SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Don't think he's looking like Wil E. Coyote, Super Genius, to his Bolshevik Bund, right about now.
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"All of Vlad's forces and all of Vlad's men, are out to put Humpty together again." (4 Viewers)
- Thread starter XBe02Drvr
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Admiral Beez
Captain
And we still don't know who this submarine is intended for."The Italian shipbuilding company DRASS has started the construction of a small submarine of the DG-160 class at its plant in Romania for an undisclosed customer."
Why Build a Mini-Submarine 600 km From the Black Sea, and How Could it Help Ukraine? | Defense Express
What advantages do mini-submarines have as a type of weapon, and what can they bring to modern naval warfare?en.defence-ua.com
Thumpalumpacus
Major
From ISW:
Russian forces' usage of conscripts and forces already in Kursk Oblast, nearby forces fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and lateral redeployments across the theater to defend against the Ukrainian incursion is consistent with a number of likely Russian courses of action (COAs) that ISW forecasted.[22] ISW forecasted four likely COAs involving the forces the Russian command could choose to defend against the Ukrainian incursion, including: COA 1, forecasting that the Russians could decide to use existing forces and conscripts already defending in the international border area; COA 2, forecasting that the Russian command could pull from the Northern Grouping of Forces within and nearby Kursk Oblast; and COA 3, forecasting that Russia could redeploy operational reserves or frontline units from elsewhere in the theater.[23] Redeployments of conscripts, elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces, and select units from frontline areas in Ukraine suggest that the Russian military command has determined that possible disruptions to the offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and other less-critical frontline areas are an acceptable risk to adequately respond to the Ukrainian incursion. The Kremlin has seemingly chosen to avoid redeployments from higher priority sectors on the frontline in Donetsk Oblast. A prominent Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor assessed that these redeployments are weakening frontline units in other operational directions and demonstrate that Russia largely lacks operational reserves.[24] Should the Russian command choose to keep these redeployed reserves and frontline units in Kursk Oblast in the near- to medium-term, it will likely further exacerbate the C2 struggles in Kursk Oblast that will likely emerge from treating the Russian defense against Ukraine's conventional military operation as a "counterterrorism operation" that is subordinated to the FSB and Bortnikov. These decisions can present vulnerabilities and opportunities that Ukrainian forces can exploit.
[...]
Russian forces appear to be more adequately defending against Ukrainian assaults following the arrival of additional conscripts and more combat effective personnel from frontline areas in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces' rate of confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast has slowed following the reported introduction of various Russian military units in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 10 that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), repelled company-sized Ukrainian mechanized assaults in the directions of Korenevo (north of Sumy City and roughly 23 kilometers north of the international border), Snagost (south of Korenevo), Lgov, and Martynovka (northeast of Suzhda) on the night of August 9 and 10.[28] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were previously reported in both the Kharkiv and Kherson directions as of June 2024.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that an unspecified "newly formed and untested" Russian unit repelled a Ukrainian armored assault near Korenevo on August 9.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, particularly elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Aida" Detachment, seized Martynovka and Zamostye (just south of Sudzha).[31] The "Aida" Detachment was reportedly operating in the vicinity of Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast as of mid-June 2024.[32] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces re-took Makhnovka (south of Sudzha), although geolocated footage published on August 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement, assuming the footage is recent.[33]
www.understandingwar.org
Russian forces' usage of conscripts and forces already in Kursk Oblast, nearby forces fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and lateral redeployments across the theater to defend against the Ukrainian incursion is consistent with a number of likely Russian courses of action (COAs) that ISW forecasted.[22] ISW forecasted four likely COAs involving the forces the Russian command could choose to defend against the Ukrainian incursion, including: COA 1, forecasting that the Russians could decide to use existing forces and conscripts already defending in the international border area; COA 2, forecasting that the Russian command could pull from the Northern Grouping of Forces within and nearby Kursk Oblast; and COA 3, forecasting that Russia could redeploy operational reserves or frontline units from elsewhere in the theater.[23] Redeployments of conscripts, elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces, and select units from frontline areas in Ukraine suggest that the Russian military command has determined that possible disruptions to the offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and other less-critical frontline areas are an acceptable risk to adequately respond to the Ukrainian incursion. The Kremlin has seemingly chosen to avoid redeployments from higher priority sectors on the frontline in Donetsk Oblast. A prominent Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor assessed that these redeployments are weakening frontline units in other operational directions and demonstrate that Russia largely lacks operational reserves.[24] Should the Russian command choose to keep these redeployed reserves and frontline units in Kursk Oblast in the near- to medium-term, it will likely further exacerbate the C2 struggles in Kursk Oblast that will likely emerge from treating the Russian defense against Ukraine's conventional military operation as a "counterterrorism operation" that is subordinated to the FSB and Bortnikov. These decisions can present vulnerabilities and opportunities that Ukrainian forces can exploit.
[...]
Russian forces appear to be more adequately defending against Ukrainian assaults following the arrival of additional conscripts and more combat effective personnel from frontline areas in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces' rate of confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast has slowed following the reported introduction of various Russian military units in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 10 that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), repelled company-sized Ukrainian mechanized assaults in the directions of Korenevo (north of Sumy City and roughly 23 kilometers north of the international border), Snagost (south of Korenevo), Lgov, and Martynovka (northeast of Suzhda) on the night of August 9 and 10.[28] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were previously reported in both the Kharkiv and Kherson directions as of June 2024.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that an unspecified "newly formed and untested" Russian unit repelled a Ukrainian armored assault near Korenevo on August 9.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, particularly elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Aida" Detachment, seized Martynovka and Zamostye (just south of Sudzha).[31] The "Aida" Detachment was reportedly operating in the vicinity of Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast as of mid-June 2024.[32] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces re-took Makhnovka (south of Sudzha), although geolocated footage published on August 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement, assuming the footage is recent.[33]
Institute for the Study of War
This page collects ISW and CTP's updates on the conflict in Ukraine. In late February 2022, ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Escuadrilla Azul
Tech Sergeant
- 1,650
- Feb 27, 2020
Ukraine troops now up to 30km inside Russia's Kursk region, Moscow says
Russia's defence ministry said it had engaged in fighting near two villages, some 25-30km inside Russia.
www.bbc.com
buffnut453
Captain
Ukrainian forces now 30km inside Russian territory…but this is all part of Putler's plan:
Not a bad effort a battalion-sized force (although I'm sure Ukraine has reinforced successes).
Ukraine troops now up to 30km inside Russia's Kursk region, Moscow says
Russia's defence ministry said it had engaged in fighting near two villages, some 25-30km inside Russia.
www.bbc.co.uk
Not a bad effort a battalion-sized force (although I'm sure Ukraine has reinforced successes).
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RogerdeLluria
Staff Sergeant
- 1,318
- Jul 5, 2015
Kursk-Belgorod Operation: Ukraine’s Transformational Ace Up Its Sleeve
The relative inactivity post-U.S. aid package passing was partly a given, as Ukraine would obviously need some time to receive and distribute the U.S. aid. But for those wondering what Ukrain…
realcontextnews.com
I found this part particularly interesting:
Russia's land forces—"more so than any other military"—are highly dependent on its rail network to supply their troops and move them and their equipment. And one of the main Russia rail lines supporting the war for a large part of the front line—the Lgov-Belgorod Line—has now been severed during this operations and is partly under Ukrainian control along with the Lgov-Vorozbha line, to the point that they have taken over and will be able to use Russia's own rail lines to rapidly move in its own heavy equipment into the area.
Glider
Captain
I also read a paper in Newsweek a few days ago where the state of the Russian Railways was discussed. They are to all intents and purposes worn out, and in serious danger of failing. The single biggest problem is ball bearings, 55% of which were imported from the west. Alternatives have been tried but they don't last nearly as long and often don't fit.Kursk-Belgorod Operation: Ukraine’s Transformational Ace Up Its Sleeve
The relative inactivity post-U.S. aid package passing was partly a given, as Ukraine would obviously need some time to receive and distribute the U.S. aid. But for those wondering what Ukrain…
I found this part particularly interesting:
Russia's land forces—"more so than any other military"—are highly dependent on its rail network to supply their troops and move them and their equipment. And one of the main Russia rail lines supporting the war for a large part of the front line—the Lgov-Belgorod Line—has now been severed during this operations and is partly under Ukrainian control along with the Lgov-Vorozbha line, to the point that they have taken over and will be able to use Russia's own rail lines to rapidly move in its own heavy equipment into the area.
The problem has been compounded by a huge increase in rail traffic to China and India caused by the switch in Imports and Exports from Europe which was a lot shorter. This in turn has also increased the load on the infrastructure the rails, bridges and so on.
It has been described as being on the point of collapse and it should be noted that a lot of this information has come from Russian Newspapers.
The state-owned Russian Railways faces "imminent collapse" amid a shortage of locomotives, driven by Western-imposed sanctions imposed over the war in Ukraine, a Russian Telegram channel has reported. The sanctions have contributed to a ball-bearing shortage in Russia, which has affected locomotive maintenance in the country. This has led to a rise in malfunctions on the network's trains and an increase in the number of vehicles being suspended, Russian newspapers Vedomosti and Kommersant reported in February and March this year.
The VChK-OGPU outlet, which is widely believed to have ties to Russian security agencies, reported Monday, citing an unnamed source, that the railway network's deputy head Sergei Kobzev told his subordinates at an internal meeting "that the situation is critical."
"The complete collapse of the entire railroad network in the country could happen in days," the channel said. "[Russian Railways] chiefs have been ordered to work to the point of exhaustion. Those who fail to cope are threatened with dismissal and 'execution.' This is the motivation."
Russia's Justice Ministry added VChK-OGPU to its "foreign agents" register earlier this month for "dissemination of false information aimed at creating a negative image of the Russian army."
Igor Sushko is a Ukrainian military blogger and the executive director of the Wind of Change Research Group. He shared what he alleged was a leaked audio clip of a meeting between Kobzev and his subordinates, in which he says that the "Russian rail network is on the precipice of total collapse."
Russia evacuates more than 76,000 people in Kursk region, Zelenskyy vows to 'restore justice'
Russia is fighting intense battles against thousands of Ukrainian troops as deep as 20 kilometres inside the Kursk region after Ukraine's biggest attack on Russian sovereign territory since the start of the war.
www.abc.net.au
More Ukrainian Brigades Roll Into Russia’s Kursk Oblast As Ukrainian Artillery Blocks Russian Reinforcements
After four days, five Ukrainian brigades control 400 square miles of Russia.
www.forbes.com
Russian Warplanes Are Bombing Russia, Aiming To Block Invading Ukrainian Troops
The Kremlin’s glide-bombing campaign has shifted to Kursk Oblast in Russia.
www.forbes.com
Set To Orbit Above Moscow’s Missiles, Starlab Hopes Space Truce Holds
Russian threats to escalate Space War I - by shooting down SpaceX spacecraft aiding Ukraine - are imperilling plans to loft independent space stations into orbit.
www.forbes.com
Ukraine Is Determined To Flatten Khalino Air Base, Situated Just 50 Miles From The Front Line Of Ukraine’s Surprise Invasion Of Russia
The Ukrainians have targeted the air base in Kursk twice in 11 days.
www.forbes.com
Iran to Supply Fath 360 Ballistic Missiles to Russia for Use in Ukraine Conflict
Iran to Supply Fath 360 Ballistic Missiles to Russia for Use in Ukraine Conflict
www.armyrecognition.com
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Unchain the Vipers!..and ATACMs..and everything else we give Ukraine.Ukraine Is Determined To Flatten Khalino Air Base, Situated Just 50 Miles From The Front Line Of Ukraine’s Surprise Invasion Of Russia
The Ukrainians have targeted the air base in Kursk twice in 11 days.
