"All of Vlad's forces and all of Vlad's men, are out to put Humpty together again." (3 Viewers)

[Denniss]

If you pack all the russian mines in Ukraine in a line its probably long enough to reach the moon from earth (and back).
Breaching the minefields under heavy enemy fire did not work
They had massive problems and losses from attack helos, it took months and lots of begging to receive ATACMS to reduce this threat a lot (by killing a dozen Ka-52 and forcing the other to bases way back).
The west was (and still is) too afraid to sent longer range weapons.
The Ukraininans have to keep the pressure up in their offensive zones (to advance and to fix russian troops) and in the russian offensive zones they have to make sure to turn those into killing zones without losing too much ground.

 

[RogerdeLluria]

...

As it stands, to my civilian mind, Russia is winning. They're holding back ... But it's early days, and today, Russia is winning.

Winning is always relative to the objectives. Russian objectives where:
- Weaken NATO.
- Reach Kiev and install a puppet government.
- Annex Novorussiya creating a corridor to Transnistria.

/

I think they failed miserably at all of them, so, no, Russia is not winning and I doubt they will.

On the Ukrainian side, if the objective was to stop Russians form reaching Kiev and annexing Novorussiya, they already won more than a year ago.

Of course objectives evolve over time and now it looks that Russian ones are to just conquer the 4 Oblasts theoretically annexed by Putin without actually fully controlling any one of them, or even holding onto what they have. On the other hand Ukrainian ones are at a minimum to recover all territory lost since 2022, and at a maximum get to pre-2014 borders.
Considering those I can concede that Russia may be winning the same way that Germans where winning in the western front in 1915.

 

[RogerdeLluria]

Russian tank sets a new Olympic record: Double turret toss !!!
That deserves extra points just for difficulty.


View: https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1716870577812877596

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

KHARKIV REGION, Ukraine, Oct 25 (Reuters) - Andrii Ilkiv, a Ukrainian police sapper, had his leg amputated below the knee after a land mine blew up beneath him in September 2022.

By May the following year he was back at work, standing on a prosthetic limb, sweeping for and defusing mines.

The 37-year-old father of four is one of 14 sappers who have returned to their demining jobs in a national police unit of some 100 people, despite being wounded in blasts while clearing mines during Russia's invasion.

"Of course, obviously there's fear when you return, when you stand next to a minefield there's fear, but on the other hand you know that with the help of a metal detector, a sapper spade and special equipment, you can move, and conduct demining work," said Ilkiv.

Ukraine, locked in a raging 20-month war with Russia, estimates that 174,000 sq km of its territory - about a third of the country - is potentially strewn with mines or dangerous war detritus.

Kyiv fears it could take decades to clear the area.

Despite losing limbs, Ukrainian sappers return to work clearing land mines

Andrii Ilkiv, a 37-year-old father of four, is one of 14 sappers who have returned to their demining jobs after being injured. He lost part of his leg when a mine blew up under him.

www.reuters.com

 

[Admiral Beez]

Russian tank sets a new Olympic record: Double turret toss !!!
That deserves extra points just for difficulty.


View: https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1716870577812877596

The Ukrainians certainly prefer hard punk music with their vids. Myself, I prefer the jaunty Bayraktar earworm from the AFU's greatest hits of 2022.

 

[Admiral Beez]

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wDJvCsImVLQ

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

Anyone surprised?

Ukraine war: Russia executing own retreating soldiers, US says

The White House says heavy losses and poor morale are leading to mutinies in some units.

www.bbc.com

 

[Admiral Beez]

That Azov mother/daughter team has been busy lately!

There is some truth to the mother/daughter strike in Moscow.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/23/ukraine-cia-shadow-war-russia/

Paywall free version here Ukrainian spies with deep ties to CIA wage shadow war against Russia …

"KYIV — The cluttered car carrying a mother and her 12-year-old daughter seemed barely worth the attention of Russian security officials as it approached a border checkpoint. But the least conspicuous piece of luggage — a crate for a cat — was part of an elaborate, lethal plot. Ukrainian operatives had installed a hidden compartment in the pet carrier, according to security officials with knowledge of the operation,and used it to conceal components of a bomb. Four weeks later, the device detonated just outside Moscow in an SUV being driven by the daughter of a Russian nationalist who had urged his country to "kill, kill, kill" Ukrainians, an explosion signaling that the heart of Russia would not be spared the carnage of war. The operation was orchestrated by Ukraine's domestic security service, the SBU, according to officials who provided details, including the use of the pet crate, that have not been previously disclosed."

 

[buffnut453]

Yet another article about low morale and poor treatment of soldiers in the Russian army:

Ukraine war: Russia executing own retreating soldiers, US says

The White House says heavy losses and poor morale are leading to mutinies in some units.

www.bbc.com

The problem is we're still not seeing evidence of these problems on the battlefield. Their defences are still causing significant challenges for Ukrainian forces and, in some areas, Russian forces are advancing.

We've been hearing about poor morale, lack of munitions, poor equipment etc. for the best part of a year now and yet the Russian army still isn't showing signs of self-destruction. Something doesn't jive in all of this...and I don't think it's necessarily the press that's at fault. I worry that Western intel services are looking for evidence of hoped-for results rather than making a cold, hard assessment of the actual situation.

 

[Admiral Beez]

We've been hearing about poor morale, lack of munitions, poor equipment etc. for the best part of a year now and yet the Russian army still isn't showing signs of self-destruction.

The winter is going to be brutal for the Russians.

 

[buffnut453]

The winter is going to be brutal for the Russians.

We said that last year, and yet Russian forces in Ukraine emerged with their defensive positions much better prepared than was the case in September 2022.

I'm not trying to be a nattering nabob of negativism but I do think that Russian forces have learned extensively, and quickly, following the almost comical performance during the actual invasion of Ukraine in 2022. They've proven resilient and capable of robust defence and, as yet, have shown no signs of their lines breaking.

 

[buffnut453]

Another piece of bad news for Russia...but does it mean the economy is close to failure? Oil production is down 25% compared to pre-invasion levels but that's still a lot of oil revenue coming into the country. Lack of Western investment and the cutting off of export markets in Europe is clearly playing a role but sanctions is a long game not a quick win. That said, it seems clear that Russia's economy is struggling, and performing far worse than North America and most of Europe (although Hungary's interest rate is sitting at 13%).

Russia hikes interest rates to 15% as inflation soars

The Bank of Russia raises rates more than expected to try to lower inflation and boost the rouble.

www.bbc.com

 

[Greg Boeser]

Yet another article about low morale and poor treatment of soldiers in the Russian army:

Ukraine war: Russia executing own retreating soldiers, US says

The White House says heavy losses and poor morale are leading to mutinies in some units.

www.bbc.com

The problem is we're still not seeing evidence of these problems on the battlefield. Their defences are still causing significant challenges for Ukrainian forces and, in some areas, Russian forces are advancing.

We've been hearing about poor morale, lack of munitions, poor equipment etc. for the best part of a year now and yet the Russian army still isn't showing signs of self-destruction. Something doesn't jive in all of this...and I don't think it's necessarily the press that's at fault. I worry that Western intel services are looking for evidence of hoped-for results rather than making a cold, hard assessment of the actual situation.

What??!! That's never happened before!
Look at all the WMD we found stockpiled in Iraq 20 years ago! And all those moderate mullahs in Iran! Such misinformation disparaging our fine intelligence services will not be tolerated!
Report to re-education camp at once!

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Ukrainian military pilots have begun learning to fly the F-16 Fighting Falcon jet in Arizona, the U.S. Air Force confirmed Wednesday.

A "small number" of Ukrainians started training at Morris Air National Guard Base in Tucson this week, Air Force spokesperson Rose Riley said in an emailed statement. Morris is home to the 162nd Wing of the Arizona National Guard, an F-16 pilot training hub that hosts international students.

"The training curriculum will align with the foundational knowledge and skills of each pilot and is expected to last several months," Riley said.

Ukrainian pilots begin F-16 training in Arizona

The F-16 fundamentals training course is expected to last several months, an Air Force spokesperson said.

www.airforcetimes.com

 

[Domobran42]

Yet another article about low morale and poor treatment of soldiers in the Russian army:

Ukraine war: Russia executing own retreating soldiers, US says

The White House says heavy losses and poor morale are leading to mutinies in some units.

www.bbc.com

The problem is we're still not seeing evidence of these problems on the battlefield. Their defences are still causing significant challenges for Ukrainian forces and, in some areas, Russian forces are advancing.

We've been hearing about poor morale, lack of munitions, poor equipment etc. for the best part of a year now and yet the Russian army still isn't showing signs of self-destruction. Something doesn't jive in all of this...and I don't think it's necessarily the press that's at fault. I worry that Western intel services are looking for evidence of hoped-for results rather than making a cold, hard assessment of the actual situation.

Or maybe interpretation?

For example, in World War 2, issue for Russians was not production of new stuff, but rather getting it to the troops. You had millions of new, unused rifles sitting in factories while troops at the front... well, you know the scene.

If issue is logistics, Russian troops may well be lacking stuff - lack of munitions, poor equipment etc. - without it signalling immediate or even approaching self-destruction of the Russian army. Because stuff is being produced, just not being delivered, and so Russian army may continue operating at a reduced capacity... forever, basically.

Of course, it might also be just wish fulfillment, propaganda, or any combination of the three.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

An interesting editorial explaining why support for Ukraine is crucial:

Spoiler

In August of 1990, as then-President George H.W. Bush considered whether the United States should send troops to expel Iraq from Kuwait, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher urged him forward with the candor that made her memorable: this was "no time to go wobbly."

It is now apparent to most observers that the war between Russia and Ukraine will continue for an indefinite period of time with little likelihood of a decisive victory by one side or the other. As the costs of war in blood and treasure go up, the probability of "wobbling" on the part of political leaders in NATO member countries, including in Washington, also increases. Already in the United States, some members of Congress, media commentators, and research analysts are questioning either the significance of the American commitment to Ukraine or the increasing costs of weapons and other means of support.

Some skeptics have limited their criticism to the current administration's choice of strategy and tactics while contending that they support Ukraine's self-defense in principle. Others are more expansive, questioning the motives behind the U.S. support for Ukraine's self-defense. Included in the latter critique is the argument that the war is really about re-establishing NATO as an indispensable politico-military powerhouse, as in the halcyon days of the Cold War before NATO became distracted by "out of the area" missions such as Afghanistan. Other Ukraine-skeptics suspect the Biden administration and its supporters of using a proxy war in Ukraine to deal a decisive blow against Russian President Vladimir Putin, possibly including an embarrassing military setback that could lead to regime change in Russia.

Many Americans are, based on our experiences from the Vietnam War to the so-called "forever wars" in Iraq and Afghanistan, understandably concerned about the costs, duration, and expected endgame from U.S. and allied NATO commitments to Ukraine. Although American troops have not been committed to combat in Ukraine, U.S. military and civilian advisory personnel support the Ukrainian war effort, and the United States bears the largest share among NATO members for the costs of advanced military equipment and other requirements for high-end conventional warfare.

In addition, the myriad facets of this kind of war, both on and off the battlefield, understandably are difficult even for addicts of television news networks to follow. The conflict combines conventional and unconventional warfare, including special operations (saboteurs and guerrilla fighters), political warfare of various kinds, and ample use of twenty-first-century technology (drones and cyberwar) alongside slugging matches that resemble the engagements of World War II (indeed, sometimes on the very same terrain fought over on the Eastern Front between 1941 and 1945). Additional complexity is added by the extension of fighting to air and sea domains to support ground operations or other purposes.

Another aspect of the war that confounds some Americans is the allegations of corruption against Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian politicians in general. The implication is that the regime in Kyiv might not be worth defending if its version of democracy is light on integrity and accountability. On the other hand, allies come in all varieties, and some may never meet American democratic standards (as seen by us). Alliances in wartime are subject to the discipline of necessity as well as the appeal of popular sovereignty. The United States and the Soviet Union fought World War II as allies. After the war, they fell into opposition for the next forty-five years. Geostrategy often rearranges the distribution of balls on the billiard table of international politics, political affinities notwithstanding.

For counterpoint, there is the critique of U.S. and NATO expansion after the Cold War by Professor John Mearsheimer and others who argue that NATO's post-Cold War enlargement was a dangerous maneuver that inevitably aroused Russia's suspicions. From the Russian perspective, there is some truth in this analysis, but the argument is prone to overstatement. In contrast to Russian fears and Putin's rhetoric, NATO enlargement was not necessarily the same thing as NATO military encirclement or adventurism. NATO was, and remains, an alliance of democratic states whose military objective is stability and deterrence, not preemptive war against Russia. The historical track record of invaders of Russia is not impressively favorable: Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon, and Hitler all found defeat in Russia's vastness. Putin's resentment of NATO is not based on realistic fears of military attack but on his own ambitions to redraw the map of Europe in Russia's favor. Autocrats, like Putin, often exaggerate the fears of foreign intervention to prop up their regimes on the home front.

Another possible counterpoint concerning U.S. policy debates about American commitments to Ukraine is the concern as to whether the United States can maintain deterrence and defense in Europe while keeping other military and security balls in the air at the same time. The attack by Hamas against Israel on October 7, 2023, immediately engaged U.S. diplomatic, military, and humanitarian efforts to support our strongest ally in the Middle East while urging restraint and working to deliver humanitarian aid to address the dire needs of both Israelis and Palestinians. The war between Israel and Hamas has the potential for horizontal escalation (more state or non-state actors involved) and vertical escalation (more destructive and prolonged fighting than hitherto). In addition to the fighting in the Middle East, the United States must also maintain diplomatic engagement and military deterrence with respect to China and its menacing of Taiwan. The continuing buildup and testing of North Korean nuclear weapons also provide additional distraction in Asia.

Notwithstanding the previously cited reasonable concerns by some Americans about U.S. commitments to Ukraine and possible distractions, the case for NATO support for Ukraine against Russia remains a strong one. NATO is defending peace and security in Europe against an effort to forcibly change territorial state boundaries on a scale not seen since 1945. For the rules-based international order as well as for Ukraine, the conflict is existential. As to whether the United States can handle more than one global crisis or challenge simultaneously, the answer is yes, provided that political leadership and military performance rise to the challenges of twenty-first-century complexity.

The issue for Americans is to define our political and military objectives relative to this conflict, as well as for the strategy that connects the two. Putin's aim is clear enough: a shrink-wrapped Europe inside a matryoshka doll, enhancing his legacy and grip on power. We need to ensure that our objective of preventing that from happening is clear as well.

Lawrence J. Korb is a senior fellow at American Progress. Previously, Dr. Korb served as assistant secretary of defense (manpower, reserve affairs, installations, and logistics) from 1981 through 1985.

Stephen J. Cimbala is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine, an American Studies faculty member, and the author of numerous books and articles in the fields of international security studies, defense policy, nuclear weapons and arms control, intelligence, and other fields.

It's No Time To Go Wobbly On Ukraine

Notwithstanding the concerns of some Americans about U.S. commitments to Ukraine, the case for NATO support against Russia remains a strong one.

nationalinterest.org

 

[Admiral Beez]

We said that last year, and yet Russian forces in Ukraine emerged with their defensive positions much better prepared than was the case in September 2022.

True, but over the 2022/23 winter the Russians held good supply lines. For the winter of 2023/24 the Russian supply lines are not as good. The Russians may well emerge in the spring of 2024 with improved defensive positions, but I'm foreseeing shortages of food, fuel and warm/dry clothing - not to mention the lack of rotations to/from the front.

 

[MiTasol]

We said that last year, and yet Russian forces in Ukraine emerged with their defensive positions much better prepared than was the case in September 2022.

I'm not trying to be a nattering nabob of negativism but I do think that Russian forces have learned extensively, and quickly, following the almost comical performance during the actual invasion of Ukraine in 2022. They've proven resilient and capable of robust defence and, as yet, have shown no signs of their lines breaking.

I agree and further think that if Ukraine had been given enough support the moment it became evident that they were capable of putting up a good fight in early March 22 then the Russians would have been expelled from most of Ukraine in the first 12 months.

Just think of the difference it would have made if Ukraine had been given all those Russian weapons that NATO members had on hand in the first weeks of March 22. With righteous anger, "unlimited" weapons, totally inexperienced Russian forces and no Wagner Group the Ukrainians would have gone through them like a dose of salts.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Just think of the difference it would have made if Ukraine had been given all those Russian weapons that NATO members had on hand in the first weeks of March 22. With righteous anger, "unlimited" weapons, totally inexperienced Russian forces and no Wagner Group the Ukrainians would have gone through them like a dose of salts.

Imagine if the US had supported Ukraine ten years ago, in 2013 or sooner when the newly free country needed help. There was no fighting, no Russian invasion. A newly free Ukraine needed help, but got ignored by a West focused on curbstomping Iraq for nonexistent WMBs and of course Afghanistan.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Imagine if the US had supported Ukraine ten years ago, in 2013 or sooner when the newly free country needed help. There was no fighting, no Russian invasion. A newly free Ukraine needed help, but got ignored by a West focused on curbstomping Iraq for nonexistent WMBs and of course Afghanistan.

Excellent use of the retrospectrascope!