tests etc)
1944 production amounted to 201 aircraft, almost all of them with the new Merlin 70, which seem to have given considerable trouble. 23 were lost on missions or to enemy action (11%), with a couple being shot up during Bodenplatte. The Merlin 70 proved that it was almost as good at destroying planes as the Luftwaffe, with further 22 lost to engine cuts and engine fires. A number of others were lost to accidents etc.
1945 production amounted to 18 aircraft, all with Merlin 70, with one being lost to enemy action and one to engine fires.

The below is the list of PR Mark XIs lost to enemy action - 40 of the PR Mark XI has been destroyed via enemy action:

BS498 PRXI 3682 HEA FF 25-11-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 541S 26-3-43 Missing (Dortmund-Ems Canal) 13-6-43
BS501 PRXI 3716 BEN FF 1-12-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 542S 14-12-42 VASM 27-9-43 universal camera install 541S 16-10-43 Missing (Essen) [5-3-43]
BS502 PRXI 3717 HEA FF 6-12-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 542S 14-12-42 VASM 27-9-43 universal camera install Missing (V-sites) 25-2-44
EN151 PRXI 3769 CHA M61 FF 20-12-42 33MU 22-12-42 1PRU Benson 11-1-43 542S 1-2-43 Missing (Nurnberg) 26-2-43
EN330 PRXI 3830 CHA M61 FF 9-1-43 33MU 11-1-43 1PRU Benson 5-2-43 NWAfrica 21-5-43 542S 9-7-43 Missing on PR mission over V-sites 10-4-44
EN338 PRXI 3889 CHA M61 FF 20-1-43 33MU 27-1-43 Benson 9-3-43 1OADU 26-3-43 Malta 26-3-43 218Grp NAfrica 30-11-43 682S Missing on PR to Munich 24-8-44
EN347 PRXI 3927 CHA M61 FF 29-1-43 39MU 2-2-43 Benson 15-2-43 ? 1OADU 10-3-43 NAfrica 10-3-43 Missing on PR mission over Sardinia 30-3-43
EN385 PRXI 3708 HEA M61 FF 2-12-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 541S 9-12-42 Missing from PR sorties to Cologne 13-2-43
EN411 PRXI 3979 CHA M61 FF 12-2-43 45MU 14-2-43 Benson 12-3-43 541S Missing (Lubeck) 28-5-43
EN421 PRXI 4104 CHA M63 FF 10-3-43 Benson 23-3-43 1OADU 16-5-43 NAfrica 19-5-43 Missing (Naples) 13-6-43
EN424 PRXI 4100 CHA M63A FF 13-3-43 6MU 15-3-43 1PRU Benson 25-3-43 543S 12-4-43 542S Missing from PR over V-sites Pas de Calais 14-4-44
EN427 PRXI 4129 CHA M63A FF 20-3-43 Benson 23-3-43 1OADU 20-4-43 FF eng trouble returned Benson 25-4-43 Miles Aircraft 1-7-43 Missing (Genoa) 29-8-43
EN503 PRXI 4288 EA M63 FF 8-5-43 6MU 15-5-43 Benson 23-5-43 541S 1-6-43 VASM 1-9-43 univ camera install Missing from PR over Pas de Calais 21-1-44
EN652 PRXI 4370 CHA M63 FF 26-5-43 6MU 25-6-43 ros 22-7-43 Benson 23-7-43 542S 20-8-43 8OTU 30-8-43 Missing on training flight 12-3-45
EN669 PRXI 4520 CHA M63 FF 6-7-43 6MU 11-7-43 Benson 23-7-43 541S 26-8-43 1OADU 4-10-43 Missing(Hamburg) 18-12-43
EN685 PRXI 4638 CHA M63 FF 13-8-43 6MU 15-8-43 Benson 2-9-43 543S 16-9-43 Missing (Hannover) 13-5-44
PL782 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 2-4-44 8/7USAAF 20-4-44 lost over Germany 5-9-44
PL790 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 6-4-44 8/7USAAF 20-4-44 lost over England 15-6-44
PL796 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 25-4-44 Benson 20-5-44 4S 15-6-44 High level PR pm east of Utrecht Shot down by Me109 of JG1 nr Nieukuik 24-12-44 F/O T A Priddle killed
PL834 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 14-5-44 Benson 20-5-44 16S 8-6-44 missing on PR mission to Arnhem 20-9-44
PL841 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 29-5-44 Benson 9-9-44 1OADU 20-9-44 NWAfrica 25-9-44 ACSEA 12-10-44 681S missing from PR mission to Moulmein 7-6-45
PL845 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 1-6-44 Benson 15-9-44 16S 5-10-44 missing on PR mission to Venlo 18-11-44 P/O W C Heath killed
PL848 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 11-6-44 Benson 15-9-44 16S 28-9-44 Damaged by Bfl09s CAC ops 25-12-44 HAL 23-2-45 recat E SOC 14-9-45
PL853 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 12-6-44 Benson 15-9-44 16S 5-10-44 Sortie to Dusseldorf shot down by Me163 from JG400 14-1-45
PL856 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 12-6-44 Benson 16-8-44 541S 5-9-44 missing (Luneburg) 20-3-45
PL883 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 3-7-44 400S CAC ops 26-7-44 Benson 14-10-44 Destroyed in air raid Eindhoven CE 1-1-45
PL899 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 22-7-44 1PP Benson 14-10-44 541S 1-11-44 missing (Hamburg) 1-1-45
PL904 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 28-7-44 Benson 16-8-44 541S missing (Bremen) 28-9-44
PL906 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 29-7-44 Benson 16-8-44 542S missing (Munich) 27-11-44
PL911 PRXI M70 6MU 21-8-44 Benson 15-9-44 400S 28-9-44 Destroyed in air raid Eindhoven 1-1-45
PL916 PRXI M70 6MU 27-8-44 Benson 9-9-44 1OADU 16-9-44 NWAfrica 18-9-44 683S missing (Stuttgart) 8-10-44
PL919 PRXI M70 6MU 29-8-44 Benson 28-9-44 541S 28-11-44 missing (Frankfurt) 24-12-44
PL950 PRXI M70 9MU 18-9-44 CRD RAE 28-9-44 Benson 27-10-44 400S 9-11-44 DBR in air raid Eindhoven CB 1-1-45 HAL recat E SOC 13-9-45
PL962 PRXI M70 9MU 24-9-44 8/7USAAF 3-10-44 lost over France 15-1-45
PL976 PRXI M70 Benson 12-10-44 16S 23-11-44 Destroyed in air raid Melsbroek CE 1-1-45
PL991 PRXI M70 Benson 15-11-44 1OADU 7-12-44 NWAfrica 14-12-44 683S missing from PR mission over Trieste presumed ditched in Adriatic 29-1-45
PM123 PRXI ALD M70 1PP Benson 18-11-44 16S 11-1-45 enemy action 19-3-45 AFDS CFE 15-11-45 SOC 8-4-48
PM128 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 27-11-44 400S Attack on Eindhoven airfield CB 1-1-45 409RSU 18-1-45 HAL 17-4-45 recat E SOC 3-9-45
PM142 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 17-12-44 400S 18-1-45 Tac/R sortie Hit by fire from a ship as he flew low over the Baltic 9-5-45 F/Lt L L McMillan DFC AM killed
PM148 PRXI M70 1PP Benson 17-1-45 541S 23-1-45 missing (Bohlen) 8-3-45

Edit: seems to have missed "Mk XIT" series, but no time now to add these...

continued.

The following 27 PR Mk XI were lost to engine related troubles - its noteworthy how much trouble the Merlin 70 series gave:

EN154 PRXI 3774 CHA M61 FF 21-12-42 33MU 22-12-42 1PRU Benson 15-1-43 541S 21-2-43 FAAC 19-2-44 HAL 8OTU 1-7-44 engine failed on takeoff force-landed Woodbine Farm Haverford West CE 11-5-45 SOC 25-5-45
EN414 PRXI 4046 CHA M61 FF 28-2-43 46MU 4-3-43 Benson 14-3-43 1OADU 5-4-43 NWAfrica 8-4-43 Engine cut forcelanded at Forli CE 26-5-45 SOC 31-5-45
EN425 PRXI 4114 CHA M63 FF 17-3-43 6MU 20-3-43 1PRU Benson 27-3-43 1OADU 29-4-43 Gibraltar 1-6-43 Middle East 30-9-43 Engine cut ditched off Rhodes 24-5-45
EN682 PRXI 4629 CHA M63 FF 11-8-43 6MU 17-8-43 Benson 2-9-43 ros 7-9-43 542S engine failed wheels up landing nr Billingshurst Station Sussex CE 2-8-44
PL758 PRXI CHA M63 AAEE 28-2-44 cool trials with reduced area rad exit duct Fitt FXII rud Benson 20-8-44 4S 31-8-44 HAL 6-2-45 recat E SOC 3-9-45 bboc SFU Honiley 7-3-46 engine failed wheels up landing nr Warwick 19-7-46 FA SOC 25-7-46
PL763 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 12-3-44 1OADU 28-3-44 ? MedAAF 11-4-44 682S Caught fire taxying at San Severo 12-10-44
PL774 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 27-3-44 1OADU 6-5-44 ACSEA 18-5-44 9FU Engine cut on ferry flight bellylanded 15m E of Bone 22-7-45 SOC 6-9-45
PL776 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 23-2-44 1OADU 4-4-44 ACSEA 17-4-44 681S Engine cut bellylanded nr Whaiknyaung 28-3-45 SOC 26-4-45
PL787 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 22-4-44 Benson 14-5-44 4S 25-5-44 Engine caught fire on high level PR mission and abandoned over Channel 17-7-44 F/O N S Cooper killed
PL797 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 22-4-44 Benson 14-5-44 400S 23-5-44 Engine cut on PR mission abandoned St.Mervieu (sic) nr Bayeux 17-7-44
PL827 PRXI CHA M70 RAE 6-5-44 replacement trials aircraft for EN409 Rate of roll and continuation of compressibility trials initiated with EN409 Engine broke up in dive hit HT wires recovering and crashed Whitmoor Common CB 15-9-44 HAL recat E 24-9-44
PL828 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 30-4-44 Benson 13-6-44 400S 6-8-44 Attack on Eindhoven airfield CAC 1-1-45 Engine lost power on PR mission bellylanded at Blankenberg FAAC 21-3-45 HAL recat E SOC 14-9-45
PL829 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 2-5-44 Benson 14-5-44 400S 25-5-44 eng fire in circuit Odiham hit tree crashed dbf CE 28-7-44 pilot killed
PL831 PRXI ALD M50 6MU 7-5-44 Benson 14-5-44 4S 30-5-44 High level PR sortie Caught fire and crashed nr Petersfield Hants CE 9-8-44 F/O R A Drapper killed
PL858 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 19-6-44 Benson 3-7-44 1OADU 17-7-44 MedAAF 20-7-44 ACSEA 8-8-44 681S Engine caught fire abandoned nr Kalewa 2-1-45 SOC 6-9-45
PL860 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 30-6-44 1OADU 24-7-44 NWAfrica 27-8-44 ACSEA 6-9-44 Caught fire in air and crashed Mount Lavinia Colombo Ceylon 30-12-44
PL864 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 7-7-44 Benson 9-9-44 NWAfrica 21-9-44 682S Engine cut on approach stalled and hit ground Ochey CE 6-1-45
PL882 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 1-7-44 541S 22-7-44 Engine cut over North Sea ditched 5-12-44
PL901 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 28-7-44 Benson 16-8-44 542S 28-8-44 Engine cut on PR mission crashlanded nr East Grinstead Surrey FACE 6-1-45 SOC 12-1-45
PL913 PRXI M70 6MU 23-8-44 Benson 5-9-44 16S 14-9-44 FACB 17-11-44 HAL 1401Flt 16-1-45 engine cut force-landed Salzwedel 29-1-46
PL953 PRXI M70 6MU 2-9-44 Benson 21-9-44 4S 19-10-44 Engine cut crashlanded nr Tilburg 29-10-44
PL960 PRXI M70 6MU 9-9-44 Benson 21-9-44 1OADU 30-9-44 NWAfrica 2-10-44 Middle East 8-10-44 ACSEA 8-10-44 681S Caught fire and abandoned off Ceylon 30-12-44 [SOC 27-2-47]
PL964 PRXI ALD M70 9MU 2-10-44 1PP Benson 17-1-45 16S 8-2-45 Engine cut on take-off crash-landed Teuge FAAC 5-8-45
PL996 PRXI ALD M70 1PP Benson 18-11-44 MedAAF 309FTU Engine caught fire on ferry flight abandoned nr Troyes 10-12-44
PL997 PRXI M70 Benson 25-11-44 1OADU 7-12-44 Middle East 17-12-44 ACSEA 10-1-45 681S 6RIAF 7RIAF Engine cut on take-off crashlanded Kohat CE 14-2-47 SOC 27-3-47
PM135 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 11-12-44 eng fire ground running Benson CE 31-12-44
PM152 PRXI M70 1PP Benson 22-1-45 4S 22-2-45 Engine caught fire on take-off Mill CE 22-3-45

Yes, that's all been known for years. Can you tell us how that translates to loss rates?

The Spitfire was not the only PR aircraft deployed by the British over Europe.
Steve

Now, if you though the PR XI was bad, here is the PR Mark III and IV - the major PR type of 1941-1943.

Lets see the PR Mark III briefly. 17 produced. Nine were shot down. Ouch.

PR Mark IV

1941 saw 97 PR Mark IV produced, all with the less than stellar Merlin 45. Of that, 44 were lost to enemy action (45% ...!) and further 7 to engine failures. Again, a number of others were lost to accidents and other causes, used in tests etc.
1942 saw 136 PR Mark IV produced, most of them with the somewhat better Merlin 46. 32 were lost to enemy action (23,5%), mostly in the same year and in the MTO - a telling statistic. Further 11 aircrafts engines went kaputt and a number again was lost in accidents.
1943 saw the last 11 produced, with one being lost over Foggia, and another mysteriously going missing in a transit flight between Gibraltar and North Africa in mid 1943.

stona said:

The Spitfire was not the only PR aircraft deployed by the British over Europe.
Steve

Click to expand...

The point is to sober up those who may believe they operated with inpunity.

You're still firmly in the "so what" zone.

"Someone I don't know posted a file, and I picked all the negative stuff out of it.

Look at meeeeeee."

Can you tell us how that all translates to loss rates? Actual engine failures vs operating hours? Anything at all?

Why so excited mhuxt? Its just loss data...

The sudden increase in engine failures, many on take off with the introduction of the Merlin 70 was certainly an interesting thing for me. Perhaps you have more information on this (Merlin 70 troubles).

I know it's friggen loss data, I posted it as the thread's about PR.

I'm still waiting for you to tell us something we didn't already know.

And people wonder why Luftwhiners get sh*tcanned.

I'm outta this thread.

Montgomery's plan once Caen had not fallen as planned was, in his words, "to assault to the West of the river Orne and to develop operations to the South and South-East, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of First US Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg."
It was the German Panzer Divisions that thwarted the plan, not any lack of effort on the part of the Anglo-Canadian forces. British hopes of enlarging the beachhead were dashed and the open country South East of Caen was denied them. The Panzer Divisions themselves were broken into Kamfgruppen to hold the line against the British thus ruining German plans to concentrate armoured forces to throw the allies back into the sea. A not inconsiderable achievement. Not all campaigns are won by breakthroughs and hundred mile dashes.

On 10th June Montgomery and Dempsey met Bradley. Montgomery now revised his plan to launch a pincer attack on Caen. The most daring aspect was to drop the 1st Airborne Division (held in reserve in England) around Evrecy. It was our old friend Leigh Mallory who blocked this causing Montgomery to describe him to Freddie de Guignand (his Chief of Staff at 21st Army) as " a gutless bugger."

It was on 11th June, importantly the day after he had met Bradley, that he wrote that his general objective was "to pull the Germans on to the Second Army so that the [US] First Army can extend and expand."

It was the Germans and specifically their Panzer Divisions who dictated this state of affairs, not Montgomery. Both Runstedt and Rommel regarded the 2nd Army as the principal threat because a South Easterly breakthrough towards Falaise opened the possibility of an allied dash for Paris. They also both admitted to under estimating the Americans.
There were consequences for the Germans too. Geyr was very unhappy that using these divisions to block the route to Paris led to "the unfortunate decision to employ on the inner flank the most powerful mobile forces."

Quickly an ugly battle of attrition developed. Constant pressure was maintained on the Germans by ground air and artillery attack (hardly drinking tea) and this, while seldom adventurous, prevented Rommel from using his armoured divisions effectively. He was forced to adopt "fire fighting" tactics, dividing up these divisions to reinforce infantry formations on the point od collapse.

Montgomery's statement that Caen was the key to Cherbourg was not only wrong but didn't impress his American colleagues. General Collins, tasked with taking Cherbourg, observed to Bradley "Why doesn't he just send us the key?"
Montgomery was a complicated character. One of his flaws was an inability to admit when he was wrong.

Things are never as simple as they seem, or Wikipedia would have you believe.

Best estimates for BRITISH losses alone between 6th June and 19th July 1944 are about 6,000 killed and 29,000 wounded. That is not "drinking tea" and it is disrespectful to their memory to use phrases like that.

Cheers

Steve

Glider said:

More or less all of them. In Dec 1944 a Luftwaffe PR officer admitted that no air reconnaissance of British Industry had taken place for three years.

Source Hitlers Spies David Kahn page 135

This tends to knock a hole in the view that the Luftwaffe overflew every couple of weeks.

Click to expand...

They flew 187 recon sorties in 1943 over Britain, an all time low but enough to check whats happening now and then IMHO.

Well lets see the hard data instead on Luftwaffe recon activity in the West/MTO, via Hooton: Eagle in Flames.

Fliegerkorps X: Campaign against Malta, Jan - May 1941, recon sorties: 132 recon sorties flown.
Fliegerkorps X: excluding Malta, Jan - May 1941, recon sorties, armed: 364 recon sorties flown.
Fliegerkorps X: excluding Malta, Jan - May 1941, recon sorties, E Med: 525 recon sorties flown.
Maritime recon sorties in MTO, 1942, Fliegerkorps II and X: 1730 recon sorties flown.
Luftflotte 3 recon sorties in the West, July - December 1941: 1330 recon sorties flown.

For a comparison of British 1942 recon sortie totals for 1941: 1888 PR, 652 other. See post. no 70 of this thread

Luftflotte 3 recon sorties in the West, Jan- December 1942: 5868 recon sorties flown.
Fliegerkorps II, recon sorties against Malta January - November 1942: 536 recon sorties flown.
Fliegerfuhrer Afrika / Fliegerkorps X recon sorties over land, January December 1942: 2770 recon sorties flown.

For a comparison of British 1942 recon sortie totals for 1942: 2079 PR, 1878 other. See post. no 70 of this thread.

Luftwaffe recon activity in the MTO, January - May 1943: 3710 recon sorties flown.
Luftwaffe recon activity in the MTO, 13 December 1943 - 16 January 1944: 497 recon sorties flown.
German operations over Britain, 1943: 187 recon sorties flown

For a comparison of British 1943 recon sortie totals for 1942: 2286 PR, 2339 other. See post. no 70 of this thread.

Now this data for LW recon may be well incomplete, as Hooton only gives some figures now and then. I also ommitted Eastern Front recon sorties, but to give some idea where German recon priorities/assets were, in the first ten days of Unternehmen Zitadelle, 1943, Luftlotte 6 flew 1371 recon sorties, while Luftflotte 4 flew 693.

A distant relative was one of those tea drinkers in Normandy. Hes still there and will never grow old so obviously drinking tea is a bloody dangerous occupation. I am out of this thread as well, its always the same an interesting thread gets derailed by sh1tkickers who have to re-write what happened 70 years ago for some strange nasty little reason.

They flew 187 recon sorties in 1943 over Britain, an all time low but enough to check whats happening now and then IMHO.

Click to expand...

But how many were successful? The loss rate was 18%.

stona said:

Best estimates for BRITISH losses alone between 6th June and 19th July 1944 are about 6,000 killed and 29,000 wounded. That is not "drinking tea" and it is disrespectful to their memory to use phrases like that.

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You seem to have missed "seemingly" from that sentence, that referenced to the lack of progress and keeping to the original plans and was not meant to be disrespectful to the sacrifices the troops made. I am aware that the resistance was stiff - still, for some reason the British could not keep with the schedule and it irritated a lot of people, especially as Monty came up with his usual garbage excuses and how he planned that all along. Now, as for drinking tea, that was a very real phenomenon, Reynolds for example strongly criticizes that aspect of the British offensives and and tactical "thinking", namely the absolutely passivity of local commanders and that of the British infantry. British infantry would usually advance slowly towards to set objectives with tanks, after a barrage. If they managed to reach it, they would STOP, no matter if there would be no Germans to offer resistance, they would not even try to exploit the opportunity. Instead, they would do what they were always doing, dig some holes and prepare some tea. That lack of aggressive and opportunity spirit was what set them apart from the US and German army. Americans usually grabbed opportunities, and the Germans were aggressive even in defense, emphasizing the importance of immediate counter attacks. In short, the British army tactical doctrine was essentially stuck in World War I. Hold the trenches, barrage them with artillery, advance slowly with tanks, fix bayonet because the Hun fears the naked iron and above all else, do not do anything unless an officer tells you to. Like in WW1, it could work if the odds were heavily in your favor, but it was anything but up to date, or brilliant.

Tante Ju said:

You seem to have missed "seemingly" from that sentence, that referenced to the lack of progress and keeping to the original plans and was not meant to be disrespectful to the sacrifices the troops made. I am aware that the resistance was stiff - still, for some reason the British could not keep with the schedule and it irritated a lot of people, especially as Monty came up with his usual garbage excuses and how he planned that all along. Now, as for drinking tea, that was a very real phenomenon, Reynolds for example strongly criticizes that aspect of the British offensives and and tactical "thinking", namely the absolutely passivity of local commanders and that of the British infantry. British infantry would usually advance slowly towards to set objectives with tanks, after a barrage. If they managed to reach it, they would STOP, no matter if there would be no Germans to offer resistance, they would not even try to exploit the opportunity. Instead, they would do what they were always doing, dig some holes and prepare some tea. That lack of aggressive and opportunity spirit was what set them apart from the US and German army. Americans usually grabbed opportunities, and the Germans were aggressive even in defense, emphasizing the importance of immediate counter attacks. In short, the British army tactical doctrine was essentially stuck in World War I. Hold the trenches, barrage them with artillery, advance slowly with tanks, fix bayonet because the Hun fears the naked iron and above all else, do not do anything unless an officer tells you to. Like in WW1, it could work if the odds were heavily in your favor, but it was anything but up to date, or brilliant.

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Yes that is what the British did at Anzio when the British General Lucas ordered the American troops from moving inland to take the high ground to prevent the defenders from surrounding the beaches and turning them into a killing ground. Even though the road to Rome was open the British General Lucas stopped the Americans from leaving the beach because it was tea time.

For anyone that wants to learn the actual truth behind World War Two watch Churchill the Hollywood years , you tube Churchill the Hollywood years.

It is all very well and good making a plan, but then reality wakes up and bites you in the backside!
It may be that Caen was supposed to be taken on Day 1, but I don't think anyone had the courtesy of informing the Germans of the plan!
Gallipoli was supposed to be taken on Day 1, El Alamein did not go exactly to plan ; nor did Anzio, or many other battles.
That does not mean that the plan was not a good one, its always going to be down to what happens on the day, weather, luck etc can easily play their hand.
As posted earlier a good plan usually is a flexible plan that can respond to the reality of the situation at hand.

If as written by OldSceptic, Bradley acknowledges that the British / Canadian /Polish were to hold the line and pull in the German reserves whilst the US swung around them - it is pretty pointless in arguing with that!

I think TJ needs to sit down and read some decent history books.

Since we are talking about stultified thinking, advancing behind a barrage etc how would you fit an operation like "Market Garden" into that template. The fact that it was ultimately unsuccessful is not relevant. The thinking and planning was both bold and adventurous.
I doubt that it would have been attempted had Montgomery's pincer plan with advanced airborne units been tried at Caen, but that's another story.
Cheers
Steve

Tante Ju said:

Its story is much like that of the two staged Spitfire fighters - production was very slow initially and the type appeared only in small numbers, most of them being produced in 1944. The early ones (1943 series) all had the Merlin 61 or 63 and were not that hot. The Merlin 70 engined variant begun to appear in the spring of 1944 only and even though it had improved high altitude performance - and unfortunately so did the new high altitude Luftwaffe fighters that appeared at the same time.

The production numbers are telling.

1942: 10 were produced in the last two months of the year, of which 4 were shot down on mission and one was lost to engine failure.
1943 production amounted to a whopping 61 aircraft up to August 1943, all with M61/M63 engines. 12 of them, or exactly 20% of the production was shot down, three further planes were lost to engine failures and a number of others to misc reasons (accidents, tests etc)
1944 production amounted to 201 aircraft, almost all of them with the new Merlin 70, which seem to have given considerable trouble. 23 were lost on missions or to enemy action (11%), with a couple being shot up during Bodenplatte. The Merlin 70 proved that it was almost as good at destroying planes as the Luftwaffe, with further 22 lost to engine cuts and engine fires. A number of others were lost to accidents etc.
1945 production amounted to 18 aircraft, all with Merlin 70, with one being lost to enemy action and one to engine fires.

The below is the list of PR Mark XIs lost to enemy action - 40 of the PR Mark XI has been destroyed via enemy action:

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TJ says "40 destroyed via enemy action" but then again that's not what the entries say - note the number of "missing" which could mean such things as being caught in a thunder storm - there is no confirmation they were all destroyed by enemy action.

At least three of this list were lost post war or over Britain during training, so those can be written out. (37 lost on operations)

Then there were those caught on the ground at Eindhoven - there's no reason include these when we are supposedly talking about Mk XIs lost while engaged on operational sorties, although it does make the list look more impressive... thus there were 32 lost on PR operations.

Exactly three were confirmed as lost to enemy aircraft...

Also note the production numbers, which TJ has also gotten wrong;

there were, in fact 471 PR Mk XIs built, 211 with Merlin 70s.

Thus, the Operational Loss Rate of PR Mk IXs = 8.5% - that's using the original estimate of 40 given in post #123.

So lets have a proper look at the list:

BS498 PRXI 3682 HEA FF 25-11-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 541S 26-3-43 Missing (Dortmund-Ems Canal) 13-6-43 [Time in Service 6 months]
BS501 PRXI 3716 BEN FF 1-12-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 542S 14-12-42 VASM 27-9-43 universal camera install 541S 16-10-43 Missing (Essen) [5-3-43] [Time in Service 3 months]
BS502 PRXI 3717 HEA FF 6-12-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 542S 14-12-42 VASM 27-9-43 universal camera install Missing (V-sites) 25-2-44 [TiS 15 Months]

EN151 PRXI 3769 CHA M61 FF 20-12-42 33MU 22-12-42 1PRU Benson 11-1-43 542S 1-2-43 Missing (Nurnberg) 26-2-43 [TiS 3 Months]
EN330 PRXI 3830 CHA M61 FF 9-1-43 33MU 11-1-43 1PRU Benson 5-2-43 NWAfrica 21-5-43 542S 9-7-43 Missing on PR mission over V-sites 10-4-44 [TiS 15 Months]
EN338 PRXI 3889 CHA M61 FF 20-1-43 33MU 27-1-43 Benson 9-3-43 1OADU 26-3-43 Malta 26-3-43 218Grp NAfrica 30-11-43 682S Missing on PR to Munich 24-8-44 [TiS 19 Months]
EN347 PRXI 3927 CHA M61 FF 29-1-43 39MU 2-2-43 Benson 15-2-43 ? 1OADU 10-3-43 NAfrica 10-3-43 Missing on PR mission over Sardinia 30-3-43 [TiS 2 Months]
EN385 PRXI 3708 HEA M61 FF 2-12-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 541S 9-12-42 Missing from PR sorties to Cologne 13-2-43 [TiS 2 Months]
EN411 PRXI 3979 CHA M61 FF 12-2-43 45MU 14-2-43 Benson 12-3-43 541S Missing (Lubeck) 28-5-43 [TiS 3 Months]
EN421 PRXI 4104 CHA M63 FF 10-3-43 Benson 23-3-43 1OADU 16-5-43 NAfrica 19-5-43 Missing (Naples) 13-6-43 [TiS 3 Months]
EN424 PRXI 4100 CHA M63A FF 13-3-43 6MU 15-3-43 1PRU Benson 25-3-43 543S 12-4-43 542S Missing from PR over V-sites Pas de Calais 14-4-44 [TiS 13 Months]
EN427 PRXI 4129 CHA M63A FF 20-3-43 Benson 23-3-43 1OADU 20-4-43 FF eng trouble returned Benson 25-4-43 Miles Aircraft 1-7-43 Missing (Genoa) 29-8-43 [TiS 5 Months]
EN503 PRXI 4288 EA M63 FF 8-5-43 6MU 15-5-43 Benson 23-5-43 541S 1-6-43 VASM 1-9-43 univ camera install Missing from PR over Pas de Calais 21-1-44 [TiS 8 Months]
EN669 PRXI 4520 CHA M63 FF 6-7-43 6MU 11-7-43 Benson 23-7-43 541S 26-8-43 1OADU 4-10-43 Missing(Hamburg) 18-12-43 [TiS 4 Months]
EN685 PRXI 4638 CHA M63 FF 13-8-43 6MU 15-8-43 Benson 2-9-43 543S 16-9-43 Missing (Hannover) 13-5-44 [TiS 8 months]

PL782 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 2-4-44 8/7USAAF 20-4-44 lost over Germany 5-9-44 [TiS 5 Months]
PL796 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 25-4-44 Benson 20-5-44 4S 15-6-44 High level PR pm east of Utrecht Shot down by Me109 of JG1 nr Nieukuik 24-12-44 F/O T A Priddle killed [TiS 6 Months]*
PL834 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 14-5-44 Benson 20-5-44 16S 8-6-44 missing on PR mission to Arnhem 20-9-44 [TiS 3 Months]
PL845 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 1-6-44 Benson 15-9-44 16S 5-10-44 missing on PR mission to Venlo 18-11-44 P/O W C Heath killed [TiS 1 Month]
PL848 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 11-6-44 Benson 15-9-44 16S 28-9-44 Damaged by Bfl09s CAC ops 25-12-44 HAL 23-2-45 recat E SOC 14-9-45 [TiS 3 Months]
PL853 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 12-6-44 Benson 15-9-44 16S 5-10-44 Sortie to Dusseldorf shot down by Me163 from JG400 14-1-45 [/COLOR][TiS 3 Months]
PL856 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 12-6-44 Benson 16-8-44 541S 5-9-44 missing (Luneburg) 20-3-45 [TiS 6 Months]

PL899 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 22-7-44 1PP Benson 14-10-44 541S 1-11-44 missing (Hamburg) 1-1-45 [TiS 2 Months]
PL904 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 28-7-44 Benson 16-8-44 541S missing (Bremen) 28-9-44 [TiS 1 Month]
PL906 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 29-7-44 Benson 16-8-44 542S missing (Munich) 27-11-44 [TiS 3 Months]
PL916 PRXI M70 6MU 27-8-44 Benson 9-9-44 1OADU 16-9-44 NWAfrica 18-9-44 683S missing (Stuttgart) 8-10-44 [TiS 1 Month]
PL919 PRXI M70 6MU 29-8-44 Benson 28-9-44 541S 28-11-44 missing (Frankfurt) 24-12-44 [TiS 1 Month]
PL962 PRXI M70 9MU 24-9-44 8/7USAAF 3-10-44 lost over France 15-1-45 [TiS 3 Months]
PL991 PRXI M70 Benson 15-11-44 1OADU 7-12-44 NWAfrica 14-12-44 683S missing from PR mission over Trieste presumed ditched in Adriatic 29-1-45 [TiS 1 Month]

PM123 PRXI ALD M70 1PP Benson 18-11-44 16S 11-1-45 enemy action 19-3-45 AFDS CFE 15-11-45 SOC 8-4-48[TiS 2 months]
PM142 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 17-12-44 400S 18-1-45 Tac/R sortie Hit by fire from a ship as he flew low over the Baltic 9-5-45 F/Lt L L McMillan DFC AM killed [TiS 4 Months]
PM148 PRXI M70 1PP Benson 17-1-45 541S 23-1-45 missing (Bohlen) 8-3-45 [TiS 2 Months]


32 lost during wartime operations, not neccessarily all due to enemy action.

And those that can be removed from the list...

EN652 PRXI 4370 CHA M63 FF 26-5-43 6MU 25-6-43 ros 22-7-43 Benson 23-7-43 542S 20-8-43 8OTU 30-8-43 Missing on training flight 12-3-45 [TiS 20 months - NON OPERATIONAL LOSS]
PL790 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 6-4-44 8/7USAAF 20-4-44 lost over England 15-6-44 [TiS 2 months NON OPERATIONAL]
PL841 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 29-5-44 Benson 9-9-44 1OADU 20-9-44 NWAfrica 25-9-44 ACSEA 12-10-44 681S missing from PR mission to Moulmein 7-6-45 [TiS 8 Months POST WAR]
PL883 PRXI ALD M70 6MU 3-7-44 400S CAC ops 26-7-44 Benson 14-10-44 Destroyed in air raid Eindhoven CE 1-1-45 [TiS 3 Months]
PL911 PRXI M70 6MU 21-8-44 Benson 15-9-44 400S 28-9-44 Destroyed in air raid Eindhoven 1-1-45
PL950 PRXI M70 9MU 18-9-44 CRD RAE 28-9-44 Benson 27-10-44 400S 9-11-44 DBR in air raid Eindhoven CB 1-1-45 HAL recat E SOC 13-9-45
PL976 PRXI M70 Benson 12-10-44 16S 23-11-44 Destroyed in air raid Melsbroek CE 1-1-45
PM128 PRXI ALD M70 Benson 27-11-44 400S Attack on Eindhoven airfield CB 1-1-45 409RSU 18-1-45 HAL 17-4-45 recat E SOC 3-9-45