"All of Vlad's forces and all of Vlad's men, are out to put Humpty together again." (18 Viewers)

GrauGeist said:

Speaking of returning territory, it appears that the warm amd fuzzy relationship between Moscow and Beijing may be just window dressing.

A few months back, an FSB document was leaked that indicated growing concern over China's potential move on Russian territories like the Vladivostok region and pre-1858 territory.

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Thumpalumpacus said:

Anyone who thinks China is not leveraging this war for realpolitik is nauseatingly idealistic ... or bought and sold.

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Marcel said:

The US still seems to be very naive of late in all of this. For the "best country in the world", it's not very good.
Not that the EU is any better. Although they are not as naive, they still fail to make any impression on the fighting parties.
The impotence of the international community has been very disappointing. Not only in this war, but in other issues as well.

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Marcel said:

The US still seems to be very naive of late in all of this. For the "best country in the world", it's not very good.
Not that the EU is any better. Although they are not as naive, they still fail to make any impression on the fighting parties.
The impotence of the international community has been very disappointing. Not only in this war, but in other issues as well.

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Report on European Nuclear Autonomy: A Strategic Analysis

The Feasibility and Timeline of a European Nuclear Arsenal

• First Operational Weapon (4-6 years): The initial phase would be dedicated to rapidly building the necessary industrial infrastructure, primarily for the large-scale production of fissile material. This is the main bottleneck. However, by leveraging existing enrichment and reprocessing facilities across Europe and combining the proven warhead designs of France and the UK, the first operational weapon could be ready within this timeframe.
• A "Decent" Arsenal (8-12 years): With a unified and coordinated effort, the project would shift to an industrial production scale. An initial arsenal of 200-500 warheads could be established, rivaling the current size of the UK and French arsenals and providing a credible deterrent.
• An Arsenal of Mass Scale (15-20 years): Once the industrial production lines are fully established, and with an unprecedented military budget of 5% of the combined EU GDP, the production rate would be immense. Europe could scale its arsenal to surpass 5,000 warheads, challenging Russia's total arsenal and establishing Europe as a decisive global nuclear power.

The Strategic Impact on Russia

• Avoid Real War: A numerically and technologically superior European deterrent would be the ultimate guarantee against Russian military aggression. The threat of a devastating response would make any conventional conflict in Europe an unviable option for the Kremlin.
• Induce Economic Collapse: The immense economic pressure of an unwinnable arms race would strain Russia's economy, leading to a potential for economic collapse and internal instability, much like what contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union.
• Reestablish the Balance of Power: By building a credible deterrent, Europe would shift the balance of power decisively in its favor, securing its long-term security without direct military confrontation.

The US Strategic Crossroads: The Current Flawed vs. The Optimal Path

• Liberation from the European Front: A self-sufficient and nuclear-armed Europe would be capable of deterring Russia on its own. This would free the United States from its long-standing security commitments in Europe, allowing it to redeploy its military and diplomatic resources.
• Focus on China: With Europe's security secured, the US could concentrate its efforts on the Indo-Pacific theater. This would enable the US to fully focus on the geopolitical and economic challenge posed by China, its primary long-term competitor.

The Central Challenge: Political Will

• Sovereignty: This is the most significant hurdle. A unified nuclear deterrent would require countries like France and the UK to surrender a degree of national sovereignty over their most critical strategic assets—something they have historically been unwilling to do. Similarly, non-nuclear nations would have to agree to cede their sovereign right to remain a non-nuclear power.
• Consensus: The European Union is a union of 27 sovereign states with diverse historical experiences, threat perceptions, and foreign policy priorities. Forging a unanimous agreement on a project of this scale and cost would be a political feat of unprecedented difficulty.
• Public Opinion: While recent polls show a significant increase in support for a common European defense policy, there remains strong anti-nuclear sentiment in many key European countries, particularly in Germany, which is a pivotal member of any such project. Public opposition could easily derail a multi-billion-euro project.
• Legal and Institutional Hurdles: Such a project would be in direct conflict with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which a unified Europe would likely have to circumvent or withdraw from. This would have major international repercussions.

• Relinquishing Control: The United States has been the primary security guarantor for Europe for over 75 years. This role has given the US immense political leverage and influence. Actively helping Europe to become its own security guarantor would mean a deliberate choice to cede that influence.
• Economic Interests: The US defense industry has long benefited from being the primary supplier of advanced military hardware to Europe. Fostering a unified European defense industry that builds its own nuclear weapons and delivery systems would reduce this lucrative market.

RogerdeLluria said:

Report on European Nuclear Autonomy: A Strategic Analysis

The current geopolitical climate, marked by Russian aggression and a shifting transatlantic alliance, has brought the concept of European strategic autonomy to the forefront of political discourse. This report synthesizes an in-depth analysis of the feasibility, timeline, and strategic implications of a unified European nuclear deterrent, contrasting the current US administration's approach with a more beneficial path for all parties.

The Feasibility and Timeline of a European Nuclear Arsenal

A unified European nuclear project would not start from scratch. It would build upon the existing and highly advanced capabilities of the United Kingdom and France, combined with the vast industrial and technological base of the rest of the European Union.
Based on this synthesis of capabilities, the estimated timeline for such a project is remarkably aggressive:

• First Operational Weapon (4-6 years): The initial phase would be dedicated to rapidly building the necessary industrial infrastructure, primarily for the large-scale production of fissile material. This is the main bottleneck. However, by leveraging existing enrichment and reprocessing facilities across Europe and combining the proven warhead designs of France and the UK, the first operational weapon could be ready within this timeframe.
• A "Decent" Arsenal (8-12 years): With a unified and coordinated effort, the project would shift to an industrial production scale. An initial arsenal of 200-500 warheads could be established, rivaling the current size of the UK and French arsenals and providing a credible deterrent.
• An Arsenal of Mass Scale (15-20 years): Once the industrial production lines are fully established, and with an unprecedented military budget of 5% of the combined EU GDP, the production rate would be immense. Europe could scale its arsenal to surpass 5,000 warheads, challenging Russia's total arsenal and establishing Europe as a decisive global nuclear power.

The key to this aggressive timeline is not just the immense funding but also the technological leap over Cold War-era efforts. Modern warheads are more efficient and require less fissile material. Europe's access to cutting-edge microelectronics and advanced manufacturing would also ensure its systems are technologically superior, faster to produce, and more reliable than those of its rivals.

The Strategic Impact on Russia

The creation of a unified European nuclear arsenal would fundamentally alter the geopolitical landscape in Europe. Rather than a conventional arms race, this would be an economic war of attrition that Russia cannot win.
Russia's economy is a fraction of the combined European economy. While Russia has historically demonstrated a willingness to dedicate a massive portion of its GDP to military spending, it simply lacks the economic capacity to match Europe's output. The strategy would be to force Russia into an unsustainable expenditure on its military, particularly on its nuclear and strategic forces.
This strategy aims to achieve several key objectives:

• Avoid Real War: A numerically and technologically superior European deterrent would be the ultimate guarantee against Russian military aggression. The threat of a devastating response would make any conventional conflict in Europe an unviable option for the Kremlin.
• Induce Economic Collapse: The immense economic pressure of an unwinnable arms race would strain Russia's economy, leading to a potential for economic collapse and internal instability, much like what contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union.
• Reestablish the Balance of Power: By building a credible deterrent, Europe would shift the balance of power decisively in its favor, securing its long-term security without direct military confrontation.

The US Strategic Crossroads: The Current Flawed vs. The Optimal Path

The current security landscape highlights a strategic crossroads for the United States, particularly concerning its relationship with European allies.
The Current Flawed Path: A Focus on Commerce over Strategy
The current US administration's approach has been to pressure Europe to increase defense spending, primarily through threats of tariffs and a transactional focus on arms sales. This approach, while potentially yielding short-term economic benefits for US defense contractors, is strategically counterproductive. It alienates allies, weakens the transatlantic bond, and does little to address the long-term strategic problem of European security, forcing Europe to remain militarily dependent. This approach, which prioritizes a commercial relationship over a strategic partnership, risks destabilizing the alliance for immediate economic gain.
The Optimal Path: Fostering European Strategic Autonomy
The most beneficial path for the United States would be to actively encourage and facilitate the rapid development of a unified European nuclear arsenal. This would represent a paradigm shift in global strategy, providing immense benefits for the US:

• Liberation from the European Front: A self-sufficient and nuclear-armed Europe would be capable of deterring Russia on its own. This would free the United States from its long-standing security commitments in Europe, allowing it to redeploy its military and diplomatic resources.
• Focus on China: With Europe's security secured, the US could concentrate its efforts on the Indo-Pacific theater. This would enable the US to fully focus on the geopolitical and economic challenge posed by China, its primary long-term competitor.

The Central Challenge: Political Will

While the technical and economic path for a European nuclear arsenal is clear, the most significant obstacle remains the lack of political will. The ambitious project described in this report, while a sound strategic blueprint, is hampered by a series of immense political challenges on both sides of the Atlantic.
In Europe:

• Sovereignty: This is the most significant hurdle. A unified nuclear deterrent would require countries like France and the UK to surrender a degree of national sovereignty over their most critical strategic assets—something they have historically been unwilling to do. Similarly, non-nuclear nations would have to agree to cede their sovereign right to remain a non-nuclear power.
• Consensus: The European Union is a union of 27 sovereign states with diverse historical experiences, threat perceptions, and foreign policy priorities. Forging a unanimous agreement on a project of this scale and cost would be a political feat of unprecedented difficulty.
• Public Opinion: While recent polls show a significant increase in support for a common European defense policy, there remains strong anti-nuclear sentiment in many key European countries, particularly in Germany, which is a pivotal member of any such project. Public opposition could easily derail a multi-billion-euro project.
• Legal and Institutional Hurdles: Such a project would be in direct conflict with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which a unified Europe would likely have to circumvent or withdraw from. This would have major international repercussions.

In the United States:

• Relinquishing Control: The United States has been the primary security guarantor for Europe for over 75 years. This role has given the US immense political leverage and influence. Actively helping Europe to become its own security guarantor would mean a deliberate choice to cede that influence.
• Economic Interests: The US defense industry has long benefited from being the primary supplier of advanced military hardware to Europe. Fostering a unified European defense industry that builds its own nuclear weapons and delivery systems would reduce this lucrative market.

In conclusion, the creation of a unified European nuclear arsenal is not merely a defensive measure; it is a strategic tool that could fundamentally reshape the global balance of power. For the United States, actively supporting this effort is not an act of relinquishing power, but a move to strengthen its global position. The journey from a technical possibility to a political reality is often the longest and most difficult part of any grand strategic plan.

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