"All of Vlad's forces and all of Vlad's men, are out to put Humpty together again." (17 Viewers)

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

SaparotRob said:

View: https://youtu.be/oNSgxKw6-Rk
Click to expand...

That's a really interesting clip - it ties the loss of the 2 tankers directly to the need to build a boom to protect the Kerch Bridge from waterborne attack. This barrier prevented large ships from traversing the Kerch Strait, forcing the use of smaller vessels not suited to these waters. So, the 2 ships were clearly lost as a result of Ukrainian actions
 
Warspite63 said:
That's a really interesting clip - it ties the loss of the 2 tankers directly to the need to build a boom to protect the Kerch Bridge from waterborne attack. This barrier prevented large ships from traversing the Kerch Strait, forcing the use of smaller vessels not suited to these waters. So, the 2 ships were clearly lost as a result of Ukrainian actions
Click to expand...

His argument is somewhat undermined by reports of a similar event in 2007 in the same area, plus footage of another structural failure to a Russian vessel off Turkey in January 2021. Both these events pre-date the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I'd want to see statistical data to prove that Russia is increasing use of inland/river vessels in the Black Sea to be sure his statements are correct.
 
Last edited:
buffnut453 said:
His argument is somewhat undermined by footage of a similar event in 2007 in the same area, plus footage of another structural failure to a Russian vessel off Turkey in January 2021. Both these events pre-date the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I'd want to see statistical data to prove that Russia is increasing use of inland/river vessels in the Black Sea to be sure his statements are correct.
Click to expand...
Oh absolutely. But the vessels are clearly inland-waterway ships, not intended for open-ocean use. Yes, they have previously (i.e. pre-2014) been used in the Black Sea (with sub-optimal results....) , but I think the key point is that now they have no choice but to use them there: more capable, larger vessels cannot transit the Kerch Strait. The fellow in the clip made another interesting point: even prior to February 2022, the Russians were acutely aware of the Ukrainian potential ability to close the Sea of Azov, due to their possession of the northern shore
 
Warspite63 said:
Oh absolutely. But the vessels are clearly inland-waterway ships, not intended for open-ocean use. Yes, they have previously (i.e. pre-2014) been used in the Black Sea (with sub-optimal results....) , but I think the key point is that now they have no choice but to use them there: more capable, larger vessels cannot transit the Kerch Strait. The fellow in the clip made another interesting point: even prior to February 2022, the Russians were acutely aware of the Ukrainian potential ability to close the Sea of Azov, due to their possession of the northern shore
Click to expand...

His point about Russia's seizure of Mariupol to prevent Ukraine from effectively closing approaches to the Sea of Azov was certainly something I hadn't considered. That said, I'm still confused at the logic of preventing deep draught vessels from entering the Kerch Strait when Ukrainian USVs don't fit that criteria. Surely the Russians are able to establish a suitable screen to prevent Ukraine from trying to destroy the Kerch bridge with a larger vessel? I mean, removable harbour screens have been around since WW1. Yes, the Kerch Strait is considerably wider than the average harbour...but preventing large vessels from entering the Sea of Azov seems to be a self-inflicted injury by Moscow (although, admittedly, not the first and probably not the last).
 
buffnut453 said:
His point about Russia's seizure of Mariupol to prevent Ukraine from effectively closing approaches to the Sea of Azov was certainly something I hadn't considered. That said, I'm still confused at the logic of preventing deep draught vessels from entering the Kerch Strait when Ukrainian USVs don't fit that criteria. Surely the Russians are able to establish a suitable screen to prevent Ukraine from trying to destroy the Kerch bridge with a larger vessel? I mean, removable harbour screens have been around since WW1. Yes, the Kerch Strait is considerably wider than the average harbour...but preventing large vessels from entering the Sea of Azov seems to be a self-inflicted injury by Moscow (although, admittedly, not the first and probably not the last).
Click to expand...
Yes - it's a good question. As you pointed out, stopping deep-draught vessels from traversing the Strait is solving a problem that doesn't exist. I believe they actually scuttled a mothballed Kara-class CG in the Strait during the 2014 incursions to (temporarily) prevent access. I get the distinct impression that subtlety and forward-thinking are not prized attributes of Russian military planning
 
I was bored so I watched a youtube sent to me

This was one of the few scenes that I liked - this is what the Ukrainians need to be doing to the Russians. So far the rest of the video is YAAAWWN
1734415702590.png
 
buffnut453 said:
His point about Russia's seizure of Mariupol to prevent Ukraine from effectively closing approaches to the Sea of Azov was certainly something I hadn't considered. That said, I'm still confused at the logic of preventing deep draught vessels from entering the Kerch Strait when Ukrainian USVs don't fit that criteria. Surely the Russians are able to establish a suitable screen to prevent Ukraine from trying to destroy the Kerch bridge with a larger vessel? I mean, removable harbour screens have been around since WW1. Yes, the Kerch Strait is considerably wider than the average harbour...but preventing large vessels from entering the Sea of Azov seems to be a self-inflicted injury by Moscow (although, admittedly, not the first and probably not the last).
Click to expand...
The seizure of Mariupol and the whole coast of the Azov Sea was required to create a "land corridor" to Crimea. It has been discussed openly since 2014. Moscow tried to do that in May-June 2014 by indirect means using "proxies" and saboteur groups but failed after Azov fighters took the city back. The second opportunity for Moscow was in February 2014 when Ukrainian troops were exhausted in the Donetsk region. The "Minsk-2" agreement has stopped the process but Mariupol was shelled mercilessly a few times with dozens of civilians killed and front lines were frozen just several kilometers away.
As for closing approaches in 2022 - until the sea drones appeared (and nobody knew about them in February), there was little Ukraine could do to Kerch Strait from Mariupol or Berdyansk. Several patrol boats. Some jets and helicopters with old weaponry on the airfields in the range of everything Russian VKS could hit them with...
By the way, the "screen" was used in 2018 when they didn't allow Ukrainian Navy boats to pass through the strait and later attacked and captured them. Russians towed a tanker from the Kerch shipyard and placed it in the middle of the channel under the bridge.
 

A senior Russian general was killed Tuesday by a bomb hidden in a scooter outside his apartment building in Moscow, a day after Ukraine's security service leveled criminal charges against him. A Ukrainian official said the service carried out the attack.

Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, the chief of the military's nuclear, biological and chemical protection forces, was killed as he left for his office. Kirillov's assistant also died in the attack.

Kirillov, 54, was under sanctions from several countries, including the U.K. and Canada, for his actions in Moscow's war in Ukraine. On Monday, Ukraine's Security Service, or SBU, opened a criminal investigation against him, accusing him of directing the use of banned chemical weapons.

An official with the SBU said the agency was behind the attack. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to release the information, described Kirillov as a "war criminal and an entirely legitimate target."

The SBU has said it recorded more than 4,800 occasions when Russia used chemical weapons on the battlefield since its full-scale invasion in February 2022. In May, the U.S. State Department said that it had recorded the use of chloropicrin, a poison gas first deployed in World War I, against Ukrainian troops.

 
defence-blog.com

Russia’s mercenaries threaten US with Alaska ‘takeover’

A member of Russia’s Wagner Group has made provocative remarks threatening to reclaim Alaska, echoing rhetoric that has surfaced in Russian political circles in recent years. Aleksey Berezutski, a Wagner Group officer, stated, "Alaska, we will definitely come back to you, Russia!" on social...
defence-blog.com defence-blog.com
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

  • ... and 2 more.
    • Total: 18 (members: 4, guests: 14)

    Similar threads

    A
    The coming $26 billion windfall for the Canadian Armed Forces. What to buy?
    2 3
    Replies
    50
    Views
    2K
    Admiral Beez
    A
    M
    All V-22's Grounded
    Replies
    2
    Views
    1K
    GTX
    GTX
    M
    All This For The Low, Low Price of .....
    Replies
    19
    Views
    2K
    MIflyer
    M
    M
    The Wrath of KAAN?
    Replies
    3
    Views
    862
    Snautzer01
    Snautzer01
    M
    The USAF V-22 Mishap of 2023
    Replies
    2
    Views
    507
    Thumpalumpacus
    Thumpalumpacus
    Back